

**Table 17.1 The Information-Gathering Spectrum for the United Nations, from Permitted to Prohibited**

| Permitted                   | Questionable   | Prohibited                            |                       |
|-----------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| (White)                     | (Grey)   | (Black)                               |                       |
| <i>Visual observation</i>   |  |                                       |                       |
| -From fixed posts           | -Observers concealed   |                                       |                       |
| -From vehicles              | -Observers camouflaged                                       |                                       |                       |
| -From aircraft              |  | -Observation using unauthorized entry |                       |
|                             | -Observers out of mission area                               | -Using sting operations               |                       |
| <i>Sensors</i>              |  |                                       |                       |
| -Visible (video)            | - Thermal (IR), X-ray, radar, metal and explosives detection |                                       |                       |
| -Satellite                  | -Hidden devices  | -Covert tracking devices              |                       |
|                             | -Ground sensors (acoustic/seismic)                           | -Using captured devices               |                       |
| <i>Human Communications</i> |  |                                       |                       |
| UN personnel:               | -Clearly identified  | -Unidentified                         | -Undercover/disguised |
| Informants:                 | -Unpaid  | -Rewarded                             | -Paid (agents)        |
| Listening devices:          | -Message interception (SIGINT)                               |                                       | -Warrantless wiretaps |
|                             | * Unencrypted messages                                       | * Encrypted messages                  |                       |
|                             | * Tactical level   | * Strategic level                     |                       |
| <i>Documents</i>            |  |                                       |                       |
| -Open source (public)       | -Private   | -Classified(non-UN)                   | -Stolen               |
| ←————— increasingly overt   |  | increasingly covert —————→            |                       |

In this century, the rising UN demand for better situational awareness allowed the organization to overcome its traditional resistance to the establishment of intelligence bodies within UN field missions. Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs) have been set up in many PKOs (Shetler-Jones 2008, 518). Though the quality of JMACs varies considerably between PKOs, they all possess analytical teams tasked with producing balanced, timely, and systematically verified information to support ongoing operations and senior policymakers, especially the mission head, who is usually a special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG). The UN's former discomfort about intelligence has been tempered by the realization that intelligence gathering does not necessarily entail underhanded methods that are illegal or subversive. JMACs generally collect, evaluate, and analyze information to aid decision-makers in a legitimate and balanced fashion.

Progress in creating a formal intelligence capacity at UN headquarters has been much slower than in the field, despite a number of serious attempts at UN reform. In 1987, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, frustrated by the lack of information that inhibited early warning and proactive responses, created the Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). Its mandate was to assess global trends,