Peacekeeping: Perspectives Old and New

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Chapter 1

Maple Leaf and Blue Beret: The Rise, Fall, and Promise of Canadian Peacekeeping

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Peacekeeping is one of the most prominent and publicized activities of the United Nations, and perhaps its most effective contribution in alleviating violence and war. It places armed international forces into conflict zones to support peace processes and agreements. Ironically, it was not even mentioned in the UN's 1945 Charter. How peacekeeping emerged is a tale consisting not only of on-the-spot improvisation in the face of imminent tragedy, but also of personal heroics during armed conflicts and timely diplomacy in the halls of UN headquarters and national capitals. Some nations were initially skeptical but soon embraced peacekeeping; others, including most developing world countries, only became involved much later. Canada was one of the early pioneers that sustained its contributions for a half-century, but that commitment declined dramatically in the twenty-first century. In 2015, the Trudeau government promised to "re-engage" Canada with UN peacekeeping. Ironically, during Trudeau's mandate Canada's participation fall to its historic low, with only a temporary spike in 2017–18.

As Canada seeks to find its way back to peacekeeping, history points

to lessons of both success and failure. It also shows how a national identity can be tied to an international activity like peacekeeping. This theme is also contained in following chapters by Michael Carroll who further examines Canadian involvement in the UN and Peter Londey who provides us a perspective on Australian peacekeeping. Many Canadians are proud that a Canadian foreign minister, Lester Pearson, proposed the establishment of the first UN peacekeeping force, which helped solve the world-threatening Suez crisis in 1956. Canadians are also proud of the efforts of General Roméo Dallaire, who saved tens of thousands of lives as commander of the UN force in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. But Canadian peacekeepers had their challenges and defeats, particularly in conflict zones such as Rwanda and Bosnia 1993–95, as well as the embarrassing behaviour of a few Canadian soldiers in Somalia in 1993. These experiences provide valuable insights into the conduct of peacekeeping: both how to and how not to do it. Because of Canada's long-standing involvement, a review of Canadian contributions to peacekeeping is also a review of the history of UN peacekeeping itself. Other nations can benefit from the story of the waxing and waning of Canada's involvement in UN peacekeeping and its promised re-engagement.

Early Development: Observer Missions 1947–1956

In first few years of the United Nations, the Security Council had only limited success in fulfilling its "primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security." As Cold War tensions encroached on the Council it became obvious that the new world organization, born out of the Second World War, was largely failing as an enforcer of peace. The breakdown of the postwar security system under the UN Charter (especially Chapter VII) pressed the United Nations to search for other ways to deal with conflicts. Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with the "pacific settlement of disputes," was used less by the veto-prone Security Council than by the General Assembly. Indeed, the latter began to develop significant procedures to help in dispute settlement. In 1947, the General Assembly established UN field missions/commissions in Palestine,

the Balkans, and Korea using military personnel from member states.[1] These bodies developed methods of inquiry and observation that helped UN operations deal with some high-stakes conflicts, such as the one in divided Korea.

   In its first mission, Canada proved to be a wavering member. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), 1947–48, was created to help establish democracy in Korea, but it triggered an unusual cabinet crisis in Canada.[2] When Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King learned that two Canadian military officers had been deployed to UNTCOK to supervise military withdrawals of American and Soviet forces and help supervise the first Korean elections (held only in the south), he admonished his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent. Prime Minister King, who may have felt that his interest in the occult empowered him to predict that there was going to be a war in Korea, stressed that he wanted Canada to have no part in it. But King's rationale was not only rooted in his misgivings about future problems in the East; he was also a cautious isolationist wanting to limit Canada's involvement in a dangerous world. Ironically, the incident became a "coming of age" for Canada, for many of King's cabinet ministers threatened to resign if the nation withdrew from the UN's Korea Commission. Thus, the aging Prime Minister King had to allow Canada's participation, including two UN military observers.[3] Though King's prediction about the war in Korea proved accurate, he was very wrong about Canada's isolationist future.

1. The Security Council had established in 1946, a Consular Commission with observers in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies) to help oversee the resolution of the Dutch-Indonesia dispute but Canada did not participate in that mission, unlike Australia. See David W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). See also the chapter by Peter Londey in this volume. The United Nations does not list the mission among its peacekeeping operations (https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations) because it was not under the operational control of the UN Secretary-General; similarly, for the UNTCOK mission discussed in this chapter.
2. Walter A. Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 12, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–32.
3. Department of National Defence, Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy, "Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations (as of December 2003)," available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/past-eng.html.

The nation became an ardent supporter of the United Nations, especially in its mission to support international peace. St. Laurent lent special salience to this point when he became Prime Minister in 1948 by declaring: "the UN's vocation is Canada's vocation."

The Canadians helped observe and supervise the Korean elections that preceded the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK, i.e., South Korea), with North Korea refusing to allow UN elections in its territory. After North Korea attacked the ROK in June 1950, Canada contributed 27,000 troops to the UN-authorized "police" action to defend the ROK. While this was enforcement rather than peacekeeping, it demonstrated Canada's commitment to the United Nations. Five hundred and sixteen Canadian soldiers lost their lives in that war, which did free the Republic of Korea from an invading Communist force.

Canada contributed to UN observer missions in other post-war hot spots, especially to deal with the necessary, but messy decolonization processes. These were the pioneering operations of UN peacekeeping, especially the observer mission created to deal with the Kashmir crisis.

The end of colonial rule in British India and the partition into India and Pakistan in 1947 led to fighting over the border princely state of Kashmir, thus beginning a long and complicated consideration of the Kashmir question by the Security Council. The Security Council by resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948 recommended the use of observers to help stop the fighting.[4] The mission was named the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), conceived to support a cease-fire agreement, observe the cease-fire line, and report violations by either side.

As the mission slowly assembled, Canada contributed eight of UNMOGIP's 40 or so observers. More importantly, Canada provided the first chief military observer, Brigadier-General Harry Angle, in November 1949. It was an honor that a Canadian general was given the command of the observer mission at the outset, but the tribute ended tragically when General Angle was killed in a plane crash on 17 July 1950 while

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4. United Nations, "UNMOGIP Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/background.shtml.

performing his duties. He was the first and highest ranking of over 120 Canadians to die in UN peacekeeping missions. Over the years, many other Canadian officers also served as head of UN operations.

After war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965, the Security Council set up an additional peacekeeping mission to oversee the cease-fire along the entire border. Another Canadian general, Brigadier Bruce Macdonald, was appointed to command the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM). But it was only a temporary (eight-month) mission. By contrast, UNMOGIP remains in existence today, like another early observer mission, also created in 1948 – the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

The proclamation of independence by Israeli leaders in May 1948 and intense fighting with its Arab neighbors created an enormous challenge for the United Nations. After the disputants rejected two Security Council calls for a truce, a third demand in Resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948 resulted in a thirty-day cease-fire. The resolution called for the supervision of the truce by a UN mediator and a group of military observers who arrived in June from Belgium, France, and the United States. Sadly, hostilities resumed at the end of June and the mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated in September. But armistice agreements were soon signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors after significant UN efforts by the Acting Mediator and UN civilian staff member, the American Ralph Bunche. As a result, the mission came under the operational control of his boss, the UN Secretary-General. Such control continued in all peacekeeping missions created thereafter. In 1949, Resolution 73 assigned new functions to UNTSO to supervise the armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, notably Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

UNTSO was the second official UN observer mission created by the Security Council in 1948, but the first to actually deploy to the field.[5]

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5. UNMOGIP was created by the Security Council before UNTSO. But because of the delay in UNMOGIP's actual commencement of operations until January 1949, UNTSO was deployed to the field first and thus the United Nations considers UNTSO as its first peacekeeping mission. For details on UN missions see Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams, eds.,

Canadian participation in UNTSO started late (1954) but grew when Canadian Major-General E.L.M. "Tommy" Burns was appointed head of the mission. General Burns received repeated praise in the Security Council for his dynamic service as Chief of Staff.[6] Burns held the position until he was appointed the commander of a new UN force in November 1956, part of a major evolution in UN peacekeeping.

Interposed and Interventionist Forces 1956–1974

Following the creation of the early observer missions, UN peacekeeping went through a phase of dynamic development as a mechanism of conflict control, with Canada playing a key role. During this period UN operations were not only larger, they involved armed units with responsibilities that went well beyond observation. They had to separate belligerents by positioning themselves in between to prevent small flare-ups or disputes from becoming wars. The first such mission, created in 1956, was proposed by Canada and served as an important model for subsequent missions.

United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

After Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, Israel, Britain, and France coordinated an invasion of Egypt and demanded the latter's acceptance of their occupation of the Suez Canal and other parts of Egypt. Many nations condemned the invasion, including the United States, which introduced a resolution in the Security Council calling on Israel to withdraw and Britain and France to refrain from using force in the Suez Canal area. When Britain and France vetoed the resolution, diplomatic action switched to the General Assem-

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The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
6. Alastair Taylor, David Cox and J. L. Granatstein, *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response* (Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 116–117. General Burn's memoire is *Between Arab and Israel*, (Toronto, Clarke, Irwin and Co, 1962).

bly, where Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, made a remarkable speech that gave birth to the first UN peacekeeping force. In his Assembly speech at the Emergency Session, he declared:

> we need action, then, not only to end the fighting but to make the peace… a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.[7]

After hasty consultations with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and others to persuade them of the feasibility of the concept, Pearson introduced a resolution that passed in the early morning hours of 4 November by a vote of 57 to 0 with 19 abstentions (including the protagonists, Egypt, France, Israel, and the United Kingdom). Within 12 hours Secretary-General Hammarskjöld recommended, and the General Assembly accepted, the establishment of a UN mission with Canada's Major-General Tommy Burns, then Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the Commander. Canada also announced its willingness to contribute troops to the mission.

A cease-fire became effective 7 November and by 15 November advance units of UNEF arrived in the Canal Zone. By mid-December, the force was fully operational and shortly thereafter British and French troops completed their withdrawal. Addressing the Assembly on 23 November, Pearson foresaw that this force "under United Nations control… may be the beginning of something bigger and more permanent in the history of our Organization… the organization of the peace through international action."[8] Indeed, UNEF went far beyond earlier unarmed observer missions, like UNTSO or UNMOGIP. It was a peace force, about 6,000 strong, drawn from ten countries that formed an armed barrier between the combatants. True to Pearson's prediction, it ushered in a

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7. Hon. L. B. Pearson, The Crisis in the Middle East, October-December, 1956 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957), 9–10. Also available at https://undocs.org/A/PV.562.
8. Speech by L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the UN General Assembly, 23 November 1956, 1 GAOR, Eleventh Session, 1956–7, vol. I, p. 26S. Available at https://undocs.org/A/PV.592; In Chapter 2 Michael Carroll provides his interpretation of the Canadian motivation underpinning involvement in UNEF.

new era of UN peacekeeping, demonstrating a greater degree of force for self-defence.

True to Canada's creative role in conceiving UNEF, Canada performed many functions from the outset of the mission besides providing the Force Commander. For example, the UNEF buildup involved almost every long-range transport aircraft that the Royal Canadian Air Force had at the time. The United Nations also asked Canada to contribute a signals squadron, a field hospital, a transport company, and a RCAF communications squadron. There followed a rapid deployment of these units and by 6 December, about a month after the initial resolution, almost 300 Canadians were in Egypt. The Canadian signalers were scattered amongst the various national contingents, so they served everywhere UNEF was deployed. Then, on 17 December, Canada authorized three new units for UNEF, as well as an air component for communication and observation, and officers for General Burns' staff. This second wave of Canadians for UNEF was transported to Egypt by Canada's aircraft carrier, HMCS Magnificent. The Canadian contingent was to soon number some one thousand personnel, more than 20 percent of UNEF's total strength of 4,700 (on average over time).[9] This indicated the level of Canadian commitment to a new enterprise for which it was a lead nation.

In UNEF, Canada pioneered aerial reconnaissance in peacekeeping to supplement ground reconnaissance. The mission patrolled the Egyptian-Israeli border from the air and by ground for over a decade from November 1956 until May 1967. Then, in 1967, the winds of war again blew across the Middle East as the situation between Israel and its Arab neighbors deteriorated to the point that no peacekeeping mission could halt the gathering storm. Egypt demanded the withdrawal of UNEF, and UN Secretary-General U Thant felt compelled to comply. Much to the dismay of Lester Pearson, now Canada's Prime Minister, the withdrawal of UNEF began and war broke out soon after.

Despite the setback, the instrument of peacekeeping had already become well established. Two years after the establishment of UNEF in

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9. Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 46–48.

1956, the United Nations created another mission: the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). Canada contributed about 10 percent of the force, which was mandated to uncover illegal arms shipments to rebel forces. Air observation made it possible to observe the entire country in some way and became a very important part of the UN operation, especially when the airborne observers located vehicle convoys possibly smuggling arms into Lebanon. After a separate and short deployment of US marines to Lebanon in July 1958, tension increased, and the new president of Lebanon demanded the marines withdraw. To facilitate this Canada contributed an additional 50 observers. The strength of the mission reached 591, including 75 Canadians.[10]

The utility of Canadian aerial reconnaissance was proven again in the United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM, 1963–64). To observe the cease-fires between the intervening forces of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Royalist forces backed by Saudi Arabia, the UN mission needed aircraft to survey Yemen's mountainous terrain. In 1963 Canada agreed to provide UNYOM with two Caribou and one Otter aircraft and personnel. Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) ground crews had to deal with dust and sand penetration of all parts of the aircraft. By the time the mission withdrew in 1964 after 14 months, the best that could be said is that it had exerted a restraining influence on hostile activities in the area. At its peak the military strength of UNYOM numbered 150 personnel of which 50 were Canadians. The dispute in Yemen was to continue until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war compelled Egypt to withdraw its troops from Yemen. Three years later the parties in Yemen came to an agreement and the civil war of that era ended.

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

Despite the crises in the Middle East, the UN's biggest and toughest mission of the Cold War was in Africa. There the United Nations and Canada had to learn its largest and harshest lessons in the difficulties of

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10. Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 148.

interventions in civil wars. The *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC) was a milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping. Its peak military strength was almost 20,000 of which 420 were Canadians.[11] Without infantry unit contributions, Canada could not compete in numbers with other troop contributing countries (TCCs), but by providing skilled staff officers it could still have a major impact on the mission. In addition, there was an important civilian operations component comprised of some 2,000 experts, of which many were Canadian. ONUC was an extremely complex operation whose mandate was made more robust due to the rapidly changing situation in the Congo. The mission was also costly in terms of finances and lives: 245 military personnel were killed (three of whom were Canadian) as well as Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.[12]

Canada participated in ONUC from the very outset, including running the mission's air operations. The bilingual Canadians served in many other capacities in the Congo. Mission headquarters included Canadians, but signals was Canada's primary role, which Canada had already extensively played in UNEF. The communications squadron was headquartered in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) with many detachments scattered throughout the vast Congolese interior.

Ironically, even as the gradual withdrawal of the UN force in the Congo began, Canada made dangerous but life-saving contributions to the Congo operation. When the UN force was reduced from almost 20,000 to a mere 5,500 personnel, military Congolese renegades, called the jeunesse perpetrated atrocities against missionaries and aid workers in several provinces, as well as burning villages. The ONUC Chief of Staff, Canadian Brigadier-General Jacques Dextraze, assembled a force to rescue missionaries and protect the victims. The rescue missions involved quick insertion of rescue teams by helicopter, often under fire from the ground, and air evacuation of the missionaries, who had been gathered by a ground assault team with fire support from helicopters. A Canadi-

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11. Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 260.
12. United Nations, "Republic of the Congo – ONUC, Background," available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm.

an Otter aircraft played the reconnaissance and command/control roles. Many rescue missions were carried out and more than a hundred people were rescued, often while under fire.[13]

The experience of ONUC precipitated a feeling of angst in the United Nations over large and complex missions in African conflicts devoid of agreement between the parties. The immense operational challenge in the Congo was also accompanied by enormous financial costs. For a long time, the United Nations shunned such expensive and complex operations and did not carry out another operation in Arica until 1989. But as ONUC was ending in 1964, another ambitious UN initiative was already underway to deal with a raging conflict on a southern European island.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

When Cyprus gained independence from Britain, tensions ran high between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Tensions broke out into open fighting in 1964. Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 created the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) "to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."[14]

Canada played a principal role in the formation of the mission. When Canada announced on 12 March 1964 that it would participate in UNFICYP, it was the only country that had pledged to do so. Pressure mounted as Turkey announced it would intervene militarily unless the UN force was deployed on the island in a few days. As Professor King Gordon wrote: "it is generally conceded that in a period of great international tension it was Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, who saved the peace."[15] After consulting with Secretary-General

13. Paul Mayer, "Peacekeeping in the Congo: The Operation at Liembe" *The Canadian Guardsman* (1965), 136–141, as cited in *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*, Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, eds., (Toronto, Dundurn Press, 2001), 211.
14. United Nations, "UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," "UNFICYP Background," available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/background.html.
15. Gordon, J. King, "The UN in Cyprus," *International Journal* XIX (Summer

U Thant in New York, Martin called many countries to round up more troops, and secured assistance from Sweden. Within days the force was on its way. The Canadian contingent deployed with great speed, thanks to the RCAF, and was the first to become operational, which helped persuade Turkey to call off its planned invasion.[16]

The Canadian advance party arrived in Cyprus on 15 March 1964. The next day RCAF flights began to arrive in Cyprus with the 1,100 strong Canadian contingent, comprised of an infantry battalion, a reconnaissance squadron, and headquarters troops. The heavy vehicles and materiel arrived two weeks later on Canada's last aircraft carrier, the *Bonaventure*. For most of their time in Cyprus, Canadians were deployed in the region of the Cypriot capital, Nicosia, where inter-communal fighting had been intense.

UNFICYP did succeed in reducing tension on the island and the size of the force was reduced from an initial strength of 6,500 (of which about 1,100 were Canadians) in 1964 to about 3,500 (with about 480 Canadians) from 1969 to 1974. Yet, a political settlement was not attained as the Greeks insisted on a unitary state controlled by them without the measures to protect the Turkish minority that had been part of their previously agreed constitutional arrangement.

In July 1974 a sudden coup d'état by Greek Cypriot National Guard forces advocating enosis (union, in this case with Greece) precipitated armed intervention by Turkey in support of the Turkish minority. UNFICYP suddenly had to deal with a full-scale invasion and war between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish army. UN headquarters in New York could only tell the UNFICYP Commander, General Prem Chand, to do his best "to limit violence and protect civilians," which the UN force did heroically, sustaining many casualties. During and shortly after the 1974 war, 74 UN soldiers were shot, of which nine were killed.

Upon the renewal of hostilities in 1974 Canada almost doubled its contribution to UNFICYP, increasing the strength of its contingent from

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1964): 335.
16. Most information in the UNFICYP, UNEF and UNDOF sections is taken from Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 87.

480 to 950. Canadian soldiers played a key role in limiting violence during the 1974 war, including by keeping UN control of Nicosia's airport, thus preventing it from being overrun. Canadians also helped place the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia under UN control, and evacuated UN personnel from areas under heavy fire.

When a cease-fire came into effect on 16 August 1974 Cyprus was a divided island with Turkey controlling the northern third and the Greeks controlling the southern two-thirds. Nicosia remained partitioned as before the war, but a "green line" now extended across the entire island from east to west spanning 180 kilometers. Canadians were again given responsibility for the highly sensitive Nicosia area, and remained in Cyprus until 1993, providing some 59 rotations of battalion-sized contingents. In almost three decades of service on the war-torn island, 21 Canadian soldiers were killed, but the mission earned a prominent place in Canadian military history.

When UNFICYP was created in 1964, Canada was still experiencing its "Golden Age" in international affairs. It was recognized as one of the world's most committed and competent peacekeepers.[17] This confidence was also shown when Canada again committed to a new mission called UNEF II, six years after UNEF had been asked to leave Egypt.

United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)

As victor of the Six Day War in 1967, Israel, occupied large stretches of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack against Israel to recapture lost territory. Egyptian and Syrian forces achieved surprise by attacking on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur and initially made considerable gains, encouraging Jordan to join the war. However, within the week Israeli counterattacks were not only able to turn the tide and regain most of the territory the Arabs had

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17. For a detailed discussion concerning the evolution of peacekeeping as a core part of the Canadian national identity and the role of domestic politics in creating that perspective see Colin McCullough, *Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).

just recaptured but threatened Damascus and surrounded the Egyptian 3rd Army in Sinai, raising fears of Soviet intervention on Egypt's behalf. On 22 October a cease-fire took effect briefly, but hostilities soon resumed until intense American and Soviet pressure led to the acceptance of a new cease-fire demand contained in Security Council Resolution 340 (1973)[18] of 25 October that the parties accepted the next day. Resolution 340 demanded the return of all forces to positions of 22 October, increased the number of UNTSO observers, established a new peacekeeping mission called United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) to act as a buffer in the Sinai, and asked the Secretary-General to report on these arrangements within 24 hours. The Security Council allowed the Secretary-General to expand the authorization of the use of force from self-defence to include "defence of the mission."[19]

UNEF II quickly interposed itself between the opposing armies, established observation posts and checkpoints, conducted patrols, and prevented moves forward. Canada's peak contribution to UNEF II was 1,145 military personnel, about 15 percent of the force. Canada's role was mostly logistical. Canadian Brigadier-General Douglas Nicholson headed the 11-man evaluation team that assessed the logistical requirements for all of UNEF II. From nothing, the Canadians quickly created a logistical support system. A Polish logistics contingent was expected to play a key role, but the Israelis refused to allow Poland, a Soviet-bloc member and therefore Egyptian ally, into their areas of operation. Canadians then had to assume additional duties. The Canadians also became operational much sooner and did the work assigned to the Poles for several months.

In November 1973 Canada agreed to provide a signals unit. A massive airlift that month comprised of 20 flights airlifted 481 troops, 43 vehicles and 115 tons of equipment in three days. Later that month Canada agreed to provide a supply company, a maintenance company, a postal detachment, a military police detachment, a movement control unit, and an air transport unit. The latter, 116 Air Transport Unit, used two Buffa-

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18. United Nations, "Middle East - UNEF II Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef2backgr2.html.
19. Trevor Findlay, "*The Use of Force in Peace Operations*" (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 102.

lo aircraft and 50 technicians to logistically support the entire UNEF II operation.

One of the initial tasks of the Canadians was to deliver food and water to the surrounded Egyptian Third Army, whose fate had threatened Soviet intervention in the war. Also, Canadians quickly deployed to front line positions on either side of the canal including Rabah and Ismailia.

Tragically, in 1974, a Canadian Buffalo aircraft with 116 Air Transport Unit at Ismailia was shot down by Syria on a routine flight to Damascus killing all nine Canadians aboard. It was the largest loss of Canadian peacekeepers in a single day. Several decades later, the Canadian Parliament chose that day (August 9) as National Peacekeepers' Day to annually commemorate Canadian sacrifices in peacekeeping.

The conclusion of the Middle East Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979 ushered in the end of UNEF II. It was clear the Soviets would have vetoed a new UN force, so the Security Council allowed UNEF II's mandate to expire in July. To monitor the implementation of the Camp David Accords including the withdrawal of Israelis from all Sinai, a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was assembled outside of UN auspices. Canada contributed 140 personnel. Though not a UN mission, it was modelled after UN peacekeeping operations. The United States was the main supporter, but Canadian generals have held command of the mission at various times, including from 2014 to 2017.

The success of UNEF II, including as the forerunner of MFO, was immense and cannot be understated. It was the only peacekeeping mission in the region that terminated with a peace treaty. Moreover, the peace between Egypt and Israel changed the Middle East. But it did not solve the problem of Israel's occupation of Syrian territory after 1967.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

While UNEF II deployed rapidly in October 1973 to oversee an Egypt-Israel ceasefire, Syria-Israel tensions remained high until the United States mediated a disengagement agreement on 31 May 1974. The same day the Security Council adopted Resolution 350 (1974) which established the

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to supervise the agreement. UNDOF maintains a buffer zone in the Golan Heights that is 75 kilometers long and ranging in width from about 10 kilometers to 200 meters.[20] Israeli and Syrian forces are on opposite ends of the buffer zone and their forward lines comprise areas of limitation where both forces and arms are restricted.

Out of the UNDOF's original strength of 1,335 military personnel, Canada provided 230 personnel, comprised of a logistics company, a signal troop, and staff officers for UNDOF headquarters in Damascus. Canada and Poland shared logistical responsibilities. Japan requested to join Canada in providing logistics, beginning a strong thirty-year partnership.

The dynamic period of UN peacekeeping from 1956 to 1974, part of the "Golden Age" of Canadian foreign affairs, saw the creation of nine new peace missions of which five had responsibilities greater than monitoring. The 1956 UNEF mission, proposed by Canada, was the first mission to interpose itself between parties and secure a cease-fire, not merely observe it. Five peacekeeping operations during this period had responsibilities involving the facilitation and supervision of disengagement of armed adversaries.

During this period of rapid development in peacekeeping, Canada's role was one of leadership. A Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, won the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the 1956 Suez Crisis, introducing the idea of a peacekeeping force – a dramatic innovation from previous observer missions and a novel way to use the armed forces of UN member nations. Canadian generals commanded five missions of the traditional type (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNIPOM, UNEF, and UNFICYP). Furthermore, Canadian soldiers participated in all of the UN's peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, even as the number of field missions declined considerably.

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20. United Nations, "UNDOF Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/undof/background.shtml.

The UN's Quiet Period 1975–1987

Following the establishment of UNDOF in 1974, which marked the end of the UN's dynamic period of peacekeeping during the Cold War, reticence regarding new peacekeeping missions became evident. In fact, only one new peacekeeping operation (UNIFIL, see below) was established from 1975 until the end of the Cold War in 1988–89, though most of the existing missions were maintained. In part, the decline was due to financial difficulties and the refusal of some UN Member States to pay their assessed (obligatory) peacekeeping fees. There was also a disenchantment arising from the perceived limitations of peacekeeping and the fact that some missions had not met the UN's original expectations. Although the UN's most ambitious operation, ONUC, had prevented the breakup of the country, it had become mired in a civil war that had failed to bring about lasting peace and stability in the Congo. UN member states accepted that certain criteria had to be met before creating new missions, particularly the consent of the parties to resolve their conflict.

The one new mission (in Lebanon) that was established during this period was plagued with turbulence and in many ways was a contributor to the disenchantment with peacekeeping. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set up after the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon, which was in response to a series of rocket and commando attacks into Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) mandated UNIFIL to confirm an Israeli withdrawal, restore peace and security, and assist Lebanon in re-establishing its effective authority in the region. Canada agreed to provide a signal troop to the mission though only for six months since UNEF II was putting a strain on Canadian communications personnel. By June Canadian signalers in UNIFIL numbered 120.[21]

To some extent UNIFIL's high casualty rate, manifold problems, and limitations were responsible for the UN's reticence to launch even one other peacekeeping operation from 1974 to 1988. There were certain-

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21. Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 154.

ly other factors, including the continuing ideological conflict within the Security Council. Some even declared peacekeeping "dead" as a tool to deal with new conflicts. But in 1988, with the ending of the Cold War, the United Nations finally overcame it reticence and embarked upon a dramatic and robust reengagement in what is now called modern peace operations.

The Resurgence of Peacekeeping 1988–1992

In 1988 the United Nations established three new UN missions, signaling a renaissance in peace operations. There followed a major jump with another eight new missions from 1989 to 1991 with greatly expanded mandates and responsibilities, bringing the total number of new missions during this period to 11 in four years, almost as many as during the four-decade Cold War (13 missions). Canada played an active role in these new missions. To punctuate the renewed enthusiasm for peacekeeping, the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeepers. Of the 800,000 who had served in the field, about 80,000 (10 percent) were Canadians. They received the glory of the prize but not any of the prize money. (These funds eventually went to create the Dag Hammarskjöld medal, which is awarded posthumously to peacekeepers who had died while on mission and is presented to the next of kin.)

   The three missions launched in 1988 were all primarily observer missions, though with important additional functions. The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), from 1988 to 1990, facilitated the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United Nations dispatched 50 military observers to Afghanistan and Pakistan to monitor the implementation of the agreements for the departure of Soviet troops from the region. Canada provided five of these observers for the duration of the mission.[22] The mission succeeded in fulfilling its mandate in a climate of great unrest and danger. Unfortunately, the United Nations, and the international community as a whole, lost its focus

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22. Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 73.

on Afghanistan after the Soviet forces departed. In hindsight, this was a strategic miscalculation. The Canadian military had to return to Afghanistan in much larger numbers post-9/11, but in a combat mode, not as a peacekeeper.

The second mission established in 1988, the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), was much larger than UNGOMAP. After dynamic mediation by the UN Secretary-General that helped end the Iran-Iraq War, UNIIMOG helped end a barbaric eight-year war characterized by human waves and slaughter on the front lines, as well as chemical attacks, and missile attacks aimed at cities. From 1988 until 1991 the mission monitored the successful cease-fire. At its peak UNIIMOG consisted of about 400 military observers aided by a large Canadian signals unit (525 personnel). The mission established and monitored the cease-fire lines, investigated violations, supervised and confirmed the withdrawal of all forces, and oversaw exchanges of POWs.

The third observer mission created in 1988 was the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) which verified the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, made possible by the end of the Cold War. This small UN mission, peaking at only 70 observers, was the first UN peacekeeping operation in which Canada did not participate, though Canada did contribute to the follow-on mission, UNAVEM II (1991–95). With the two missions taken together, it is correct to say that Canada participated in every peacekeeping operation of the Cold War and until 1995, the only country with such a record.

The next UN mission was launched on a much grander scale and was the UN's first foray into Africa since the 1960s (ONUC, Congo). The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) facilitated the decolonization of Southwest Africa as it became Namibia, an independent state. To facilitate this, UNTAG operated from April 1989 to March 1990 as a multidimensional peace operation with important responsibilities. Clearly the prevention of hostilities between South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was of enormous importance, but UNTAG' responsibilities went well beyond those normally undertaken by traditional peacekeeping forces. It successfully organized

elections and helped the country prepare for independence. It was a huge mission of 4,493 military personnel, 1,500 civilian police, 2,000 international and local staff, and some 1,000 additional international personnel who worked during the UN-supervised elections.[23] Canada contributed 250 logistic personnel, 100 police officers, 50 election monitors, and an expert on computerized election results. Canada also gave the mission $15 million in budgetary support, 4,000 ballot boxes, and offered two Hercules aircraft to transport supplies to northern Namibia and Angola as the mission began.[24] UNTAG was the first of many peacekeeping missions to which Canada provided police, mostly from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).[25]

The UN's next peace operation, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), did not serve as a mid-wife to a new nation like UNTAG, but it was the UN's first mission in Latin America, helping struggling nations to begin anew after paralyzing civil wars. Hostilities between Nicaragua and Honduras over the presence of the "Contras" who launched attacks into Nicaragua, had frustrated the implementation of the "Esquipulas II Accord." That agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, promotion of free elections, and the end of support for insurrectionist forces. ONUCA was established in November 1989 to conduct on-site verification of the security undertakings in the agreement. One aspect involved the demobilization of the Contra rebels, which could only be undertaken after the rebels agreed to it. Following the defeat of the Sandinista government in the UN-monitored Nicaraguan elections in February 1990, the Contras disbanded and ONUCA's mandate was twice expanded to accommodate demobilization. In 1990, the UN performed its first election monitoring in a sovereign member state (Nicaragua), opening a new frontier for UN support of democracy, replicated in

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23. United Nations, "Namibia - UNTAG, Facts and Figures," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagF.htm.
24. Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 73.
25. The experiences of Canadian police in UNTAG and subsequent missions are described in Beno Maure, *Leading at the Edge: True Tales from Canadian Police in Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping Missions Around the World* (Mounted Police Foundation, 2021).

dozens of countries afterwards.

At its peak, ONUCA personnel numbered 1,195. Canada's peak contribution comprised 175 personnel of which 130 were with the air unit (helicopter detachment).[26] Canadian naval personnel were also deployed aboard patrol ships seeking to interdict weapons bound for the rebels.

In the busy peacekeeping period after the Cold War, Canada contributed a record number of troops. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), 1991 to 2003, monitored a 200 km demilitarized zone between the two countries. UNIKOM's peak strength was 913, of which Canada contributed 301 personnel comprised of one military observer and 300 engineers.[27] Fifteen Canadian personnel were sent to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), 33 personnel to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and 11 to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).[28]

The UN's largest mission of this period was in Cambodia, a nation that had been torn apart by civil war and genocide. During its four-year rule (1974–79), the Khmer Rouge killed about two million of the country's nine million people. In accordance with the 1991 Paris Peace Accord, the United Nations was to take on major responsibilities in the war-ravaged country. First the Security Council created the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to assist the four Cambodian parties to maintain their cease-fire until the larger UN mission, namely the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was in place. The Advance Mission deployed 1,090 military personnel[29] supported by international and local staff, and Canada contributed 103 personnel.

UNTAC supervised a cease-fire that held firm despite Khmer Rouge

26. Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," in W.J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993), 449.
27. W. J. Durch, "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission," in Durch, *op. cit*, p. 263.
28. Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 74.
29. United Nations, "Cambodia - UNAMIC, Facts and Figures," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html.

threats, and the mission oversaw national elections, which the Khmer Rouge did not sabotage. UNTAC's expansive mandate also included the protection of human rights, military security and civil administration, maintenance of law and order, resettlement of refugees, mine clearing, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and economic reconstruction and development. To achieve this, UNTAC was comprised of seven components: military, police, and civilian (human rights, civil administration, electoral, rehabilitation and repatriation). UNTAC consisted of 15,991 troops, 3,359 police and during the elections some 900 international polling officers.[30] Canada contributed 213 personnel.[31] The multidimensional nature of the mission was characteristic of modern peace operations to come.

In the early 1990s, peacekeeping seemed to have a new life. With the creation of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the United Nations had established in five years (1988–92) the same number of peace operations that it had created during the Cold War, i.e., in the forty years after the beginning of peacekeeping.[32] In addition to this historical precedent, ONUMOZ turned out to be another encouraging success. It delivered Mozambique from civil war, demobilized and disarmed (voluntarily) more than 76,000 soldiers from both sides, and engineered a huge humanitarian assistance program. Furthermore, the democratic elections supervised by the United Nations led to the inauguration of a new parliament and president in December 1994[33]. Canada's contribution, however, was small: 15 UN military observers, deployed at headquarters and throughout the country, as well as election officials (civilians).

Peacekeeping was expanding, and Canada contributed increasing

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30. United Nations, "Cambodia - UNAMIC, Facts and Figures," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html.

31. Jockel, Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 75. A firsthand account is given by Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad in Scarce Heard Amid the Guns: An Inside Look at Canadian Peacekeeping (Dundurn Press, 2011).

32. Stephen M Hill and Malik, Shahin P., Peacekeeping and the United Nations, Brookfield, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1996, p. 118.

33. United Nations, "Mozambique - ONUMOZ, Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozS.htm.

numbers overall, reaching a peak in July 1993 of some 3,300 uniformed personnel. To further establish peacekeeping in the national consciousness, the National Peacekeeping Monument (titled "Reconciliation") was erected next to the National Art Gallery in Ottawa where important peacekeeping ceremonies are held at the monument each year.

Until 1993 Canada was the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping forces. But in 1993–95, Canada shared with the UN some of the worst tragedies and setbacks in UN and Canadian military history. Part of the challenge was how to adapt traditional peacekeeping, which was mostly between standing armies of nations, to the new and more vicious environments of civil wars within nations.

In his seminal 1992 report "Agenda for Peace," Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali redefined peacekeeping as involving "hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned."[34] He envisaged a deviation from the previously accepted principle of consent of the parties; "peace enforcement" would be a component of new missions to enforce a cease-fire by taking coercive action against any party that violated it. This ambitious concept would soon be put to the test and required a modern force and mentality that the UN did not have. In addition, expanded peacekeeping operations were sent to three extremely difficult arenas of conflict: Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.

Tragedy and Setback: 1993–1995

The exuberance for "peace enforcement" that had been displayed by the Secretary-General as well as the members of the Security Council was destined to be checked by one all-encompassing reality of the post-Cold War world. Even if power bloc rivalries were now at an end, and if ideological competition would no longer plague the international community, peacekeeping operations would still require ample strength to "enforce peace." The mere arrival of peacekeepers in a conflict zone would not quell violence if the peacekeepers were weaker than the parties engaged in fighting. The mission in Somalia was to be the first to demonstrate this.

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34. B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace (United Nations, New York, 1992).

The UN's means did not match its mandate in the more robust form of peacekeeping that was being called for.

The civil war that broke out in Somalia following the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991 created nearly one million refugees and threatened five million people with hunger. The Secretary-General organized talks between the factions, who agreed to a cease-fire, monitored by UN observers. On 24 April 1992 the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor the cease-fire, protect UN personnel, and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from sea and airports to distribution centers in Mogadishu and its environs. Canada contributed headquarters staff.

Unfortunately, intense fighting in Somalia obstructed the relief effort. In August the Security Council deployed an additional 3,000 troops to protect humanitarian aid and workers. Canada sent 750 personnel. The famine situation still worsened, as did the attacks on aid workers. The United States in November 1992 offered to lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, an idea which the Security Council accepted. The mission was authorized in December 1992 to use "all necessary means" to support the relief effort. The US-led operation became known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and was comprised of contingents from 24 countries. Canada agreed to deploy 1,300 Canadian soldiers, fatefully choosing inappropriately trained soldiers from the Airbourne regiment.[35]

The UNITAF force aided distribution of humanitarian aid in Mogadishu and the surrounding area enormously, and early in 1993, 14 Somali political movements agreed on a cease-fire and pledged to hand over all weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM. Thus encouraged, the Security Council decided in March 1993 on a transition from UNITAF to a new mission, UNOSOM II, which it endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. Not many Canadian soldiers, up to nine at a given time, served in that mission.

UNOSOM II had a momentous task. UNITAF had patrolled less than

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35. Karsten Jung, *Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests through Peacekeeping* (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2009), 60.

half of Somalia with 37,000 troops, while UNOSOM II had to cover all Somalia with only 22,000 peacekeepers.[36] Moreover, certain Somali factions that had pledged compliance did not respect the cease-fires. The killing in June 1993 of 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan as well as civilian casualties, led to aggressive US attempts to catch the leader of the clan that had killed the Pakistanis. But the October killing of 18 American soldiers, while on a US operation independent of UNOSOM II, led the US to announce its withdrawal from the country. UNOSOM II itself was finally withdrawn ignominiously in March 1995. It was evident that feeding and freeing Somalia required forceful intervention against the warlords, and the world community, particularly the United States, was unwilling to sustain the costs of such intervention.

A feeling of incredible failure was felt by the United Nations and international community, and especially Canada. Though Canada was part of the UN-US unsuccessful efforts in Somalia, the Canadian news was even worse. Several Canadian airborne troops, operating under the US-led UNITAF, were discovered to have tortured and killed a Somali youth caught stealing from their camp in March 1993. A court martial of those individuals uncovered more misbehaviour. The government launched a broader inquiry into the events in Somalia, including inadequate preparations for deployment, but this inquiry faced stonewalling by senior generals, including Canada's top military officer, who was forced to resign. The final report of the prolonged inquiry, titled Dishonoured Legacy, shocked the nation. Also, the government disbanded the entire Airborne Regiment, which in hindsight was the wrong regiment to send on a peace-keeping mission. It was trained for rough combat and not for the subtleties of peacekeeping. It also contained racist elements.[37] This proved to be a disaster in the history of the Canadian military.

As the mission in Somalia was still underway, another tragedy was

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36. United Nations, "Somalia - UNOSOM II, Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr1.html.
37. Donna Winslow, "The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry." Canadian Government Pub Centre, 1997. Razack, Sherene. *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism* (University of Toronto Press, 2004).

in the making. The United Nations asked Canada to provide the force commander for a mission in Rwanda. Brigadier-General Roméo Dallaire was chosen to lead the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). He diligently set up a mission in the heart of Africa, but nothing could have prepared him for the atrocities he was to witness. In a hundred days about 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered in the most intense genocide since Second World War. At the start, Dallaire could not even convince UN officials that genocide was occurring. His urgent requests for reinforcements were rejected under American, British, French, and Belgian pressure.[38] Only Canada responded to the appeals of its general; it was the only nation to send additional troops to UNAMIR during the genocide, though the numbers were still inadequately low (less than 100). However, with fewer than 300 peacekeepers General Dallaire managed to save the lives of over 20,000 people who had sought refuge at UN-monitored sites. Nonetheless, Dallaire felt so distraught and impotent in the face of the Rwandan slaughter that he later attempted suicide back in Canada. For their part, UN leaders took many years, unfortunately, to assume any responsibility for the Rwandan tragedy, blaming it on an overly cautious Security Council that suffered from the "Somali syndrome," or crossing the "Mogadishu line," i.e., fear of overextending a mission mandate to enforcement. Dallaire ultimately recovered and was appointed to the Canadian senate. After the genocide ended in July 1994, the follow-up mission, UNAMIR II, was also commanded by a Canadian general (Major-General Guy Tousignant) but that mission ended by Rwandan request in 1996.

As if the disasters in Somalia and Rwanda were not enough, another debacle was stalking the United Nations (and Canada) in Yugoslavia. The disintegration of the country precipitated the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), initially established by the Security Council in February 1992 in Croatia to create conditions that might foster peace and security. In this regard it had many functions, such as the demilitarization of United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) and monitoring a cease-fire

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38. Karsten Jung, *Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests through Peacekeeping* (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2009), 62.

agreement between Croatia and local Serb authorities. When confronted by Croat atrocities and ceasefire violations in the Medak Pocket, a Canadian unit held its ground and engaged in a major firefight with Croat forces until the latter withdrew.[39]

When the Yugoslav conflict intensified and civil war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was among the first to call for an international response. The Security Council subsequently expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to include the containment of the civil war in Bosnia and continued to add multifarious tasks to the mission such as escorting humanitarian aid convoys and protecting "safe areas." Unfortunately, the UN mission once again lacked the capacity to execute its ever-expanding mandate, especially to force peace on those who wanted war.

Canada's 1,200 soldiers in Bosnia were repeatedly exposed to gunfire and UNPROFOR was in jeopardy. The force was authorized to request air support from NATO when under attack, which led Bosnian Serbs to take 150 UN personnel hostage. In response to later air strikes, 370 UN peacekeepers, including Canadians, were kidnapped and used as human shields to protect military equipment.[40] In June 1995 the Serbs overran UN safe areas ignoring the understrength UNPROFOR units and killing thousands of Muslims. In the Protected Area of Srebrenica, the Canadians had turned over responsibility to peacekeepers from The Netherlands in 1994, who in 1995 embarrassingly departed after extreme intimidation from Serb forces. These Bosnian Serbs went on to slaughter 7,000 Muslim men and boys. In response to all these attacks, the United Nations approved a massive air campaign against the Serb forces by NATO. This finally brought Serb forces to the negotiating table and resulted in the December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. These were enforced by a 50,000 strong NATO operation called the Implementation Force (IFOR), followed a year later by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), to which Canada contributed over 1,000 soldiers at a given time. NATO's

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39. Carol Off, *The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War* (Vintage Canada, 2010).
40. Carol Off, *The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War* (Vintage Canada, 2010), 64.

I/SFOR missions secured peace in Bosnia because the Serbs knew that defying IFOR would have grave and destructive consequences for them, unlike defying UNPROFOR, which had precipitated pointless Security Council resolutions that the UN missions were unable to implement.

UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, and UNAMIR thus had suffered the same problem – an ambitious mandate for a UN force with insufficient capabilities to implement it. Canadian soldiers on these missions remembered their helplessness.

Frustration with UNPROFOR provided another perceptual blow to Canadian peacekeeping, adding to the personal anguish Canadians felt after the Somali and Rwandan disasters. Canadian contributions declined and have never come back. At its peak, in 1993, over 3,000 Canadians were still on UN duty; thus, the world's 60th largest army was contributing 10 percent of its peacekeepers. No UN member state could match Canada's half-century contribution to peacekeeping, though ironically the Canadian military questioned its own participation in the activity. The backlash of the Somali, Rwandan, and Yugoslavian missions could not be averted, either for Canada or the United Nations. There had to be consequences.

The Great Canadian Decline: 1997–2006

By 1997 UN peacekeeping had shrunk markedly, partly since new missions were not required. Only 26,000 blue berets remained in the field, down from 70,000 in previous years. The number plummeted much further by 1998 with only 15,000 UN peacekeepers deployed.

Canada was part of this downturn, but not for the same reasons. Another element entered the formula for Canada. It was the nation's mounting national debt and the pressing need to cut the annual deficit, which led to massive cuts in defence expenditures. The need for fiscal restraint coupled with the concern in Canada over the emotional costs on peacekeepers and its toll on the military caused the government to step back and reconsider. By 1997 only 254 Canadians[41] still wore the blue beret,

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41. Carol Off, *The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War*

though its numbers were higher in NATO's peace operation in Bosnia. The nation that had once contributed 10 percent of all UN peacekeepers now contributed less than 2 percent. Later, it was to fall to less than 0.2 percent.

UN peacekeeping, however, was bound to recover, though Canada's contribution did not follow suit. The new UN operations established in the late 1990s were relatively small and limited in scope, yet a UN rebound was in motion, and would become phenomenal in the twenty-first century.

A great test came in 1999 in Kosovo. The world community could not ignore Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing, a repeat of what it had earlier seen in Bosnia. NATO was the first to act. When peace negotiations failed to bring about a settlement, the Alliance decided to intervene with force, even without the sanction of the UN Security Council, which was skewered by Russia's opposition and its threatened veto. Canada participated even in the absence of a UN mandate in the interest of saving lives. Determined to ensure Kosovo did not become another Bosnia, Canada contributed to a massive air campaign in March 1999. Though providing only 2 percent of the aircraft, Canada flew nearly 10 percent of the patrol missions.[42]

When the air campaign ended, the Security Council established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to rebuild and administer the province. NATO, not the UN, was given the military mission of "peace support" (to use NATO terminology for peacekeeping), creating the Kosovo Force (KFOR), operating under UNMIK. Canadians contributed 1,450 troops to KFOR, as well as advanced equipment like the Coyote armoured reconnaissance (recce) vehicle.[43]

The second half of the nineties also saw a series of missions in Haiti that helped bring temporary stability and some law and order to the troubled island. These included the United Nations Mission in Haiti

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(Vintage Canada, 2010), 78.
42. Carol Off, *The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War* (Vintage Canada, 2010), 86.
43. W. A. Dorn, *Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology and Innovation in UN Peace Operations* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2011), 147–149.

(UNMIH, 1993–96), the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UN-SMIH, 1996–97), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UN-TMIH, 1997), and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH, 1997–2000). Canada provided 500–600 military personnel at a given time to UNMIH and UNSMIH and was rewarded with the Force Commander position for UNTMIH. Over 600 Canadian police officers[44] served in Haiti between 1994 and 2001 both for training and technical assistance to the Haitian National Police.

Canada also sent police officers to serve in the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA 1997) designed to verify the agreement between the Guatemalan government and revolutionaries. In 1999, more Canadian police served with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which observed the cease-fire and disengagement of forces between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States. It continues with a toe hold of 5–10 staff officers to this day.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), established in 1999, made use of Canadian police and civilians, but not Canadian military personnel. The mission oversaw a successful referendum on 30 August, in which the Timorese people voted in favour of independence. Indonesian forces, both military and militia, then instituted a reign of terror on the Timorese that only ended when tremendous international pressure was applied on the Indonesian government, including the threat of denying loans from the International Monetary Fund. Indonesia quickly capitulated and allowed an Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to enter the half-island. Canada deployed troops, two C-130 aircraft, and an operational support ship, HMCS *Protecteur*, as part of this UN-mandated mission, though with embarrassingly slow speed, given the setbacks on the Canadian ships during the Pacific crossing. Canadian soldiers were sent to a difficult part of the island in the border province with Indonesia's West Timor. Canada briefly transferred a 280-strong infantry company to the subsequent mission, the

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44. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Peacekeeping: 2000-2001 Annual Review,* *11.*

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which governed the country until newly elected leaders could take over the responsibility two years later.

The rise and fall in Canadian contributions are seen in the graph of Figure 1.1. NATO took over peacekeeping duties in Bosnia in 1996, so Canada sent most of its deployed troops to NATO, not the United Nations. As well, UN peacekeeping itself declined to a small number for several years. It was only with the dawn of the new century that the world organization saw a surge in demand for its missions. Canada, like most developed world countries, did not participate in this. But Canada did maintain approximately 200 troops (logistics personnel) in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). Elsewhere, Canada only sent forces for two small and short increases. One was part of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) to which 450 troops were deployed along with Canada's Coyote reconnaissance vehicle to monitor movements across the temporary security zone. The other surge was to Haiti after President Jean Bertrand Aristide was forced from office in 2004. Canadian soldiers deployed alongside US forces and then were re-hatted as UN peacekeepers before being withdrawn. But these were short (six month) non-rotating deployments.

In the new century, the Liberal governments of Jean Chretien and Paul Martin looked favorably upon peacekeeping, but the military was less than enthusiastic. Stung by the experiences of UN peacekeeping in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, many senior officers preferred to serve under NATO. Then, after the 9/11 attacks on the USA, Canada began its decade-long engagement in Afghanistan, giving National Defence Headquarters a ready excuse not to deploy with the United Nations. After Canada's substantial deployment into Kandahar in 2006, Afghanistan became the main preoccupation of the Canadian Forces. Canada became virtually a single mission military and Canadian peacekeeping suffered even more.

## Conservative Government: Further Decline (2006–15)

Figure 1.1. Canadian contributions of uniformed personnel (military and police) since 1950, showing the peak number for each year and the missions giving rise to the peaks.

Sources: Canada, "Canadian Forces Overseas Operations" (2019), available at https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations.html ; Canada, Canadian Armed Forces, "Past Operations" (2019), available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/index.page ; Canadiansoldiers.com, "Peacekeeping," available at http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/history/peacekeeping/peacekeeping.htm
Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 260–261; United Nations, "Troop and Police Contributors" (2019), available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

This shift to a counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan suited well the newly elected Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.[45] It did not share the Liberal Party's sense of ownership of "Pearsonian" peacekeeping. Instead, it strongly identified with the Canadian combat mission in southern Afghanistan. Within two months after coming into power in January 2006, the Conservatives withdrew the 200 or so Canadian logisticians serving in the UN mission in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). This brought Canada to a new low in its UN contribution: only about 60 Canadian troops, while in Afghanistan the contributions to the NATO mission surged to over 2,500. The Canadian contribution of troops in Afghanistan stayed at this level throughout the Kandahar deployment (2006–2011).

The need for police, however, escalated in UN missions, especially in Haiti. As a result, Canada found itself in the unusual position of providing more police officers than soldiers to UN missions. The United Nations also relied on Canada to provide successive Police Commissioners for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The job carried a responsibility to oversee the 2,000 UN police in MINUSTAH and exerted strong influence over thousands in the Haitian National Police.

Even with the police contribution, the number of uniformed Canadians in peacekeeping remained small. Canada dropped in rank to 70 out of about 120 countries, far down from its former number one spot. While the number of uniformed personnel has remained small in recent decades, in a few ways Canada's peacekeeping contribution and legacy was maintained. Financially, Canada continued to be the 8th largest contributor. This was not an act of benevolence but a requirement under the UN system of national assessments, which are roughly proportional to a nation's GNP. Canada could boast that it has consistently paid its dues "in full, on time and without conditions" unlike its neighbor to the south.

Canada continued to chair the Working Group of the UN's Special

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45. Kevin Spooner, "Legacies and Realities: UN Peacekeeping and Canada, Past and Present," in Collin McCullough and Robert Teigrob, eds., *Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits and Prospects* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016), 214.

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, called the Committee of 34 or C34—denoting the number of original members, which had swelled to 124 states. Canada assumed this role decades earlier and the Conservative government was not so hostile to the United Nations that it would shirk this inherited responsibility.

At UN headquarters, however, Canadian military presence in New York fell off the radar. By 2007, there was not a single Canadian officer in the Office of the Military Adviser (OMA) at UN headquarters, although over 70 other countries had seconded one or more officers to OMA. This was only slightly corrected in 2010 when a Canadian colonel took the leadership of the Military Planning Service at UN headquarters but another Canadian was not sent to OMA when he retired in 2014.

Despite government apathy in peacekeeping, the Canadian public continues to view peacekeeping as Canada's most important contribution to the world. In this, the Conservative government was not in step with the opinion of the Canadian population, as well as the perception of Canada in the international community. But the government changed after the election of 2015. One can see these similar domestic influences, reinforced in the following chapters by Carroll and Londey, but in particular Michael Holm's discussion of the same disconnect between supportive American public opinion and a lack of governmental commitment to peacekeeping.

Trudeau Government: Reality Not Meeting Rhetoric

Upon election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised that Canada would re-engage in UN peacekeeping. He gave explicit instructions to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in the minister's Mandate letter (12 November 2015) to strongly support United Nations peace operations. The government made major pledges at the Peacekeeping Ministerial in London, UK (8 September 2016) of "up to" 600 military and 150 police. The Prime Minister made additional pledges at the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Vancouver on 15 November 2017.[46]

46. Prime Minister, "Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter" (November

Despite the promises and rhetoric, the Canadian contribution to peacekeeping fell to a lower level than under the Harper government. In May 2018, it reached an all-time low: 19 military and 21 police. Not since Pearson proposed the first peacekeeping force had the numbers been lower. While the Trudeau government sought to champion an increase in women from around the world contributing to UN peace operations, the Canadian numbers dropped to only one military women (in South Sudan) and five policewomen (all in Haiti) in peacekeeping.

Canadian military leadership in UN operations was also lacking: while Canada had provided nine military commanders of UN peace operations in the 1990s, it has not won the honour in the subsequent two decades. It missed an opportunity to provide a force Commander to the UN mission in the Congo in 2007, in Mali in 2017 and it posted no one to the Office of Military Affairs in New York, an office that a Canadian general once headed (Maurice Baril, 1992–95).[47]

However, Canada briefly re-engaged in UN peacekeeping in a limited way in 2017–18. In July 2018 it provided the UN mission in Mali with an aviation task force of eight helicopters and an aeromedical team, involving an estimated 250 personnel in total. This was a substantial contribution, but the commitment was only for one year. And this would be less than the half of the maximal pledged military contribution (600 personnel). This contingent was withdrawn in 2019, despite repeated UN requests to reconsider.[48] Furthermore, a new mission for Canadian police contributions was not announced. Canada's contribution fell to an all-time low afterwards of 34 personnel in August 2020 and has stayed low.[49]

12, 2015), available at https://www.walterdorn.net/269. UK, "Pledge Slide Show" at Peacekeeping Ministerial, London, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/un-peacekeeping-defence-ministerial-london-2016.

47. See Walter Dorn, "Tracking the Promises: Canada's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping," available at https://www.walterdorn.net/256.

48. It was cited that the Canadian helicopters and personnel were required for Canadian domestic operations., Branka Marijan, "Canada's reluctant participation in peacekeeping in Mali: What it reveals," Project Ploughshares (April 24, 2019); available at https://ploughshares.ca/2019/04/canadas-reluctant-participation-in-peacekeeping-in-mali-what-it-reveals/.

49. See Walter Dorn, "Tracking the Promises: Canada's Contributions to UN

Conclusion

Throughout the UN's twentieth century history, Canada provided key leadership, personnel, and equipment to assist with the evolution of peacekeeping. At the top of the list is Lester Pearson, aptly called the father or co-founder of UN peacekeeping forces. Included in the list are many UN force commanders: from Brigadier-General Angle who died while on service in Kashmir (1950) to Major-General Burns who commanded the first UN peacekeeping force (1956) to Major-General Dallaire who won national and international acclaim for his conscientious efforts to mitigate the inhuman avalanche of the Rwandan genocide (1994). Later, Brigadier-General Robin Gagnon stood on strong moral principle to lead the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH).

It was not only Canadian generals who made personal sacrifices to lead peacekeeping missions. Many soldiers and military aviators lost their lives in the activity. Until 2003, Canada was the nation that had lost the largest number of personnel (then overtaken by India), an undesirable honour but nevertheless one that indicates a history of deep commitment. Canada was the only country to contribute to all the UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War. It maintained a leadership position well into the mid-1990s, before the number of Canadian troops fell precipitously (see the graph in Figure 1.1).[50]

In the twenty-first century, UN peacekeeping surged: the world organization deployed more peacekeepers to hot spots than at any time in the organization's history. The number of UN peacekeeping personnel in the field grew more than fivefold from 2000 to 2015 but Canada did not contribute to the surge. Canadian contributions stagnated and then declined. During the presidency of Donald Trump (2016–2021), UN peacekeeping declined as a whole in numbers under US pressure and Canada made one major but short effort (Mali) to increase the number of Canadian

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Peacekeeping," available at https://www.walterdorn.net/256.
50. See Kevin Spooner, "Legacies and Realities: UN Peacekeeping and Canada, Past and Present," in Collin McCullough and Robert Teigrob. *Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits, Prospects* (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2017).

personnel deployed.

In the early 2020s, with about 90,000 military and police serving in 14–16 UN-led peacekeeping missions, the UN deploys, supports, and directs more uniformed personnel in field operations than any actor in the world, including the US government – more than the UK, France, China, and Russia combined. However, Canada moved from its number 1 spot to 81st in rank. Many more troops deployed in other types of operations, especially for NATO on traditional combat-oriented ones like the Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia.

Since 1999, not only has the number and size of UN missions grown, but UN missions are now more robust, more multi-faceted, and more complex, though still inadequate to meet the ambitious tasks. The mandates include the protection of civilians, thanks in part to a Security Council resolution advanced by Canada in 1999. The rise in demand for peacekeeping has been most notable in Africa, where more than 72,000 peacekeepers are deployed in places like Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and South Sudan. The demand for peacekeeping is expected to rise, not fall, in coming years, given the dire state of war-torn areas of the world. Contributions from experienced countries with advanced military and logistics remain much needed to create more operational capacity.

The future of the world would be brighter if countries make increased and sustained contributions to UN peacekeeping, especially countries like Canada with militaries that are well trained, combat-ready, multilingual, and multi-dimensional. Contributors like Canada that have not been colonial powers but have a legacy of working for peace are especially welcomed in peace operations.

However, Canada is still not on track and the Trudeau government's repeated promises remained unfulfilled. Rhetoric remains lofty on paper and in speeches, but the Canadian government has yet to match its words with deeds. As a result, Canada's re-engagement has been slow and hesitating. Canada has not heeded its own advice to the world, when the Defence Minister Sajjan addressed the UN Security Council: "The time

for change is now and we must be bold."[51] It seems Canada has ignored the words of Lester Pearson when he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957: "We made at least a beginning then. If, on that foundation, we do not build something more permanent and stronger, we will once again have ignored realities, rejected opportunities, and betrayed our trust. Will we never learn?"

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51. Speech of Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan to the UN Security Council meeting on "Collective Action to Improve Peacekeeping," (28 March 2018). See also Walter Dorn and Peggy Mason, "Harjit Sajjan has Defaulted on Canada's Peacekeeping Promises," *The Globe and Mail* (9 August 2021), available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-harjit-sajjan-has-defaulted-on-canadas-peacekeeping-promises.