

Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-2007

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Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI) Research

- "Peacekeeping Satellites" (1987)
- "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping" (1994-95)
 - UN Archives: ONUC
- "The Cloak and the Blue Beret"
 - Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
- "Rwanda: Predicting and Preventing the Bloodbath" (1996)
 - "Deaf and blind in the field"
- "Intelligence at UN Headquarters? Zaire 1996-97" (2007)
 - I&R Unit (intell. Officers)
- Intelligence-led Peacekeeping in Haiti 2006-07 (2010)
 - Visit (Dec 2008)
 - Archival doc: AAR
 - Images from AAR; UN Photo/S.Paris, Internet

Haiti





MINUSTAH Mission Mandate

Security Council Resolution 1542 (2004)

UNDER CHAPTER VII

**SECURE AND
STABLE ENVIRONMENT**

**HUMAN
RIGHTS**

**POLITICAL
PROCESS**



Cité Soleil: Gang Rule



- “Taxation”
“Soldiers”
“Terror”
- No HNP entry
- Jordanian AOR
 - 6 killed
- Route Nat. No. 1
 - Extortion
 - Kidnapping

Dangerous Patrolling 2005



Op “Iron Fist” July 2005: Civilian casualties



One of the parishioners (R) fainted for three hours during a gun fight between U.N. forces and heavily armed gangs. Three children in the church were wounded by U.N. fire according to parishioners. Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Saturday, October, 21st, 2006.

See description of operation at:
http://www.blogtheberkshires.com/haiti/2007/02/un_cracks_down_on_gangs_reside.html

Public Anger



UN Vehicle Blocked by Crowds

- At UN Headquarters
- Crowd refuses to move, throws water
- Leader of the civil society group (Group of 184) Andre Apeid intervened; cleared the way
- 16 January 2006

Actionable Intelligence: “A Serious Problem”

- Lack of intell organization
 - A “dreadful oversight” (p.71)
 - Strategic & Operational
- General Heleno: “The UN failed to provide intelligence services ...” (p.72)
 - Operations based on rumours
 - Gang disinformation



Security Council Visits — Recommends JMAC



UN Photo/S. Paris

Resolution 1608 (22 June 2005)

“9. Calls upon MINUSTAH to make the **Joint Mission Analysis Cell** operational as soon as possible in order to pool and better use the information available to the MINUSTAH military, police and civilian components”

Early JMAC

- “Lacked necessary training”
- Difficulty providing useful, timely information
 - Discredited (“Dessaline army” gang)
 - Chief personnel security: “hearsay” as leverage
- Needed: strategic and tactical info; scenario-building
- J2 created July 2006
- “Channel all info through JMAC”

2006



New SRSG Edmond Mulet (centre)
visits Cité Soleil



UN Photo/Sophia Paris

VIP Close Protection Team

Elections 2006



UN Photo/Sophia Paris



Elections 2006



UN Photo/S. Paris

Negotiations; Kidnappings
Gang stranglehold had to be met with FORCE

Intelligence Bodies Developed

- Force intelligence (J2/U2)
- Battalions intelligence (S2)
- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC)

UN Police (UNPOL)

- Relied on JMAC
 - Seconded intell staff to JMAC
 - Crime analysts
 - Photo-interpreters
- “Intelligence-led policing”
 - Military partnership
 - HNP arrests
 - Formed Police Units (FPU) & Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units
- UNPOL contacts with local population
- JMAC target packages
 - Paid informants
 - Human source manager



UN Photo/



JMAC


Dziedzic and Perito (USIP, 2008)

“MINUSTAH’s JMAC has established the *gold standard* for intelligence support for planning and execution of operations mounted to defend and enforce the mandate

...

DPKO should capture the process, policies, precepts, and information collection plans that were key to JMAC’s success in Haiti and strive to replicate these in other missions that are threatened with illegal armed groups.”

JMAC in MINUSTAH



JMAC Intelligence

- Precision operations
- Targets and timing determined by intelligence
 - Gang leaders chosen: JMAC best info
- Evens' networks & behaviour patterns
 - Blue House and Jamaica Base
 - anticipate gangs' next move.

Strategic Assessment

- Based on gang psychology, UN assessment concluded:

“If outnumbered and outgunned, they [gang members] will attempt to delay and escape”

Intelligence on Gangs

Case: Offensive operations against
Evens Jeune

“Intelligence Preparation of the Environment”
(IPE)

Evens' Capabilities

■ Strength

- about 40-50 men



EVENS JEUNE



CLAUDE EVENS



EVEL ANDOU

■ Weapons

- Machine gun & semi-automatic assault rifles
- Ammunition stockpiled month before
- Molotov cocktails and hand grenades
- Shooters, based at the National School
 - Possessed infrared scope (night targeting)

■ Tactics

- 'robust networks of lookouts using cell phones, rooftop snipers, and gunmen who use women and children as human shields'

■ Funding Sources

- US\$ 25,000 to kill the would-be kidnappers of a prominent Haitian

An aerial photograph of Cité Soleil, a densely populated urban area. The image shows a complex network of narrow streets and tightly packed buildings, mostly in shades of brown and grey. A large, light-colored, rectangular area, possibly a sports field or a cleared lot, is visible in the center. The city is bordered by a body of water on the left and a more open, green area on the right. The text "Cité Soleil" is overlaid in the upper center.

Cité Soleil

Operations from Dec 2006-Feb 2007





STRONG POINTS

Operation “Blue House”



- Seized January 2007 using diversion
- Evens expelled people nearby to set fire to houses so resulting fire and smoke might force the Brazilian soldiers to leave their post. Not carried out.

UN Activities

- Daily patrols by UNPOL, HNP and force
- Strong Points
 - JMAC wearing their uniforms
 - Informants sometimes wearing uniforms (identity hidden)
 - Tactical actions, not “deep cover”

Sources

- *Human intelligence*
- *Imagery intelligence*
- *Signals intelligence lacking*

HUMINT

- Rich environment
- Wide-ranging disaffection with gangs
- Persons close to the gang leaders (including lovers)
- Low income in Haiti (more than half on less than \$1 per day)
- Toll-free 24/7 hotline in 2005 (tips)
- Hazard of false rumours

Technologies








- Aerial imagery

Not Used:

- Remote cameras
- Radars (aerial or ground surveillance)
- Seismic / acoustic sensors
- Signals interception (tactical or other)
- Cell phone blockers
- Tethered balloons with sensors


9 February 2007

OPERATION JAURU SUDAMERICANA

	COUNTRY	TROOP	APC
	BRAZIL	480	14
	BOLIVIA	60	5
	CHILE	25	4
	JORDAIN	12	12
	PARAGUAY	30	-
	PERU	50	3
	URUGUAY	60	6







VIAS DE ACESSO - 02 FEV 07





2.8m deep

3.0 m

4.8 m



Evolução da Base Jamaica – 10 Nov 05





8

2

1

4

10

11

6

5

3

9

7

12



Cache of buried weapons and ammunitions, besides the KAZOU kiosk.

Cache weapons and ammunitions under a construction of na abandoned house.



TUNNEL WHERE THERE IS A BURIED SHELTER

4,5 m THE SHELTER IS IN THE SOUTH PART OF THE TUNNEL





OVERLAY



Area of forbidden fire 1st phase



Area of forbidden fire 2nd phase



Area of forbidden fire 4th phase



Area of forbidden fire 3rd phase



Overlay of Operation
4th phase


























Personnel Line-up



UNPOL / FPU



280600Feb07

FPU Deployment

Soleil 9

2007-02-28_Beloney_AFTER ACTION REPORT 72 HRS - Op LpT NIVO.doc



Crowd Control



“Hundreds of U.N. peacekeepers raided Haiti’s largest slum Friday to arrest gang members.” - Ariana Cubillos/Associated Press

<http://wordpark.com/pettifog/2007/02/10/>













Photo # 141460 UN Photo/Logan Abassi
UN Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti. Brazilian UN peacekeepers patrol the Cité Soleil neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince during an operation to restore order in the area by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), after three hours of heavy fighting between gangs. Date: 09 February 2007

Evens

- Escaped
- Declared he was going to shoot himself
- Located six weeks later in Les Cayes, thanks to information supplied by the local population
- Arrested on 13 March 2007 by the HNP and transported by MINUSTAH helicopter to a jail in Port-au-Prince

Outcome

- SRSBG Edmond Mulet of Guatemala
 - Walk freely in Cité Soleil
 - Jubilant crowds
 - "Most satisfying moment of my service"
- Haitian man seriously injured during combat
 - Receiving first aid, told JMAC officer: *"I'm injured and maybe I will lose my leg but thank you. I have regained my freedom and my dignity."*



JMAC Intell. Methods & Products

- Simple 'scenario-building'
- 'Link analysis'
- Selection of targets: CARVER (scale 1 to 10)
 - Criticality, Accessibility, Return (or Recoverability of adversary), Vulnerability (of UN), Effect, and Recognizability
- 'Target packages'
 - Zachari: house played cards, arrested in military-UNPOL-HNP (Jan 2007)
 - Vulnerability analysis
- Weekly intelligence briefing for SRSG
Weekly intelligence summary
Threat assessments for VIP visits and electoral processes
 - (Sitreps) daily and weekly for New York, as well as flash reports

Classification System

- Rudimentary
- Originally: restricted, confidential, strictly confidential, secret, top secret, for eyes only of XX
- Current: 'confidential'
 - Minimal, more and most sensitive
 - 'MINUSTAH Third Party Confidential'
- No control measures to enforce rules
 - No punitive measures
- Chief JMAC 'walked' sensitive documents to SRSG
- No document registration
- JMAC's stand-alone computer servers

Info Leaks from HNP

- Turn-coat HNP officers
- HNP asked to turn over cell phones at op start
 - targeting info provided later

December 2008





MISSION HOUSE
MEDICAL CLINIC
Providing Quality
Dental, General, and
Specialist Services

MEDICAL
CLINIC



12.20.2008



"Brezilyen yo swete yon lwaye
Nowèl ak yon Nouvo Anè Pwospè ak
tout ayisyen"



12.20.2008


CASA 212 - Uruguay





Intelligence-led Peacekeeping

- Significant progress in field 2005-
 - JOC/JMAC
 - Paid informants
- UN headquarters
 - I&R Unit 1994-99
 - OMA Assessment
- Classification systems
- Checks and balances
 - Transparency versus secrecy
- Lacking human analysts
- Lacking technological capabilities
 - Monitoring and surveillance
 - Tactical Sigint
 - Headquarters "home"
 - C-34
 - Studies



KEEPING WATCH

Monitoring, Technology & Innovation
in UN Peace Operations



A. Walter Dorn

Foreword by LGen The Hon Roméo A. Dallaire (Ret'd)

Making peacekeeping more
intelligent ...

with intelligence

