Intelligence-led Peacekeeping:
UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), 2006-2007

Military and Police Advisors Community, New York, 24 May 2011

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Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI) Research

- “Peacekeeping Satellites” (1987)
- “Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping” (1994-95)
  - UN Archives: ONUC
- “The Cloak and the Blue Beret”
  - Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
- “Rwanda: Predicting and Preventing the Bloodbath” (1996)
  - “Deaf and blind in the field”
  - I&R Unit (intell. Officers)
- Intelligence-led Peacekeeping in Haiti 2006-07 (2010)
  - Visit (Dec 2008)
  - Archival doc: AAR
  - Images from AAR; UN Photo/S.Paris, Internet
MINUSTAH Mission Mandate


UNDER CHAPTER VII

SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT
HUMAN RIGHTS
POLITICAL PROCESS
Cité Soleil: Gang Rule

- "Taxation"
- "Soldiers"
- "Terror"

- No HNP entry

- Jordanian AOR
  - 6 killed

- Route Nat. No. 1
  - Extortion
  - Kidnapping
Dangerous Patrolling 2005

Photo # 105837 UN Photo/S. Paris
Op “Iron Fist” July 2005:
Civilian casualties

See description of operation at:
Public Anger

UN Vehicle Blocked by Crowds

- At UN Headquarters
- Crowd refuses to move, throws water
- Leader of the civil society group (Group of 184) Andre Apeid intervened; cleared the way
- 16 January 2006
Actionable Intelligence: “A Serious Problem”

- Lack of intell organization
  - A “dreadful oversight” (p.71)
  - Strategic & Operational

- General Heleno: “The UN failed to provide intelligence services ...” (p.72)
  - Operations based on rumours
  - Gang disinformation
Resolution 1608 (22 June 2005)

“9. Calls upon MINUSTAH to make the Joint Mission Analysis Cell operational as soon as possible in order to pool and better use the information available to the MINUSTAH military, police and civilian components”
Early JMAC

- “Lacked necessary training”
- Difficulty providing useful, timely information
  - Discredited ("Dessaline army" gang)
  - Chief personnel security: "hearsay" as leverage
- Needed: strategic and tactical info; scenario-building
- J2 created July 2006
- “Channel all info through JMAC”

Aldunate, pp.71-72, 148
New SRSG Edmond Mulet (centre) visits Cité Soleil

VIP Close Protection Team
Elections 2006

UN Photo/Sophia Paris
Elections 2006

Negotiations; Kidnappings
Gang stranglehold had to be met with FORCE
Intelligence Bodies Developed

- Force intelligence (J2/U2)
- Battalions intelligence (S2)
- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC)
UN Police (UNPOL)

- Relied on JMAC
  - Seconded intell staff to JMAC
    - Crime analysts
    - Photo-interpreters

- “Intelligence-led policing”
  - Military partnership
  - HNP arrests
  - Formed Police Units (FPU) & Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units

- UNPOL contacts with local population

- JMAC target packages
  - Paid informants
  - Human source manager
Dziedzic and Perito (USIP, 2008)

“MINUSTAH’s JMAC has established the gold standard for intelligence support for planning and execution of operations mounted to defend and enforce the mandate...DPKO should capture the process, policies, precepts, and information collection plans that were key to JMAC’s success in Haiti and strive to replicate these in other missions that are threatened with illegal armed groups.”
JMAC in MINUSTAH

Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)

- Force Commander (FC)
  - Chief Intel Advisor to FC
- Administrative Unit
- Strategic Analysis Unit
  - Analysts (2)
    - Political Affairs
    - Human Rights
    - Justice
    - Civil Affairs
    - Humanitarian
    - DDR
- Operational Analysis Unit
  - Military (6)
    - Military (Source Management)
    - Military (Data/Software)
    - Police
    - Police, Source Management
    - Security (2)
    - Security (Data/Software)
- Collection Analysis Unit
  - Police (7)
- Chief JMAC
  - Deputy Chief JMAC (Chief Intel Advisor to Chief Security Advisor)
- Police Commissioner (PC)
  - Chief Intel Advisor to PC
JMAC Intelligence

- Precision operations

- Targets and timing determined by intelligence
  - Gang leaders chosen: JMAC best info

- Evens’ networks & behaviour patterns
  - Blue House and Jamaica Base
  - anticipate gangs’ next move.
Strategic Assessment

- Based on gang psychology,
  UN assessment concluded:

  “If outnumbered and outgunned, they [gang members] will attempt to delay and escape”
Intelligence on Gangs

Case: Offensive operations against Evens Jeune

“Intelligence Preparation of the Environment” (IPE)
Evens’ Capabilities

- **Strength**
  - about 40-50 men

- **Weapons**
  - Machine gun & semi-automatic assault rifles
  - Ammunition stockpiled month before
  - Molotov cocktails and hand grenades
  - Shooters, based at the National School
    - Possessed infrared scope (night targeting)
Tactics

- ‘robust networks of lookouts using cell phones, rooftop snipers, and gunmen who use women and children as human shields’

Funding Sources

- US$ 25,000 to kill the would-be kidnappers of a prominent Haitian
STRONG POINTS
Operation “Blue House”

- Seized January 2007 using diversion
- Evens expelled people nearby to set fire to houses so resulting fire and smoke might force the Brazilian soldiers to leave their post. Not carried out.
UN Activities

- Daily patrols by UNPOL, HNP and force
- Strong Points
  - JMAC wearing their uniforms
  - Informants sometimes wearing uniforms (identity hidden)
    - Tactical actions, not “deep cover”
Sources

- Human intelligence
- Imagery intelligence
- Signals intelligence lacking
HUMINT

• Rich environment
• Wide-ranging disaffection with gangs
• Persons close to the gang leaders (including lovers)
• Low income in Haiti (more than half on less than $1 per day)
• Toll-free 24/7 hotline in 2005 (tips)

• Hazard of false rumours
Technologies

- Aerial imagery

Not Used:
- Remote cameras
- Radars (aerial or ground surveillance)
- Seismic / acoustic sensors
- Signals interception (tactical or other)
- Cell phone blockers
- Tethered balloons with sensors
9 February 2007

Images from MINUSTAH AAR
THE SHELTER IS IN THE SOUTH PART OF THE TUNNEL.
Evolução da Base Jamaica – 10 Nov 05
Cache weapons and ammunitions under a construction of an abandoned house.

Cache of buried weapons and ammunitions, besides the KAZOU kiosk.

TUNNEL WHERE THERE IS A BURIED SHELTER

4.5 m THE SHELTER IS IN THE SOUTH PART OF THE TUNNEL
Area of forbidden fire 1st phase
Personnel Line-up
“Hundreds of U.N. peacekeepers raided Haiti’s largest slum Friday to arrest gang members.” - Ariana Cubillos/Associated Press

http://wordpark.com/pettifog/2007/02/10/
UN Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti. Brazilian UN peacekeepers patrol the Cité Soleil neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince during an operation to restore order in the area by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), after three hours of heavy fighting between gangs. Date: 09 February 2007
Evens

- Escaped
- Declared he was going to shoot himself
- Located six weeks later in Les Cayes, thanks to information supplied by the local population
- Arrested on 13 March 2007 by the HNP and transported by MINUSTAH helicopter to a jail in Port-au-Prince
Outcome

• SRSG Edmond Mulet of Guatemala
  • Walk freely in Cité Soleil
  • Jubilant crowds
  • “Most satisfying moment of my service”

• Haitian man seriously injured during combat
  • Receiving first aid, told JMAC officer: “I'm injured and maybe I will lose my leg but thank you. I have regained my freedom and my dignity.”
- Simple ‘scenario-building’

- ‘Link analysis’

- Selection of targets: CARVER (scale 1 to 10)
  - Criticality, Accessibility, Return (or Recoverability of adversary), Vulnerability (of UN), Effect, and Recognizability

- ‘Target packages’
  - Zachari: house played cards, arrested in military-UNPOL-HNP (Jan 2007)
  - Vulnerability analysis

- Weekly intelligence briefing for SRSG
  - Weekly intelligence summary
  - Threat assessments for VIP visits and electoral processes
    - (Sitreps) daily and weekly for New York, as well as flash reports
Classification System

- **Rudimentary**

- Originally: restricted, confidential, strictly confidential, secret, top secret, for eyes only of XX

- Current: ‘confidential’
  - Minimal, more and most sensitive
  - ‘MINUSTAH Third Party Confidential’

- **No control measures to enforce rules**
  - No punitive measures

- Chief JMAC ‘walked’ sensitive documents to SRSG

- No document registration

- JMAC’s stand-alone computer servers
Info Leaks from HNP

- Turn-coat HNP officers
- HNP asked to turn over cell phones at op start
  - targeting info provided later
“Brezilyen yo swete yon Jwaye
Nowèl ak yon Nouvo Ane Pwospè ak
tout ayisyen”

12.20.2008
Intelligence-led Peacekeeping

- Significant progress in field 2005-
  - JOC/JMAC
  - Paid informants

- UN headquarters
  - I&R Unit 1994-99
  - OMA Assessment

- Classification systems

- Checks and balances
  - Transparency versus secrecy

- Lacking human analysts

- Lacking technological capabilities
  - Monitoring and surveillance
  - Tactical Sigint
  - Headquarters “home”
  - C-34
  - Studies
KEEPING WATCH
Monitoring, Technology & Innovation in UN Peace Operations

A. Walter Dorn
Foreword by LGen The Hon Roméo A. Dallaire (Ret'd)
Making peacekeeping more intelligent ...

with intelligence