PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

AJP-3.4.1

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JULY 2001

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
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARISATION (MAS)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

July 2001

1.   AJP-3.4.1 - PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS is a NATO UNCLASSIFIED publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2181.

2.   AJP-3.4.1 is effective upon receipt.

Jan H ERIKSEN
Rear Admiral, NONA
Chairman, MAS

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CHAPTER	RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS
1	US
2	
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4	
5	US
6	BE
7	

NATION	RESERVATIONS
BE	Paragraph 0646. Belgium considers that, within an HQ, CIMIC is entirely a staff function. Accordingly, it is a J9 responsibility to advise the JFC. (Ref AJP-3)
US	a. Paragraph 0117.c. The US does not agree with text stating that the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is, in conjunction with the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, 'the UN focus for all mine and munitions related matters'. b. Paragraph 0516. The US does not agree with the following concluding words: 'and designation with, for example, Laser Target Marking (LTM)'.

ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION – 3.4.1

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Allied Joint Publication – 3.4.1 (AJP-3.4.1) July 2001 Edition,
is promulgated

As directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Change Date	Date Entered	Effective Date	By Whom Entered

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PREFACE

0001. In April 1999 during a summit of the Heads of State and Government of the NATO Nations in Washington D.C., an updated Strategic Concept was approved. This committed the Alliance not only to the defence of its members but also to peace and stability in its region and periphery. It thus broadly defined two types of NATO military operations - Article 5 Collective Defence Operations and non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO). Peace Support Operations (PSO) are continually developing within the context of CRO. Such operations are designed to tackle the complex emergencies[1] and robust challenges posed by collapsed or collapsing states in an uncertain and evolving strategic environment. PSO are conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation, such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). They involve military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified condition. They involve a spectrum of activities, which may include Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping as well as Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, Peace Building and Humanitarian Relief.

0002. The purpose of this Allied Joint Publication (AJP) is to develop and describe military doctrine for the conduct of PSO. In so doing it aims to guide and inform those involved at both the strategic and operational levels in the conduct of NATO and NATO-led PSO. As such, it should be of use to both NATO and partner Nations. The document is not intended to be overly prescriptive but does incorporate the lessons learned by NATO military forces in the Balkans and by Nations' forces elsewhere.

0003. The response to complex emergencies generally involves both military and civilian elements. Indeed, the military role is normally to create the necessary conditions for other organisations to do their work and so create a stable, self-sustaining secure environment for the longer term. PSO are thus characteristically multifunctional and multi-layered activities. The military doctrine presented here demonstrates this essential partnership and should be read with the wider political and civilian aspects of conflict resolution in mind.

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[1] See Glossary.

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CHAPTER 5 – MILITARY CAPABILITIES

CHAPTER 6 – OPERATING IN A PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

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ABBREVIATIONS

CHAPTER 1 - THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

0101.   The context for the 1NATO response to complex emergencies is described in MC 327/2 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO). This Chapter describes the strategic environment for Peace Support Operations (PSO), encompassing political aspects together with factual information covering NATO and other relevant organisations.

Section I - Political Control and Guidance

0102.   Normally NATO will be invited to act in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the United Nations (UN) or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In exceptional circumstances, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) may decide to take unilateral action. That authority will issue a mandate, for example a UN Security Council resolution, which provides direction and authority to the participants. If NATO agrees to support a mission under the auspices of another organisation, the NAC retains the direction and authority for the deployment of NATO forces.

0103.   **Mandate Development**. The mandate from other authorities should, wherever possible, have been developed in consultation with the NAC if NATO forces are to be involved. It should give a clear political end state. The authority and parameters for the NATO operation will be issued in the form of an Initiating Directive. This will establish:

   a.   Legitimacy of the operation.

   b.   Nature of the operation.

   c.   Strategic objectives and political / military end-state.

   d.   Strategic Mission and Tasks.

   e.   Freedoms, constraints and restraints.

   f.   Rules of Engagement (ROE) guidance.

   g.   Expected Duration (if possible).

   h.   Logistics and key supporting aspects.

   i.   Civil-military co-ordinating mechanisms.

0104.   **Political Primacy**. The other authority will nominate a senior political authority in the area of operations; in the case of the UN, this individual will normally be designated as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), while in the case of the OSCE the designation will be Head of Mission (HoM). The senior political authority will coordinate with the activities of all elements in theatre to achieve coherent progress towards the political

end state. NATO forces will be one of those elements, with a military strategic objective and operational plan approved by the NAC which contributes towards achievement of the political end state. While the NAC always remains the political authority for NATO forces, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will need to liaise closely with the senior political authority to ensure unity of effort for the overall mission.

0105. **Objective**. The military/strategic objective of a PSO will be defined in the NAC Initiating Directive as clearly as possible having due regard for other strategic objectives and the political end state identified in the other organisation's political mandate. This will allow NATO military authorities (NMAs) in co-ordination with the IFC to develop OPLAN military objectives in concert with the activities of civilian agencies to facilitate progress towards the desired end state. It is important that the military/strategic objective reflects a realistic military/strategic end state that allows withdrawal of NATO forces at an appropriate stage before the final political end state. It is also important that military commanders have visibility of the objectives of other agencies involved in the operation and clearly understand the part that each will play in achieving the desired end state.

0106. **Multifunctional Response**. Complex emergencies require a response which co-ordinates the actions of military, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies involved, to include international, governmental, non-governmental, and private voluntary organisations. As a PSO is multidimensional in tasks and participation, co-operation between all participating elements and co-ordination of all agencies is essential to achieve the strategic objectives and political end-state. Such a composite response should be designed to control, contain and redress the immediate and underlying causes and symptoms of the problem such that the operation can progress towards a lasting settlement.

0107. **Co-ordinating Mechanisms**. Having specified the political end-state, strategic objectives, and main effort, the Operation Plan (OPLAN) should establish the mechanisms needed to ensure co-ordination, for instance, conferences and committees, communication and liaison networks. Within this framework, Alliance forces will co-operate with civil authorities in accordance with NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) policy and doctrine.

Section II – NATO

0108. **Alliance Strengths**. Over the years, NATO has established and maintained impressive and unique political and military structures designed to deter potential enemies and to defend members' territory from attack. These structures have proved adaptable and valuable assets in PSO. NATO would normally consider supporting only those missions where its capabilities are essential to their success. The most important NATO capabilities and strengths for PSO are detailed below.

0109. **Combined Joint Planning Staff**. The Bi-SCs' Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) has been actively involved in the planning and preparation of operations. This has provided valuable experience and a capable planning staff at the strategic level which could greatly facilitate the activities of the Operational Commander.

0110.   **Common Doctrine and Procedures**. Interoperability in any multinational operation is a critical requirement:

a.   The Alliance has developed doctrine and a wide range of NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAG) on procedures and equipment that can be applied to a PSO. Current doctrine and agreements on procedures provide a sound foundation for successful multinational military operations.

b.   Equipment interoperability, while not fully achieved, also supports the conduct of combined NATO military operations. A number of STANAGs, especially those related to operational and logistical procedures, have been shown to be both flexible and adaptable, and could be adopted by Non-NATO forces working alongside NATO Nations in a PSO.

c.   Since its inception, NATO has recognised the importance and value of common exercises and training on land, at sea and in the air. This essential experience is increasingly the basis by which Non-NATO forces can be prepared routinely to participate in PSO. This preparation is the foundation on which a military force can be generated when a mission is accepted by the NAC.

0111.   **Multinational Command and Control Structure**.

a.   NATO's military command structure is a particular strength. Since its inception, NATO has integrated diverse military forces to achieve common objectives using common doctrine. Alliance headquarters have established procedures for most types of operations and crises, and have gained the collective expertise to overcome the obstacles posed by differences in language, culture, and national military procedures. This experience is especially applicable to the initial stages of a PSO, when military units of different nations arrive in a new geographic area to form a multinational force.

b.   The January 1994 Brussels Summit directed the NAC to develop the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to facilitate a more effective and flexible conduct of all Alliance missions, including PSO, in co-operation with Partners as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In November 1996, the MC endorsed MC 389, the 'Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's CJTF Concept'. This directed the Strategic Commanders (SC) to establish an initial CJTF HQ capability as soon as possible. The CJTF capability will be available for the full range of Alliance military missions, as one of the potential options from the range of both political and military measures available to the Alliance. Although the CJTF capability, in principle, is available for Article 5 as well as non-Article 5 operations, it will primarily be employed for non-Article 5 CROs. The provisions for Partner participation in NATO-led CJTF operations are an integral part of the Alliance's CJTF capability. No specific provisions have been developed for the inclusion of non-NATO/non-Partner nations. However, to the extent possible, the provisions

developed for Partners will be applied on a case-by-case basis. When NATO's CJTF Capability has reached its Full Operational Capability, NATO can effectively and quickly establish a CJTF HQ by augmenting the nucleus provided from one of the three designated CJTF Parent HQs. Such a headquarters could be activated for a PSO mission, as well as for other crisis response operations.

    c.   NATO Nations have also agreed the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) Concept. Once implemented, it will task the Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILUs) on behalf of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and will co-ordinate joint sustainment of the military force within the JOA.

0112. **Alliance Infrastructure and Communications Systems**. A sound communications and command and control infrastructure is crucial to mounting and sustaining any operation. NATO's assets in this area would prove to be important assets for any PSO. Such resources could also be made available to support non-NATO elements participating in a NATO-led operation.

0113. **Reaction Forces**. Alliance forces, especially designated reaction forces, maintain a high state of readiness. They are especially responsive to short-notice operational requirements for PSO.

0114. **PfP and Other Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations Involvement**.

    a.   Decisions to invite Partners to contribute to NATO-led PSO will be taken by the NAC on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration NMA advice, thereby balancing political considerations and military effectiveness.

    b.   In accordance with its international mandate the NAC retains the ultimate authority to direct NATO operations. Partner Nations and other possible Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCN) should be involved in the process of developing political and strategic military guidance in accordance with the principles and phases of involvement outlined in the Political–Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations (PMF), PO (99)28, 20 Apr 99. This will be achieved through two forms of involvement: through National representatives and through Partner officers in international positions.

Section III - United Nations

0115. **The UN Charter**. NATO's strategic concept states 'The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area'[1]. The UN Charter provides the terms of reference for the various elements of the UN, and for

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[1] NAC –S(99)65 24 Apr 99. The Alliance Strategic Concept paragraph 15.

regional arrangements and agencies in fulfilling this responsibility. Although the Charter makes no specific reference to PSO, the three chapters which most relate to PSO are: Chapter VI, that deals with the pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter VII, that refers to such actions by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security and Chapter VIII, that deals with regional arrangements. Further details of the UN are in Annex 1A.

0116. **Establishment of a Mission**. Within the UN, the Security Council (UNSC) is the body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. UN mandated PSO are established through resolutions of the UNSC though in certain circumstances the General Assembly may establish a consent based peacekeeping operation. Alliance support of, or involvement in, PSO should, in principle, be within the context of the UN Charter and will be negotiated between the UN Secretariat, UNSC, NAC and national governments.

0117. **Mission Planning**. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has undergone a number of significant changes in the way it performs peacekeeping and more broadly PSO. Moving from predominantly unarmed or lightly armed observer and peacekeeping missions, the more complex challenges presented by the new strategic environment have caused the UN to expand its role in promoting peace and stability and to deploy multidimensional, multinational forces. Experiences over the past several years have resulted in a review of methods and capabilities. Additionally, the UN recognises, in line with Chapter VIII of its Charter, that it may need to seek the assistance of regional or other organisations with specific PSO capabilities. At the strategic level, the Secretary General's Peace and Security Executive Committee, consisting of the Under Secretaries General for Political Affairs and Peacekeeping, the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC) and the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, meet as required to review crises. The key elements of any UN response to a crisis will generally consist of elements from the following departments:

a. **The Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the planning, preparation, conduct and direction of all UN PSO. The DPKO is based in New York and headed by an Under Secretary General (USG).

b. **The Department of Political Affairs**. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) provides advice and support on all political matters to the Secretary General. It is based in New York and headed by an Under Secretary General.

c. **The Emergency Relief Co-ordinator**. The Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC) is the UN's principal policy advisor, co-ordinator and advocate on humanitarian issues. The mission of the ERC is to mobilise and co-ordinate the collective efforts of the international community to meet the needs of those exposed to suffering in disasters and emergencies, and to ensure the response is rapid, effective and integrated. The ERC and his office, the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are also responsible for Inter-Agency mechanisms and are the UN focus for all mine and munitions related matters.

    d.   **The High Commissioner for Human Rights**. The High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) is based in Geneva and is the focal point for human rights and the co-ordination of those issues within the entire UN system. The HCHR is likely to be increasingly involved in PSO and the scale of human rights abuses may justify a separate element in the political mission plan of the SRSG.

    e.   **The High Commissioner for Refugees**. The High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) is based in Geneva and is the focal point for all refugee issues and the co-ordination of these issues throughout the UN system. The HCR and his office, generically referred to as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), will normally take the lead in responding to crises where a refugee problem is paramount.

0118. **The UN System**. There are many UN, international and inter-governmental organisations, which may be engaged in a PSO. One or another organ of the United Nations is normally the lead agency for international involvement in a particular country. In a crisis involving refugees and relief assistance, for example, the lead agency may either be OCHA or UNHCR. Specialised agencies within the UN system, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) or the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) will often also play a key role in complex emergencies. The specialised agencies generally have subsidiary regional organisations which also could come into play. The UN System also includes two of the major international lending institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD).

Section IV - International and Intergovernmental Organisations

0119. **International Organisation for Migration**. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is an intergovernmental organisation currently[2] with 76 member states and 45 observer states. Although established outside the UN, IOM holds observer status in the UN General Assembly. IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. It acts with its partners such as UNHCR to:

    a.   Assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration.

    b.   Advance understanding of migration issues.

    c.   Encourage social and economic development through migration.

    d.   Work towards effective respect of the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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[2] As at 18 October 2000 (Source IOM website).

0120. **The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement**. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement consists of three independent parts: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the National Societies and the Federation:

    a.   **International Committee of the Red Cross**. The ICRC is financed by voluntary contributions by governments (85%), the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (10%) and private sources (5%). The mission of the ICRC is, on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, to protect and assist victims of international or non-international armed conflict and those affected by internal disturbances or tension.

    b.   **The National Societies**. In its own country a national Red Cross society serves as an auxiliary to the public authorities in humanitarian matters. Its primary task is to back up the military medical services in time of conflict.

    c.   **The Federation**. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies provides support for the humanitarian activities carried out by the national societies. By co-ordinating international relief operations in natural disaster situations and encouraging development aid, it endeavours to prevent and alleviate human suffering.

    d.   **International Committee of the Red Cross Principles**. In addition to International Humanitarian Law Treaties, the ICRC's duty is to uphold seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality.

    e.   **Field Operations to Assist and Protect Victims**. On the basis of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols the mission of the ICRC is to protect and assist victims of armed conflict, specifically to:

        (1)   Visit and interview, without witnesses, prisoners of war and detained or interned civilians.

        (2)   Provide aid to the populations of occupied territories.

        (3)   Search for missing persons and transmit messages to Prisoners of War (PW) and detained civilians.

        (4)   Offer services for the establishment of hospital zones and localities, and security.

        (5)   Receive requests for aid from protected persons.

        (6)   Exercise its right of initiative to pursue the above tasks and, in internal disputes, to offer its services to the parties to the conflict.

(7)   Exchange human remains and PW.

Section V - Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

0121.   The OSCE, as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe. The organisation also includes Canada and the United States and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing co-operative security and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of human rights, preventative diplomacy, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE is able to mandate certain PSO related activities, for example the Kosovo Verification Mission, and may request the support of NATO in conducting such operations. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical co-operation. Further details are in Annex 1B.

Section VI - Western European Union [3]

0122.   Arrangements for the use of Alliance assets and capabilities in WEU-led PSO are an essential element of the developing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. The CJTF concept provides linkage between NATO and WEU through the concept of WEU-led CJTF operations within the Petersberg missions.[4]

0123.   In the planning for these missions, Alliance assets and capabilities will be identified in the CJTF concept for WEU-led operations. At the European Union's June 1999 Cologne Summit it was decided to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence and to make arrangements in order to ensure the political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations so that the EU can decide and conduct such operations effectively. These arrangements include a political-military decision-making structure, a Military Staff, a Military Committee and others. Further details are in Annex 1C.

Section VII - International and Government Donors

0124.   Governments are by far the greatest source of funding for humanitarian aid and PSO. Governments provide support for the military response elements through their defence budgets and channel humanitarian aid (development and emergency) to a large number of other PSO elements through their donor agencies. These may be national donor agencies or

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[3] This section will be reviewed in the context of evolving EU work. The Cologne European Council in May 99 commissioned the preliminary work to allow the EU to fulfil its responsibilities in the area of the 'Petersberg Tasks'. It set a deadline for a decision by December 2000 at which time the Western European Union would be deemed to have 'completed its purpose'.

[4] In June 1992 WEU Ministers met at Petersberg near Bonn and agreed three categories of missions namely: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of crisis management situations, including peacemaking. (NATO Handbook 50th Anniversary Edition).

international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

0125. **Donor Channels**. Channels chosen by donors are changing. Government to government aid, which once accounted for the bulk of bilateral emergency aid, now only represents a small fraction of the total flow. Governments may still be an important channel but in complex emergencies when there is political instability, and the government infra-structure may be ineffective, multinational channels such as the UN, EU, World Bank and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), are increasingly favoured.

0126. **Nature of Donor Operations**. Donor operations are most often of a facilitating kind. For example, donors may become involved in organising logistics and setting up communication systems and information centres. Recent operations in Bosnia, using the military as managers and implementing partners, have been designed to create employment and civil development.

Section VIII - Non-Governmental Organisations

0127. NGO is an official term used in Article 71 of the UN charter. NGOs are private (primarily non-commercial) organisations generally motivated by humanitarian or religious values (the term Private Voluntary Organisation may also be used, see Glossary). The NGO sector is extremely diverse, including thousands of organisations differentiated by size, maturity, expertise, quality and mission. Increasingly, NGOs are willing to work with other national and international donors to achieve effective but non-political responses to humanitarian crises. Prominent examples of NGOs include Co-operative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

0128. **Missions and Values**. NGO missions might range from a general remit to 'alleviate poverty' to a specific mission to 'support health care services in communities affected by conflict'. An NGO's mission is usually underwritten by values or principles that guide their conduct and which may be expressed, among others, in terms of human rights, emphasising that their work promotes rights to life, food, water, health, freedom of expression, etc.

0129. **NGO Co-ordination and Liaison**. The proliferation of NGOs in humanitarian crises means that co-ordination and the harmonisation of activities is complex and time consuming. In the early part of a crisis, and before the deployment of a UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC), NGOs generally form some kind of ad hoc network or umbrella group or consortium to co-ordinate their activities. As emergencies escalate and the number of NGOs and donor funding increase, there is a commensurate increase in the need for co-ordination, and accountability to donors. This has the potential to develop into competition for funding and other resources, which can distort relationships and cause friction. The need to counter-act such negative pressures places an emphasis on regular liaison and communication at all levels. CIMIC provides an excellent mechanism for regular communication and liaison to take place between military and NGO representatives.

0130. **Relationships with the Military**.   In the past both the military and NGOs have tended to assume antagonistic stereotypes of one another. However, an increasing incidence of shared operational experiences has enhanced mutual understanding and contributed to more positive and constructive relationships. While the military should accept that NGOs may be working to their own agenda, military and NGO objectives will often be mutually reinforcing and therefore require harmonisation and co-ordination, if only to delineate areas of responsibility and rationalise potential areas of friction. Effective co-operation will have a major impact on the success of a mission. In this context it is important to recognise that in many PSO local (indigenous) NGOs may be among the few functioning social institutions with the ability to reach people in a helpful and constructive way. CIMIC will enhance effective cooperation between the military and NGOs in a PSO.

Section IX - The Corporate and Civil Sector

0131. Parties with commercial and financial interest in the arena might be persuaded to engage in post-conflict reconstruction activities. Multinational or large national companies developing or marketing a particular resource should be consulted on the economic implications during the development of the mission plan. The establishment of a working economy will almost certainly require the involvement of institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the EU. Their involvement should help create the financial environment into which companies can invest to support reconstruction and re-development. In addition, the civil sector may provide support and security services to the military force and NGOs and, by the use of local employment, assist the development of the local economy.

ANNEX 1A - UNITED NATIONS

1A1. The procedures for Alliance support of a particular PSO will be agreed by the NAC. Outlined below are the ways in which decisions would normally be taken in the case of a PSO authorised by a UN mandate, and the UN bodies that would be involved in the process.

Section 1 - Primary Decision-Making Bodies

The General Assembly

1A2. Composed of representatives from all UN members. While they have no executive powers, they do decide how costs will be apportioned for an operation.

The Secretariat

1A3. Composed of the Secretary General (SG), his advisors, and nine separate Departments and Offices. The Secretariat is charged with the administration of the UN and the implementation of its various obligations.

The Security Council

1A4. The focal point in the efforts to organise collective security, it is composed of 15 members. Five (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States) are permanent members (each with the power to veto resolutions), and ten others elected periodically by the General Assembly on the basis of regional representation.

1A5. The Security Council is vested with the exclusive authority to address matters of international peace and security; the General Assembly can act only if the Security Council fails to do so. The key point is that the Security Council decides on the mandates and the overall policy of peace-keeping. Never having implemented the Charter's provisions for it to exercise direct control over UN military operations, the UNSC has traditionally charged the SG with this responsibility, which is accomplished through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

1A6. DPKO (Figure 1A-1 overleaf) is responsible for all UN field operations, providing planning, preparation, conduct and direction. Its functions are to:

    a.   Provide management and direction.

    b.   Formulate policies and procedures.

Figure 1A1 - The Department of Peacekeeping Operations

c.   Arrange the provision of personnel, military units & equipment from contributing nations.

d.   Develop operational plans & methodologies.

e.   Undertake contingency planning.

f.   Propose resource requirements.

g.   Monitor & controls budgets & funds.

h.   Provide logistic & administrative support.

i.   Maintain contact with parties to the conflicts.

j.   Liase with Member States & agencies.

k.   Prepare the SG's reports.

## Section II - The UN Decision-Making Process

Figure 1A2 – The UN Decision Making Process: An Example[1]

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[1] Although this diagram implies that the appointment of a SR/SE takes place before the UNSC approves a mandate, this is not always the case. The first fact finding for proposed PSO mandates can be by the Secretary General, an international panel of jurists, the ICRC or a UN Commissioner.

Initiation

1A7.   There are four ways in which a potential PSO might be brought before the Security Council for action. Given the increasing sophistication of communications these avenues often will be used simultaneously:

   a.   Within the Security Council by a member state.

   b.   By the SG.

   c.   At the request of any member state.

   d.   At the request of a party to the dispute through a member state.

Preparation

1A8.   As a potential operation develops, the UN will employ its various capabilities to monitor, survey and prepare evaluations and assessments. A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) might be appointed and initial, informal contacts with potential troop contributors will be made. A preliminary in-country survey will be carried out and the Security Council given a report, which will include the concept of the operation, how it will be supported and financed, and a draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

1A9.   If the operation is approved by the Security Council a Force Commander (FC) will be appointed and a mandate issued. The concept of operations, including contributions and costing, will then be finalised.

Deployment Mission Execution and Redeployment

1A10. Once the deployment begins, the overall direction of the operation, including redeployment is in the hands of the SG, acting on behalf of, and being responsible to, the Security Council. The SG delegates the day-to-day operational direction to SRSG or FC if there is no SRSG: however, the SG usually retains direct control over policy and major decision-making within the scope of the mandate. This principle may limit the SRSG's, HoM's or JFC's freedom of action, but is generally required by the Security Council. The SG must report periodically to the UNSC on the status of the operation and the fulfilment of the mandate; at a minimum this will occur in conjunction with the periodic need for the UNSC to renew the mandate. The SG will also consult with the UNSC when there are significant developments which indicate the need for a changed mandate, a decision to commit more resources, or a decision to end the mission. Such consultations can occur at the initiative of either the SG or the UNSC.

ANNEX 1B - ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

1B1. The OSCE evolved in 1994 from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which began in the early 1970s as a multilateral forum for dialogue and discussion between East and West and culminated in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975. The principles laid down then remain valid today: security in Europe; co-operation in economic, scientific technological and ecological matters; and co-operation in humanitarian affairs. The OSCE is currently composed of 54 states.[1] All states have equal status and decision making is by consensus. The Chairman-in-Office (CIO), assisted by a SG, is responsible for the co-ordination and consultation on current OSCE business.

Section I - Primary Decision-Making Bodies

Summits of Heads of State or Government

1B2. The Heads of State or Government generally meet every two years and set priorities and provide orientation at the highest political level.

Ministerial Council

1B3. Comprising the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating States, the Ministerial Council is the central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE. It generally meets in non-summit years.

The Permanent Council

1B4. The Permanent Council, comprising the heads of national delegations to the OSCE, is responsible for the day-to-day operational work. It meets weekly for political consultation and decision-making, but can be convened as necessary to deal with emergency situations.

The Chairman-in-Office

1B5. The CIO is vested with overall responsibility for executive action. The CIO, who normally serves a one year term, is the Foreign Minister of the State that organises the current Ministerial Council Session. There are several groups and representatives who assist the CIO in their responsibilities.

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[1] The FRY was suspended in 1992.

The Secretary General

1B6.   The Secretary General (SG) serves for a three year term and acts as the representative of the CIO and is the OSCE's Chief Administrative Officer, ensuring implementation of OSCE decisions.

Section II - OSCE Relationship to the UN

Linkage

1B7.   According to OSCE documents, it will work with "due regard to, and in conformity to, UN responsibilities and actions." As such, the OSCE relationship with the UN is on the basis of a regional organisation, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It should be noted that under current policy, potential OSCE missions would not include peace enforcement.

Decision Making

1B8.   There is no Security Council equivalent body in the OSCE. The decision to initiate and dispatch a PSO would be taken by the Permanent Council and would need to be unanimous. The decision would also include the adoption of a mandate, which will form the basis of the operation. The OSCE may request Alliance support though all OSCE states are eligible to contribute as invited by the CIO.

Command and Control

1B9.   Should the OSCE take responsibility for a PSO, the Permanent Council would exercise overall political control and guidance. Operational guidance would be given to the CIO, assisted by an ad hoc group. Operational command in the mission area would be delegated to a Head of Mission (HoM). If requested, NATO support to such an operation would require the establishment of special procedures for the overall command and control of its and those Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations forces offered to the Alliance.

Section III – OSCE and Arms Control

1B10. Allies have legal obligations and political commitments to agreements on Arms Control and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) to which they are signatories. These agreements are instruments to enhance stability and security. They apply not only in peacetime, but also in times of crisis and can be a significant factor during crisis management by providing transparency, openness and predictability. Preparations for, and conduct of, PSO, will take account of agreements on Conventional Arms Control and CSBMs, which provide flexibility to meet legitimate operational security and force protection requirements as well as transparency needs.

ANNEX 1C - THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION [1]

Section I - The Council

1C1. The Council is the Western European Union's (WEU's) main body. Its task, set out in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, is to consider all matters concerning the application of the Treaty and of its Protocols and Annexes. It addresses all security and defence questions coming within WEU's sphere of responsibility. It is organised to exercise its functions on a permanent basis. It can be convened at any time at the request of a Member State.

The Council Of Ministers

1C2. The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and usually meets once every six months, in the country holding the WEU Presidency. At each Ministerial meeting, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of the Member States, Associate Members and Observers usually meet together in the morning. In the afternoon the same Ministers from all 28 countries meet to consider the WEU's consultative process and work.

The Permanent Council

1C3. The Permanent Council is WEU's central body in the day-to-day management of the Organisation. It tasks and co-ordinates the activities of its Working Groups. It is composed of Permanent Representatives, supported by Military Delegates. It meets as necessary - normally weekly. The Council may meet in different configurations, taking account of the status of various WEU nations. The current practice is that the Permanent Council alternates weekly between a meeting 'at 21' - Member States, Associate Members and Observers, and a meeting 'at 28' - all WEU nations.

The Chiefs of Defence Staff

1C4. The Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) meet twice a year prior to WEU Ministerial Councils, or on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary.

Section II - The Working Groups

1C5. The Permanent Council is helped in its work by a number of working groups. Some have standing missions and are assigned a particular role in times of operations. Some have mandates from the Permanent Council to work long-term issues. The overall organisational structure of standing supporting groups is shown at figure 1C1.

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[1] This section will need to be reviewed in the context of evolving EU work. The Cologne European Council in May 99 commissioned the preliminary work to allow the EU to fulfil its responsibilities in the area of the 'Petersberg Tasks'. It set a deadline for a decision by December 2000 at which time the Western European Union would be deemed to have 'completed its purpose'.

Figure 1C.1 - The Western European Union Organisation

Section III - Standing Group Responsibilities

The Council Working Group

1C6. The Council Working Group (CWG) is composed of representatives from national delegations - in many cases the Deputy Permanent Representatives. The CWG prepares all Council meetings and supports the Council in all political, institutional and general matters.

The Politico-Military Group

1C7. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is composed of national delegates representing their political and military authorities. It provides the Council with politico-military advice on issues concerning the operational role of WEU.

The Military Delegates Group

1C8. The Military Delegates Committee (MDC) is composed of the Military Delegates representing the CHODs. The MDC meets at the Council's request, to prepare for meetings of CHODs, to evaluate and advise on the military aspects of all planning and to monitor the military aspects of the Military Staff's work.

Section III - The Military Staff

1C9. A Military Staff has been established under the authority of the Council, principally to carry out planning for WEU operations and to establish and keep up to date the list of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). It operates under the 3 star Director of the Military Staff (DMS) who is responsible directly to the WEU Permanent Council. He has a combined joint staff of just over 60 from all WEU nations. Once WEU decides to address a crisis, the Council instructs the Military Staff to draft contingency plans, to include: the mission of the force, force packages drawn from the FAWEU list and command and control arrangements.

Section IV - Decision-Making Mechanisms

1C10. On the recommendations of the PMG, having considered advice from the Military Delegates Group, the Council will decide the mission and structure of the force. The Council appoints the Operation Commander and selects the Operation HQ, the FC and designates the Point of Contact (POC). If NATO assets and capabilities are used, the NAC, with the advice of the Military Committee, selects for proposal to the WEU Council the Operation Commander and the Operation HQ as well as, if foreseen, the FC and Force HQ. It will also designate a Point of Contact to serve as the Operation Commander's representative at WEU Headquarters in Brussels.

1C11. The Council will consider, adapt and agree to the Operation Plan formulated by the Operation Commander. An agreement has been reached on preliminary conclusions and transitional arrangements for the financing of WEU operations. These mechanisms and procedures are regularly tested, through exercises.

Section V - Command and Control

1C12. As no military command and control assets are permanently assigned to the WEU no permanent military structures exist below the Headquarters in Brussels. Therefore, operational headquarters made available by nations for planning purposes will be selected on a case-by-case basis.

1C13. There are a number of multinational HQ potentially available to the WEU for example EUROCORPS, MND(C), UK-NL AF, EUROMARFOR and EUROFOR. Since June 1996, the WEU can call upon NATO to assist the preparation and execution of a WEU-led operation through the provision of 'NATO assets'. This could include the nomination of an existing HQ or the activation of a CJTF HQ as the basis for command and control.

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CHAPTER 2 - THE NATURE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0201.   This Chapter establishes the basis for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the definition of success in them. It also discusses the factors affecting the achievement of success and examines in outline the types of operation that military forces are likely to undertake in PSO.[1]

0202.   The term Peace Support Operations is now widely used by many civilian agencies to describe their activities in complex humanitarian emergencies. PSOs are multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief.

0203.   All military operations are conducted with a degree of restraint, be that only an adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict. What distinguishes PSO from other military operations is the impartial approach by the Peace Support Force (PSF). PSO are neither in support of, nor against a particular party, but rather are conducted in an impartial and even-handed manner. PSO are designed to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create a self-sustaining peace. PSF actions are based upon judgements of the degree of compliance and/or non-compliance of the parties with the agreement between the parties and not against any bias or pre-determined designation.

0204.   Both the mandate from the appropriate international authority, and the NAC decision should distinguish a PSO from any other enforcement action or war with a designated enemy, by specifying a desired political end state rather than the achievement of military victory. An enforcement operation may attempt to change the correlation of local forces and impose a solution by force alone, and may be required as a precursor to a PSO. The objectives of a PSO will then refer to such issues as the restoration of peace and security, and support for the principles of the UN and International Humanitarian Law. In PSO, the active participation of the parties, in the formulation and achievement of the political end state will be essential. On the other hand, as military operations move towards war or enforcement, the need to engage the parties in dialogue will diminish until ultimately the specified strategic objectives and political end-state could be imposed on the parties without consultation.

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[1] Details on the principles of PSO may be found at Chapter 3 and details of military tasks may be found at Chapter 6.

Section I – Defining Success in Peace Support Operations

0205. In PSO, success will generally be related to the achievement of a number of pre-determined strategic objectives which form elements of the overall political end state and should be defined in the overall political mandate and the NAC Initiating Directive. The nature of PSO is such that these objectives will normally relate to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. The achievement of the political end-state will be the defining criteria for the success of the entire operation, including the military mission. The achievement of security related military objectives will usually be a precursor, or milestone on the way to attaining the political end-state.

0206. The achievement of military goals is relatively easy to state. However, the real or actual success of the operation is related to the daily circumstances of the local populace in the former conflict area and the realisation of a situation in which 'conflicts are no longer solved using force'. In PSO, overall success may be measured by the achievement of benchmarks (for example increased compliance, demobilisation and retraining of former combatants, and the ability of local authorities to guarantee security). A clearly defined set of criteria and associated operational guidelines enunciated by the senior political authority is thus critical to the success of the operation. The achievement of such milestones and the other strategic objectives related to the political end-state requires perseverance and the efforts of a wide range of civilian organisations and local agencies. The actual success of an operation will therefore be measured against the overall result and not just on the achievement of the military objectives.

0207. The achievement of the military objectives and the creation of a secure environment do not guarantee the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. But without security (and justice), the reconciliation, reconstruction and development programmes necessary to create a self-sustaining peace are unlikely to be effective. However, once the security related military objectives have been achieved, the attainment of the political end-state will require the mission's main effort to be switched from the PSF to the peace building activities of the civilian components of the mission. Without such a switch of main effort and a commensurate switch of funding and resources, the operation is unlikely to progress beyond that of a military stalemate.

Section II - Factors Affecting Success in Peace Support Operations

0208. In the conduct of PSO, military success will generally involve the enforcement of compliance and/or the building of consent such that there can be an incremental hand-over of responsibilities to military forces with lower combat capabilities, other security organisations and civilian agencies. As these conditions are achieved, military success may be manifest in a draw down of the PSF profile and an incremental withdrawal of military forces. Success in PSO is highly dependent on the successful transition to other forces.

0209. Mission success requires that the PSF must be adequately led, trained, organised, equipped and armed. This will give it credibility with the parties and thereby the ability to achieve its

operational objectives. A second ingredient for success is strict impartiality on the part of the PSF. Therefore a range of measures to counter the charges of partiality that will inevitably be raised are required. Finally, the professional conduct of the PSF must reinforce all aspects of the conduct of the mission. Key behavioural aspects are the correct attitude and conduct of the PSF personnel, their resolute and consistent responses, especially in cases of non-compliance, and a close and harmonious co-operation between national contingents.

0210. The PSF JFC must also take into account those factors that can inhibit the chances of success. The lack of support of the international community for the operation, and no less important, the lack of support from the local populace and the leadership of the parties are such factors. Others include the implicit tension between 'normal' military missions (i.e. combat operations) and those conducted during PSO; cultural aspects (i.e. related to the different cultural environment in the conflict area than that which a large part of the PSF is used to); to the multinational character of any PSF; and also the complexity of PSO in general.

0211. The challenges posed by PSO, in particular a feeling of impotence caused by limited ROE, can cause discontent within the PSF when the road to success is difficult and long. These problems can easily jeopardise the success of the PSF and can prompt the parties to try to exploit resulting national differences and disagreements. Such actions can be predicted and should be pre-empted by sound planning and leadership within the PSF. Commanders at all levels must continually be prepared to deal with these tensions and the threat that they pose.

Section III - Conflict Prevention

0212. Conflict prevention activities are normally conducted in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, military deployments designed to deter and coerce parties will need to be credible and this may require a combat posture and an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII. Conflict prevention activities may range from diplomatic initiatives, through efforts designed to reform a country's security sector and make it more accountable to democratic control, to preventive deployments of forces designed to prevent or contain disputes from escalating to armed conflict. Other conflict prevention activities may include military fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring.

0213. **Military Activities**. Military assets used for conflict prevention should generally be focused on the support they provide to the political and developmental efforts to ameliorate the causes of societal tensions and unrest before the commencement of conflict. Military activities will be tailored to meet the political and developmental demands but will generally fall within the following categories:

   a.   Early Warning.

   b.   Surveillance.

   c.   Training and Security Sector Reform.

     d.   Preventive Deployment.

0214. **Sanctions and Embargoes**. Sanctions and embargoes are actions which could be conducted by the Alliance, initially as an aid to conflict prevention. Subsequently sanctions and embargoes may be conducted in any PSO, enforced with varying degrees of military, economic and political pressure. The UNSC may attempt to pressure parties to reduce the level of hostilities in a conflict by selecting economic/trade or other (including military) sanctions and implementing them, when appropriate, by imposing embargoes. NATO air and maritime assets are capable and trained to execute and support these operations. Ground forces also have capabilities that may be employed in this role, for example through border surveillance. In such cases co-operation will normally be sought with customs organisations of NATO nations, due to their specific expertise in this field.

Section IV – Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping

0215. Increasingly, experience indicates that mandates for PSO are likely to require elements that involve a degree of PE. Nevertheless an understanding of the differing elements of PK and PE is necessary in order to inform decision making, particularly at the political level.

0216. **Peacekeeping**. PK operations are generally undertaken in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter in order to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement. A loss of consent and a non-compliant party may limit the freedom of action of the PK force and even threaten the continuation of the mission. Thus, the requirement to remain impartial, limit the use of force to self-defence, and maintain and promote consent would guide the conduct of PK.

0217. **Peace Enforcement**. PE operations normally take place under the principles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties to the conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. In the conduct of PE, the link between military and political objectives must be extremely close. It is important to emphasise that the aim of the PE operation will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel, coerce and persuade the parties to comply with a particular course of action. The provision of adequate military forces to establish a coercive combat capability is critical to any decision to deploy Alliance forces on a PSO.

0218. **Conduct**. The long term demands of peace require that coercive techniques be used with restraint and in conjunction with other techniques designed to promote co-operation and consent, and persuade the parties and local population to commit themselves to the peace building process. The approach that the PSF intends to adopt should be communicated clearly and by every means practical to the parties in conflict in order to persuade them to comply with the mandate, desist from the use of force and revert to peaceful means to achieve their objectives. Therefore, a PE force must be organised, equipped, trained and deployed to enforce compliance whilst also supporting the longer-term peace building process. In the case of PK, a PSF should utilise all other techniques available, other than the proactive use of

force, to gain and maintain the initiative. Those techniques are generally defined in terms of consent promotion or more traditionally as 'hearts and minds' techniques.[2]

0219. **The Selection of Peace Support Force Profile**.

a. **Assessment**. In determining whether a mission should be undertaken as a PK or a PE operation, a thorough estimate should be made of the operational conditions. This should include the likely level of compliance of the parties in conflict based on their attitudes both to each other and to any peace process. If a peace process has been agreed by the parties in conflict and it is considered that there is a genuine will and intention to abide by that process, a PK force only capable of using force in self-defence may be adequate. If the parties are disinclined to agree on a peace process, or to respect a peace agreement once negotiated, then a combat capable PE force will be needed to ensure compliance with the operation's mandate.

b. **Transition from PK to PE**. A PSF designed for PK will generally be lightly armed and thus incapable of enforcement. Any transition to PE from a mission only mandated for PK therefore requires a conscious political decision, a new mandate and more robust ROE. The PSF will need to be reinforced and reconfigured, physically and psychologically or replaced by a force configured for PE. It is normally not possible for a PSF to move from a PK to PE without a very significant operational pause unless the PSF as deployed was prepared for PE from the outset.

c. **Transition from PE to PK**. The aim of a PE force should be to conduct itself judiciously so as to lower its operational profile to one more akin to PK as soon as judged appropriate. As such, the management of any PE operation concerns the management of change. Transition from PE to PK will be judged upon compliance at the local level and will require the gradual introduction of those techniques appropriate to PK or the replacement of the PSF with a force configured for PK. The aim being to expand those areas where there is consent and compliance at the expense of areas of minimal consent and possibly non-compliance. Should a PE force find that on deployment the level of compliance is high it may be possible to lower its operational profile and adopt an approach more akin to PK from the outset. For such a PSF, a reversion to the use of enforcement techniques would be relatively straightforward, so long as the mandate and ROE had not been restricted.

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[2] Further details on military tasks within these operations may be found in Chapter 6.

Figure 2.1 - The Relationship Between Force Capability and Consent

0220. **The Relationship between Force Capability and Consent**.

a.   Figure 2.1, above, shows the relationship between Force Capability and Consent and introduces one of the fundamental doctrinal concepts of PSO. Intervention in the form of a PSO may be required during a crisis. If this occurs towards the left of the crisis section of the diagram, consent for the intervention by the receiving State will be high, and it may be possible to mount a 'traditional' Peacekeeping (PK) operation. In this situation the capability of the intervening Force to use force need not be high. As the level of consent reduces or becomes less certain to the right, the capability of the Peace Support Force (PSF) to use force will need to increase in order to be able to react appropriately. As PSF capability increases to allow greater use of force, its profile and activities become those for Peace Enforcement (PE) rather than PK. Levels of consent are highly unlikely to be uniform in time or space and thus the intensity of PSF actions may vary across the Joint Operations Area (JOA). This fluctuating level of consent could lead to the danger of insufficient Force capability in localised areas, and encourages the deployment of Forces with the capability and authority to conduct PE activities in all but the most stable situations.

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b.   A PSF will deploy with a mission to restore peace and stability in an even-handed and impartial way. Its activities will be guided by reference to this mission and they will have no designated enemy. If the situation deteriorates to the extent that there is no consent for a PSO intervention and the intervening force has to take enforcement action against a designated enemy, it can not be impartial, and the operation is no longer a PSO, since a clear understanding of the concepts of consent and impartiality and their impact on Force capability are critical to PSO doctrine.[3]

Section V - Peacemaking

0221. Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation, sanctions or other operations as directed by the NAC. Peacemaking is accomplished primarily by diplomatic means; however, military support to peacemaking is possible either indirectly (e.g. staff support or planning) or in the form of the direct involvement of military assets.

Section VI - Peace Building

0222. Peace Building covers actions that support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political settlements of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, foster a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction. All too often, once the conflict has been brought to an end, the attention of the international community moves on, the peace building phase of the mission plan is under-resourced and the operation stalls. Peace building therefore requires the commitment of humanitarian and development resources to a long-term political process.

0223. Following a conflict, especially a civil war, the local infrastructure may be severely damaged, civil and political institutions may be inoperable and hatred might be deeply embedded in the minds of the former warring parties. The situation may be exacerbated because one or more of the parties to the conflict opposed the final settlement or objected to the role of the PSF and/or the Civil Implementation elements. Peace-building actions are designed to cement a fragile peace and to contribute towards long-term stability by encouraging reconciliation.

0224. Military involvement will mainly involve the provision of a stable and secure environment in which civilian agencies can focus on the reconciliation and peace building processes. Military peace building activities should have a high visibility and impact demonstrating an immediate benefit from the presence of the PSF. Military enthusiasm to help should be

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[3] Covered in detail in Chapter 3.

balanced against the danger of creating dependency. In such circumstances, advice should be sought from the development community to ensure that short-term military gains are not counter-productive to any longer term development strategies.

Section VII - Humanitarian Relief

0225.   Humanitarian relief activities are conducted to alleviate human suffering. They may be conducted independently or as an element of a PSO. Humanitarian relief provided by military forces of the Alliance may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations. However, the prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with specialised civilian, national, international, government or non-government organisations and agencies. Co-ordination of military humanitarian relief with participating civilian relief organizations is necessary. This will ensure that military engagement, which tends to be short-term and impact-driven, does not create dependency nor run contrary to longer-term development programmes

0226.   **Refugee and Internally Displaced Person Assistance**. The numbers, movement, activities, and other characteristics of refugees and internally displaced persons[4] will vary depending on the situation, but can range from small groups to many thousands. Such movement may be spontaneous, resulting from conflict or the aftermath of a natural disaster. The political desire to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and other displaced persons may be the genesis for a PSO or other humanitarian operation. Military assistance to both refugees and displaced persons is oriented towards providing vital services, to those temporarily displaced from their homes and vulnerable to exploitation and oppression. Military forces can assist these activities within their capabilities but the principal responsibility for refugees and displaced persons rests with the country they are in and specialised agencies such as OCHA and UNHCR. If emergency humanitarian relief assistance is required during a PSO, the PSF have the resources to manage and co-ordinate the required assistance but normally should do so only in the initial, critical phases of an operation when civilian assets are not yet available. NATO assets can take responsibility for specific humanitarian relief functions, however, more normally they will be used to assist the efforts of aid and development organisations and agencies. In extreme circumstances, the PSF may have to take direct responsibility for the delivery of aid in order to maintain the flow.[5]

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[4] See Glossary for definitions.
[5] Further details on military tasks within these activities may be found in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 3 - FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0301. The principles for Joint and Multinational Operations, as described in AJP-01(B) apply to the conduct of Peace Support Operations (PS0). In addition, the distinct nature of PSO requires the consideration of a number of other principles. All these principles need to be given a particular interpretation and/or emphasis in a PSO environment. In particular impartiality, Consent, and Restraint in the use of force must be considered as basic doctrinal concepts that guide military activity in the conduct of Peace Support Operations. The application of these basic concepts and the other relevant principles are described in this chapter.

0302. The conduct of PSO requires an understanding of the complex concepts of consent and impartiality and how they constrain and guide the conduct of military activities, in particular the use of force. An understanding of the relationship between these fundamental concepts is essential for the effective management of civil-military interactions and the achievement of the desired political end-state in PSO.

0303. Apart from the principles of Impartiality, Consent, and Restraint in the use of force, other principles must also be considered while planning for and executing a PSO. The specific relevance and implication of these principles are discussed in Section V below. Not all principles will apply with equal weight in every situation, nevertheless all should be considered. The judgment of those responsible for the planning and execution of the PSO will determine the weight and the application of each principle.

Section I - Impartiality

0304. **The Nature of Impartiality**. An aid to understanding impartiality is to view it from two related perspectives: on the one hand as a guide to the conduct of the PSF, and on the other hand as a perception of the belligerent parties. The conduct of a PSF should always be impartial and even-handed; if force is used against a particular party, it should only be because of what that party is doing (or not doing) in relation to the mandate, rather than who they are. This may be described as principled impartiality, in sharp contrast to a simply neutral stance. The use of force, even when applied in an even-handed and impartial manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such-especially by any party that persistently transgresses. However, for a PSF which is capable of combat, the perception of the parties will be of less immediate concern than for a PK force. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the conduct of operations: the impartial status of a legal system is not compromised because it only punishes the guilty, though that may not be the perception of a persistent criminal.

0305. **The Significance of Impartiality**. The significance of impartiality is that if it is discarded or the PSF is perceived as being partial by any of the parties to the conflict, it will have a negative effect upon their consent for the operation and thus make the conduct of the operation more difficult. It can result in a loss of trust and the confidence of the local factions and cause them to withdraw consent and thus limit the options that may be available to the

PSF. At worst, a perception of partiality and a consequent loss of consent could lead to widespread non-compliance and unrestrained violence, resulting in heavy military and civilian casualties and the failure of the mission. Should impartiality be discarded, the PSF will risk becoming a party to the conflict and the operation will cease to be a PS0 and, in effect, become an armed conflict.

0306. **Impartiality and the Conduct of Operations**. Before and during the conduct of a PS0, great care must be exercised at all levels to avoid compromising the impartial nature of the operation. Any action or inaction by the PSF will almost inevitably be seen as favouring one party over the other. Nonetheless, to the fullest extent possible, PSO must be conducted impartially, in accordance with the mandate, and without favour or prejudice to any party. Whenever possible, accusations of partiality should be refuted and actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartiality of the PSF. Circumstances leading up to deployment of a PSF may have already created perceptions of a biased agenda among some local parties and partially compromised the PSF's impartial status. In such a case, every effort should be made by the PSF to redress this perception and to promote the impartial status of the force.

0307. **Impartiality versus Neutrality**. Impartiality must not be confused with neutrality. To do so limits both flexibility, and the potential to exercise initiative; it also promotes passivity and consequently limits the development of the mission. Impartiality, perhaps better described as principled impartiality, requires a degree of judgement against a set of principles, or the mandate, or both, while the notion of neutrality does not. The conduct of PSO will be impartial to the parties but never neutral in the execution of the mission.

0308. **Impartiality and Transparency**. It is more difficult to challenge the impartial status of a mission if the parties are made aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions and likely techniques to be used by the force. These place a premium on the requirement for an active information strategy, reinforced by the civil-military co-operation programme, and an effective liaison system. A failure to communicate will foster suspicion and may prevent the development of the trust and confidence upon which the long-term success of the operation depends. However, the requirements of force protection, especially in the conduct of PE may render complete transparency inappropriate.

Section II - Consent

0309. **The Nature of Consent**. It is helpful if consent, like impartiality, is viewed from two perspectives. First, as a determinant of the conduct of the PSF itself - the emphasis that the PSF gives to the promotion and maintenance of consent; and second, from the perspective of the parties and indigenous population. Judgements concerning the level of consent should be made with reference to time and space: time as in the permanence or fragility of consent; and space, horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict. Whilst there may be consent at the strategic level, (by virtue of national or party commitments to a peace agreement), at the tactical level there may be local groups who disagree violently with their leaders, and who may be hostile to the PS0. This may result in non-compliance by (para-) military elements of one or more of the parties,

including (for example) attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of the PSF. In the aftermath of an inter-state conflict the degree of consent should be relatively clear cut and agreed in a peace plan by the disputing States. In the event of an intra-state conflict or civil war, the waning factions may be difficult to differentiate from the general population, making judgements concerning consent highly problematic. Consent from the warring factions may be minimal and amount to nothing more than a phoney tolerance of the operation, while the rest of the population may be desperate for intervention and assistance. Should the level of consent be uncertain, and the potential for opposition exist, it would be prudent to deploy a force capable of enforcing compliance and promoting consent from the outset.

0310. **The Significance of Consent**. The promotion of co-operation and consent is fundamental to achieving the political end-state in all PS0. Without the active co-operation and consent of the parties and the indigenous population there cannot be a self-sustaining peace. The need to promote co-operation and consent and the long-term demands of peace will constrain the use of all military techniques and not just the use of force. This should not be confused with a minimalist approach but is the basis of a philosophical approach to the use of force which limits its application to that necessary to achieve the desired outcome.

0311. **Compliance, Justice and Consent**. Compliance may already exist; if not, it may need to be encouraged by inducements and rewards or enforced by coercion. A clear communication of the requirements of the mandate and the principles underpinning the PS0, with an explanation of the rewards for compliance and penalties for non-compliance, may serve to rationalise PS0 actions, refute accusations of partiality and enhance credibility and consent. The enforcement of compliance may be a necessary precursor or adjunct to the promotion of co-operation and consent. Coercive compliance is not an option for a lightly armed PK force. In the conduct of PS0, if the immediate military object is to bring an end to any fighting, commanders must talk to the leaders of those engaged in the fighting. However, peace with impunity and without justice is unlikely to receive the consent and wide support which is necessary for its continuation. Thus, the creation of a self-sustaining peace requires that commanders do not focus their activities exclusively on those involved in the fighting but also work to promote the co-operation and consent of those already engaged in peaceful activities.

0312. **The Consequences of a General Loss of Consent and Non-Compliance**. A PSF might lose consent in various ways. A belligerent faction may simply decide to remove consent and compliance unilaterally. Credibility, linked to consent may also be lost if local parties question why the PSF does not respond to breaches of the mandate to enforce international laws and take action to control major abuses to basic human rights such as ethnic cleansing. A loss of consent and non-compliance may result in an escalation of violence, sustained opposition to the PSF and a possible loss of control. In such circumstances, a PSF may find it necessary to divert its efforts to force protection tasks rather than the accomplishment of the mission. Any loss of consent for a PSF prepared for PE should be a manageable situation. Regardless, consent will eventually need to be re-established if the operation is ever to progress towards its desired end-state.

0313. **The Management of Consent**. In addition to the promotion of the co-operation of the local people, much of the conduct of a PSF will be designed to manipulate the threshold of consent, in order to create more operational space and greater freedom of action. This can best be achieved by the deployment of a PSF with sufficient capability to deter hostile actions or by the judicious application of force to demonstrate and reinforce credibility. When force is used, it will be necessary to have a keen feel for the impact that actions may have, not just on local consent, but also on the consent for the operation as a whole. When general consent is in doubt, its stabilisation and promotion should be a priority task, but when it is more certain it may be possible to use more robust methods in confined areas without affecting the overall level of consent and the accomplishment of the mission. At all levels, political leverage, sanctions and the threat of credible force or its judicious use, and/or other means may be sufficient to deter or persuade the parties and individuals to consent to an operation and comply with the wishes of the authorising body.

0314. **Transmission of Consent**. Experience has shown the need for continued effort, not only to expand areas of general consent but also to transmit consent up and down a party's chain of command. For example, if a JFC has secured the agreement of a leader to a particular course of action, he should try to ensure that the terms of that agreement are promptly and accurately passed to those party members facing his subordinate commanders, thereby limiting misinterpretation and non-compliance. Liaison officers with faction HQs can help monitor the passage of orders and agreements and, if necessary, assist with their transmission.

0315. **Co-operative Ventures**. Consent will be further promoted if it can be shown to the parties that their status and authority will increase if they are successful in resolving their own disputes. If the people and parties can be made shareholders in the peace process, then their motivation to co-operate will be greatly increased. At the tactical level, this possibility can be pursued by creating incentive-based opportunities to co-operate together in jointly carrying out certain tasks. Such action might be risky and difficult but deserves consideration.

Section III - Restraint in the Use of Force

0316. Restraint should always be exercised when applying force in PS0. The appropriate and proportional level of force in relation to the aim must be used. The degree of force necessary may be defined as the measured and proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective. Authoritative limits on the circumstances in which, and the ways and means by which, force may be used may be established in the mandate as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers and, in certain circumstances, Host Nation law. They will be reflected in the NAC's Initiating Directive and in approved ROE. The mere demonstration of the resolve and capability to use force may be all that is necessary.

0317. **Rules of Engagement**. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force may be used. ROE will reflect legal and

political restraints, but they cannot limit the exercise of self-defence or inhibit a commander's ability to take all necessary action to protect his force.[1]

0318. **The Consequences of Using Force**. The consequences of using force reach far beyond the immediate tactical situation. ROE are authorizations to use force but the circumstances in each case will determine whether force as authorized by ROE will be used. Political considerations and the need to work with a wide range of civilian agencies will require that all military actions, and in particular the use of force, are restrained and balanced against the long-term requirements of peace building. The use of force must take account of the potential effects upon the conduct of not just military activities but also the conduct of those other agencies working towards the same long-term goal.

0319. **Management of the Consequences**. The management of the consequences from the use of force and the achievement of objectives is one of the most important considerations with which the JFC, together with the SRSG or HoM must deal. It affects every aspect of the mission and requires continual review to balance security and mission accomplishment. The JFC should make the final determination regarding force capability requirements after reviewing the mandate, situation and operational constraints.

0320. **The Application of Force**. When used, force should be precise, appropriate, proportionate and designed to resolve and defuse a crisis and prevent further escalation. Collateral damage should be minimised and reasonable measures taken to avoid civilian casualties. Options other than the use of force should be considered and used if possible and appropriate. Only the minimum force necessary should be used but this does not exclude the use of force sufficient to overwhelm, should it be necessary to do so.

0321. **Consent and the Use of Force**. In cases of clear breaches of the mandate, the flouting of international law and the abuse of human rights, the use of force, if authorised by the ROE, may serve to enhance the credibility of the force and the consent for the operation nationally and internationally. It may be that force loses local consent but if this can be isolated, wider consent may be promoted. In certain circumstances, consent may serve to marginalize opposition and render it vulnerable to the use of force. If general consent for the operation can be promoted to such a degree that it reduces armed opposition to the status of maverick banditry, then the use of force, which is within the prescribed limits of the ROE, may enhance consent for the PS0. In such circumstances consent can thus facilitate, not hinder, the use of force.

0322. **The Use of Force and Self-Defence**. Military forces should not confuse such wider authorisation to use force as may be contained in ROE with the inherent right to use force in self-defence. The meaning of self-defence for these purposes is given in MC 362. An explanation of extended self-defence and its distinction from the use of force under ROE is also in MC 362. The sensitive issue for PSF is whether to intervene in response to human rights abuses directed at civilians 'on the ground'. Any authorisation so to do would be found

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[1] See Annex 4B for further details.

in applicable ROE. Such an intervention would only be legally permissible if authorised by applicable ROE and/or the mandate. In formulating ROE, however, it should be borne in mind that a narrow and neutral concept of operations which limits itself to observation and reporting, may not be appropriate in circumstances of widespread violations of basic human rights and ethnic cleansing, even if it does reduce the risk of casualties to the PSF. To take this narrow approach may undermine the credibility of the PSF, not just with the wider international community and the parties to the conflict but also with aid agencies that operate unarmed and generally unprotected.

Section IV - Other Principles to be Applied in Peace Support Operations

Objective/End-State

0323. Every military operation must be directed towards an attainable objective or end-state. In a joint and multinational PS0 of long duration, involving many civilian organisations and agencies, the military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way to achieving the political end-state or an element of that end-state. Military activities may be designed to assist the further development of the PS0 by other civilian agencies. Such complex issues must be addressed in the formulation of the mandate and mission plan in order to achieve both unity of effort and purpose amongst all military and civilian organisations and agencies involved in the PS0.

Perseverance/Long Term View

0324. The achievement of the political end-state in PS0 will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives. Protracted development plans may curtail the military aspiration to achieve operational tempo and lead to military impatience and frustration. However, the pursuit of short-term military success, at the expense of long term social, economic and political gains should be resisted.

Unity of Effort

0325. The complexity of PS0 and the necessity for continual military interaction with a large number of International Organisations (IOs), NGOs, and PVOs will probably make co-ordination with their activities one of the most difficult challenges. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents and between the military and civilian components of an operation.

0326. Co-ordination with civilian agencies can usually only be achieved by dialogue and consensus and not by command. Unity of effort can best be achieved by the development of a multifunctional planning approach. The SRSG or HoM will have prime responsibility for co-ordination and the achievement of unity of effort. To achieve unity of effort at the strategic level requires close liaison between the NAC, the authorising political body and national political bodies and, at the operational and tactical levels, close and early liaison between the military and civilian components of the operation. Effective liaison at all levels and regular

conferences and meetings involving all agencies and parties will be essential to achieving unity of effort.

Flexibility

0327.   The multi-agency environment in which PS0 are conducted and the complex nature of the challenges to be confronted, require commanders at all levels to place a premium on initiative and flexibility. Detailed orders will often be overly prescriptive for the management of a PS0 environment. Hence, the requirement to be fully aware of superior commanders' intent, the political context of the PS0 and the practice of mission analysis.

0328.   The successful transition to peace involves the management of change. Within the constraints of the NAC Directive, and thus their ROE, forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another at short notice and with the minimum of outside assistance. A PSF should be balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment and logistics. Arrangements to facilitate the speedy availability of reserves should be considered.

0329.   Thus, flexibility is vital to the successful conduct of PS0 and a PSF must be capable of dealing with an escalation of military activity. As a consequence ROE and the mechanism for their amendment have to be flexible, responsive and designed to cope with likely changes in the operational environment and the PS0 force structure. They may inevitably place limits on the extent of flexibility achievable.

Legitimacy

0330.   The legitimacy of the PS0 and the wider perception of that legitimacy will increase support within the international community, contributing nations, and the involved parties, including the civil community in the JOA.[2]

Security

0331.   Self-defence is an inherent right and force protection a command responsibility in all military operations. In its directive the PSF may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of any civilian components of the operation. This will have to be taken into account when planning the size and composition of the force and when drawing up military orders and ROE.

0332.   On occasions aid agencies may employ local civilians or expatriates as guards and escorts. These will require security screening. Precise responsibilities and operating procedures will require co-ordination with the activities of the PSF. This inter-action must be regularly reviewed by the JFC.

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[2] Legal issues are discussed in Chapter 4.

0333. All military personnel involved in an operation must be trained and equipped in such a manner as to maximise their safety while carrying out their tasks. Whilst they cannot be forced to do so, civil agencies operating within a JOA should be encouraged to make their personnel appropriately aware of the risks and dangers they may face.

Credibility

0334. For the PSF to be effective, it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission. Establishing credibility will also create confidence in the operation, not just among the local parties but also with the international community. A co-ordinated plan will be important in achieving this. While the PSF should not appear to pose a direct threat to any of the parties if they remain compliant, there should be no doubt that it is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and is supported by the political will to do so. Therefore the national military components must be well equipped and self sufficient, as well as prepared and trained for their mission.

0335. The PSF must demonstrate its effectiveness immediately on deployment to the JOA. The PSF must be employed with a sound concept of operations and adequate ROE to guarantee mission success, even in the face of attempts by the parties to either gain an advantage or to undermine the mission. The force must respond with professional bearing and swift, effective, impartial actions to incidents. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of disciplined, controlled, and professional behaviour, both on and off duty.

Mutual Respect

0336. The respect in which the PSF is held will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the parties and the local population. Through Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or other special agreements the PSF enjoys certain immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, its members must normally respect the laws and customs of the host nation and must be seen to be doing so. The PSF will also acknowledge the de-facto status and position of the parties to the conflict and will usually not act to change them, except as agreed by all parties. Commanders should also ensure the same principles are recognised and implemented amongst the different national, cultural and ethnic elements within the formations that make up the PSF.

Transparency of Operations

0337. The PSF's mission and concept of operations must be easily understood and obvious to all parties. The parties must be fully aware of what the mandate demands of them and what will be the consequences of not complying. Likewise they should also be made aware of the advantages to be gained by compliance. Failure to achieve common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility. Information should be gathered and communicated through open sources wherever possible.

0338. While transparency of operations should be the general rule, this must be balanced against the need to ensure the security of the mission and its members. The requirements of force protection may render complete transparency inappropriate.

Freedom of Military Movement

0339. Freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any PS0 and should be covered by the mandate. The PSF should be free at all times to perform its duties throughout the designated mission area.

0340. Parties to the conflict will often try to impose local restrictions on freedom of movement. These restrictions must be resolutely and swiftly resolved through negotiations, and if these do not achieve success, more vigorous and resolute action including the use of force may be needed.

Civil-Military Co-operation and Liaison

0341. Ideally all implementing agencies, both military and civilian will be involved in the development of a multifunctional planning approach. At the tactical level the timely and effective harmonisation and co-ordination of military activities with those of the civilian agencies is essential for success. This co-ordination should encompass all involved political, military, diplomatic, administrative and humanitarian governmental and non-governmental organisations and agencies. Ultimately, co-ordination can only be achieved by consultation as these agencies have permanent mandates and agendas that may compete with each other and be different to those of the military force.

0342. Co-operation arrangements should be supported by the establishment of committees, action groups and extensive liaison with all the agencies and organisations involved. Relations between the military component of an operation and non-military agencies should be based on mutual respect, communication and standardisation of support to ensure unnecessary overlap is avoided and that unity of effort is concentrated on the fulfilment of the mandate.

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CHAPTER 4 - NATO DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0401. The preceding chapters have described the organisations and practices that influence and define Peace Support Operations (PSO). They also contain the particular characteristic conditions and principles which facilitate and constrain NATO involvement in PSO. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the interaction of these elements in the context of the NATO decision making and planning process in order to draw out the specific considerations relevant to PSO. The detail which follows is expanded upon in the Force Planning Guide for PSO and is based upon NATO's Operational Planning Process laid down in MC 133 and the Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). Further coordination mechanisms are outlined within the Pol-Mil Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations (PO(99)28, 20 Apr 99).

Section I – Key Aspects of Alliance Involvement in Peace Support Operations

General Considerations

0402. Individual member States as well as the Alliance as a whole will take a variety of considerations into account in any decision to undertake PSO. These may include the objectives of the operation, essentiality of NATO participation, the probability of success given NATO participation and possible risks. Prior to approving Alliance support, the NAC may take into consideration the factors outlined below to provide an acceptable framework for accomplishment of the PSO.

Legitimacy

0403. The wider perception of the legitimacy of the PSF by both the conflicting parties and the wider international community will be a significant factor in the success of PSO. Legitimacy has legal, social and political components as outlined below.

0404. **Legal Component**. All military operations must take into account both the letter and spirit of national and international law. The appropriate legal considerations will provide the framework for the conduct of military operations. The planning and mounting of PSO raises some legal issues that are different from those raised by conventional military operations. These include:

   a.   The legal basis or authority for any given PSO.

   b.   The legal status of personnel and equipment engaged in PSO, which is generally enshrined in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).[1]

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[1] Further detail is in Annex 4B.

    c.   The Rules of Engagement (ROE), governing the conduct of personnel and the employment of equipment, engaged in a PSO.[2]

    d.   The requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which is often referred to as the law of war or International Humanitarian Law (IHL).[2]

    e.   Legal obligations stemming from Arms Control Treaties.

0405. **Social Component**. The social aspect of legitimacy for any operation is based upon the support of the population and political leadership in the participating nations and the wider international community. The PSO needs to be perceived as being justified and the right thing to do. Social legitimacy is therefore a major pre-condition for the successful initiation, continuation and conclusion of any PSO and contributes to the broad support and wider participation with the operation by international and non-governmental organisations. Support from the population in the conflict area is also critical to the long-term success of a PSO. Compliance and consent for the PSF enhances its freedom of movement and allows military aspects of the overall operation to move more quickly to a successful conclusion.

0406. **Political Control**. The overall political control of NATO participation in a PSO will be the responsibility of the NAC. In addition one or more UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) will usually mandate an operation. The conduct of PSO is based on an agreement with, or at the request of, the recognised government where one exists, and all the parties in the conflict. In the absence of consent for the PSF intervention or where there is an expectation that consent may be withdrawn, the conditions for NATO involvement and the use of force should be specified in the NAC Initiating Directive.

0407. **Neighbouring Countries**. It is also important to consider the role that neighbouring countries may play in providing facilities for the PSF to operate from, or transit over or through, their territory. It should not be assumed that these states would automatically consent to the operation, as they may be part of the problem. Separate SOFA or MOU may require negotiation with each involved country.

North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive

0408. Ideally, the NAC Initiating Directive for a PSO should both define the strategic objectives that constitute a clear political end-state and allot organisations, resources and responsibilities for the achievement of those objectives and the end-state. When reaching this decision the NAC will consult contributing states and relevant International Organisations.

0409. Crisis Response Planning, including military and civilian advice on operational feasibility and the required capabilities, should initiate the drafting of decisions. When the political or operational environment changes, the decision should be reviewed and if necessary, new missions defined or, alternatively, missions terminated. NATO nations and, in accordance

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[2] Further detail is in Annex 4B.

with the agreed procedure the NNTCN must be consulted in the formulation of the Initiating Directive and subsequently when:

a.   The mission duration is extended or its task revised.

b.   There is a fundamental change of the situation in the mission area, which could affect implementation of the directive.

c.   Consideration is given to partial or complete termination of the mission.

d.   Consideration is given to changes to ROE.

0410. The complex multi-functional nature of PSO requires that commanders understand that military objectives will generally be only milestones on the road to achieving the political end-state. It is therefore important that clear mission guidance is given which allows commanders, at all levels, to understand not just their senior commander's military intent but where that intent fits into the broader political context of the operation. Military directives, orders and ROE should be drafted carefully so as to permit commanders the maximum latitude to respond to the multi-agency, multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of PSO while guarding against the potential for an escalation of violence and the destabilisation of the on-going political process.

Voluntary Participation by Member Nations

0411. In NATO, member nations may choose not to participate in a non-Article 5 CRO, and therefore may also not wish their personnel to participate in a CJTF HQ. Nonetheless, if the Alliance provides a CJTF HQ for a non-Article 5 CRO, personnel planning should be based on the principle that such nations personnel serving in a position in a CJTF HQ nucleus should remain in their posts until they are replaced by suitably trained personnel.

0412. The same philosophy applies to the participation of NATO nations in a WEU-led operation initially incorporating a NATO CJTF HQ nucleus. Under the terms of MC 389 NATO CJTF nucleus personnel would, in principle, remain in their posts until they could be replaced by suitably trained WEU personnel, on rotation. However it would be up to individual nations as to whether their NATO employed personnel would remain in place.

Force Contributions

0413. Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) should be involved in the planning, preparation and decision-making procedures in operations to which they contribute. Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCN) will be involved in accordance with the Pol-Mil Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations (PO(99)28, 20 Apr 99). The type of personnel (professional, conscripts, or reserve) and units (standing or reserve) to be deployed are decisions left exclusively to contributing nations. However, implicit within a nation's offer to support a PSO is the understanding that resources will be made available promptly. This includes the ultimate national responsibility for the necessary logistic support and may be discharged in a

number of ways, including agreements with other nations or with NATO as set out in MC 319/1 'NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics'. Once contributed, resources should not be withdrawn or reallocated by nations without suitable notice being given to the NAC through the chain of command.

0414. Any political, legal or military limitations on contributions to the PSF should be stated early so planners may account for them. Political restrictions should be minimised to allow commanders maximum flexibility within the terms of the directive.

0415. It is also essential that military contributions contain the required capabilities and meet the necessary standards of training and readiness for the tasks and organisational structure prescribed by the mission directive.[3]

Conditions for Terminating the Operation

0416. The mission's mandate should be reviewed periodically by the responsible international organisation to determine what progress has been made, how the operation may be adjusted, or if the mission should be terminated. The NAC would advise the mandating authority of its collective view on the continuation of a PSO involving Alliance support.

0417. The definition of strategic objectives and the political end-state in the Initiating Directive should facilitate the development of criteria and conditions that allow the progression of the operation to be assessed regularly. The SC is responsible for providing periodic updates through the MC to the NAC. The NAC may then provide additional direction to reduce, increase or terminate the PSO based on the SC assessment.

0418. The imposition of time constraints for the duration of the operation is a high level political-military decision. Time lines imposed upon the former warring parties may ensure that the PSO maintains momentum. However, the declaration of an operational timescale, including a withdrawal date for the PSF may cede the initiative to the parties. They can then wait for the departure of the PSF. On the other hand, establishing a fixed date for the participation of the PSF serves notice that parties must also work diligently to resolve their differences, unless they are willing to forgo the support of the PSF.

0419. In either case, it is important to establish criteria that require quantifiable actions by all parties that demonstrate successful implementation of the mandate to the international community. Additionally, the SC should ask the NAC to maintain positive momentum in resolving political and other related issues. Failure to move forward on these issues will likely prolong the duration of the mission and the engagement of Alliance assets in it.

0420. Critical in this respect is a clear and common understanding among all contingents of the PSF, as well as among the political and military leadership of the PSO, of what constitutes success,

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[3] See Annex 4A.

what measures or activities could facilitate success and what threats to success can be identified.[4]

Section II - Timing of Involvement

0421. It is likely that civilian relief and humanitarian organisations will be involved before any political decision to engage NATO forces. It is likewise possible that UN, OSCE or NATO and other national military forces may be involved before any collective NATO action. Early military engagements may be in the form of conflict prevention deployments, training or other security sector reform activities. As with any military operation, early warning and adequate planning time are highly desirable. NATO has a tested crisis management system that includes a precautionary system capable of assessing warnings and indicators emanating from deteriorating situations. However, the ability to react in a timely manner depends entirely on the resolve of the International Community to act. This resolve is most effectively demonstrated by an early political engagement in the crisis area and the development of an appropriate and adequately resourced mandate.

0422. Options for NATO involvement range from early conflict prevention deployments to enforcement operations designed to set the operational conditions for a subsequent PSO. To a great extent, the timing of the decisions to engage and deploy will determine the nature of NATO involvement in a PSO and consequently where in the spectrum of PSO that involvement lies. Early engagement by a credible PSF will generally prove the most cost-effective option in the longer term.

Section III - The NATO Planning Process for PSO

Preliminary Planning Considerations

0423. The Alliance aim at the earliest stage of planning will be to establish:

    a.   Legitimacy of the operation.

    b.   Nature of the operation.

    c.   Freedoms, constraints and restraints.

    d.   Strategic objectives and timelines.

    e.   End-state.

0424. The NAC, with advice from the MC, may need to give advice to the authorising international body on the formulation of its mandate, which should contain the strategic objectives and

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[4] Chapter 2, Section II addresses criteria for success in detail.

political end state.[5] Planning will take place in a crisis management environment. The results of early planning will indicate the broad nature of the mission, possible Alliance objectives, resource requirements, and the likely outcome of a NATO commitment. This analysis is fundamental to the NAC decision. It should also identify strategic options and their associated advantages and disadvantages; this will allow potential force contributors to consider their position.

0425. As part of this iterative process, the NAC and MC will consider the preliminary conclusions in order to agree to the strategic objectives and political end-state and to provide high-level strategic guidance to the SC. This guidance should define Alliance strategic objectives in order to allow the SCs to conduct all necessary contingency planning. In addition to an Alliance end-state which is compatible with that identified by the mandating authority, the NAC will also identify those conditions that would lead NATO to consider terminating its part in a PSO. These conditions may be judged against:

    a.   A loss of the International Community's resolve to remain committed to the operation caused by:

        (1)   A loss of consent.

        (2)   A lack of compliance.

        (3)   Insufficient commitment to or progress with civil projects.

    b.   Unacceptable casualties among members of aid agencies or the PSF.

0426. A critical decision at this time is the selection of a suitable HQ below SC level to lead the operational planning effort. This may be an existing HQ or require the activation of a CJTF HQ.

Initiating Directive

0427. At the earliest opportunity, the NAC will issue an Initiating Directive through the MC to the nominated SC. It is this directive that provides the framework for the development of the military Operational Plan (OPLAN). The SRSG or HoM is rarely in a position to produce his civilian mission plan in time to inform the development of the military OPLAN. In these circumstances, the SC, or JFC should offer maximum assistance to the SRSG or HoM.

Public Information Plan

0428. Any NATO PSO will generate and attract intensive major international and domestic media and public attention. This attention will inevitably lead to public scrutiny and debate. For this reason, as the plans evolve the political and military authorities must produce a supporting coherent Public Information Plan (PIP). While support by the media does not

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[5] See Chapter 1.

guarantee an operation's success, continuing media criticism and hostility can help cause its failure.

0429. An agreed PIP must be implemented from the outset and be co-ordinated with the mandating authority, national governments and all HQs. Whenever possible involved civilian organisations and agencies should also be made aware of the PIP and their activities co-ordinated with it. To be of value a PIP should take account of all military and civilian activities within the mission plan. For this reason its development, evolution and execution will require the approval of the SRSG or HoM, the SC, JFC and, on occasion the MC and NAC. The military element of the PIP will require a sensitive balance between the distinct but related areas of Public Information, Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA) and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). Their activities will need to be co-ordinated in the Information Operations Plan.

Liaison and Reconnaissance

0430. To ensure effective planning, the NAC must authorise reconnaissance in the Initiating Directive. This will enable the SC and designated subordinate HQ to conduct reconnaissance and establish liaison to ensure early co-ordination in the mission area with those civilian agencies already engaged. The development of crisis response plans will depend on the ability of the designated JFC and his principal staff officers to observe and assess conditions in the JOA. All information-gathering activities must take account of the cultural and ethnic environment, the history of the region, the political and civil objectives of the parties and the objectives of civilian agencies already engaged. The historical relationship of TCNs and the region into which the deployment is to take place may affect deployment options.

0431. Reconnaissance should be given a high priority in the initial stages of the planning process. Once political approval is given for detailed planning, subsequent reconnaissance visits should be planned frequently, and liaison teams from the designated HQ should be deployed to appropriate agencies in the JOA as soon as possible. Whenever possible national reconnaissance should be co-ordinated internationally. The information available from Military Attaches and former Exchange Officers or Military Advisory Groups may also be of use.

0432. The establishment of a comprehensive liaison network is vital to success in any PSO. There will invariably be a requirement for mobile and deployable liaison elements equipped with suitable, secure communications. Military headquarters at each level must plan to have capable liaison personnel at a wide range of locations, including the local offices of the international civil agencies and NGOs as well as the headquarters of the parties to the conflict.

Planning Force Structure and Composition

0433. Following the political direction to develop a plan, the SCs will first develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which can include an initial Statement of Requirement (SOR). After NAC approval of the CONOPS the SCs will develop the OPLAN which will have a detailed

SOR. This process will be iterative, because a matching between forces provided by nations and the CONOPS/OPLAN requirements will have to take place.

0434. While an initial troops-to-task assessment may result from the reconnaissance and mission analysis, it is during the concept development stage that identification of the required military capabilities, numbers, generic grouping and the command structure, (joint) support forces and facilities is completed. This information becomes the JFC's SOR. The SOR is used as the basis of the NATO force generation process through which PSF contributions will be sought from member nations. High-level political contact should be made to determine the desirability and likely extent of non-NATO nations' participation in the operation as well.

0435.   If nations are not likely to make the necessary forces available, the MC in consultation with the responsible SC will determine if the mission may still be accomplished, perhaps by sequentially accomplishing objectives or by an alternate concept of operations. Alternatively if sufficient resources are unlikely to be made available the SC and MC may recommend the cessation of any further planning.

0436. As in other military operations, the final force structure depends on a number of factors, including the size of the operational area, the nature and expected duration of the mission, lines of communications, terrain, weather, threat, and logistical requirements. The PSF must be a task-organised, multinational organisation. The SC will closely monitor the final grouping of national contingents into formations, thereby avoiding unwanted or uneven organisational structures. The SC will also decide as to the final division of the JOA into areas of operation, thereby avoiding unwanted combinations of formations with parties in the conflict, as well as taking into account national preferences for certain areas of operation.

0437. An additional planning consideration is the balance between the security of the force (force protection) and the signal these actions send. A heavily armed and aggressive PSF may be perceived in certain cultures as a provocation demanding a violent response. Similarly, a PSF that places undue emphasis on overt force protection measures is less likely to command respect, establish sufficient liaison with the local population, or inspire confidence in the security environment.

Writing and Approving PSO Plans

0438. Military OPLANs for PSO follow the NATO Operational Planning system as outlined in MC 133. The political nature of PSO will normally generate a high level of political and military interest and involvement as the subsequent OPLANs are developed. Work on an OPLAN should start as early as possible and must incorporate the timely build up, deployment, employment, sustainment, reinforcement of in-place forces and redeployment of assigned forces to support the JFC's concept of operations. The early engagement in planning will help clarify the objectives of the mission and thus pre-empt problems that may occur as the mission becomes operational. A full understanding of the mission and the JFC's Intent down to the lowest level within the PSF is critical for success. The logistic concept should also be developed as early as possible, in accordance with the doctrine set out in the AJP-4 series

documents and their supporting ALPs, to ensure that any force committed to a PSO is effectively deployed and sustained for the forecast duration of the mission.

Multifunctional Planning Approach

0439. The development of an overall, comprehensive and multifunctional planning approach for what is a profoundly political situation is crucial to the successful organisation and execution of any PSO. The multifunctional approach should be developed in co-operation with all agencies thus addressing the overall needs of the situation with a view to making the best use of resources. Though the result is not binding on the JFC, its aim will be to co-ordinate the activities (or at least ensure cooperation) of all functional disciplines towards the creation of a self sustaining peace and the realisation of objectives. The multifunctional planning approach will address the structure to deal with all civil and military aspects of the PSO. It must be adaptable to changing circumstances. The key to success is a clear enunciation of objectives and those conditions which determine the political end-state. These objectives may be milestones along the way to achieving the political end-state or elements of it. The approach should contain strategic assumptions, indicate functional activities against time for the different civilian and military elements of the mission, identify the potential main effort and highlight decision points in a phased concept of operations. The identity of the political body responsible for the development of the civilian mandate and mission plan, will determine whether the NAC, SC or JFC or a combination of the aforementioned should be responsible for integrating the NATO contribution within the multifunctional planning approach.

0440. The multifunctional planning approach will provide coherence and unity of effort. In doing so, it should clearly establish the high level Chain of Command (C of C) by unambiguously explaining all C2 relationships, and the responsibilities and mechanisms for co-ordination. A prime element in the C of C must be to lay down the JFC's scope to deal directly with the political and military representatives of any belligerent or conflicting parties, in co-ordination with the SRSG or HoM.

0441. Many aspects of a PSO (eg the actions of various NGOs) will be difficult or impossible to predict in detail. Until the division of responsibility between the civil and military objectives is identified and agreed, military planners should anticipate where assistance might have to be given in the early stages to support civilian efforts. This analysis must be flexible and recognise the difference between 'mission creep' and 'mission development'. The former being involvement in activities which are unrelated to the political end-state, the latter being efforts to ensure progress is made to achieve strategic objectives including the political end-state.

0442. Should the mandating political authority and its SRSG or HoM fail to produce a plan for the civilian mission, the SC and other NATO authorities must use the Initiating Directive issued by the NAC as the catalyst to commence the development of a NATO OPLAN. This preparatory work subsequently may be used to inform and assist the SRSG or HoM in the development of the civilian mission plan and the multifunctional planning approach. Such early Alliance planning will ensure that NATO activities are articulated into a strategic and

political concept of operations. Subordinate commanders will then formulate their own mission statements and tasks, interfacing them with the instructions already received by the Commanders of the various contingents. The early identification of the mission statement for each of the military component commanders will ensure that all planning and organisation will be focused towards achieving unity of purpose, military strategic objectives and the political end-state.

Figure 4.1 – The Context for Multifunctional Planning

0443. **The Context for Multifunctional Planning**. Figure 4.1 illustrates the development of a generic PSO, showing the various types of organisation that may become involved at each stage, sets the context for multifunctional planning, and highlights the need for co-ordination of effort, particularly in the planning stages. The PSO can be described in 4 phases:

a. **Phase 1**. From a period of relative stability, unspecified causes create a level of human suffering which prompts international concern. The situation is monitored, perhaps externally or by the deployment of human rights monitors or long term international development agencies already on the ground, and governments and aid agencies mobilise resources to alleviate suffering and promote development. If the situation deteriorates further, emergency relief agencies deploy, hoping to deal with the immediate crisis in human suffering to allow longer-term aid and development to take effect. These activities attract increasing media attention which inevitably forces international Governments to pay greater attention to the developing crisis.

Throughout this phase, all organisations and agencies involved or likely to be involved, must co-ordinate their planning.

b. **Phase 2**. When the international community decides that the crisis is no longer containable without military intervention, a NATO military force will be deployed to conduct a PSO which may have a PK or PE profile. Deploying rapidly, the military will build up sufficient forces to stabilise the security situation. While the military mission may well take precedence at this stage, it will be conducted within the parameters of the overall operation, and the planning and conduct of operations must again be closely co-ordinated with the activities of other agencies. It is critical that both MSU and Civil Police (CIVPOL) units or representatives deploy at this stage with a rapid build up of CIVPOL as soon as possible. As the security situation stabilises, the military may begin to withdraw, having created the conditions for the other agencies to progress the operation towards the end-state of a self-sustaining peace.

c. **Phase 3**. Once the security situation is sufficiently stable, and CIVPOL can cope with the maintenance of law and order, the main PSF can withdraw but MSU units may need to remain until the end of this phase. Emergency relief agencies may need to continue their activities to reduce human suffering.

d. **Phase 4**. At the stage when human suffering has reached a level where immediate emergency relief is no longer required, longer term aid and development agencies will continue their work to develop the capabilities of the Host Nation to cope on its own. The final end-state of the PSO is a self-sustaining peace that requires no special international effort over and above normal developmental aid and assistance.

Section IV - Deployment and Mission Execution

Deployment

0444. The PSF should move to the operational area as soon as possible after the decision to commit forces and once reconnaissance, site surveys, and approval of the OPLAN are complete. OPLANS and deployment plans must be kept up to date to reflect any changes to the political or military situation in the JOA. Prompt and efficient deployment helps to establish the immediate credibility of the force.

0445. Engagement by the international community in a crisis area will be multi-directional and take place in many different dimensions. The PSF may be only one element in that wider engagement, with the engagement of the Alliance also multi-directional and in several dimensions. For example sanctions or grants may set the economic and fiscal conditions in the JOA, just as the public information plan and any Information Operations activities will influence perceptions and the psychological conditions in the JOA. The physical deployment of the PSF should therefore be part of a co-ordinated engagement strategy.

0446. In addition to the considerations discussed below, it is essential that the PSF should arrive demonstrating a force posture that is appropriate to the mission. This combined with a well-organised reception and controlled move through the JOA to operational locations will also contribute to the credibility of the PSF. A multi-dimensional deployment in the air, land and maritime environments will generally ensure that the PSF quickly gains the initiative and any hostile elements have difficulty concentrating their resources and focusing their efforts. The appropriate timing of deployment will depend upon a number of factors including:

    a.   Consequences and requirements of any on-going political or diplomatic initiatives.

    b.   Force readiness and training states of the various force elements.

    c.   National deployment plans and competition for Ports of Disembarkation (POD) and other reception facilities.

    d.   National and JFC's TOA criteria.

    e.   Funding and legal issues affecting international organizations and national governments.

    f.   On-the-ground situation assessment of security conditions and requirements.

    g.   Over-arching these military considerations will be the pressing political imperative for action; this must be tempered by the JFC's assessment of the degree of consent and impartiality in the operational environment.

Mission Execution

0447. Once an OPLAN has been developed and the deployment has occurred, the remainder of the PSO should be executed in accordance with the phases and objectives of the OPLAN and in the wider context of the civilian mission plan and agreed multifunctional approach. It will be essential to strategic success that the military activities are continually reviewed to ensure that they are synchronised with those of the political and civil elements of the mission. This can only be done at the highest level, certainly between the JFC and the SRSG or HoM. It may require the JFC to call upon the MC and NAC, through his SC, to guarantee timely and effective communication with any authorising political authority.

0448. The OPLAN will have defined the JFC's and Component Commanders' (CC) Intent, Main Effort and supporting objectives for each phase of the operation. Monitoring operational progress will require detailed assessments of the level of compliance of the parties and judgements of progress towards decision points. Particular attention should be paid to changes in the operational environment which could lead to changes being required in the mission directive or the structure and capabilities of the PSF. Appropriate contingency planning should be conducted by the development of branches and sequels in the OPLAN. Establishing the correct balance between 'mission creep' and 'mission development' will be

an important part of the assessment of the progress that the operation is making towards strategic objectives and the achievement of the political end-state.

0449. The dialogue between the JFC, the SC, NAC and any other authorising political body is crucial to ensure that the PSF is properly prepared, balanced and provided with suitable ROE for the operation. Flexibility of approach and adaptability of forces are key, as will be the dissemination of any changes to the JFC's intent to every member of the PSF. The compression and overlap between the strategic, operational and tactical levels in PSO is such that a tactical military action can destabilise the political process of which the military is but one element.

Section V - Withdrawal, Transition and Redeployment Operations

Withdrawal

0450. The decision to withdraw NATO support for a PSO will be based upon a political assessment that the benefits of achieving strategic success no longer justify the required expenditure of resources.[6] Any decision to withdraw will include consideration of its consequences on the actions and objectives of civilian implementing partners.

0451. It is possible that one or more of the factions, as well as the local population, could resist, or even attempt to prevent, the withdrawal of NATO forces. The possibility of civilian unrest and opposition to a withdrawal of NATO forces should be addressed in contingency plans. A withdrawal could be conducted in an environment of widespread human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing and large numbers of displaced persons. Such circumstances would have potentially catastrophic moral, ethical and political consequences and would therefore merit very serious consideration before any decision to withdraw.

0452. As with any operation, a withdrawal will require detailed planning. It should be based upon a contingency plan written early and updated throughout the operation. It must address both a permissive and non-permissive environment. The plan must state clearly the conditions for TOA of formations back to national command.

0453. The plan must also take into account the requirement to protect or even evacuate the civilian elements of the mission, in a deteriorating situation. This will require liaison and a high degree of co-ordination and co-operation. The latter may not be easy to achieve as many of these organisations will be highly committed to their work and will generally have made their own evacuation plans.

0454. A withdrawal plan must also state the policy for the disposal of the civil and military infrastructure and equipment owned by NATO or the TCNs in the JOA. It must make clear what is to be handed over to other organisations, what is to be extracted as part of the withdrawal and what is to be destroyed before the operation is complete.

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[6] The factors which might be taken into account in making this assessment are at 0425.

Transition Operations

0455. Transition operations not only refer to the transfer of command, missions and tasks from one element of the PSF to another but also transfers of responsibilities to non-NATO forces or civilian organisation or agency[7]. Whenever possible, such operations should be identified and planned in advance. They will be executed generally upon the attainment of a particular objective or decision point in the OPLAN. A transition operation may also be required to reflect a change in the political situation, political guidance or operational environment.

0456. Transition operations may indicate an escalation or de-escalation of activity as well as a change in political emphasis or military main effort. They can include a changeover of HQs, a relief in place of one NATO force element to another or the transfer of responsibilities to a non-NATO, possibly UN or civil police force.

Redeployment

0457. Redeployment of the main military force should signal the achievement of the primary military end-state. The planning and execution of any redeployment operation is just as important as that required for deployment.

0458. The acknowledgement of success expedites the pace of the operation and can create pressure to TOA forces back to national command too early. If not properly controlled and co-ordinated, this can result in unwarranted competition for routes, infrastructure, and PODs. For these reasons, the JFC requirement for unity of effort at all levels of his PSF is as important as ever. Casualties incurred at this stage of an operation are particularly unjustifiable.

0459. It should not be assumed during planning that all forces would redeploy to their home countries or original deployment bases. There may be a need to base them elsewhere in the region to condition stability or to release them for other missions. Whatever their destination there will be stringent administrative, logistic and environmental criteria to be met before personnel and equipment leave the JOA. This places significant demands on real estate management in the form of staging and marshalling areas. The coordination function of the MJLC staff together with J3 and J4 staff at CJTF HQ will be especially crucial for the smooth execution of this function.

0460. Depending on the mission, it may be necessary that the PSF leaves established structures that will facilitate the future operations of the humanitarian agencies or the host government. Planning for this should be just as thorough as for preceding phases. Preliminary redeployment planning should be part of the overall planning for the operation. A smooth, well-planned, well-orchestrated redeployment will ensure that the PSF leaves a lasting favourable impression and more importantly, ensures that the civilian elements of the mission can work successfully towards the achievement of a lasting and self-sustaining peace.

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[7] See ATP–35(B) '*Land Force Tactical Doctrine*'.

0461. Redeployment requires that the PSF HQ co-ordinates not only the routes, infrastructure and PODs but also the management of environmental issues, for example for the hand back of bases and training areas to the Host Nation. Environmental issues will require a policy and possibly specific NATO funding.

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ANNEX 4A – EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Foundation

4A1. Traditionally, education and training of staff, units and forces are national responsibilities. The multinational and multifunctional nature of Peace Support Operations (PSO), however, may require combined, joint education and training beyond either normal national standards or capabilities.

4A2. Special attention should be paid to the required shift in psychological orientation for individuals trained for combat to the very different environment in which the use of force is more restrained. Education and training for PSO should involve participants from international organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

4A3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) differences within a force may reduce operational effectiveness. Common or harmonised ROE should be sought as early as possible. All partners must, as a minimum, understand how each will apply force in support of the mission or in self-defence. This will avoid units being placed in situations in which differences in their ROE prevent them conducting properly co-ordinated responses.

4A4. Many Alliance members have already established specific training facilities and courses for PSO which personnel of other nations, normally in small numbers, are invited to attend (in accordance with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Peacekeeping (PK) Course Catalogue). Within the EAPC, a document on 'Standardisation of PK Training and Education' exists and forms the baseline for PK training in many EAPC countries.

NATO Training for Peace Support Operations

4A5. Nations contributing military forces to a PSO should ensure that these forces are trained not only to a common basic level of military skills but also in PSO techniques.[1] As a step in this direction, NATO conducts courses on PSO open to all Euro-Atlantic nations. These courses are based on common doctrine and are designed to:

a.   Develop a common understanding of PSO within the Alliance.

b.   Disseminate NATO PSO policy and doctrine.

c.   Offer a co-ordinated set of courses at appropriate times and to instruct a greater number of students than any one nation could accommodate.

d.   The Alliance encourages the integration of PSO training into all professional military career courses. Such education should focus on the broad aspects of peace support activities.

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[1] See ATP-3.4.1.1 '*Peace Support Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*'.

Education

4A6.   Educational objectives for potential commanders and key staff personnel should aim to enhance awareness of the principal aspects of a PSO and how PSO may differ from more warlike operations. Recommended subjects include:

4A7.   Historical, geographical and cultural background of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and region, including the origins of the conflict, religious beliefs and customs.

4A8.   Decision-making process for PSO in the United Nations, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, European Union and NATO.

      a.   The principles of PSO.

      b.   Negotiation, inquiry and mediation techniques.

      c.   Preparations for and the conduct of PSO.

      d.   Rules of Engagement (ROE).

      e.   Law of Armed Conflict / Law of War / International Humanitarian Law and other legal aspects of PSO.

      f.   Public Information plans and concepts.

      g.   Codes of Conduct.

      h.   Gender issues.

      i.   Rights of the child.

      j.   Multinational logistics.

Training

4A9.   When developing a pre-deployment training programme, planners should take into account the significant time and non-training related resource requirements for service personnel preparing for movement, in terms of medical and administrative needs.

4A10. The subjects that may need particular attention in pre-deployment training are listed below. This list may need refinement to reflect on-going best practices in the JOA. Whenever possible, training should continue after deployment.[2]

      a.   Use of force and ROE and other principles.

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[2] Techniques are discussed in detail in ATP-3.4.1.1 '*Peace Support Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*'.

b.   Culture and customs of mission area.

c.   Basic language awareness and key phrases.

d.   Operating checkpoints and roadblocks.

e.   Patrolling.

f.   Observation and reporting.

g.   Search techniques.

h.   Mine awareness and clearance.

i.   Unexploded Ordnance and Improvised Explosive Device awareness, reconnaissance and clearance.

j.   Equipment and ordnance recognition.

k.   Relationships with International Organisations, NGOs and Private Voluntary Organisations plus Inter-Agency Liaison.

l.   Communications.

m.   First aid and endemic local diseases.

n.   Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence procedures (if NBC weapons have been or may be used in the area), including procedures against the hazards of toxic materials emanating from Release Other Than Attack (ROTA).

o.   Security.

p.   Boarding techniques.

q.   Interception techniques at sea and in the air.

r.   Co-operation between ground and naval forces in the littoral.

s.   Media awareness training.

t.   Use of any specific PSO technology, e.g. non-lethal weapons.

u.   Detention of host nation personnel and seizure of property.

v.   Law of Armed Conflict / Law of War / International Humanitarian Law.

w.   Collection of evidence for war crimes tribunals.

Exercises

4A11. Exercise training for NATO-led PSO should be conducted at all levels, with a primary focus on joint and combined exercise activities. In accordance with the overall objectives for PfP, NATO/PfP military exercises provide a suitable setting for training covering the full spectrum of missions and tasks relevant to likely NATO-led PSO.

4A12. Higher level seminars and CPX with PSO scenarios should include crisis management procedures and decision-making processes. The training and exercising of designated headquarters and possible CCs must cover: planning, deployment, sustainment, execution and redeployment.

4A13. Formations earmarked to take part in PSO should design their exercises with a focus on tactical training and functional interoperability requirements. Exercise objectives should include the co-operation with IO and NGO as part of their CIMIC training.

4A14. It is quite possible that a training and preparation programme, including FTXs, CAXs, CPXs high level seminars or live firing exercises will be conducted within the JOA. As well as the training benefit, this could act as a demonstration of Alliance resolve and cohesion.

ANNEX 4B - LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section I - Status of Forces Agreement

4B1. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) will normally be negotiated with the nation(s) where the Peace Support Operation (PSO) is conducted, as well as with the nation(s) that provide parts of its (their) territory for use as Lines of Communication (LOC) or Staging Areas. A SOFA deals with the legal status of the members of the Peace Support Force (PSF) and typically contains provisions concerning criminal jurisdiction, immunity, claims, and other matters. If a SOFA can not be agreed upon with the host government, separate legal arrangements on elements can still be negotiated. Under some circumstances, protection can be derived from the 'Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations' and the 'United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel'

Section II - Rules of Engagement

4B2. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are defined in MC 362. If a particular nation needs to supplement, for what ever reason, the NAC approved ROE, then the former is entitled to issue its own National Amplification ROE (NAROE), subject always to the caveat that NAROE cannot be any wider in their material application in comparison to the extant force commanders ROE. In all cases, the national contingents' ROE must be in compliance with both their own and international laws. ROE contain guidelines that reflect the operational policy related to the appropriate and authorised use of force by the PSF. ROE are directions for operational commanders that set out the circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be applied to achieve military objectives for the furtherance of coalition government policy. ROE are thus issued as a set of parameters to inform commanders of the limits of constraint imposed or of the freedom permitted when carrying out their assigned tasks. The ROE are designed to ensure that the application of force is appropriately controlled. ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instruction. In passing orders, subordinate commanders at any level must always act within the ROE received but they are not bound to use the full extent of the permissions granted. ROE are determined for each specific operation based upon the objectives of the mission. ROE are formulated by the military in accordance with the principles of international law and subsequently approved by the political leadership.

4B3. ROE usually begin with general principles and remarks concerning their structure and applicability. In all cases, agreed upon principles for the use of force are presented: proportionality and military necessity. Following these broad general principles is guidance specifically related to the operation. Where applicable, a distinction is made between the rules for land, air and naval forces. A selection of agreed authorisations based on MC 362 is provided to the commander. He may use all, some, or none of the authorities as he deems appropriate. ROE can be tailored to the nature and purpose of the operation and the available assets. The order will also contain a procedure for a commander to request changes to the

applicable ROE if deemed necessary because of changed circumstances or modified views. The ROE document ends with a number of relevant terms and definitions.

4B4. The ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence. Self-defence is defined in MC 362. When self defence does not apply, the right to use force for mission accomplishment must be based on the ROE. In any event, under all circumstances, the principles of necessity and proportionality apply.

4B5. One must be aware that the ROE are usually formulated in a general way and, as a consequence, do not provide solutions to every problem. The individual remains personally responsible for his actions.

Section III - Law of Armed Conflict

4B6. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is the body of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict. The PSF will not generally be a party to the conflict, yet certain LOAC principles may be applied. Individual civilians along with the civilian population must never be purposefully targeted unless they have taken active part in the armed conflict. When military force is used, every effort should be taken to minimise the risk of civilian casualties.

Section IV - War Crimes Tribunals

4B7. In recent years, some PSO have been deployed to areas where War Crimes Tribunals, under the auspices of the UN, another international organisation, or a national government, have been convened to investigate and prosecute war crimes. PSF should be aware of the activities of such tribunals within their AO, and areas in which PSF may be called upon to support such tribunals. The degree of support that can be given by a PSF will normally be governed by the Mandate. However, at the outset of a PSO there are certain tasks, such as the marking of newly-discovered evidence for later collection by investigators, in which PSF should be trained. In some cases, the existence of a War Crimes Tribunal may cause the impartiality of the PSF to be questioned by persons or groups being investigated by the Tribunal. However, the potential or actual presence of War Crimes Tribunal investigations also can serve to inhibit persons or groups from disrupting the mission of the PSO. War crimes issues should be considered in the planning of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

CHAPTER 5 – MILITARY CAPABILITIES

0501 Each nation organises and structures its forces differently. This chapter highlights military capabilities relevant to Peace Support Operations (PSO). Owing to national differences in organisation and capabilities, the structure and grouping of considerations is not a perfect template for every nation. Each component is considered in turn followed by relevant joint capabilities. Generic capabilities are not described or advertised here; more detailed information is widely available elsewhere.

Section I - Maritime Component

0502 **Attributes**. Fundamental naval attributes such as defence, deterrence, protection, patrolling, surveillance, poise, sealift and amphibious options mean that such forces may be able to exert significant leverage in PSO through their posture and availability. These distinct attributes enable naval forces to conduct a wide variety of activities which are described below.

0503 **Maritime Tasks in Peace Support Operations**. The application of maritime power is generally defined within three categories of environment: combat, constabulary or impartial activities in actual or potential conflict and more benign environments. Only those tasks specific to PSO are described below:

a. Active monitoring of a sea area, at sea or from the air, for any infringements of sanctions or embargoes and their enforcement.

b. Patrolling and monitoring a maritime cease-fire line or demilitarised zone and the control of piracy and contraband.

c. Patrolling and monitoring sea areas to control and/or enforce economic or legal agreements related to the mission, e.g. fishery, seabed exploitation and international borders.

d. Supervising the cantonment of vessels.

e. Contributing organic aircraft, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and helicopters.

f. Conducting amphibious operations.

g. Contributing to riverine operations and support for the insertion from or withdrawal to the sea.

h. Sea basing of selected elements of the PSF and their support / logistic infrastructure.

i. Provision of sea borne medical and other logistic and humanitarian resources.

j. Disaster relief operations and assistance to seaborne refugees.

      k.   Provision of a neutral platform for peace negotiations.

      l.   Mine countermeasures and ordnance disposal to enable freedom of movement.

      m.   Conducting military evacuation operations and NEO.

      n.   Fire support to forces ashore.

0504   **Planning Considerations**. Maritime forces (including maritime air assets) may play a role in all phases of a PSO from pre-deployment planning, through deployment, sustainment and conduct of operations to withdrawal. Littoral operations will require an enhanced co-operation between maritime, air and land forces. This might lead to a joint command over such a sea/land area or a well-established supported/supporting relationship. This co-operation should include planning, picture compilation, common assessment, mutual action/reaction, and mutual support.

Section II – Land Component

0505   Land forces will usually have a significant role to play in all the tasks described in Chapter 6, employing the techniques described in ATP-3.4.1.1.[1] Land forces will manage the day to day interface with the parties to the conflict and the indigenous population. This intimacy places considerable significance on ensuring that soldiers are sensitive to the nature and ethos of PSO.

Special to Arm Considerations

0506   **Armour**. The use of Armour may have a role across the spectrum of PSO. Armoured reconnaissance units are particularly useful in both PK and PE type operations, especially when a unit's geographical area of operations is large. The surveillance capabilities, firepower, mobility, protection and communications of armoured reconnaissance vehicles and the training of reconnaissance troops, makes them suitable for such tasks as liaison, control points, convoy security, quick reaction and clearing routes. The deployment of MBTs in the conduct of PSO will depend on the scale of opposition and equipment available to local forces.

0507   **Artillery**.   Mortar locating radars and other artillery locating assets may help the force document and apportion responsibility for attacks and other violations. The deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), although not always a land force asset, may have particular utility in all PSO, not just to monitor hostile acts but to track forces and monitor refugee movement. Artillery may provide a deterrent function as well as a contingency capability to respond directly to escalations of violence. Mortar and artillery illumination, and when appropriate, HE ammunition, can be used as a demonstration of resolve to deter further

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[1] ATP-3.4.1.1, 'Peace Support Operations Tactics Techniques and Procedures'.

hostile acts and enforce compliance. The increased availability of precision guided munitions may significantly reduce the risk of collateral damage, a factor that has previously constrained the use of artillery.

0508 **Infantry**. Infantry will normally represent the predominant component of the PSF and will generally provide the basic military framework around which the PSO will be conducted. Military bases can be sited around infantry elements, who have the capability to provide base security, reaction forces and local patrols within the Area of Operations (AOO). Other typical infantry tasks include: domination of the ground through a network of vehicle and foot patrols, check points, observation posts; cordon and search operations; imposition of curfews; convoy protection; dispersing crowds and riots; gathering information and intelligence and assisting in Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) projects. Armoured personnel vehicles will enhance their protection and employability for high-risk tasks such as interposition. The combat skills of the infantry will be essential in the conduct of PE.

Section III - Air Component

0509 Air power (including maritime assets) may provide appropriate tools for most PSO. From the earliest stages of a crisis air power can provide a deterrent, with implicit or explicit threat of escalation. Alternatively, it may prepare the environment for insertion of a ground force, and then complement other forces by its ability to be activated or reduced rapidly in concert with progress on other military, humanitarian or diplomatic fronts. Finally, air power projection operations can be ended quickly.

0510 Because air assets and their Command, Control and Information (C2I) structures will often be located outside the Joint Operations Area (JOA), there is potential for operational goals to diverge from those of forces more intimately enmeshed in the management of the dynamics of the relationships with the parties and the management of the situation on the ground. For instance, a strategy of enforcement from the air might compromise the impartial status of a PSO and render the situation more difficult to manage on the ground. Joint planning is therefore essential to ensure that all operations are fully integrated into and support of the overall PSO OPLAN. Air operations in PSO may be grouped into 5 areas, described below.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

0511 At the strategic and operational levels, air assets can make a major contribution to diplomatic and other efforts to prevent or limit conflict. Operating from outside a potential area of conflict, they can gather information without intruding into and risking exacerbating the situation. Relevant capabilities may include:

   a.   A variety of fixed-wing airborne sensors such as Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and high altitude photographic coverage.

   b.   Satellites providing various types of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and various types of imagery.

c.   Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

Air Transport

0512   Both strategic inter-theatre and tactical fixed-wing Air Transport (AT) aircraft will generally be required in the conduct of a PSO. They can move significant amounts of personnel and materiel quickly into the JOA in advance of sea lift or ground transport means, and may be exploited, if approved and legally authorised, to move food and emergency aid, conduct aeromedical, airborne and SF operations, or evacuate nationals, aid workers and others caught up in the dispute.

Control of the Air

0513   It is widely accepted that the control of the air is a pre-requisite for all military operations, including PSO. Even a poorly equipped protagonist may be able to launch limited air attacks that achieve disproportionate political results. In contrast, it may occur that offensive air actions by PSO forces are governed by restrictive ROE. Counter-air operations are likely to be reactive, and control of the air achieved through: protection of aircraft from attack by air or surface weapons; monitoring airspace to detect and confront unauthorised activities; imposition of an air blockade; and preparedness to attack all or part of any belligerent's air inventory where there is irrefutable evidence of non-compliance. The airspace over the JOA, while not necessarily hostile, may not be totally friendly either. Legitimate civil air traffic may be intermingled with potentially illegitimate traffic. Training flights may need to be conducted within airspace earmarked for operations and enforcement of air policing may be constrained by: the nature of the PSO; the terms of the mandate; Status of Forces (SOFA); and ROE. This drives the need for a sound airspace control plan and de-confliction procedures.

Offensive Air Power

0514   Offensive air power can discourage the parties from using military force by the application of a broad spectrum of capabilities, from 'show of force' through non-lethal to lethal force. Those capabilities enable air power to apply the appropriate force in any kind of conflict and to rapidly escalate or de-escalate according to the situation. This requires a clear and convincing political statement of intent, backed with the military capability to counter opposition effectively. A well-publicised preparation at home bases, rapid deployments to the area of conflict and high visibility exercises can all reinforce diplomacy and discourage conflict. Ultimately offensive aircraft may reduce the non-compliant parties' will and ability to fight by destroying key elements of military potential or other high value assets.

0515   All offensive air operations must be impartial. Throughout, the prime aim must be to attack with sufficient, but proportionate, force so that protagonists are convinced that continued non-compliance is pointless. The selection of targets will be crucial for this, and will usually require political sanction.

0516   When considering potential targets the impact must be proportional, consistent with LOAC and have obvious relevance. This is essential, not only to meet legal requirements, but also to ensure acceptability to the international community. Weapons stocks, armour and heavy artillery are less controversial examples; static irritants to ground forces, such as road blocks or temporary Control Points (CPs), could be exploited for exemplary destruction by Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). However, small or highly mobile targets, and those where there is a risk of collateral damage or civilian casualties, will require careful selection, approval, and designation with, for example, Laser Target Marking (LTM).

0517   All attacks must be recorded and followed up with post-attack reconnaissance in order to: confirm the required effect was achieved, refute claims of collateral damage and facilitate the post-conflict destruction/neutralisation of dud-fired aerial-delivered ordnance. Given almost inevitable and immediate media coverage, unsuccessful or inaccurate attacks can have a disproportionate and negative impact on a PSO campaign.

Helicopters

0518   Helicopters, whether jointly held or belonging to maritime, land or air forces, can perform a wide range of essential functions in PSO. Helicopters provide first class local information; their low operating altitude gives excellent perspective, while their rapid response and forward deployment can yield timely data. They provide an air transport capability for troop movement or logistic re-supply and perform reconnaissance. Armed and attack helicopters are a flexible combat force. Helicopters themselves are vulnerable and also need protective measures and avionics commensurate with the threat and scope of potential tasks in PSO. Helicopters will inevitably be a scarce resource, and their tasking should therefore be centrally directed to ensure the most effective distribution of their effort.

Section IV - Joint Logistics

0519   **NATO Logistics**. In a NATO-led operation the principles of collective responsibility for logistics, as set out in the current version of MC 319 and AJP-4, will apply. Although the provision of logistic support to national forces is ultimately the responsibility of the nations providing those forces, arrangements for multinational logistics should be put in place to the greatest extent possible in order to save personnel and money and to minimise the logistic footprint in theatre. Where a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) is deployed it should be used to coordinate these functions and thus avoid, where possible, the duplication of effort between National Support Elements (NSEs). Wherever possible, the MJLC must be in place before the arrival of the component forces. Regardless of whether or not the operation is led by NATO, nations must ensure that co-ordination takes place among participating nations and other organisations (such as the UN). Through co-ordination, it will be possible to increase the overall effectiveness of logistics effort. This applies particularly to the provision of 'common' supplies and services (such as accommodation, food and water, transportation, storage, petroleum, medical support and the like). Logistic support concepts and procedures, as well as the size and structure of logistic units, should be tailored to the supported units and their related employment options.

Planning Considerations

0520   Apart from the normal logistics support functions, certain PSO, especially those with a humanitarian focus, will be almost entirely of a logistic nature. The operational environment for PSO is often characterised by long distances, difficult terrain, a hostile climate, a scarcity of basic facilities and a lack of Host Nation Support. Long Lines of Communications (LOCs) to the JOA may compound this. This may have a considerable impact on the size of the logistic effort to sustain the force, let alone to enable it to operate effectively, and may well require the deployment of NSE including a co-ordinating HQ. Logistic support advisors therefore need to be involved at the start of the planning process and be included in any reconnaissance. Logistic support considerations are likely to dictate major aspects of the PSF's conduct of operations, and may be of such priority as to require the involvement and employment of combat arms.

0521   In suitable circumstances units may deploy with limited weapons and ammunition, transport, communications, equipment support, and medical assets. The operational imperatives of PE, however, dictate that a force should be sustained and fully capable of combat. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate for the civil sector to be allocated certain logistic functions to support the PSF and aid agencies. Logistic support operations that support other military forces or cross multinational boundaries will require extensive liaison.

0522   PSO may require the commitment of logistic support resources to support civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) programmes for the benefit of the local population and any casualties of conflict. Such commitments might include medical support, health care, and extensive construction projects. If engaged in the latter, engineers are likely to require large supplies of construction materials. Co-ordination between engineer and supply or contract units will be essential. Local contractors are likely to require direct cash payment for NGO sponsored projects in hard currency. Given the likely need to exploit local resources, the operation of contracting agencies will be of particular significance to logistic support activity.

0523   A commander must balance and match his logistic support requirements against the available resources. Having done so, he can formulate his logistic plan and stipulate his logistic priorities in terms of the types of support that are the most critical, and the users that have the highest priority. He should also take account of any logistic support limitations that may restrict future operations and contingency plans. Logistic support demands will often constrain the scope of operations and may sometimes require the commander's overall planning process to be checked and revised. The logistic plan should also consider the PSF's exit strategy and redeployment procedures.

Section V – Joint Capabilities with Specific Relevance to Peace Support Operations

0524   **Special Forces**. The characteristics of Special Operations Forces have many relevant applications in PSO, but their overt deployment in a politically charged environment can be highly emotive. Their ability to be deployed discreetly, at long range, with secure

communications, makes Special Forces capable of short notice liaison, reconnaissance and other tasks. They are also suited to civil-military co-operation tasks, community relations and community information activities, as well as the raising, training and reform of local security forces.

0525 **Engineers**. Engineers are a vital asset in PSO. The assistance level can vary from teams to complete units. Small teams are used to assess damage or estimate engineering repairs, and can assist in specialized support such as power supply and distribution, utilities repair work and well drilling operations. With large PSO, engineer units provide skills including construction, structural repair, debris clearance, utilities restoration, and camp construction for deployed forces, displaced civilians or refugees. In addition to completing the tasks outlined above, engineers often play a key role in the transition and hand-over to civil authorities. During planning, commanders must understand that redeployment can be a significant engineer challenge, particularly when terminating PSO. Civil engineering operations support force redeployment through the preparation of facilities for hand-over, including close-out of construction projects, refurbishment and turnover of property and real estate to the Host Nation (HN). Additionally, engineers terminate leases and facility contracts, construct wash racks and other redeployment facilities, and prepare collection points for hazardous materials. Environmental considerations may affect all phases of operations. The JFC should be aware of environmental requirements and their potential impact on joint operations. Environmental planning is an essential process that incorporates environmental considerations into operational planning.

0526 **Ordnance Disposal**. Engineers and other ordnance clearance and disposal specialists, from whatever arm or service, may be required to conduct and supervise the location and area clearance of mines and other unexploded ordnance.

0527 **Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Troops**. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defence Troops (decontamination units, Recce/survey teams) should be employed when there is the presence or threat or previous use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or potential terrorist acts, or when the JOA contains civilian facilities containing toxic materials or research laboratories, chemical plants or waste deposits and stockpiles.

0528 **Medical Services**. Nations are principally responsible for the medical support of their contingents tempering this principle by the need for co-operation, co-ordination and economy. Military medical services are designed principally to provide medical services to the forces and not the indigenous population. However, in PSO they may also be used to support humanitarian operations and community relations projects, as well as provide direct support to military operations. In addition, living conditions in PSO may be very basic and could pose a considerable health and hygiene hazard. Standard military medical units or facilities may not be appropriate for this task; thus mission tailoring may be required. Environmental health and hygiene reconnaissance and monitoring are vital for troop health and welfare. The expectations of servicemen and women, the public, media and government will be higher than might be expected for war. Standards of care must therefore conform, as closely as possible, to those expected in peace.

0529 **Multinational Specialised Units**. Over the long term local police should have primary responsibility for all civilian law enforcement issues. In the interim, and where this is not possible, the PSF has the responsibility for creating a secure environment. Multinational Specialised Units (MSUs) provide the JFC with police forces that have military status and the training, experience and capability to deal with this area of public security. MSU roles may include information gathering, investigations, criminal intelligence, counter terrorism, maintenance of law and order, and public security related matters. The aim should be for MSU and other PSF components to transfer civilian law enforcement responsibilities to civilian police components of the PSO, and/or to local civilian police forces, at the earliest feasible point in the course of the operation.

0530 **Military Police**. Military police are able to provide the JFC with a rapid investigation and management capability. This may include: war crimes response, the investigation of complaints and claims made against the PSF, the prevention of crime, including looting and black marketeering, the maintenance and restoration of law and order (not just in a military context), the protection of designated high threat personnel and the control of routes, traffic stragglers, refugees and other non-combatants. Civilian policing is, and should be, primarily conducted by civil authorities or specified civilian policing elements of the PSO. Military police may, however, perform this function in close co-operation with local police forces or UN police.

0531 **Military Provost Staff**. The Military Provost Staff is able to advise and assist the National Contingent and/or the Joint Force Commander with the in-JOA detention requirements of national or multinational forces in support of the civil authority.

0532 **Veterinary Services**. Military working animals, especially guard dogs, often have a particular utility in PSO, for example as a deterrent short of lethal force. Also, the inspection of locally procured livestock for consumption by own forces should conform to peacetime standards requiring the involvement of veterinary services. Animal welfare may be of paramount importance in certain rural societies. Animals may be more than just a source of food; they may also be of religious significance and be viewed as a source of wealth or draft power. As a consequence, veterinary services can play a significant role in many community relations programmes. For PSO, conducted in a rural environment, the need for advice to the commander on veterinary matters may prove highly significant.

0533 **Intelligence**. Successful intelligence support during peace support operations relies on continuous information collection and intelligence production. Increased reliance on HUMINT sources may often be necessary. Furthermore, it is necessary to collect information on all parties to the conflict to understand and appreciate varying perspectives and methods of operation. Special equipment such as night observation devices and thermal imagery devices, as well as special surveillance aircraft, will also be useful in peace support operations. The

intelligence needs of the commander involved in peace support operations are in some ways more complex than those of the commander conducting combat operations in war.[2]

0534 **Psychological Operations**. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) can play an important role in facilitating cooperation between belligerent parties and peace support operation forces. Through the use of local information programs, such as radio or television newscasts and leaflet distribution, PSYOPS elements can ensure the operational objectives and efforts are fully understood.

0535 **Public Affairs**. PSO are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. Public Affairs (PA) personnel support the commander by working to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the force and its conduct of peace support operations. As reports of PSO are widely visible to national and international publics, PA are critical in PSO. News media reports contribute to the legitimacy of an operation and the achievement of political, diplomatic goals. PA must monitor public perceptions and develop and disseminate clear messages.

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[2] Intelligence is covered in paragraph 0618.

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CHAPTER 6 – OPERATING IN A PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

Section I – Operational Framework

0601. To understand the complex multifunctional and multidimensional nature of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) requires a conceptual vision that not only focuses on the here and now but also provides a framework to conceptualise many diverse activities in time and space. Such a conceptual framework will help visualise and therefore synchronise the various functional areas of activity and achieve unity of effort and purpose and direct all military and civilian activities towards strategic objectives and the political end-state. Such an approach is necessary at all levels of operation and to ensure coherence between strategic and tactical activities. For example, information operations targeted at international and local perceptions should be designed to reinforce, and be reinforced by tactical level military activities, such as those designed to enhance community relations by the conduct of civil-military projects.

0602. At the tactical level the management of an incident will generally require the close control of the immediate environment around the incident, while some form of leverage to resolve the crisis, e.g. in the form of negotiation, is applied elsewhere in another dimension. For example, the removal of a road-block and the subsequent management of a local area of operations may best be achieved by negotiation with a local civic or religious leader rather than the application of force. In this way, a multidimensional framework of understanding can provide the necessary basis for both the successful conduct of the overall mission and the guidance for the resolution of specific incidents at the tactical level.

0603. A useful means of managing this multidimensional and multifunctional framework is to distinguish between the immediate and close environment and that which may be distant in time, space, distance and function.

0604. **Shaping the Immediate Environment**. In the immediate or close environment, it will be necessary to conduct those activities that involve the intimate management and control of the operational environment. Such activities in PSO rely on a combination of tactics, techniques and procedures designed to enforce compliance and control local events and activities designed to promote general co-operation and consent. Typical examples of close operations designed to enforce compliance are the stopping, boarding and searching of shipping, the imposition or denial of specified flying conditions, the (temporary) use of road-blocks and check-points, and crowd and riot control. Such operations have to be timely and relevant to be effective.

0605. **Shaping the Distant Environment**. This is the environment in which shaping operations will generally be directed at the perceptions of the parties and in which operations are designed to pre-empt future potential problems or set the conditions for their successful resolution. At the strategic and operational levels such operations will be directed at the leadership of the parties, contributing or potential contributing states to the mission and world opinion in general. The early deployment of significant maritime and air forces may be used

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to support political signals of intent and act to persuade disputing parties to desist from a particular course of action. At the operational level, such operations generally focus on local political, humanitarian and human right issues. At the tactical level, shaping operations may involve military manoeuvres to deter, compel or coerce, or possibly the conduct of negotiations at a higher level up the parties' chain of command from the site of any incident. In PSO, shaping operations will be designed to ensure compliance, promote co-operation and consent and, thus may require a protracted period of time. It is in this environment that other functional areas of activity, other than the military, may prove most useful in achieving objectives.

0606. **Shaping the Supporting Environment**. The supporting environment may be displaced from the immediate environment by time, space, distance and function or be an integral part of it. Supporting operations may concern maintaining the support of the international community and of the home base for the PSO, training and the maintenance and sustainment of the force, involving Host Nation Support (HNS) when appropriate. Force protection activities may also be viewed as taking place in this environment. Force protection activities include: anti-piracy operations to keep open maritime lines of communications, the provision of defence works at strategic airfields, mine awareness and measures to reduce casualties caused by traffic accidents. Force protection, maintenance and sustainment activities are inherent in all military operations. However, in PSO these functions may need to be extended to include support to other agencies, including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs), and other PSO related activities being conducted in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) by (unarmed) observers and humanitarian relief workers. These notions should be borne in mind when addressing the multifunctional planning approach to a PSO.[1]

0607. **Core Functions**.   The fundamental elements, or core functions, of combat operations involve two aspects: the shaping and control of the operational environment so as to more easily accomplish the mission; and the direct application of military techniques to achieve resolution and the accomplishment of the mission. These are described respectively as *fixing* and *striking*. Implicit in both is the need for good intelligence to *find* and identify the causes of the problem. In the conduct of a PSO the main effort could be in the immediate, distant or supporting environment, and often the most appropriate elements to achieve the desired long term solution may not be military forces. Military forces will however, more normally provide the fixing function so as to create a secure and stable environment within which the activities of other agencies may be used to strike at and resolve the symptoms and underlying causes of the conflict.

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[1] See Chapter 4.

Section II – Military Approach and Command Style

The Military Approach in Peace Support Operations

0608. The military needs an approach that accepts chaos and disorder, the very characteristics inherent in PSO, and turns them to advantage. They must seek to gain, and maintain, a position of advantage with which to influence the will and cohesion of opponent(s) or parties. Such a position may be legal, or moral - the mandate or ROE may indicate this, the prevention of ethnic cleansing for example; it may be physical - the possession of vital life saving supplies; or the possession of a greater means of coercion than the parties. This approach therefore has its focus on the intangible as well as the tangible.

0609. An approach which focuses exclusively on the material, rather than the perceptions and attitudes of the parties is unlikely to persuade the parties in a PSO environment that their best interests lie in peace and thus to achieve the reconciliation necessary for a lasting settlement. The application of this approach should allow the PSF the ability to retain its own freedom of action in time and space and to control the tempo of the operation. The successful conduct of the military phase of a PSO will require that time and resources be devoted to perception management activities.[2]

Command Style.

0610. The above approach to the conduct of PSO is best achieved and supported by adopting a particular command style which describes what is to be achieved (the *what*), the commander's intent (the *why*), specifies a timeframe (the *when*) and the allocation of the necessary resources (the *with what*). It does not dictate how the objectives should be achieved, but allows subordinate commanders the initiative to develop the mission in a coherent and positive manner. In PSO, such a flexible and responsive method of command is best able to manage the interactions of the many involved agencies and to ensure proper mission development as opposed to undesirable mission creep.

0611. Mission development should be encouraged, as opposed to mission creep that should not. Mission development is a term used to describe planned, organized and controlled mission changes, so the mission develops coherently towards the achievement of the conditions defining the end-state. Mission creep is a term used to describe taking on new tasks beyond the original intent without the necessary prior rigorous analysis, or allocating them without the necessary resources. Mission creep normally results from incoherent political direction. Changes of mission can be erroneously made when the full breadth of implied tasks is not properly appreciated in the estimate process.

0612. Whilst highly desirable, not all national military contingents may be familiar with this command style and multinational force commanders may need to develop command mechanisms which take into account the normal practices of their subordinate national

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[2] PSO techniques are covered in ATP-3.4.1.1, '*Peace Support Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*'.

contingents. Timely and detailed Situation Reports (SITREPS) to higher headquarters should help to offset the desire that some commanders may have to 'micro-manage' operations.

Section III – Phases of the Operation

0613. Engagement in a PSO by the international community, individual nations and the Alliance may be incremental, ad hoc and multifunctional. It may prove necessary to deploy a number of National Contingents as part of (and possibly in advance of) a NATO force each under a National Contingent Commander (NCC). These contingents may be joint in nature and have a National Support Element (NSE) to serve as a co-ordinating headquarters for the reception, staging, and onward movement of personnel and material as well as the sustainment of the force.   The deployment and conduct of a NATO military force will generally cover the phases and general activities listed below.

0614. **Preparation**. The preparation phase covers all activities prior to departure, including warning, reconnaissance, planning, liaison, assembly, administration and training. The preparation phase of a PSO is a national responsibility, with NATO's Strategic Commanders (SCs) giving guidance on the standards of training, equipment and personnel strengths to be achieved.

0615. **Deployment**. The deployment phase starts with the departure of the national contingents of a PSF from their home bases and ends with their arrival in the designated JOA. The deployment phase is basically a national responsibility, with NATO's SCs and the Joint Force Commander (JFC) having a co-ordinating and overview role.

0616. **Transfer of Authority**. Once forces designated by contributing nations are deployed to the JOA and declared operationally ready, the transfer of authority to the JFC should take place.

Employment

0617. **Initial Employment**. The employment phase begins with the arrival of the elements of the PSF in the JOA and covers their reception, move to base camps, preparatory measures, their tactical deployment forward into their respective Areas of Operations (AOOs), and the subsequent conduct of operations. Establishing the PSF's security and self-sufficiency will be prime planning considerations in the early stages of an operation. Other initial and preparatory activities will include briefings, reconnaissance, liaison visits, training, and administration.

0618. **Intelligence**. At the operational level, and in its simplest form, good intelligence may involve the identification of the causes of the emergency and where the main effort should be applied to resolve the conflict. At the operational and tactical levels, producing detailed intelligence on the local community, local politics, the economic situation, the location of refugees and all the factions, is necessary for any mission to succeed. For example, it is needed to target aid to where it is most needed and to prevent any element of the PSF from being out-manoeuvred

and surprised either physically or in negotiations. The following detailed considerations generally apply:

a.   Successful intelligence support during PSO relies on continuous information collection and intelligence production from all sources. The intelligence needs of the PSO commander are in some ways more complex than those of the commander conducting combat operations in war.

b.   Planning must address the necessary support to ensure that communications, processing capability, and downlinks are available for broadcast dissemination of information and intelligence.

c.   In a multi-national setting, forces and agencies will need to share intelligence, to some degree. This may involve sharing intelligence information with national military forces or non-governmental agencies with which NATO has no previous intelligence sharing agreements. In order to avoid sensitivities over sharing issues planning must include development of policy and dissemination criteria and authority for each instance.

d.   Mission planning must also take into consideration intelligence collection operations. Collection of intelligence in PSO may differ somewhat from intelligence collection in conventional operations as belligerent parties may perceive intelligence gathering as a hostile act.

e.   Intelligence staffs must address and adapt to a situation that will include multiple belligerents, multiple threats and local issues. As such, conventional military intelligence analysis activities may need to be augmented by subject matter experts.

0619. **Shaping and Controlling**. At the operational level this function may refer to deterrent operations in general, or more specifically could include naval embargoes and air interdiction operations. Other fixing functions may include such activities as the separation of forces, impounding of weapons, the provision of aid and responding to widespread, systematic human rights violations.[3]

0620. **Resolution or Striking**. The ultimate achievement of the mission in a PSO will require the application of the most appropriate techniques to enforce or reward compliance, enhance reconciliation, restore peace, resolve the conflict and attack or redress the underlying causes of the complex emergency. In the conduct of PSO 'striking' will not, in the first instance, refer to the application of force but could refer to the strategic delivery and tactical distribution of emergency food supplies or civil development programmes in unsecured areas.[3]

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[3] See paragraph 0607.

0621. **Sustaining the Operation**. The PSF has to sustain its operations until the envisaged end-state has been achieved, by means of a harmonised and effective system of rotation of units and individuals, and by means of a harmonised and effective logistic support effort.

Redeployment.

0622. A redeployment phase starts with a cessation or handing over of operational tasks. The nature of any redeployment may vary from emergency extraction to planned withdrawal, routine roulement or, in case of a Peace Enforcement (PE) type operation, the hand-over to a Peacekeeping (PK) force. When appropriate, redeployment will cover the transfer of operational and administrative activities to relieving troops, international relief agencies or civilian authorities. Post-operational activities will embrace all after-action activity, including post-operational reports; the submission of lessons learned information and national administration.

Transfer of Responsibility.

0623. Multinational and multi-agency PSO will normally require the hand-over or take-over of tactical areas of operation or responsibilities to other military forces or even civilian agencies. Such action should be pre-planned, and carefully co-ordinated and managed. Considerations concerning the subsequent conduct of activities or functions, and the nature of the agency, to which these responsibilities will be transferred, should condition the immediate conduct of operations. Any divergence or discrepancies in transfers of responsibility may be exploited by the parties.

Section IV – Military Tasks in Peace Support Operations

0624. There is a large number of military tasks or activities that may need to be conducted throughout the range of PSO. These may be conducted in sequence although normally many will be conducted as concurrent activities with differing degrees of emphasis depending on the stage and circumstances of the operation. This section describes the main elements but is not intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive. Those at the beginning of the section are more likely to be relevant to PK and those towards the end are more relevant to PE.

0625. **Preventive Deployment Sub-Tasks**. Conflict prevention is primarily a diplomatic activity, however, preventative deployments and other military activities will play an essential role in supporting diplomatic activities to prevent, contain or control conflict. At the tactical level, and working on the principle that 'prevention is better than cure', activities to pre-empt conflict, or at least prevent its spread, will usually be a prime consideration in all military activities. There are five principal sub-tasks as part of a preventive deployment, which may all overlap, that contribute to the prevention of conflict.

    a.   **Early Warning**. By identifying the threat of an outbreak of violence, early warning will buy time for a range of preventative diplomatic, humanitarian and military actions to be put into place. As a consequence, commanders at all levels should focus their

intelligence and information gathering assets on any potential crisis within their areas of interest.

b.   **Surveillance**. The presence of widespread surveillance in an area of operations will help to deter breaches of the peace by any party. Surveillance can also provide the means for attribution of culpability. Effective surveillance is, therefore, a major conflict prevention technique.

c.   **Stabilising Measures**. Stabilising and confidence building measures, supported by peace building programmes, may contribute to the lowering of tension in an area and may represent the first step towards the restoration of law and order, and negotiations for a political settlement. They may take several forms:

    (1)   The establishment of an effective liaison and communication network between all parties.

    (2)   Mutual and balanced reductions in personnel and equipment within any armed local factions.

    (3)   The separation of forces.

    (4)   Zonal restrictions on the deployment of weapons and military personnel, including the enforcement of no-fly zones.

    (5)   Advance reporting of military activities or exercises.

    (6)   Joint inspections of disputed areas.

d.   **Training Assistance Programmes**. Training and assistance to indigenous efforts to reform the defence and security sector will be designed to enhance democratic accountability and transparency, and ensure security resources are used to support the legitimate aspirations of the country as a whole. Specifically, education and training programmes will be designed to enhance understanding of human rights issues and promote democratisation efforts within all elements of military and security forces.

e.   **The Restoration of Law and Order**. The creation of a secure environment and the provision of assistance to local civil authorities to restore the rule of law will often be a task for a PSF. In such an operation, tasks may range from counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist tasks to the specific protection of human rights, the detailed recording and collection of evidence of violations, and the arrest of designated war criminals. A NATO PE operation to end wide spread human rights abuses and restore the rule of law may well be the precursor to handing the operation to a UN PK force, Civil Police (CIVPOL) or Host Nation authorities.

Observation and Monitoring

0626. In PSO, strategic and operational level observation and monitoring may be conducted by maritime and air assets, including satellites, but ultimately will rely heavily on the human factor, i.e. the observations of troops on the ground and in proximity to the parties and indigenous population. Traditionally, individual observer teams have acted as the 'eyes and ears' of the Security Council and their presence has often been sufficient to deter breaches of cease-fires and peace agreements. Their up-to-date reports provide useful evidence to counter claims put forward by partisan interests at Security Council discussions. Observers may be employed individually or in small multinational joint teams to observe, monitor, verify, and report and, where possible, to use confidence building measures to defuse situations of potential conflict. Specific tasks may be to provide early warning to trigger political initiatives, to observe a withdrawal or to monitor the movement of refugees and other displaced persons. Subsidiary tasks could be to provide liaison, investigation and negotiation, although unarmed observers would normally take no executive action with regard to violations. Observers are generally unarmed and have traditionally relied on their impartial status for protection and personal security.

Supervision of Truces and Cease-Fires

0627. Military forces may be deployed to supervise any commitments agreed to by the parties as part of a truce, cease-fire or other peace plan. This may include operational level joint force deployments. Tasks will generally be agreed and specified in the detail of the agreement or treaty. These might include the following (see also 0630-0631):

 a. The separation, containment, disarmament and demobilisation of forces.

 b. The execution of the details of the agreement, such as the exchange of prisoners and bodies, and arms control agreements.

 c. Liaison between the parties and all elements of the force, both military and civilian.

 d. Negotiation and mediation on behalf of all parties to the dispute.

 e. The investigation of complaints and violations to the details of the agreement or treaty.

 f. The movement and re-settlement of refugees and displaced persons.

 g. Assistance to UN and other CIVPOL in those areas with mixed populations that may be located outside buffer zones and in areas of potential hostile territory.

Interposition

0628. A PSF can deploy as an inter-positional force, as a form of trip-wire either when consent exists or when consent is fragile, if supported by a credible external deterrent power or

standoff force. Troops involved in interposition operations are generally deployed to pre-empt conflict. As such, these operations take place in areas of recent or potential, rather than actual conflict, either between states or within a state where tension is rising between parties. Although there would be consent to the operation, at least from the Host State, a peace plan or formal cease-fire may not have been agreed, and the situation may be characterised by sporadic outbreaks of violence. Interposition operations will generally take the form of the establishment of a buffer zone, or, where the communities are intermingled, the establishment of areas of separation wherever the communities are physically mixed.

Transition Assistance

0629. Transition assistance refers to all forms of general military assistance to a civil authority or community rendered as part of a wider diplomatic, humanitarian and economic strategy to support a return or transition to peace and stability. In the aftermath of an intra-state conflict, and in the absence of effective government, transition assistance may initially take the form of direct help to civil communities, before efforts can be made to rebuild a more effective government infrastructure. Transition assistance operations are generally a post conflict activity; however, their chance of success will be enhanced if reconstruction and peace building efforts are conducted as a subsidiary activity throughout the duration of the PSO. Military tasks in a transition assistance operation cover a broad range of activities, but for ease of definition, can be grouped under the following headings, reflecting the purpose for which such tasks might be undertaken.

a.   **Supervision**. Important supervisory tasks might include: a transition of authority; reforming local security forces, the relocation and re-settlement of refugees and displaced persons.

b.   **Administration**. Tasks might range from liaison to support for the establishment of an interim government. In between tasks could include assistance with the supply of power, water, public transport, communications and hygiene services, i.e. all those public services that form an essential part of the daily life of a community.

c.   **Protection**. The creation of a secure environment may be extended to include the safeguarding of individuals, communities and installations.

d.   **Response**. The ability of military forces to respond to fresh incidents is essential to retain control and keep the initiative. In all military operations commanders should have reserves and contingency plans prepared for such situations. In some circumstances responses may consist of techniques, other than the use of force.[4]

e.   **Control**. In any transition assistance operation a commander may be called upon to support collective control measures. These may range from economic sanctions to local curfews. As with other dealings with the parties to the conflict, prohibitions and

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[4] Techniques are discussed in detail in ATP-3.4.1.1 '*Peace Support Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*'.

restrictions have to be proportionate, legal and applied impartially. Otherwise the PSF will risk losing local co-operation and consent.

f.   **Co-ordination**. In all larger scale and complex PSO there will be a requirement to co-ordinate the activities of a large number of agencies, e.g. NGOs, PVOs and others. Military forces may be tasked to assist with this co-ordination.

g.   **Law and Order**. Military assistance operations will contribute to the overall aim of maintaining law and order, a responsibility that rests ultimately with the police and civil authorities and one that should be transferred gradually to those authorities as early as possible during a PSO. If the situation is degenerating, military enforcement operations may be necessary to restore the peace and to provide direct support to the police. Military operations of this nature will tend to be a post conflict activity.

h.   **Support to the Electoral Process**. The re-establishment of law and order and the creation of a secure environment are essential prerequisites to the successful conduct of elections. Without some guarantee of protection and security, individuals will not have the confidence to vote and the electoral process will lack credibility. Military support for the electoral process may take many forms but will generally consist of the establishment and protection of voting centres and the secure transportation of ballot boxes and electoral staff.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration.[5]

0630. Disarmament and demobilisation operations will be only one phase of a wider and longer-term transition operation designed to reform the indigenous security sector and to (re) integrate those military personnel, considered surplus to military requirements, back into society. All such operations will invariably involve many civil and military agencies in a fully integrated plan. A process of de-criminalisation and concerns over child soldiers will be a major concern throughout. Without a rudimentary security framework, there is little or no chance of armed forces agreeing to disarm or demobilise. Financial inducements and an offer of future employment may encourage disarmament and demobilisation. However, unless armed forces can see a sustainable future for themselves and those they represent development programmes and the creation of a self-sustaining peace will remain highly problematic. The tendency to revert to violence to achieve objectives will remain high until an alternate, guaranteed and economically viable form of employment can be provided. Forcible disarmament may be considered, but over a wide area would be very manpower intensive and in certain cultures impossible to accomplish. The final military phase of a demobilisation and disarmament operation may be the hand-over of security tasks to legally constituted and properly trained local forces. The creation and training of such a force may be a prerequisite to longer term success and a task for elements of the PSF.

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[5] See Glossary for definition.

0631. **Sequence of Disarmament and Demobilisation**. Disarmament and demobilisation operations may follow the sequence described below.[6]

    a.   **Securing Agreement**. Agreement to any disarmament and demobilisation process should be voluntary, but could be secured through sheer exhaustion, truce, or as the result of a successful PE operation. Disarmament and demobilisation operations which occur as a consequence of enforcement will be difficult to manage. Details in the agreement should include arrangements for the separation of forces, procedures for the handing in, storage and destruction of weapons, and the cantonment, training and demobilisation of forces.

    b.   **Establishing and Managing a Cease-fire**.

        (1)   **Scope**. Cease-fires normally depend on a clear geographical delineation and an agreed time-scale for their implementation. However, in more volatile circumstances, and when forces are intermingled, the best that may be achieved could be a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal to camp.

        (2)   **Delineated Cease-fires**. In geographical terms a cease-fire may be delineated by:

            (a)   Cease-fire Line.

            (b)   Zone of Separation.

            (c)   Control Zone.

            (d)   Area Cease-fire.

        (3)   **Management of Cease-fires**. The effective management of a cease-fire will require close supervision on both sides of the line, with radio communications between them, by observers and patrols on the ground and in the air, and possibly at sea. The cease-fire document should contain procedures and responsibilities for:

            (a)   Investigation.

            (b)   Arbitration.

            (c)   Attribution.

            (d)   Penalties and rewards.

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[6] Further details can be found in ATP-3.4.1.1 '*Peace Support Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*'.

(4)   **Responses**. A prompt and firm response to breaches of cease-fire agreements is essential. Delayed and inappropriate responses will prejudice the credibility of the cease-fire and risk a degeneration of the overall security situation.

c.   **Withdrawal and Assembly of Former Warring Factions**. Following a cease-fire or peace agreement, demobilisation operations may require the co-ordinated disengagement and withdrawal of forces into prescribed assembly areas or cantonment sites. For security reasons such actions are best conducted simultaneously and tied to specific times and dates, throughout the whole JOA. Suitable reception arrangements and efficient administrative and logistic support plans are essential for success. Should the local authorities be incapable of performing these tasks, they may fall to the PSF.

d.   **Disarming Former Warring Factions**. Successful disarmament is dependent on the confidence that the parties have in the demobilisation process as a whole. Critically it hinges on their trust in the PSF to keep the peace, but this may be enhanced by mutually verifiable arms reduction agreements, supported by Arms Control experts of allied nations. Disarmament may need to be mutually phased and encouraged by a series of rewards. Besides collecting weapons from former combatants, disarmament may include the collection of war supplies from any stockpiles and depots or even weapons in transit. The safe custody and accurate accounting for weapons and material is essential. The destruction of weapons and other warlike materials must be planned in an ecologically sound and verifiable manner.

e.   **Demobilisation**. Having completed disarmament, the next step in the process is to select those individuals or units that are to be retained and trained and those considered surplus to military and other security (police) requirements and discharged. The future size and shape of any future defence and security force should be the result of a comprehensive review that balances requirements with resources. Military forces that wish to transfer to the police service will need comprehensive retraining.

f.   **Rehabilitation of Former Warring Factions**. Having selected those who can be trained for a future security force, support measures will need to be created for the dispersal and rehabilitation of the remainder of the parties. This stage is principally the responsibility of the civil authorities and will be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution of the other means of government and state control, and the provision of alternate forms of employment. Those being discharged will need education and training with a view to civilian employment. This will inevitably be an expensive and long-term aspiration that will be conditional upon the development of a viable state economy. In many cases, the military will include those who were responsible for the perpetration of human rights abuses and war crimes, even against their own people. Issues of culpability and justice may need to be addressed as part of the reconciliation process and as a precursor to recreating trust in the security and defence sector.

Restoration of Law and Order Operations

0632. Operations to contain a conflict or to forcibly separate belligerent parties may be a necessary precursor to operations designed to restore law and order, subsequently operations to enforce the continuing rule of law may be a necessary pre-determinant for the creation of a peaceful situation. Thus PSO tasks may be seen as a seamless spectrum leading to a peaceful settlement. The restoration of law and order will generally be a task for the police or local authorities. However, operations to restore the rule of law will inevitably be required in the circumstances of chaos associated with a complex crisis, and when there are no coherent parties, or the parties are ill disciplined and indistinguishable from the criminal elements of the local society. In such circumstances, military operations may be designed to counter insurgent, terrorist or criminal activities and enforce the terms specified in the mandate. The successful re-imposition of the rule of law may be dependent upon separating and protecting the general population from the protagonists whilst gradually subverting or eliminating any who obstruct the restoration of the rule of law. The creation of a relatively secure environment will be necessary to allow the civilian agencies the freedom of movement necessary to conduct their operations.

The Protection of Humanitarian Operations

0633. It will be important to restore the peace and create a stable and secure environment in which aid can run freely. Should the situation be such that civilian humanitarian operations require widespread protection specific tasks may include the protection of convoys, depots, equipment and those workers responsible for their operation. Conditions of widespread banditry may exist, and when aid operations are being consistently interrupted there may be a requirement to use force in large measure to achieve the mission. Such activities will need the closest co-operation and co-ordination between military forces and civilian aid agencies, not least to maintain the independent status of the aid agencies. When military protection is not available, aid agencies may need to use local personnel or civilian firms for guards and protection. The use of such persons and companies for these duties is the responsibility of the agencies but may in itself a create a security problem that may need to be carefully managed.

Protection of Human Rights

0634. PSO are increasingly conducted in situations in which there are wide spread and ongoing abuses to basic human rights, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Such abuses frequently occur in collapsed or collapsing states in which the rule of law has ceased to exist. Only a PSF prepared for combat can operate in such an environment, curtail human rights abuses, and create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can redress the underlying causes of the conflict and address the requirements of peace building. While a principal role of organisations such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the monitoring and protection of human rights and the recording of violations, a PSF may be called upon to fulfil a variety of supporting functions in close co-ordination with specialist agencies and civilian police. A

PSF will help to deter human rights abuses simply by its presence and by any reports it may send to human rights agencies. It is essential that all evidence relating to human rights abuses and war crimes is systematically and accurately recorded for future investigations. The apprehension of the perpetrators of war crimes will generally require the involvement of the PSF supported by specialist war crimes investigators, and other civilian enforcement agencies.

Explosive Ordnance and Mine Clearance

0635. **The Hazards**. Explosive ordnance and mines pose a significant threat to all people, equipment and animals during, and after, the termination of a conflict, both at sea and on land. With the exception of mines in international waters, unexploded ordnance and minefields in combat zones are primarily the responsibility of the parties themselves. In theory, they remain part of the parties' obstacle plan should the PSF withdraw. If the PSF wishes to retain its impartial status it is obliged not to reveal the location of one party's minefields to the other, although it should try and ensure that they are discreetly and adequately marked in accordance with international law. Unless the mandate specifies otherwise, a PSF is not permitted to lift a party's unexploded ordnance or minefields, except when those munitions that prevent the force from carrying out its mission, or that offer a hazard along tracks and sea-lanes in use by international shipping or other non-involved parties.

0636. **Tasks**. While unexploded ordnance and mine clearance operations are primarily the responsibility of the party that laid them, the PSF can be employed to mark, isolate and clear mines and unexploded ordnance where they present a direct threat to life. They can also be employed to train local forces to do the same. They will generally seek to identify areas of hazard. This information will usually be produced on a master map which will be made available for dissemination to all elements of the operation. Non-military personnel who consider that they may be about to venture into an area at risk from mines and unexploded ordnance would be advised to check with local military units first. Within the UN, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), often with assistance from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the focus for all mine related and mine clearance operations. There is a growing trend to employ civilian companies to conduct mine clearance operations.

0637. **NATO and Mine Clearance**. NATO forces do not conduct humanitarian de-mining operations, but rather engage in mine clearance operations in support of military tasks. NATO forces will continue to support engaging in mine clearance operations only to ensure freedom of movement for NATO forces and completion of assigned missions.

Conflict Containment

0638. Conflict containment operations are designed to impact on areas of actual or potential conflict and to use or threaten force in order to prevent any further hostile acts and enforce a cessation of hostilities. The aim of conflict containment is to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighbouring areas and States. Consequently actions should be designed to stabilise the situation and create an environment in which means other than the use of force, such as

negotiation, will be used to resolve differences. Conflict containment operations may require the forcible separation of belligerent parties.

The Forcible Separation of Belligerent Parties

0639. Peoples and states have an inherent right to use force in self-defence. In such circumstances, international intervention may be considered imperious and inappropriate. Should political pressures fail to achieve separation and forcible military separation is the only option, the achievement of the mission may require the exercise of a large degree of force. In an intra-state conflict, the forcible separation of parties who are determined to continue fighting may require the deployment of overwhelming force. Military commanders given a mission in which the desired end-state is not the defeat of any of the warring parties but to force their separation and disengagement, should conduct operations in an even handed and impartial manner. As a commander develops the situation, he should re-deploy his forces and adjust the tempo of activity so that the belligerent parties have an option to disengage and withdraw. If they do not do so then the alternative is to pursue a military operation more vigorously. However, diplomatic activities should continue to run in parallel with military operations and every pause in the operation should be viewed as an opportunity for further diplomatic initiatives.

The Establishment and Supervision of Protected or Safe Areas

0640. **Requirement**. The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. However, unless those within the safe area are disarmed, it may be used as a base from which to sally out and conduct raids. Clear guidance should be given, therefore, as to what is demanded of any force that is tasked with establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Inevitably, efforts will be needed to counter the accusations from those within and outside the safe area that the operation is designed to assist the other side.

0641. **Conduct**. Areas to be protected or made safe may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers of one or more of the belligerent forces. The PSF may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organisations within the safe area. The first stage in any PSO designed to protect or make an area safe is to demilitarise that area and this in itself may require PE actions. Having accomplished that, and taken all necessary measures to defend the area, other specific military tasks may include:[7]

    a.   Establishing, monitoring and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.

    b.   Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas[8] and weapon holding areas and sites.

    c.   Holding ground.

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[7] Described in AJP-3.4.1.1 '*Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Support Operations*'.
[8] See Glossary for Definition

    d.   Dominating approaches.

    e.   Conducting patrols and searches.

    f.   Manning checkpoints and other control measures.

    g.   Developing reinforcement and extraction plans.

    h.   Controlling the air.

    i.   Developing fire support and close air support plans.

The Guarantee and Denial of Movement

0642. These operations guarantee or deny movement by air, land or sea and thus are joint and generally conducted at the operational level. Operations that guarantee or deny movement will not be credible if they rely for success on the consent of the parties to the conflict. Examples might include the enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone or no-fly zone to prevent the harassment of an unprotected population, or the creation of a safe corridor to allow for the free and unmolested movement of aid and refugees, and the protection of own forces.

The Enforcement of Sanctions

0643. The enforcement of sanctions may be synonymous with operations designed to deny movement. Sanctions concern the denial of supplies, diplomatic, economic and other trading privileges, and the freedom of movement of those living in the area of sanctions. Such operations to enforce sanctions will be joint and conducted at the operational level. Sanctions may be conducted partially against a specific party or impartially over a wider area embracing all parties. Partial operations can compromise any subsequent PSO.

Section V – Civil Military Co-operation

0644. **Definition of Civil Military Co-operation**. So as to make best use of resources, and to pre-empt potential sources of friction, it is essential that military and civilian agencies co-ordinate their activities and co-operate fully to achieve unity of effort. At the operational level all implementing agencies, both military and civilian will hopefully have been involved in the development of the multifunctional planning approach. Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is a principal means of achieving this. It is defined as: '*The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international agencies, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies*'[9].

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[9] MC 411/1 '*NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation*'.

0645. **The Significance of Civil-Military Co-operation**. The concerted development and application of CIMIC will achieve a number of goals: firstly harmonisation of civilian and military relations within a theatre of operations; secondly co-ordination and maximising the use of resources designed to redress the deprivation and suffering of the populace, concurrently with reconstruction activities and, finally, enhanced credibility for the PSF, to promote co-operation and consent for the operation and to persuade the parties to the conflict and the uncommitted members of the host nation that their best interests lie in peace. The immediate aim is to fully co-ordinate civilian and military activities to support humanitarian projects and to achieve the maximum support for the operation, at the expense of any opposition. The longer-term aim of generating sufficient stability and self-dependency is directly linked to the desired end state and exit strategy. This activity should reduce overall dependency on external aid. At the tactical level, the timely and effective harmonisation and co-ordination of military activities with those of the civilian agencies is essential for success. This co-ordination should encompass all involved political, military, diplomatic, administrative and humanitarian governmental and non-governmental organisations and agencies. Ultimately, co-ordination can only be achieved by consultation as these agencies have permanent 'mandates' and agendas that may compete with each other and be different to those of the military force.

0646. **Planning Civil-Military Co-operation.** Civil-military considerations are an essential part of the overall planning and conduct of a PSO. They should therefore play a significant role in a commander's estimate and planning process, to identify both the tasks and the operational constraints. Consideration should be given to integrating CIMIC planning and direction into the J3/J5 functions in a HQ, aided by specialist CIMIC staff officers. CIMIC activities will form an integral part of the JFC's plan, are thus an operations support function, and are the business of all elements of the PSF. It is critical, however, that CIMIC planning is not done in isolation, and that the military engages with civilian agencies at all levels when formulating specific CIMIC plans. This may be achieved by co-location of the main military and civilian authorities, or by the use of a Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC).

0647. **Co-operation and Liaison Arrangements**. Co-operation should be facilitated by the establishment of committees, action groups and extensive liaison with all the agencies and organisations involved. This will be assisted by the establishment of Civil-Military Co-ordination Centres. These provide a place for liaison with aid agencies, the local government and communities, and can react to requests for assistance and complaints against the parties or the PSF. It is important, however, that the local population does not grow to rely on the military force to resolve all their problems. CIMIC centres should be regarded as referral centres and ideally be located away from the main military force and in a position of maximum accessibility to the aid agencies and local population. When appropriate, CIMIC centres may contain a media operations section.[10]

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[10] Further guidance for the management of CIMIC can be found in AJP-9 'NATO *Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine*'.

Section VI - Humanitarian Relief

0648. **Subjects of Humanitarian Relief**. Human deprivation and forced migration are a common feature of crisis. The numbers of such people needing help can range from individuals to entire ethnic groups. In the first instance, support to displaced persons and refugees should be left to specialist agencies, such as the ICRC and the UNHCR. However, the scale of the problem may be so huge and/or the situation so unstable that the assistance of military forces may be required.

0649. **Emergency Relief**. Emergency relief concerns the sustainment of the means to safeguard life. The protection of human life is an inherent responsibility of a PSF and should be so specified in the OPLAN. Relief operations, in the narrow sense of the provision of aid, are principally the preserve of humanitarian or aid agencies, whether UN, government, including host government where one exists, NGOs and the civil sector. Military forces should be ready to assist in relief operations when the need for them arises, taking care to coordinate with other organisations concerned. More normally, military forces work to create the conditions in which these other agencies can operate more freely and effectively.

0650. **The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations by a Peace Support Force**. Military relief operations may be designed to provide emergency relief, the delivery of aid supplies, or longer-term reconstruction assistance to aid agencies and the civil sector, including local communities. Relief operations should be conducted impartially. However, aid to one party, even when it is based on a perception of need, will invariably be seen as partial by other parties, and there is always the danger that relief supplies could filter through to belligerent forces. While PSF relief activities should not be curtailed by these possibilities, they should be conducted openly with some level of supervision to ensure supplies do not get into the wrong hands.

0651. **Reconstruction Activities**. Reconstruction activities will be the responsibility of civilian agencies however some military assistance may be needed to facilitate the transition from relief to reconstruction.   Reconstruction assistance concerns the reconstruction of a life support infrastructure capable of providing such facilities as food, water, shelter, fuel and other means of self-support, sustainment and the guarantee of human rights. Typically, such operations could involve the digging of wells, the reconnection of water and electricity grid systems (where they exist) and the rebuilding of schools, hospitals a communications network and support to the rule of law and an effective legal system. Should the military be required to assist in these functions at the outset of a PSO, these tasks should transition from military to civilian responsibility at the earliest feasible point.

0652. **Negative Effects of Humanitarian Relief**. Security, for both recipients and donors, must be a precursor for a humanitarian operation to provide long term relief from suffering. Humanitarian operations, whilst relieving suffering in the short term, if not carefully managed, can actually sustain the conflict and prolong the suffering. By taking from the parties the responsibility of care and feeding of their own people, humanitarian relief operations can encourage intransigence, create a dependency culture and actually sustain the

will and means to fight, rather than the will to make peace. In effect, it can take the blame for the disaster away from those responsible and allow them to challenge the intention, status and impartial nature of the operation. In these circumstances, the selective but impartial delivery of aid can be used to refute such allegations and accusations of partiality.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS[1]

Buffer Zone
A defined area controlled by a PSF from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. A buffer zone is formed to create an area of separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict.

Cantonment area
A location for the temporary housing, disarmament and demilitarisation of the parties' forces (within the framework of a demobilisation operation).

Combined Joint Task Force
A Combined Joint Task Force is a multinational (combined) and joint task force, task-organised and formed for the full range of Alliance's military missions, which Commander Combined Joint Task Force commands from a multinational and joint headquarters. The joint task force may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations. (MC 389/1)

Complex Emergency
A complex, multi-party, intra-state conflict resulting in a humanitarian disaster which might constitute multi-dimensional risks or threats to regional and international security. Frequently within such conflicts, state institutions collapse, law and order break down, banditry and chaos prevail and portions of the civilian population migrate. Therefore international activities to restore peace could include political, diplomatic, economic, military and humanitarian efforts and the use of information to promote national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government. (AJP- 9)

Demobilisation
Demobilisation consists of those activities that are undertaken by a PSF to reduce the number of factions' forces and their equipment in the area of operations to the levels as agreed in the peace settlement. See Demilitarisation and Disarmament

Demilitarisation
Demilitarisation means that military personnel and equipment are withdrawn from their military function. See demobilisation and disarmament.

Disarmament
Disarmament is a sub-process of demilitarisation. It means the (controlled process) of taking weapons away from military forces. Demilitarisation and disarmament usually take place within the framework of demobilisation operations. See Demobilisation and Demilitarisation

Humanitarian Relief
Activities conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian relief may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations.

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[1] The glossary contains only those terms and definitions not found in AAP-6 '*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.

Non-Governmental Organisation
Non-Governmental Organisation is an official term used in Article 71 of the UN charter. As the term implies, NGOs are private (primarily non-commercial) organisations generally motivated by humanitarian or religious values.

Private Voluntary Organisation
Private, non-profit humanitarian assistance organisations involved in development and relief activities. PVO is often used synonymously with the term NGO.

Weapon holding area/site
A location for the temporary or (semi-) permanent storage of weapons and/or other military equipment of the parties' forces (within the framework of a demobilisation operation).

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	Air to Air Refuelling
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AO	Area of Operations
AT	Air Transport
C2	Command and Control
CARE	Co-operative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CHOD	Chief of Defence Staff
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CivSec	Civilian Secretariat
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIO	Chairman in Office
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CofC	Chain of Command
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSS	Combat Service Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAPMC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Military Committee
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOR	Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
EURO	European
EUROCORPS	European Corps
FC	Force Commander
FOM	Freedom of Movement
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GOP	Guide to Operational Planning

HCHR	High Commissioner for Human Rights
HE	High Explosive
HNS	Host Nation Support
HoM	Head of Mission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IEDD	Improvised Explosive Devices Disposal
IFOR	Implementation Force
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LCC	Land Component Command
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
MC	Military Committee
MILU	Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit
MJLC	Multinational Joint Logistic Centre
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMA	NATO Military Authority
NNTCN	Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PE	Peace Enforcement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PI	Public Information
PK	Peacekeeping
PSF	Peace Support Force
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
POD	Port of Departure
PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RRF	Rapid Reaction Forces
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SC	Strategic Command(er)
SCEPC	Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SF	Special Forces
SG	Secretary General
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SITREP	Situation Report
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOR	Statement of Requirement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN)
STANAG	Standard NATO Agreement
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TOA	Transfer of Authority
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Childrens Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USG	Under Secretary General
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Original	Abbreviations 1 to 4
Original	LEP-1 to 2

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)