

DISHONOURLED LEGACY

The Lessons of the Somalia Affair

Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into the
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

Volume 2



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CONTENTS

Note to Readers.....	xiii
Introduction.....	xv
Chapter 15 Leadership	359
Defining Leadership.....	360
Military Leadership as an Art.....	361
Leadership: Transactional versus Transformational	362
Military versus Civilian Leadership.....	364
Establishing a Standard for Military Leadership	365
Responsibilities of an Officer under the Commissioning Scroll	365
Performance Evaluation Reports	366
Views of Canadian Military Leaders.....	367
Views of Other Military Leaders and Experts.....	369
Particular Aspects of Effective Military Leadership	369
Leader as Disciplinarian.....	370
As Disciplinarian of Troops	370
Self-Discipline.....	370
Looking after the Welfare of the Troops.....	371
Knowing the Troops.....	371
Using Informal Leadership to the Unit's Advantage	372
Replacing Ineffective Commanders	372
Establishing the Qualities of Good Leadership	373
The Core Qualities of Military Leadership	374
Recommendations	375
Notes	376
Chapter 16 Accountability.....	379
Accountability Defined	380
Responsibility Defined.....	381
Responsibility in the Case of Supervision and Delegation	381

Responsibility in the Case of Ignorance, Negligence and Wilful Blindness	382
Ignorance	382
Negligence and Wilful Blindness	383
Responsibility and Sanctions.....	384
Accountability and Organizational Hierarchy	386
Accountability Within the Military.....	387
General Principles of Accountability.....	392
Accountability	392
Responsibility.....	393
Supervision	393
Delegation.....	393
Sanction.....	393
Knowledge.....	394
Specific Deficiencies in Existing Mechanisms and Processes	394
The Need for an Office of Inspector General	397
The Inspector General of the Canadian Forces	399
Mission of the Inspector General of the Canadian Forces.....	399
Functions of the Inspector General	400
Powers of the Inspector General.....	400
The Inspector General and Members of the CF and DND.....	401
Recommendations	404
Notes	406
 Chapter 17 The Chain of Command.....	 411
Failures of the Chain of Command	412
The Chain of Command: Operation Deliverance	416
Confusion in Command from the CDS to the Commander CJFS.....	418
Failings of the Chain of Command Downward.....	420
The Chain of Command in the SSF and the CAR	423
Conclusion.....	424
Recommendations	425
Notes	426
 Chapter 18 Discipline.....	 429
Meaning of Military Discipline	429
Purpose and Goals.....	430
Imposed Discipline.....	431
Self-Discipline.....	431
Objectives of Discipline.....	432

State of Discipline in the CAR before September 1992	433
Background	433
The Hewson Report.....	433
Hewson Recommendations for Improving Discipline	433
Follow-Up to Recommendations of the Hewson Report.....	434
Incidents in 2 Commando and Responses.....	434
2 Commando as a Disciplinary Challenge	434
The Rebel Flag.....	435
Aggressivity, Bonding and the Wall of Silence	435
Incidents in Other Commandos.....	436
Focus on 1 Commando and 3 Commando.....	436
Disciplinary Problems in 1 Commando.....	437
Disciplinary Problems in 3 Commando.....	437
Factors in the CAR's Disciplinary Problems	438
CAR as a 'Dumping Ground' for Problem Soldiers.....	438
Quality of Junior Officers and NCOs	438
Recruiting Practices.....	439
Relationship Between Master Corporals and Soldiers	440
CAR Turnover Rates	440
Tasking of Junior Officers	440
Conflicts Among Officers and NCOs	440
Suitability of CAR Personnel.....	441
Lack of Regimental Cohesion	441
Downplaying of Disciplinary Infractions.....	441
Evasion of Responsibility for Disciplinary Infractions	441
Remedial Measures	442
Discipline During the Pre-Deployment Phase	443
Incidents in 2 Commando.....	443
Background: Training Preparations of	
September–October 1992.....	443
Incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992	444
Initial Reactions to the Incidents of	
October 2 and 3, 1992	444
The Senior Chain of Command and the	
October Incidents	446
Discipline, October 23 to Deployment	448
Incidents in Other CAR and CARBG Sub-Units.....	449
Disciplinary Incidents in 1 Commando	450
Incidents in 3 Commando.....	451
Service Commando	451

Possible Ways to Remedy Disciplinary Problems	451
Screening Out Weak Officers and Troublemakers	452
Reassigning Personnel within the Regiment.....	453
An Adequate Military Police Contingent	453
The Senior Chain of Command and Discipline	454
Discipline During the In-Theatre Phase	455
<i>Findings</i>	458
Discipline in the Future	460
Recommendations	461
Notes	462
 Chapter 19 Suitability and Cohesion	 471
Determining Suitability and Cohesion	472
Suitability.....	473
Was the Canadian Airborne Regiment a	
Properly Formed Unit?.....	473
Effects of the Move to CFB Petawawa in 1977	473
The Hewson Report.....	474
Independence of the Commandos.....	475
<i>Findings</i>	477
Did the CAR Have a Properly Assigned Mission and	
Tasks from Higher Headquarters?	477
Downsizing of the Regiment.....	477
Role and Tasks of the CAR during Reorganization	478
The Concept of Employment	479
<i>Finding</i>	480
Was the CAR Adequately Manned?	480
The Opinion of the Director of Infantry.....	481
<i>Finding</i>	482
Did the CAR Function as a Unit?.....	482
<i>Finding</i>	484
Cohesion	485
Was There a Sound Standard of Leadership?	485
<i>Finding</i>	486
Was There an Acceptable Level of Discipline in the CAR?	486
<i>Finding</i>	487

Did Leaders and Their Subordinates Act Together?	487
Relations Between Officers and NCOs	487
Evidence of Distrust and Conflict	489
<i>Findings</i>	490
Was the CAR Suitably Trained?.....	490
<i>Finding</i>	490
Was there Excessive Instability in the CAR?.....	490
<i>Finding</i>	491
Inherent Suitability	491
Paratroopers and the Constabulary Ethic.....	492
Mission-Specific Suitability.....	493
Policy for Selecting Peacekeeping Units.....	493
The Quick-Deployment Issue.....	494
<i>Finding</i>	495
Conclusion.....	495
Notes.....	496
 Chapter 20 Personnel Selection and Screening	501
Manning of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.....	505
Selection Criteria for the Canadian Airborne Regiment	505
The Special Challenge of Selecting Airborne Soldiers	505
Informal Selection Criteria for Junior Ranks	506
Informal Selection Criteria for Leadership Positions and Impact of the 1992 Restructuring.....	506
The Selection Process.....	508
Adequacy of the Manning of the Canadian Airborne Regiment at the Time of the Somalia Deployment	510
Evidence of Problems with the Process	510
Evidence of Problems with CAR Personnel.....	513
<i>Findings</i>	521
Recommendations	524
Pre-Deployment Selection and Screening	525
Appointment of the Joint Force Commander.....	526
Pre-Deployment Screening.....	527
Adequacy of Screening for Operation Deliverance	527
<i>Findings</i>	532

Recommendation.....	532
A Caveat on Discipline and Selection and Screening.....	533
The Problem of Racism	534
The Policy at the Time of the Deployment.....	534
Project SIROS and the CAR	536
Racist Conduct in the Airborne Regiment	538
Post-Deployment Action.....	539
<i>Findings</i>	541
Recommendations	541
Notes	543
 Chapter 21 Training	 557
Training Policy for Peacekeeping Missions	558
The Traditional Approach.....	558
Peacekeeping Skills Beyond General Purpose	
Combat Training.....	559
General Purpose Combat Training.....	560
Generic Peacekeeping Training.....	560
Mission-Specific Training.....	561
Internal Reassessment.....	561
The State of Training Policy in 1992	564
<i>Findings</i>	565
CAR Training Before September 1992	565
Induction into the CAR.....	565
Annual Training	566
Annual Training Cycle	566
The CAR's Operational Roles.....	567
Training to Meet the CAR's Operational Roles.....	568
<i>Finding</i>	569
Operation Python	569
Training After Operation Python	571
<i>Findings</i>	572
Pre-Deployment Training for Operation Cordon.....	573
Responsibility for Pre-Deployment Training.....	573
Development of a Training Plan for Operation Cordon.....	575
Essential Elements for the Development of	
a Training Plan.....	575
Development of the Training Plan	576

Content of the Proposed Training.....	584
<i>Finding</i>	586
Inadequacies of the Training	587
Conduct of the Training.....	587
<i>Findings</i>	589
Vehicle Training	590
<i>Findings</i>	592
Supervision of Training.....	592
<i>Finding</i>	593
Effect of Standing Operating Procedures Development on Training.....	593
<i>Findings</i>	595
Attitudinal and Psychological Preparation	595
<i>Findings</i>	597
Standardization of Training	597
<i>Findings</i>	599
Training of 2 Commando.....	599
<i>Finding</i>	601
Exercise Stalwart Providence	601
Execution	602
Some Key Problems	602
Confusion as to Purpose.....	602
<i>Finding</i>	604
Timing of Exercise Stalwart Providence.....	604
<i>Finding</i>	604
Lack of Intelligence	605
<i>Finding</i>	605
Identification of Remedial Training Needs	605
Vehicle Training	606
Passage of Information.....	606

Use of Force	606
<i>Findings</i>	607
Pre-Deployment Training for Operation Deliverance	608
The Training of the CARBG	608
<i>Findings</i>	612
Essential Aspects of Training	613
Law of Armed Conflict	613
<i>Findings</i>	615
Rules of Engagement	615
<i>Findings</i>	618
Political, Cultural, Historical, and Geographical Training	618
<i>Findings</i>	620
Negotiation Training	620
<i>Finding</i>	621
Lack of Standards to Evaluate Training at Time of Deployment	622
<i>Findings</i>	623
In-Theatre Training	624
<i>Finding</i>	625
Recent Developments in CF Peacekeeping Training	625
Conclusion	627
Recommendations	627
Notes	631

Chapter 22 Rules of Engagement: Confusion and Misinterpretation

Chapter 22 Rules of Engagement: Confusion and Misinterpretation	653
The Drafting of the ROE	654
The Change from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance	654
Lack of Drafters' Tools	655
Influence of the American ROE	655
Directions on Using the ROE	655
The Aide-Mémoire or Soldier's Card	656
In-Theatre Training on the ROE	657
In-Theatre Directions on Using the ROE	657

Gaps and Ambiguities in the ROE.....	658
LCol Mathieu's Orders Group of January 28, 1993	659
Reactions to LCol Mathieu's Direction on the ROE	660
Attempted Clarifications of LCol Mathieu's Direction on the ROE	660
The Soldiers' Mounting Resentment	661
The Continuing Need for Training on the ROE.....	661
The Weaknesses of the Leaders	662
The Incident of March 4, 1993: Reconnaissance Platoon's Understanding of the ROE	662
The Aftermath of the March 4th Incident	663
CF Correspondence About the ROE, March to May 1993	663
<i>Findings</i>	665
Recommendations	666
Notes	667
 Chapter 23 Operational Readiness	671
Readiness: An Aspect of Operational Planning.....	671
Main Elements of Operational Readiness	673
Assessing Operational Readiness.....	673
The Special Problem of Operational Readiness for Peace Support Operations	674
The CF Operational Readiness and Effectiveness System	676
Internal Criticism of the ORES.....	677
Issues Related to Operational Readiness for Somalia.....	678
The Problems of Reorganization	678
Adaptation to Motorized Operations	679
The Readiness of Leaders.....	680
Training Readiness.....	682
Unit Discipline and Cohesion.....	684
Administrative Readiness.....	686
Declaration of Operational Readiness: Operation Cordon.....	687
Operation Deliverance	691
Declaration of Operational Readiness: Operation Deliverance.....	693
<i>Findings</i>	695
Recommendations	700
Notes	702

NOTE TO READERS

Military Ranks and Titles

In recounting events and reporting on testimony received, this report refers to many members of the Canadian Forces by name, rank and, sometimes, title or position held. Generally, we have used the rank and title in place at the time of the Somalia deployment or at the time an individual testified before this Commission of Inquiry, as appropriate. Thus, for example, the ranks mentioned in text recounting the events of 1992–93 are those held by individuals just before and during the deployment to Somalia, while ranks mentioned in endnotes are those held by individuals at the time of their testimony before the Inquiry.

Since then, many of these individuals will have changed rank or retired or left the Canadian Forces for other reasons. We have made every effort to check the accuracy of ranks and titles, but we recognize the possibility of inadvertent errors, and we apologize to the individuals involved for any inaccuracies that might remain.

Source Material

This report is documented in endnotes presented at the conclusion of each chapter. Among the sources referred to, readers will find mention of testimony given at the Inquiry's policy and evidentiary hearings; documents filed with the Inquiry by government departments as a result of orders for the production of documents; briefs and submissions to the Inquiry; research studies conducted under the Inquiry's commissioned research program; and documents issued by the Inquiry over the course of its work.

Testimony: Testimony before the Commission of Inquiry is cited by reference to transcripts of the Inquiry's policy and evidentiary hearings, which are contained in 193 volumes and will also be preserved on cd-rom after the Inquiry completes its work. For example: Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, pp. 269–270. Evidence given at the policy hearings is denoted by the letter 'P'. For example: Testimony of MGen Dallaire, Policy hearings transcripts vol. 3P, p. 477P.

Transcripts of testimony are available in the language in which testimony was given; in some cases, therefore, testimony quoted in the report has been translated from the language in which it was given.

Documents and Exhibits: Quotations from some documents and other material (charts, maps) filed with the Inquiry are cited with a document book number and a tab number or an exhibit number. These refer to binders of documents assembled for Commissioners' use at the Inquiry's hearings. See Volume 5, Chapter 40 for a description of how we managed and catalogued the tens of thousands of documents we received in evidence.

Some of the references contain DND (Department of National Defence) identification numbers in lieu of or in addition to page numbers. These were numbers assigned at DND and stamped on each page as documents were being scanned for transmission to the Inquiry in electronic format. Many other references are to DND publications, manuals, policies and guidelines. Also quoted extensively are the *National Defence Act* (NDA), Canadian Forces Organization Orders (CFOO), Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAO), and the *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces* (which we refer to as the *Queen's Regulations and Orders*, or QR&O). Our general practice was to provide the full name of documents on first mention in the notes to a chapter, with shortened titles or abbreviations after that.

Research Studies: The Commission of Inquiry commissioned 10 research studies, which were published at various points during the life of the Inquiry. Endnotes citing studies not yet published during final preparation of this report may contain references to or quotations from unedited manuscripts.

Published research and the Inquiry's report will be available in Canada through local booksellers and by mail from Canadian Government Publishing, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9. All other material pertaining to the Inquiry's work will be housed in the National Archives of Canada at the conclusion of our work.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

This report contains many acronyms and abbreviations for government departments and programs and Canadian Forces elements, systems, equipment, and other terms. Generally, these names and terms are spelled out in full with their abbreviation or acronym at their first occurrence in each chapter; the abbreviation or acronym is used after that. For ranks and titles, we adopted the abbreviations in use in the Canadian Forces and at the Department of National Defence. A list of the acronyms and abbreviations used most often, including abbreviations for military ranks, is presented in Appendix 7, at the end of Volume 5.



INTRODUCTION

Volume 1 sets out the major themes to be explored within our report. Included in that Volume is a discussion of some of the principles which we consider to be fundamental to the proper functioning of the military. Following that, we investigate the systems, structures and relationships the Canadian Forces had in place at the time of preparing for and deploying to Somalia. Next, we recount in narrative form the story of what we learned about the Somalia deployment. The complete story was pieced together with meticulous care from the testimony and documentation that was available to us.

At important junctures in that narrative we identify for the reader events which, in our view, signal system malfunction. Those points are warning signs — precursors of issues to be explored in detail in our analysis and findings. Thus, in Volumes 2, 3, 4, and 5 we analyze the details of deviations from the benchmark principles and themes. These Volumes contain the essential distillation of the Inquiry's labours. In Volumes 2, 3, and 5 we discharge our mandate by exploring the issues we were charged to investigate, making findings with respect to problems encountered, and offering recommendations to repair a system which allowed such problems to occur. In Volume 4, we investigate the failures of senior leaders with respect to the pre-deployment phase and with respect to disclosure of information and destruction of documents.

In spite of the truncation of our mandate, we have been able to effectively address almost all the points in our terms of reference, although not necessarily to the extent initially contemplated. Even as modified at the eleventh hour, our terms of reference give us latitude to report, at our discretion, on whatever we felt we had properly canvassed. Certainly, with more time we could have carried our investigation even further. Our unfinished mandate is discussed in Chapter 42 in Volume 5.

Our chosen themes and principles are tightly interwoven both in terms

of their theoretical treatment and the on-the-ground realities to which they refer. Foremost among them are leadership and accountability, which to a great extent underlie all the others. (These are discussed in detail in Chapter 15 and Chapter 16 in Volume 2). We have gone to great lengths to research, study, and delineate our understanding of how these twin pillars uphold the functioning of the military within a free and democratic Canadian society.

We have examined how these ideals should be realized in the structure and functioning of the chain of command (Chapter 17 in Volume 2), and maintained through the exercise of discipline (Chapter 18 in Volume 2). We note in particular how the entire hierarchy of the military is linked by responsibility and accountability. Interlinked duties extend outwards from each officer in every direction: upwards to higher command, outwards to fellow officers, downwards to the officers and soldiers under their command. They are not limited by specific orders or tasks: military tradition also demands that officers inform their superiors faithfully and fully, and that senior officers support those junior to them with proper supervision and oversight.

The success or failure of a mission is directly attributable to how well it is planned. Therefore, knowing the events of the weeks and months before the incidents that sparked our Inquiry is essential to understanding the systemic failures that created the circumstances which allowed certain dishonourable incidents to take place. Accordingly, we explore the various component elements of mission planning: how the military gathers intelligence and information, how higher command determines the suitability of forces for their assigned tasks (Volume 2, Chapters 19 and 20), how training is planned and implemented (Volume 2, Chapter 21), and, in particular, how Rules of Engagement are created, promulgated and impressed upon the troops (Volume 2, Chapters 21 and 22).

All these elements of mission planning contribute to operational readiness. Therefore, we placed great importance on investigating how the Canadian Forces (CF) determines that a unit is ready to be committed for action, specifically examining the systems and relationships that were in place during 1992 at the time of the Somalia operation (Volume 2, Chapter 23).

We also looked at policing and prosecutions within the system of military justice (Volume 5, Chapter 40). In so doing, we paid particular attention to the powers and responsibilities of commanding officers and the notion of command influence in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions. We also examined the security and investigative functions of military police, especially regarding how they are deployed and what constitutes appropriate strength for different kinds of operations. These considerations in turn led to an examination of the structural and institutional adequacy of prevailing arrangements within the office of the Judge Advocate General.

One of the basic themes explored in this report relates to openness and the disclosure of information (Volume 5, Chapter 39). As we carried out our probe, we were forced to use valuable time, that had been reserved for other purposes, to confront problems of inadequate information disclosure by Department of National Defence (DND) that were affecting the efficacy of our work. At the outset, we expected to investigate how information had been actively or passively withheld from those who should have known about the incidents that initiated our Inquiry. Alarming, we were subjected to a process of obfuscation and denial that was strikingly similar to that which we were charged to investigate. The allegations of cover-up that we pursued are of particular concern in that they extend beyond the domain of the military to affect the rights of all Canadians in a free society.

In the chapters which follow, we present our disturbingly negative assessment of what transpired in the Somalia deployment. Our analysis explores the problems that beset the Somalia mission and infected the structure and functioning of the CF.

Three lengthy chapters, two describing a process (mission planning in Volume 3, Chapters 24 and 25) and the other, an event (the March 4th incident, Volume 5, Chapter 38) merit a word of explanation. These chapters are essentially case studies of what can go wrong. The mission planning analysis and the March 4th incident each, in its own way, illustrates the multiple failures that occurred at virtually every turn of this operation. They demonstrate vividly a mission so ill-conceived that many Canadians will wonder why consequences even more shocking than those that led to this Inquiry did not happen or have not come to light.

In the end, following our analysis of the key issues we offer conclusions about what happened and why, and make a number of recommendations. We found a multiple of contributing reasons for the incidents in Somalia that must be of concern to the government and addressed at every level of the military and the Department of National Defence. But in essence, we found that the twin pillars — leadership and accountability — became so undermined that they no longer fully supported the roles and functions of the Canadian Forces.



LEADERSHIP

Our Terms of Reference place great emphasis on assessing the quality of leadership exercised by the chain of command of the Canadian Forces regarding the Somalia deployment. We were called upon to examine "the effectiveness of the decisions and actions" of leadership within the Canadian Airborne Regiment, Land Force Command, the Canadian Joint Force Somalia, and National Defence Headquarters as they related to Somalia.

Effective leadership is required in all spheres of endeavour such as industry, politics, or the military. But it is absolutely essential in a military context. According to a Canadian Forces manual, "Leadership is the primary reason for the existence of all officers of the Canadian Forces."¹ Without strong leadership, the concerted effort which must characterize an army is unlikely to be realized, and its individual members will not achieve the unity of purpose essential to success in military operations. Strong leadership is associated with high levels of cohesion² and the development of unity of purpose, critical to the success of any military operation. Leadership is important at all levels of the Canadian Forces, applying equally to commissioned as well as non-commissioned officers.³

A major focus in this report is military leadership. However, the original mandate of this Commission was broader. We had also planned to assess the leadership qualities of senior bureaucratic and political leaders: the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Robert Fowler, during the period covered by our mandate, and the Minister of National Defence during the in-theatre phase of the deployment, the Hon. Kim Campbell. The premature termination of the Inquiry by the present Government precluded us from hearing evidence that could have made such an analysis possible.

DEFINING LEADERSHIP

Leadership is an extremely complex and value-laden concept that is highly dependent on context. Consequently, we have made our findings and recommendations based on actual testimony at public hearings and information presented to the Inquiry in formal policy briefings, as well as from numerous source documents including Canadian Forces manuals and books, reports and articles on leadership by Canadian, American, and British military authorities. Indeed, often the Canadian military, in its leadership manuals and in courses on leadership offered by its command and staff colleges, incorporates the views of foreign military experts on this topic.⁴

There appears to be no standard accepted definition of military leadership. Instead, it is a combination of various qualities which, when taken together, are called leadership. The people exercising these qualities are deemed to be leaders, and, based on an assessment of their effectiveness in a given situation, are rated as 'good' or 'bad'.

Leadership must be distinguished from other related concepts such as command and management, although these terms are often used interchangeably. We must also distinguish leadership from the idea of authority, responsibility, and accountability.

A good manager and a good commander both require leadership ability, but simply occupying a position of authority does not necessarily make a person a leader.

Leadership includes not merely the authority, but the ability to lead others. Commanders will not be leaders if they do little to influence and inspire their subordinates.⁵ The commander, in effect, becomes a leader only when the leader is accepted as such by subordinates. Leadership requires much more than management skills or legal authority. The leader is the one who motivates the other members of the combat unit. As one American commentator on military leadership states:

Mere occupancy of an office or position from which leadership behaviour is expected does not automatically make the occupant a true leader. Such appointments can result in headship but not necessarily in leadership. While appointive positions of high status and authority are related to leadership they are not the same thing.⁶

Management is the set of skills needed to make the most effective and efficient use of available resources in the pursuit of a task. Command is the granting of official authority to an individual to assign resources in the accomplishment of a mission or task. The person named as a commander has the authority to issue lawful orders to specified individuals, and to require their co-operation and energy in the execution of those orders. With that authority,

the commander has an equal responsibility for the successful conclusion of the mission.

Commanders have the right to delegate to subordinate commanders a portion of their overall authority commensurate with assigned tasks. However, the commander is unable to delegate overall responsibility. The commander may hold delegated subordinates responsible for the effective completion of specific tasks assigned to them. However, the commander remains responsible for the actions of all subordinates and for the success or failure of the mission.

Commanders are accountable to their superiors for the effective and faithful execution of the command entrusted to them and, while it may be seen that they share such accountability with their subordinates, this must not be taken as an attenuation of their own accountability. The tracing of accountability within a military chain of command is relatively straightforward. However, accountability is also a feature attendant on any position of leadership, whether it be in command or on the staff. The subject of accountability is treated in greater detail in Chapter 16 of this Report.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP AS AN ART

The fundamental question is — is leadership a science or an art? While there is some difference of opinion on this, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen Jacques Dextraze, wrote in 1973 that leadership is the “art of influencing others to do willingly what is required in order to achieve an aim or a goal.”⁷ This is a point of view agreed to by other reputable leaders, such as U. S. Army Gen Matthew Ridgway and British Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell. As Gen Ridgway stated: “...I still think the variables of human nature combined with those of combat, and to a lesser degree with those of peacetime training, make the exercise of leadership far more of an art than a science.”⁸

Interestingly, Gen Dextraze in 1973 believed that many of the problems faced by managers in the Canadian Forces, at all levels, stemmed from the fact that the art of leadership seemed to be dying, and was being replaced by mechanical processes of control that made little distinction between human beings and machines in the system. He lamented the concurrent degradation of language, for example, the term ‘people’ was replaced by ‘personnel inventory’.⁹

The theory of leadership as art emphasizes qualities such as intuition, character, and the determination to be great.¹⁰ While new theories of leadership often move away from the leaders-are-born-not-made point of view, it is important to encompass as many viewpoints as possible in determining the essential concept of leadership.

LEADERSHIP: TRANSACTIONAL VERSUS TRANSFORMATIONAL

More modern theories of leadership are based not so much on classic traits of leadership, but on analyses of the relationship between the leader and the follower. Particularly relevant for our purpose is the current debate between *transactional* and *transformational* leadership.

Transactional leadership is considered an increasingly common form of leadership in business, in politics, and in government bureaucracy. “[L]eaders must engage in a transaction with their subordinates — an exchange based on initiating and clarifying what is required of their subordinates and the consideration the subordinates will receive if they fulfil the requirements.... This leadership consists of accomplishing well the tasks at hand while satisfying the self-interests of those working with the leader to do so. The leader sees to it that promises of reward are fulfilled for those followers who carry out successfully what is required of them.”¹¹ However, this kind of leadership has limitations. A transaction creates no enduring purpose that holds the parties together. It does not bind the leader and follower in a mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher purpose.¹² Active transactional leadership is *contingent reinforcement* — rewards (or avoidance of penalties) contingent upon effort expended and performance level achieved. The less active transactional leadership is *management-by-exception* or contingent negative reinforcement, and the extreme end of inactivity is *laissez-faire leadership*.¹³ For example, the notion of performance pay awards illustrates the contingent reinforcement feature of transactional leadership. “In many instances, such transactional leadership is a prescription for mediocrity or worse: the leader relies heavily on management-by-exception, intervening with his or her group only when procedures and standards for task accomplishment are not being met. Such a manager espouses the popular adage, ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.’”¹⁴

In contrast, transformational leadership “...occurs when one or more persons *engage* with others in a way that raises both leaders and followers to higher levels of motivation and morality.... Their purposes, which might have started out as separate but related, as in the case of transactional leadership, become fused.”¹⁵ Leadership experts appear to prefer transformational leadership to transactional leadership. U.S. LGen Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. argues that there is “a particularly formidable argument for frequent use of a transformational style that nourishes a strong sense of responsibility and initiative among subordinates. Transformational leadership, by the enlightened use of inspiration, communication, and understanding of human behavior, can

motivate subordinates to achieve more than could ordinarily be expected.”¹⁶ A 1993 article describes the transactional/transformational leadership distinction within the U.S. military as the following:

Our findings regarding current patterns of leadership in the military may suggest that many top-level officers might have been promoted on the basis of their transactional abilities to work within the system. However, the military is undergoing some fundamental changes, which may result in a different type of leader emerging at the top. We may see more Norman Schwarzkopfs who display all of the transformational factors and less of those generals who know how to ‘work the system’ transactionally.¹⁷

This particular debate is relevant to the Canadian context, for, presumably, strong transformational leadership should lead to a perception by subordinates that their leaders are effective. Yet, there is evidence that Canadian soldiers do not see their leaders as effective. A 1995 Department of National Defence (DND) survey of attitudes of military and civilian employees within DND revealed dissatisfaction towards leadership. Survey respondents believed that leaders in the Department were too concerned about “building their empires” and “following their personal agenda,” and that DND was being too bureaucratic.¹⁸ The survey noted that “[e]mployees, both military and civilian, are losing or have lost confidence in the Department’s leadership and management.”¹⁹ The former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Jean Boyle, publicly stated last year that the rank and file had justifiable concerns about the quality of high command.²⁰ And, more recently, LGen Baril, Commander Land Force Command, declared:

The Army has a significant leadership deficiency...I will re-emphasize and demand throughout the Army, responsible leadership and its essential components of moral and ethical values, which have been tried and proven in war and which are essential to the Army’s collective soul. Values such as truth, duty, and valour along with the moral courage to do what is right rather than what is fashionable. This must be the credo of the officer and NCO corps.... Unfashionable as some of these old basic values may seem to some, it is the kind of leadership that produced the mutual trust that bonded our Army in combat. That trust between the leader and the soldier is what distinguishes outstanding units from ineffective ones.²¹

Clearly, the art of leadership requires a consideration of moral and ethical values. Elsewhere in this report, we discuss in greater detail military ethics and accountability.

Transformational-style leadership is arguably of particular significance in the context of peace support operations. A recent study on the Canadian peace support experience indicates that a changing leadership dynamic is occurring in constabulary operations, wherein there appears to be a levelling of the hierarchy in favour of more interaction between senior and junior ranks. Some junior personnel perceived that their advice was more frequently

sought and taken into account than was customary in other circumstances. Greater reliance was placed on junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers.²²

MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP

Management is largely viewed as a science, specifically the science of employing people and materiel in the most economical and effective way to accomplish an objective.²³

Hence, the difference between the corporate ethic of the military and the managerial ethic is important. For, unlike civilians who work for a private company, soldiers ultimately are expected to die for their country if necessary. This is what Gen Sir John Hackett has called the "unlimited liability" of the soldier.²⁴ Also, a military leader has the duty to look after the welfare of his troops; he cannot treat them as mere tools for career advancement. Some have argued that when this distinction fades, the military suffers. For example, it has been argued that the failure of the American army during the Vietnam War was due primarily to its officer corps whose values were entrepreneurial, not corporative in nature. Officers were motivated by self-interest — advancing their own careers — rather than living up to the values of self-sacrifice and reciprocal trust characteristic of the traditional military ethic.²⁵ In effect, a managerial model that focuses on managerial efficiency and individual self-interest will erode the traditional military ethic and undermine the cohesiveness of the military unit.

A 1979 study, *Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada* by Maj C.A. Cotton, surveyed numerous Canadian soldiers and found that the army was characterized by cleavages in basic values and assumptions about structure and process within military life. This was a study in contradictions: a system oriented towards combat in which a significant minority indicated that they would try to avoid going, or simply refuse to go, should they be required to enter combat; where the majority were reluctant soldiers who, if given the chance, preferred to work at their "trade" in a predictable daily and weekly routine; and where the combat soldiers had a negative self-image and a collective sense that they are a necessary evil in a military bureaucracy.²⁶

Cotton's analysis provoked intense debate about the degree of civilianization within the Canadian military. For example, a 1989 Canadian Forces study disputed Cotton's original findings.²⁷ It argued that Cotton's conclusion that the majority of army personnel were "reluctant soldiers" was not supported when more precise attitudinal measures were used to determine support for a traditional vocational model of service versus the occupational model. The study concluded that a substantial majority of the personnel in

the Canadian army supported the traditional ethos of sacrifice, and that a great majority believed that military service is a way of life and can never be "just a job." A significant minority, however, found that the demands made upon their non-duty lives by their own military service had been excessive. To summarize, this study claims that soldiers stand firmly by the ethos that separates them from civilian life, but many are dissatisfied with the extent to which military demands have reduced their control of their own lives.

It is this aspect of civilianization of the army that has increasingly concerned members of the military. The Review Group Report on the Unification Task Force of the Canadian Forces argued that the greatest cause for concern in this regard was the gradual imposition of civilian standards on the management of the forces and on the assessment of their needs and goals. It argued that in the absence of clearly defined and defensible military values, the Canadian Forces was steadily turning to civilian values and concluded, in part, that there was a need to develop a military ethos approved by the CDS and put into effect by the military at every opportunity.²⁸

ESTABLISHING A STANDARD FOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Given the range of opinion on what constitutes military leadership, we decided to identify the *core qualities* that are essential to success. In addition, we also sought to identify other necessary attributes of leadership, as well as factors that would indicate successful leadership performance. We examined basic Canadian military documents as well as actual testimony. In addition, we consulted the literature for the views of senior military leaders, as well as other experts in the field.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN OFFICER UNDER THE COMMISSIONING SCROLL

As LCol K.W. J. Wenek explains, "[i]n a fundamental sense, officership is simply doing what one is 'commissioned' (authorized and empowered to do)..."²⁹ The commissioning scroll which authorizes and empowers officers of the Canadian Forces establishes five key norms:

- adherence to an ethic based on the core values of loyalty, courage, and integrity ("We reposing especial Trust and Confidence in your Loyalty, Courage and Integrity...");

- provision of responsible service to the state ("You are therefore carefully and diligently to discharge your Duty...");
- perfection of the *métier* of an officer, "the management of violence" ("You are...to exercise and well discipline both the inferior Officers and men serving under you...");
- exercise of command and legitimate authority over subordinate ranks, and obedience to the lawful commands of superiors ("...and We do hereby Command them to obey you as their superior Officer, and you to observe and follow such orders and Directions...");
- accountability for actions taken ("In pursuance of the Trust hereby imposed in you...").³⁰

As LCol Wenek explains, loyalty, courage, and integrity are central to the performance of an officer. Loyalty entails both loyalty up and loyalty down. Loyalty up means both obedience of the Canadian Forces to the government and, within the service, obedience to superiors. This is not a blind obedience, but rather an informed commitment involving "service before self." Loyalty down refers to the special obligations military superiors owe to their subordinates by virtue of the substantial legitimate power they exercise over them. "Generally, these obligations require officers to give particular attention to the care and welfare of their subordinates, sometimes at the risk of personal costs."³¹ Courage is self-evident. Integrity requires truthfulness and honesty in the relations between superiors and subordinates, for without such honesty there can be no trust. Integrity requires that officers "tell it like it is"; for example, complying fully and accurately with reporting requirements.³²

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORTS

The Performance Evaluation Report (PER) is the principal document for personnel management in the Canadian Forces, providing an ongoing record of each officer's performance. The PER is used by career boards and personnel staff as the primary basis for comparing officers and arriving at career decisions. The PER directly influences the career development of individual officers and, ultimately, the selection of military leaders in the Canadian Forces. Hence, the criteria therein are useful in discerning what signifies good leadership. The PER form for officers sets out a number of criteria, which have a direct, or indirect, bearing on leadership. These criteria include:

- (a) performance factors such as accepting responsibilities and duties; analyzing problems or situations; making decisions and taking action;

delegating, directing and supervising; and ensuring the well-being and development of subordinates; and

- (b) the professional attributes of professional knowledge, physical fitness, conduct, intellect, integrity, loyalty, dedication and courage.

VIEWS OF CANADIAN MILITARY LEADERS

In his presentation to special policy hearings of our Inquiry, MGen Dallaire set out five qualities of successful leadership attributed to former CDS Gen Jacques Dextraze:³³

- devotion or self-sacrifice
- loyalty
- knowledge
- integrity
- courage.

In his 1973 article on "The Art of Leadership," Gen Dextraze indicated that there are two forms of loyalty: loyalty up to one's superiors, and loyalty down to one's subordinates. In case of conflict, loyalty to country prevailed. Leadership also required forsaking personal pleasure when it conflicted with the performance of one's duty. Leaders had to possess knowledge to be efficient in their work. Integrity meant that a leader should refuse to deceive others in any way. Leaders must make decisions, accept responsibility for their success or failure, and not "shake responsibility" onto others. Finally, a leader must be courageous, willing to accept danger knowing that it exists.³⁴

Too frequently in discussions on leadership, the quality of courage is limited to physical courage. Without question, this aspect of courage is vital, particularly in action. However, the quality of moral courage is equally important in describing good leadership. Leaders must have the courage of their convictions, the courage to acknowledge their own shortcomings, and the courage to say "No," whether it makes them unpopular with their troops, displeases their peers, or thwarts the expectations of their superiors. U.S. Gen Matthew Ridgway, in an article taught by professors in Canadian military colleges, stated:

It has long seemed to me that the hard decisions are not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some hare-brained scheme which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure seems almost certain and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of precious lives.

When all is said and done, the most precious asset any nation has is its youth, and for a battlefield commander ever to condone the unnecessary sacrifice of his men is inexcusable. In any action you must balance the inevitable cost in lives against the objectives you seek to attain. Unless the results to be expected can reasonably justify the estimated loss of life the action involves, then for my part I want none of it.³⁵

In an example closer to home, it is instructive to consider the performance of LCol James Stone when he was Commanding Officer of 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI), in Korea in 1950:

The commander of 2 PPCLI, Lieutenant Colonel James Stone arrived in Korea with an untrained battalion that he was not to commit to operations until he, Stone, was satisfied that it was operationally ready. On arrival, he was instructed by his operational superiors in the U.S. 8th Army to go directly to the front. Unable to persuade the army staff of the inadvisability of the order, Stone went directly to the Army Commander. Following what must have been a most interesting discussion between this four-star American general and Canadian lieutenant-colonel, Stone proceeded to train his battalion until it was ready for combat. It proved more than able a few months later when it distinguished itself at Kapyong, for which it was awarded an American Presidential Citation, and which its successor unit still wears proudly.

...There are others, less fortunate, where a greater capacity of commanders to say no might have prevented accretions of small circumstances to produce Canadian disasters of arms. Sending troops to Hong Kong was one. Acceding to the re-mounting of the Dieppe raid was another.³⁶

Gen Dextraze, in his 1973 article, also set out basic rules of leadership, which included: accepting full responsibility in the eyes of superiors for the mistakes and failures of subordinates (don't shift the blame downward); always being concerned for the well-being of subordinates; never taking things for granted (check and double-check); and recognizing that leadership and popularity are not synonymous.³⁷

In a written brief to our policy hearings on behalf of the Canadian Forces, MGen Dallaire argued that, while characteristics and traits of leadership are not completely definitive, nonetheless, they provide the most readily understood description of leadership.³⁸ These traits are capacity (intelligence, alertness, verbal facility, originality, and judgement); achievement (scholarship, knowledge, and athletic accomplishment); responsibility (dependability, loyalty, morality, courage, initiative, persistence, aggressiveness, self-confidence, and desire to excel); participation (activity, sociability, co-operation, adaptability, and humour); and status (socio-economic position and popularity).

MGen Dallaire additionally testified that commanders also serve and care for their men (thus, it is not just for symbolic reasons that officers eat only after their soldiers have been fed), and that the military leader has undivided

responsibility for all that subordinates do or fail to do, and a personal responsibility to ensure that they accomplish the assigned mission. The leader must motivate subordinates and see that they are prepared for their tasks, and that they do not suffer unnecessary casualties, are cared for if they are sick or wounded, comforted if dying, and buried with dignity when they have died.³⁹

VIEWS OF OTHER MILITARY LEADERS AND EXPERTS

As mentioned, much of Canadian thought on military leadership relies heavily on British, American, and other foreign sources.

British military experts, such as Field Marshalls Montgomery and Wavell, have emphasized a number of qualities of a good leader, such as being physically robust, inspiring confidence, having a spirit of adventure, being truthful, optimistic, and having the determination to persevere in the face of difficulties. A good leader must be a good selector of subordinates and a good judge of character, and must be able to dominate and master events. Gen Sir John Hackett argues that a leader has something that followers want, namely a capacity to help people overcome the difficulties confronted in a joint enterprise. Therefore, a person commanding others must possess to a higher degree than the followers those qualities that they respect. A leader must be highly competent in the skills relevant to the discharge of the primary task of the organization. As well, leaders are only entitled to ask from below what they are prepared to give above, and the people in charge must put first the interests of those over whom they are positioned.

American military leaders have also emphasized the need for integrity and aspects such as the hardihood to take risks, the will to take full responsibility for decisions, the readiness to share rewards with subordinates, and an equal readiness to take the blame when things go adversely.

PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF EFFECTIVE MILITARY LEADERSHIP

A leader thus has many duties and responsibilities: among these are roles as disciplinarian, teacher, and provider. In this part of the chapter, we focus on particular aspects of leadership that appeared most relevant to issues examined by the Inquiry.

Leader as Disciplinarian

As Disciplinarian of Troops

As noted in the commissioning scroll, officers have the duty to keep their troops "in good Order and Discipline." Canadian Forces leadership manuals detail this need for the leader to exercise discipline. First, leaders must be aware that repeated offences by subordinates indicate to some degree a failure in the leadership of their unit.⁴⁰ Second, leaders must understand their disciplinary responsibilities. Leaders earn the respect of their soldiers through example, judgement, fairness and knowledge of the task or mission. "This kind of soldier realizes that being liked is not a sure road to success, but that the esteem he earns through his leadership performance is the best means of assuring the individual performance of his subordinates."⁴¹ Third, leaders must insist on high standards of performance and maintain effective communication with their soldiers.⁴² Fourth, leaders must enforce discipline fairly. Leaders should not close their eyes to any lapse in discipline which needs to be checked immediately, but when it is advisable, should wait before taking action. When there is an offence against discipline, such as an inferior performance, leaders should quickly take steps to ascertain all the facts. Leaders should point out faults when they occur, but when this approach fails, they should base their action on the seriousness of the offence, the circumstances, and the records of the offenders. Leaders must hope never to be faced with a concerted breach of discipline by a number of soldiers, but should be aware of this possibility. Leaders should inform themselves about the causes of past incidents of indiscipline. Most breaches of discipline reflect on leadership. Leaders who really understand their subordinates and have won their confidence will always be aware of the existence of a grievance long before the subordinates are driven to any concerted breach of discipline.⁴³

Self-Discipline

Only disciplined soldiers who accept the responsibility for disciplining themselves are fit to lead others. No one should be given command of anything unless they first meet this most elemental prerequisite. This applies in the first instance to the corporal on appointment to master corporal, and with increasing relevance at each subsequent rank. In turn, the task of ensuring the discipline of the subordinates is perhaps the first priority of the commander. Necessarily, commanders must expect that the discipline applied within their command must, for the most part, be externally imposed. It should, however, be a goal to move the command steadily towards a standard of self-discipline, through setting the example and requiring all those who have been entrusted with authority to do the same. Good leadership is characterized

by the example of self-discipline, steady and dependable standards of justice, fairness in treating subordinates, and putting the needs of troops ahead of one's own comforts. Through such leadership comes a disciplined unit, platoon, or army.

Disciplined leaders realize that effective leadership is based on personal consistency: leaders ask much of subordinates because leaders ask much of themselves.⁴⁴ U.S. Gen Ridgway asked: "[W]hen the crisis is at hand, which commander, I ask, receives the better response? Is it the one who has failed to share the rough going with his troops, who is rarely seen in the zone of aimed fire, and who expects much and gives little? Or is it the one whose every thought is for the welfare of his men, consistent with the accomplishment of his mission; who does not ask them to do what he has not already done and stands ready to do again when necessary; who with his men has shared short rations, the physical discomforts and rigors of campaign, and will be found at the crises of action where the issues are to be decided?"⁴⁵

Looking after the Welfare of the Troops

Leaders must care about their subordinates — the cornerstone of this is respect. Leaders who do not understand their troops and respect them as individuals have no right to assume command of them. "The first thought of the leader must be for his men's welfare, especially after an engagement. His own comfort and rest must come secondary. Traditionally, the leader eats last; thereby demonstrating his care and willingness to attend to his own needs after his men's."⁴⁶ As specific examples, providing fresh rations to troops may, in some cases, be impossible, but it is nonetheless an important factor in morale. The unit must ensure that the troops are fed well at every opportunity and are provided with combat rations adequate to their needs when fresh rations are not available. "Failure on the part of a leader to do all possible in this area is inexcusable."⁴⁷ Troops will accept shortages of weapons and equipment out of necessity but not due to lack of concern by their leaders. They are justified in their expectations that commanders will do everything possible to get the necessary equipment and supplies.⁴⁸

Knowing the Troops

At the level of section and platoon, soldiers must know that leaders care, respect and understand them personally. "The leader must get to know his men to the same degree as the soldier's family and close friends do."⁴⁹

At the higher levels of officership, the need to know your troops still applies. For example, British Field Marshall Wavell emphasized two simple rules that every general should observe in relation to his troops: first, never to try to

do his own staff work, and second, never to let his staff get between him and his troops. "What troops and subordinate commanders appreciate is that a general should be constantly in personal contact with them, and should not see everything simply through the eyes of his staff. The less time a general spends in his office and the more with his troops the better."⁵⁰ U.S. Army Gen Ridgway argued that commanders needed to maintain personal contact with their principal subordinate commanders. There was always time for these visits; administrative work could always be done at night. Commanders also have to keep principal subordinates informed of their thinking or plans. The chances of a successful execution of a tactical plan are greatly increased if commanders have secured the willing acceptance of the subordinate commanders responsible for executing the plans assigned to them. Commanders must therefore ensure that those subordinates receive notice of their plan in ample time to permit them to make the necessary reconnaissances and to issue orders.⁵¹

Using Informal Leadership to the Unit's Advantage

Informal groups will always arise within the formal military unit.⁵² Whether or not informal groups are of value depends upon the attitude of the leader. Informal groups can be advantageous to a leader. Such groups may help enforce healthy norms, thereby complementing the leader's maintenance of discipline, fill gaps in official orders, increase satisfaction and stability, provide a useful channel of communication through the grapevine, and encourage the leader to do better planning. On the other hand, the leader may encounter several difficulties arising from the existence of informal groups. Such groups may resist change, turn personnel away from the aims of the organization, spread false rumours, and force people to conform to internal codes of behaviour or possibly face cruel penalties.⁵³

Formal leaders must therefore keep themselves informed of the existence of an informal group and handle the informal group in a way that maintains the cohesiveness of the military unit. If this does not occur, the danger arises that the formal leader will effectively be replaced by the informal leader.

Replacing Ineffective Commanders

Given the decision to remove the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, LCol Morneault, just weeks before the deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia, some background information on such a scenario is useful. That high command may be compelled to remove commanders cannot be doubted. Indeed, in times of war, a commander's removal can occur swiftly. For example, during World War II, LGen Guy Simonds of 2nd Canadian Corps ordered the replacement of MGen George Kitching

as Commander of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division during the battle of Normandy in August 1944. Kitching's description of the event was that "[Simonds] told me that he was not satisfied with my performance and that I must go. That was that."⁵⁴

What are the criteria for determining when to remove a commander? One leader who addressed this issue was Gen Ridgway. He argued that there were three points to consider for the relief of commanders:

- (a) Is your information based on personal knowledge and observation, or on secondhand information?
- (b) What will the effect be on the command concerned? Are you relieving a commander whose men think highly of him regardless of personal competence?
- (c) Have you a better man available?⁵⁵

ESTABLISHING THE QUALITIES OF GOOD LEADERSHIP

From this general review, we may conclude with a list of qualities indicative of good leadership, thereby establishing a standard for assessing the performance of leaders in the Somalia mission.

In reviewing the considerable research material available on the subject, we were impressed by the concordance among sources in listing the qualities necessary to good leadership in the military. Where differences may arise is in the relative importance of those qualities and, from that, the difficulty in singling out the core qualities, without which leadership will fail. Indeed, the attributes of leadership used in the CF Performance Evaluation Report (PER) are revealing: although the PER includes a creditable list, it would seem that physical fitness carries as much weight in evaluating leadership in the CF as does courage or loyalty. Or, in MGen Dallaire's view, verbal facility is as important as loyalty. Even in reviewing the documentation by experts such as Montgomery or Wavell, one has the impression that a spirit of adventure may be as important as being truthful.

The issue, then, is to identify the central and basic qualities without which leadership will not succeed. While acknowledging that other characteristics are also ingredients of good leadership, we need to be quite clear about the pre-eminence of the core qualities.

Before establishing the list, we should acknowledge the need for the leaders in the Canadian Forces to reflect faithfully, in their own makeup, the attitudes and mores identified with all members of Canadian society.

There must be concordance between the leaders of one of Canada's most important institutions and the nation at large. No list of leadership qualities in the Canadian Forces would be complete without mention of fairness, decency, compassion, a strong sense of justice, and pride in our role as peace-keepers. In short, the Canadian military leader must exemplify the Canadian national character.

The Core Qualities of Military Leadership

Table 15.1 contains the core qualities, necessary attributes, and indicative performance factors we considered important in assessing leadership related to the Somalia mission.

Table 15.1
Leadership Qualities, Attributes, and Performance Factors

The Core Qualities of Military Leadership	Other Necessary Attributes	Indicative Performance Factors
Integrity	Dedication	Sets the example
Courage	Knowledge	Disciplines subordinates
Loyalty	Intellect	Accepts responsibility
Selflessness	Perseverance	Stands by own convictions
Self-discipline	Decisiveness	Analyzes problems
	Judgement	and situations
	Physical robustness	Makes decisions
		Delegates and directs
		Supervises (checks and rechecks)
		Accounts for actions
		Performs under stress
		Ensures the well-being of subordinates

Recommendations

We recommend that:

- 15.1** The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria, along the lines of the core qualities of military leadership, other necessary attributes, and indicative performance factors set out in this chapter, as the basis for describing the leadership necessary in the Canadian Forces, and for orienting the selection, training, development, and assessment of leaders.
 - 15.2** The core qualities and other necessary attributes be applied in the selection of officers for promotion to and within general officer ranks. These core qualities are integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness, and self-discipline. Other necessary attributes are dedication, knowledge, intellect, perseverance, decisiveness, judgement, and physical robustness.
 - 15.3** The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria for the accountability of leaders within the Canadian Forces derived from the principles of accountability set out in Chapter 16 of this Report, and organized under the headings of accountability, responsibility, supervision, delegation, sanction, and knowledge.
 - 15.4** The Canadian Forces make a concerted effort to improve the quality of leadership at all levels by ensuring adoption of and adherence to the principles embodied in the findings and recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry regarding the selection, screening, promotion and supervision of personnel; the provision of appropriate basic and continuing training; the demonstration of self-discipline and enforcement of discipline for all ranks; the chain of command, operational readiness, and mission planning; and the principles and methods of accountability expressed throughout this Report.
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NOTES

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8. Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, "Leadership", in *Military Leadership: in Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Taylor and Rosenbach, p. 22.
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19. DND, *Military and Civilian Employee Feedback Survey*, p. 5.
20. Paul Koring, "Army Unfit for Battle, Boyle Says", *The [Toronto] Globe and Mail*, February 13, 1996, p. A1.
21. "Commander Land Force Command, Statement on Leadership, July 17, 1996", pp. 5-7.

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32. Wenek, "Officership and Professional Ethics", p. 11.
33. Testimony of MGen Dallaire, Policy hearings transcripts vol. 3P, p. 486P.
34. Dextraze, "The Art of Leadership", pp. 34–35.
35. Ridgway, "Leadership", p. 27.
36. Document book 118A, tab 26. Dr. Bill McAndrew (formerly employed at the Directorate of History, DND) prepared a paper, "Command and Leadership", at the request of MGen Dallaire to assist in the preparation of a brief on leadership to this Inquiry (NS 194479 at NS 194484). For a description of the Stone incident, see Minister of National Defence, Official History of the Canadian Army, LCol Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), pp. 53–57.
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39. Testimony of MGen Dallaire, Policy hearings transcripts vol. 3P, pp. 480P, 490P.
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48. DND, *Leadership in Land Combat*, vol. 15, p. 4-11.
49. DND, *Leadership in Land Combat*, vol. 15, p. 5-4.
50. Archibald Percival Wavell, *Soldiers and Soldiering* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), p. 25.
51. Ridgway, "Leadership", p. 31.
52. DND, *Leadership*, vol. 2, pp. 5-4 to 5-12.

53. DND, *Leadership*, vol. 2, pp. 5-4 to 5-7.

54. MGen George Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields* (Langley, B.C.: Battleline Books, 1986), p. 227.

55. Gen Ridgway added:

Every man is entitled to go into battle with the best chance of survival your forethought as a leader can provide. What best helps you discharge this responsibility? Sharing things with your men; to be always in the toughest spots; always where the crisis is, or seems most likely to develop; always thinking of what help you can give your commanders who are executing their orders; doing your utmost to see that the best in rations, shelter, first aid, and evacuation facilities are available; being generous with praise, swift and fair with punishment when you have the facts, intolerant of demonstrated failure of leadership on which lives depend, yet making full allowances for human weaknesses and the stresses and strains of battle on individuals ("Leadership", pp. 29-30).



ACCOUNTABILITY

This Inquiry was established to investigate and report on

the chain of command system, leadership within the chain of command, discipline, operations, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces and the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence in respect of the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the following matters related to the pre-deployment, in-theatre and post-deployment phases of the Somalia deployment.

The terms of reference go on to provide a four-page list of the specific matters we were directed to investigate.

Our mandate was essentially to undertake a comprehensive review of the Somalia deployment. We were asked to delve into questions involving both institutional failures and individual misconduct. This involved evaluating whether institutional or structural deficiencies existed in the planning and initial execution of the operation, and whether institutional responses to operational, disciplinary, and administrative problems encountered in the various phases of the Somalia operation were adequate. Also central to our investigation was determining whether some of the problems encountered were the result of individual shortcomings or personal failures.

In discharging our mandate we focused, at the pre-deployment stage, on the nature of and preparation for the mission and tasks assigned to the Canadian Joint Force Somalia and on the suitability of the forces deployed to accomplish the tasks assigned. We were asked to examine the manner in which the mission was conducted, the effectiveness of decisions and actions taken by leadership at all levels of the chain of command, and the adequacy of the command response to the operational, disciplinary, and administrative problems encountered. The curtailment of our endeavours by Government-imposed deadlines restricted the ambit and reach of our inquiries, but what

we did investigate shines a penetrating light across the entire spectrum of activity in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. In addition, we sought to explore, to the extent possible in the circumstances, the professional values and attitudes of all rank levels with respect to the lawful conduct of operations and the treatment of detainees, as well as the extent to which cultural attitudes affected the conduct of operations. We also reviewed allegations of cover-up and destruction of evidence (although to a lesser extent than we would have preferred).

The public inquiry process is an exercise in accountability (a concept defined below). In general terms, an examination of accountability as it relates to the military could entail a consideration of principles derived from the fields of criminal liability, civil responsibility, ministerial accountability, public service administration, and corporate, managerial, or bureaucratic accountability. However, despite the breadth and scope of our mandate, we do face jurisdictional constraints. We, therefore, limited our investigation consciously and deliberately, to questions of accountability falling outside the sphere of an assessment of criminal or civil liability. We affirmed this orientation publicly on numerous occasions.

Excluding notions of criminal and civil responsibility from an analysis of accountability does not impede an inquiry's ability to conduct an appropriate review. Indeed, public inquiries are effective instruments precisely because they can probe an issue in the public interest without the need to assign civil liability or determine guilt. The applicable principles of accountability are capable of reasonably precise identification and can provide an effective measure for evaluative purposes.

ACCOUNTABILITY DEFINED

Accountability is the mechanism for ensuring conformity with standards of action. In any setting where rules are established to guide human activity, supervision of conformity with those rules is an essential condition for the stability of that environment. Those exercising substantial power and discretionary authority must be answerable (that is, subject to scrutiny, interrogation, and, ultimately, commendation or sanction) for its use. Without answerability, systems tend to become autocratic, despotic, or dictatorial. Accountability is therefore a basic attribute of open, democratic societies. Open processes generally are regarded as guarantors of responsibility in the exercise of official authority. In democracies all public officers exercising significant authority are made accountable for their decisions and the effects of them. Accountability provides a vehicle for preventing, or at least controlling, the abuse of state power.

The term accountability is neutral in its embrace. It relates to both positive and negative actions. The accountable person accounts for all activities that have been assigned or entrusted — in essence, for all activities for which the individual is responsible. Accountable officials receive credit as well as blame. Thus, in a properly functioning system or organization, there should be accountability for individuals' actions regardless of whether those actions are executed properly and lead to a successful result or are carried out improperly and produce injurious consequences.

RESPONSIBILITY DEFINED

Responsibility is not synonymous with accountability. The person authorized to act is 'responsible'. Responsible officials are held to account. People responsible for acting in an official capacity are ordinarily held to account for their actions. An individual who exercises powers while acting in the discharge of official functions is responsible for the proper exercise of the powers or duties assigned. Where the individual does so under the direction of a superior officer entrusted with supervisory authority, that superior officer is accountable for the manner in which that authority is or is not exercised. The subordinate remains responsible for the proper exercise of the powers or duties assigned, but the subordinate's proper or improper exercise of such powers or duties may also reflect proper or improper supervision for purposes of overall accountability.

Responsibility in the Case of Supervision and Delegation

There is a distinction between supervision of a subordinate's actions and delegation of the authority to act to another person (who may or may not be a subordinate). A person exercising supervisory authority is responsible, and hence accountable, for the manner in which that authority has been exercised. A person who delegates authority is responsible, and hence accountable, not for direct supervision of the kind a supervisor is expected to exercise but, rather, for control over the delegate and ultimately for the actual acts performed by the delegate.

The nature of delegation can be explained in these terms: An individual entrusted with authority to act can delegate certain tasks or functions to another person, but the act of delegation does not relieve the responsible official of the duty to account. Put another way, the responsible official can delegate the authority to act but can never delegate responsibility for the

proper performance of the tasks and duties in question. Where a superior delegates the authority to act to a subordinate, the superior remains responsible — first, for acts performed by the delegate; second, for the appropriateness of the choice of delegate; third, with regard to the propriety of the delegation (i.e., the nature, extent, and scope of the delegation and whether, in any circumstances, it was appropriate to delegate the function in question); and, finally, for control of the acts of subordinates, since delegates are the agents of their superiors and bind their superiors in acting on their behalf.

Responsibility in the Case of Ignorance, Negligence and Wilful Blindness

Ignorance

It is the responsibility of those who exercise managerial authority (i.e., management, in the sense of exercising supervisory or delegated authority) to know what is transpiring within the area of their assigned authority. The proper exercise of managerial authority includes the necessity for managers to establish adequate systems or procedures to provide relevant information; to seek information; and to be informed and kept informed of all aspects of the mandate under their charge. Even if subordinates whose duty it is to inform their superiors of all relevant facts, circumstances, and developments fail to fulfil their obligations, this cannot absolve the superior of responsibility for what has transpired. Perhaps the most relevant questions in such scenarios are whether officers who had no knowledge of the facts or circumstances ought to have inquired or to have known what was transpiring, or whether they relied unjustifiably on inadequate sources for the information at issue. An executive officer who has been kept deliberately in the dark by subordinates about important facts or circumstances affecting the proper discharge of organizational responsibilities cannot, by that fact alone, escape being held to account. In such circumstances it will be relevant to understand what processes and methods were in place to ensure the provision of adequate information to those in authority. It will also be important to assess to what extent the information in question was well-known or commonly held and whether the result that occurred could reasonably have been expected or foreseen. Moreover, how the managerial official responded upon first discovering the shortfall in information will often be germane. (For example, were steps taken to prevent repetition or continuation of the action in question?)

These circumstances apply to responsible officials who raise the claim of “I did not know”¹ about important facts or circumstances related to the discharge of organizational responsibilities under their charge. In fact, those accused of responsibility for a harmful outcome often plead ignorance. For

example, when blame for a recent riot at Headingley jail in Manitoba was attributed to the provincial Minister of Justice, she offered the defence of ignorance. Despite numerous prominent newspaper stories detailing serious problems at the jail, the Minister insisted that she knew nothing about serious problems of safety and morale. Moreover she invited the public to accept this claim as a robust defence, rather than as an admission of blameworthy failure. The implication of this view is, apparently, that when one does not know of a problem, one is never responsible for failing to take corrective action.

Similarly, some witnesses testifying before us claimed that their ignorance excused them from personal moral responsibility. Examples of such claims are explored in Volume 5, Chapter 39, on disclosure of documents. These witnesses, in effect, ask us to consider them blameless for their failure to take action to correct a problem or set of problems of which they were not aware.

Not everyone will agree with the view that officials are never blameworthy for actions omitted or undertaken in ignorance. Indeed, it is one of the responsibilities of a superior officer to put in place the measures necessary to stay informed. A superior officer has an additional obligation, where the proper mechanism has failed, to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken to remedy the situation.

The plea of ignorance ("I did not know") should be regarded as a weak defence. No automatic grace flows to the benefit of those who, when exercising managerial authority, reap the bitter harvest sown by their own non-feasance, misfeasance or negligence, or that of subordinates. Indeed, some forms of misconduct by subordinates represent failures so large or so devastating to the functioning, morale, or good order of an organization that discharge or enforced resignation of a manager or supervisor is required, even if the superior officer is generally competent, has been diligent, and has acted in good faith. The message this sanction sends to the entire corps of the organization is considered more important than the salvation or preservation of an individual career. We do not mean to say that discharge or enforced resignation of the superior must be the organization's invariable response.² Context is the controlling variable.

Thus understood, an accountable official cannot shelter behind the actions of a subordinate. Accountable officials are always answerable to their superiors.

Negligence and Wilful Blindness

Superiors' ignorance of wrongdoing by their subordinates does not excuse them from personal blame if the ignorance resulted from failure to put proper information procedures in place, or failure properly to monitor compliance with existing information procedures. Leaders who plead ignorance as their defence

must show, in other words, not only that they did not know of wrongdoing by subordinates, but also that they could not reasonably have known. That is, they must demonstrate that their ignorance was not culpable.

If leaders were instrumental in their own ignorance, they are blame-worthy for that ignorance. Those who appeal to the defence of ignorance to excuse or to mitigate their wrongful conduct do not deserve to succeed in their pleading when the ignorance was self-induced.

A further factor may help explain why information of certain kinds does not always reach high-level officials. Some senior officials may *want* to be kept in a state of ignorance with respect to certain developments. This desire can be communicated to subordinates in a variety of ways, both direct and indirect; subordinates then come to understand that certain kinds of immoral or illegal behaviour will be tolerated by their superiors so long as there is no official communication up the line. If this is effective, the senior officials are cloaked with what is termed 'plausible deniability'. They can then assert, with at least the veneer of honesty, that they gave no orders and knew of no plot to engage in illicit behaviour. Of course, a more objective inquiry into culpability would concern itself with what they knew or ought to have known and whether — through word, action, or both — they simply turned a blind eye to consequences that they were instrumental in setting in train.

Naturally, organizations that permit such an ethos to prevail also find it necessary to set boundaries on the kinds of illicit behaviour that will be tolerated. One effective means of communicating this message is through the example set by the organization's top leadership. Organizationally sophisticated leaders know that if they are seen by subordinates to be violating the spirit of certain legislation. Subordinates will take from such an example the message that they, too, should do whatever is necessary to pursue the less correct bureaucratic objective rather than fulfil the aims of the governing legislation.

Responsibility and Sanctions

There are a few recognized occasions when one who is accountable for the actions of others may nevertheless seem not to be responsible for their missteps or misdeeds. The accountable party may appear to escape sanction. In this regard it is helpful to consider two sets of circumstances. Both scenarios turn on the nature and degree of the knowledge possessed by the responsible official.

The first scenario arises when superiors have been kept uninformed of important developments by subordinates under their charge or by the delegate for whom the superior is responsible. In this scenario, if the situation described is one of supervision, not delegation, in being held to account, the

emphasis will be on the adequacy of the superior's oversight and supervision. If the situation described is one of delegation, the emphasis on accounting will be on the selection of the delegate and the adequacy of the governing controls surrounding the delegation. In either the delegation or the supervision scenario, even if the superior official is successful in demonstrating appropriate, prudent, diligent personal behaviour, the superior remains responsible for the errors and misdeeds of the subordinate. However, when assessing the appropriate response to the actions of the superior whose subordinate or delegate has erred, the authorities may be justified in selecting a penalty or sanction of lower order or no penalty or sanction whatsoever.

In the second scenario, the supervised subordinate or the superior's delegate acts, by stealth, artifice or fraud, beyond the authority (actual or delegated) that has been conferred. In the case of a delegation, if the superior has done all that can reasonably be expected in terms of selecting the delegate and imposing controls on the exercise of delegated authority, or has taken other prudent steps to prevent such mischief, the superior may escape sanction. As regards the acts of a supervised employee, a superior may, in a similar manner, avoid sanction if all due care and diligence have been exercised in supervising and overseeing the actions of the subordinate.

A leader exercising managerial or supervisory authority has a responsibility to put in place the mechanisms needed to stay informed. Leaders also have an obligation to monitor their subordinates' compliance with official policy. A leader with foresight should certainly anticipate that subordinates might conceal, rather than report, cases of serious wrongdoing. When a pattern of concealment has existed in the past and may have become a thoroughly ingrained part of an organization's ethos, a 'proactive' leader should implement thorough safeguards to prevent breaches and to detect any that do occur despite best efforts at prophylaxis.

These scenarios may suggest an evasion of responsibility by the superior, but on closer examination this impression dissolves. In point of fact, in systems that place appropriate emphasis on accountability, the superior is always held to account. In accounting to the authorities for their actions, superiors must seek to demonstrate appropriate diligence. Whether the situation involves supervision or delegation, if the superior has done all that can reasonably be expected of a responsible manager or supervisor and has taken all prudent steps that might reasonably be expected of one exercising managerial authority, the potential sanction for the miscues of a subordinate may be mitigated.

This analysis of moral responsibility might be applied to the assertion made in testimony before us that if senior officers resigned every time their subordinates made an error, there would never be any leadership. Presumably, the point being made was that in any very large organization, subordinates

will invariably make errors. Human beings are fallible, and this fallibility does not vanish when they don the uniform of the Canadian Forces. Minor mistakes will be frequent in any organization. Even systemic breakdowns can be expected from time to time. Hence the point: if those at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy were found blameworthy and asked to resign every time a subordinate made an error, even a serious error, we would need a revolving door to accommodate a rapid succession of leaders.

Accountability does not demand such draconian measures when a misstep occurs. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, it would be inappropriate to exact the automatic resignation of the senior executive in response to every error or example of misconduct. The need to account is invariable, but the proper response or sanction must be proportional and conditional upon the nature of the superior's failure or failures.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY

Hierarchy is an organizational imperative in any complex undertaking. Not all organizations are completely pyramidal in structure, but in most the relationships established to accomplish the organization's business or undertaking reflect lines of authority, communication and, ultimately, accountability. The complexity of the undertaking determines the extensiveness of an organization's chain of authority to a certain degree, but however it is structured, those at the apex of the organization are accountable for the actions and decisions of those in the chain of authority who are subordinate to them. In a properly linked chain of authority, accountability does not become attenuated the further removed one is from the source of the activity. The supervisor's supervisor is no less responsible for the acts of a subordinate simply by reason of being two rungs instead of one rung removed from the subordinate's actions. Rather, when the subordinate fails, that failure is shouldered by all who are responsible and exercise the requisite authority — subordinate, superior, and superior to the superior. Indeed, those who exercise managerial authority on occasion may be obliged to accept graver consequences for errors and misdeeds than those who serve below them.

All organizations and institutions have, in their upper stratum, a designated executive corps of responsible leaders. All senior officials or executives must bear the burden of accountability for matters under their direction or control. Also, in some contexts, such officials may be made answerable for the activities of the organization as a whole, to the extent that they can be

considered to be part of the directing mind or will of the organization.³ A person's liability to sanction for organizational misconduct or error may be determined according to express rules or common understandings, where they exist, but in the absence of such rules or shared appreciation (or in addition to them), liability may be assessed with reference to the individual's position, roles, and responsibilities within the organization. Thus conceived, accountability in its most pervasive and all-encompassing sense resides inevitably with the chief executive officer of the organization or institution.

If an individual is acting only as one part of a large organization — a 'cog in the wheel' — and many other people contributed culpably to produce a bad outcome, some would argue that neither the individual nor anyone else is individually responsible. Others would assert that everyone who contributed in any way has an equal moral responsibility.

A more reasonable position is that all and only those whose culpable actions contributed to produce the harm are responsible (blameworthy). Moreover, each is responsible proportionately to the degree of their particular contribution to the outcome. Those who make the greatest culpable contribution to an outcome deserve the greatest blame; but all who contribute, by their culpable actions or omissions, bear some responsibility.

This is a traditional line of moral reasoning, and it would seem to follow from it that officials at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy will often bear the heaviest moral responsibility when things go wrong, by virtue of their greater power and authority.

ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE MILITARY

When an officer accepts command of troops, he accepts not only the responsibility of accomplishing a mission, but the guardianship of those who serve under his command. The military hierarchy exists and can function because enlisted personnel entrust their well-being and their lives to those with command authority. When those in command authority either abdicate that authority or neglect that guardianship, more is lost than lives. Lost also is the trust that enables those who follow to follow those who lead.⁴

We accept the view that the profession of arms is unique. No other profession in society "requires the sacrifice of one's life in its service, whereas the military regularly requires it."⁵ This requirement is what General Sir John Hackett described in *The Profession of Arms* as the clause of unlimited liability.⁶ This reality has led commentators to observe that "[b]ecause it is unique, because it imposes special obligations, and because it requires special men to fulfill them, the military profession must be separate even from the society it serves."⁷

In the context of the military, two virtues or values — loyalty and obedience — are intimately linked to the principles of accountability and responsibility. Indeed, for good and sufficient reasons, loyalty and obedience have traditionally been regarded as the highest military virtues. As Alfred T. Mahan points out, “the rule of obedience is simply the expression of that one among the military virtues upon which all the others depend.”⁸ Instant unquestioning obedience must be inculcated in military personnel as a prime virtue, it is argued, because military necessity often requires that soldiers act rapidly and in concert. Delay or hesitation could be fatal. Obedience to one’s military superiors and loyalty to one’s comrades can, of course, easily express itself in concealment or cover-up of their wrongdoing.

Few authors have offered a more strict construction of the supreme value of military obedience than Samuel P. Huntington:

When the military man receives a legal order from an authorized superior, he does not argue, he does not hesitate, he does not substitute his own views; he obeys instantly. He is judged not by the policies he implements, but rather by the promptness and efficiency with which he carries them out. His goal is to perfect an instrument of obedience; the uses to which that instrument is put are beyond his responsibility. His highest virtue is instrumental not ultimate.⁹

It is important to note, however, that Huntington qualifies his version of the military ideal with the words “legal” and “authorized”. That is, instant obedience is owed only to legal orders issued by an authorized superior. This qualification highlights the crucial subordination of the military to the rule of law. Ultimately, the loyalty of every officer and soldier in the armed forces of a democratic society must be to the rule of law, as even Samuel Huntington, with his extreme emphasis on the military virtue of “perfect” obedience, is compelled to admit.

The principles of responsibility and accountability discussed in this report apply equally — and in some cases, more stringently — to leaders and members of the armed forces and to senior executives, public servants, and ministers of the Crown. The military is a highly hierarchical system that confers unusual powers of command, control, and discipline on members of the Canadian Forces. Members of the armed forces operate under the rule of law and are required to obey lawful orders under threat of severe punishment, even when they are in dangerous circumstances. Officers and other soldiers authorized to issue lawful orders benefit from absolute immunity when those orders are issued and obeyed. Members of the armed forces in certain circumstances are authorized to use destructive force, including lethal force, that may result in the injury and death of human beings.

Leaders in the armed forces are at times responsible for the safety of Canada, vast national resources, and the lives of large groups of Canadian citizens in uniform. Richard Gabriel marked these unique, near universal, military duties in the most poignant way, observing that "no [other] profession has the awesome responsibility of legitimately spending lives of others in order to render its service."¹⁰ Canadians have a right to know that the authority, responsibilities, and duties given to members of the armed forces, and especially to leaders, are performed effectively, efficiently, and within the law.

Although the modern era has seen the emergence of peacekeeping as a new and important phenomenon, the Canadian Forces, like armed forces throughout history and in most other states today, is still seen largely as an institution fashioned by discipline and ordered toward the chief purpose of fighting wars and winning them. The structure of the armed forces — its identification of authority in rank, its hierarchical organization, and its system of command — reflects this purpose. The principal organizing concept of armed force, however, is the idea of command. As used in the armed forces the term 'command' embodies sanctioned authority, unity of direction, and irreducible responsibility for the direction, co-ordination, control and behaviour of military forces under command. Command authority may vary with the rank and circumstances of officers, but these basic elements of command hold true at all levels.

It became obvious long ago that a single commander could not hope to exercise effective direct command over large forces and complex operations. Consequently, the idea of delegating authority to subordinate commanders evolved gradually and has become an essential facet of what is often called a 'system of command'. The concept of delegation, however, has never usurped command responsibility. Delegated command authority is always limited in terms of troops and resources, time, location, mission, and/or degree of powers. Commanders always retain responsibility for the behaviour of their subordinates and for the resources, missions, and authority they delegate to them. Thus the image of a 'chain of command' appears, each link fastened inseparably to the next stronger link until it ends at the superior commander. It is instructive to note that the links in the chain are commonly referred to as 'higher' or 'lower' and as 'up' and 'down', providing a strong semantic indication that the chain of command joins those of lesser authority to those of greater authority.

Not all officers in the Canadian Forces are commanders. Many exercise staff functions and duties and are accountable for the degree of diligence with which they discharge their responsibilities and assume their obligations or use their powers. However, officers who are 'in command' are deliberately set apart from other officers by custom and regulations. Commanders, even at junior rank, enjoy certain customary privileges, such as being allowed to

fly individual flags and pennants, and they traditionally have status above other officers. These customs, and others, are derived from the need in ancient times to identify commanders on the battlefield. In modern times these trappings of command may have lost some significance, but the identification of commanders remains a practical and necessary part of the military institution nonetheless.

Commanders must be clearly identified because they are the source of lawful commands, and they have responsibility in law and regulation for the training and safety of people, the proper use of resources, and the efficient accomplishment of assigned missions. In the Canadian Forces, commanders are identified in several ways. Their appointments are routinely announced, changes in command are accompanied by investigations to account for resources, and ceremonies are usually held and documents signed to mark the transfer of command from one officer to another. These types of procedures are followed not only to verify the change of command, but also to mark precisely the time at which it occurs, to avoid any ambiguity about who has command and who can be held responsible for the unit or units under command.

As with rank, officers who hold senior command are usually more experienced and qualified than officers who hold subordinate command. This ranking is another important separator between officers; it is also another important separator of responsibility. As an officer gains rank and seniority in a strongly hierarchical organization like the military, that individual's behaviour becomes increasingly important in directing the behaviour of others and serves as a model for others throughout the organization. This effect is multiplied enormously when commanders have the combined weight of senior rank and command authority. Therefore, although very junior commanders might rightly plead that they can be held responsible only for the behaviour of their immediate subordinates, senior commanders should be held accountable not only for their immediate acts and decisions, but also for the consequences — intended or unintended — of those acts for all the units and individuals under their command.

Command fixes responsibility on individuals in the Canadian Forces. In regulations, "a commanding officer is responsible for the whole of the organization and safety of the commanding officer's base, unit or element."¹¹ Although the detailed distribution of work between the commanding officer and subordinates is left substantially to the commanding officer's discretion, "a commanding officer shall retain for himself: (a) matters of general organization and policy; (b) important matters requiring the commanding officer's personal attention and decision; and (c) the general control and supervision of the various duties that the commanding officer has allocated to others."¹² The complexity of government sometimes makes it more difficult to fix

responsibility in some agencies and departments of government, but such is not the case in the Canadian Forces. Command and responsibility are clearly defined in custom and regulation and are inseparable, unless they have been allowed to deteriorate through inattention or neglect.

Although commanders are accountable and responsible for the missions assigned to them and for the behaviour of their troops, failure to achieve a mission, especially in war, is not necessarily a culpable act. Military operations are often conducted in circumstances of great uncertainty and danger. Even the most diligent commander can be defeated by a more clever enemy with greater resources. Military history is replete with examples of honest failure, and they are occasionally marked with great honour.

On the other hand, carelessness, inattention, and lack of due diligence denote negligent failure. In such cases, commanders have usually failed to train their forces adequately, to prepare fitting plans appropriate to foreseeable events, to supervise carefully the deployment of their units, or to lead their troops energetically by example. In the autopsy of any failed military operation, therefore, examiners must decide whether the battle was well fought but lost, or lost through the neglect of the commander.

In the Canadian Forces the basic questions — who should be accountable, what should be accounted for, and to whom should an organization be accountable — are answered more easily than they are in other settings, because they are defined by custom of the service and the law. All members of the Canadian Forces are responsible and accountable for their own actions. Moreover, individuals with authority provided by rank or appointment carry a particular degree of responsibility and accountability for their own behaviour as well as that of those under their direction. In this regard, commanders are the most obvious locus of responsibility and accountability.

Although those in authority and especially commanders have various and at times a wide range of things for which they are accountable, customarily, they are all always responsible for obedience to orders, for the state of their units, the accomplishment of assigned missions, and the behaviour — “the good order and discipline” — of their subordinates. In regulations, as we have explained, the demands on commanding officers are purposefully inclusive, encompassing every thing and act that falls under the direction of commanding officers in the course of their duties. Regulation and custom of the service, in other words, place no boundaries on what commanding officers should be held accountable for, charging them with all important matters requiring their personal attention and decision.

The Canadian Forces are accountable to Parliament through the government of the day, not as an institution, but through the person of the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Chief of the Defence Staff alone has the

“control and administration” of the Canadian Forces, and the *National Defence Act* specifically prevents anyone other than the Chief of the Defence Staff from issuing orders or directions to the armed forces. Moreover, all members of the Canadian Forces are subordinate to the Chief of the Defence Staff, whose lawful orders they must follow through commanders appointed directly or indirectly by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Thus in custom and in law, members of the Canadian Forces, and especially commanders appointed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, are accountable to the Chief of the Defence Staff who is, in turn, alone accountable to Parliament through the government of the day. The argument that the changing nature of public service makes accountability difficult to define is not nearly as vigorous in the armed forces.

In Canada, control of the armed forces by civilians elected to Parliament is fundamentally important to the safety of the state and its citizens. Control is meant to be exercised through a clearly delineated hierarchy of civil and military authorities where responsibility is fixed and obvious in law. If this inseparable system of authority and responsibility becomes clouded for any reason, the state's control over the armed forces is necessarily weakened. Although Parliament allows officers to have authority to issue orders and to compel obedience in the Canadian Forces, it must demand in return that accountability for that authority be sharply defined in regulations, unambiguously delineated in organization, and obvious in execution. Therefore, it is the duty of elected citizens to respect, guard, and reinforce control over the armed forces by holding those given positions of special trust in the Canadian Forces to a stringent interpretation of responsibility and accountability that allows for no uncertainty.

General Principles of Accountability

Accountability

Accountability is the mechanism for ensuring conformity to standards of action.

Those exercising substantial power and discretionary authority must be answerable (i.e., subject to scrutiny, interrogation and, ultimately, commendation or sanction) for all activities assigned or entrusted to them — in essence, for all activities for which they are responsible.

In a properly functioning system or organization, there should be accountability for an individual's actions regardless of whether those actions were properly executed and led to a successful result or improperly carried out and produced injurious consequences.

An accountable official may not shelter behind the actions of a subordinate. An accountable official is always answerable to superiors.

However an organization is structured, those at the apex of the organization are accountable for the actions and decisions of those within the chain of authority who are subordinate to them. Within a properly linked chain of authority, accountability does not become attenuated the further removed an individual is from the source of the activity. When a subordinate fails, that failure is shouldered by all who are responsible and exercise the requisite authority — subordinate, superior, and superior to the superior.

Accountability in its most pervasive and all-encompassing sense resides inevitably with the chief executive officer of the organization or institution.

Responsibility

Responsibility is not synonymous with accountability. One who is authorized to act or exercises authority is 'responsible'. Responsible officials are held to account. An individual who exercises powers while acting in the discharge of official functions is responsible for the proper exercise of the powers or duties assigned.

Supervision

A person exercising supervisory authority is responsible, and hence accountable, for the manner in which that authority is exercised.

Delegation

A person who delegates authority is responsible, and hence accountable, not for direct supervision of that kind a supervisor is expected to provide but, rather, for control over the delegate and ultimately for the actual acts performed by the delegate.

The act of delegation to another does not relieve the responsible official of the duty to account. Individuals can delegate the authority to act, but they cannot thereby delegate their assigned responsibility in relation to the proper performance of such acts.

Where a superior delegates the authority to act to a subordinate, the superior remains responsible, first, for the acts performed by the delegate; second, for the appropriateness of the choice of delegate; third, with regard to the propriety of the delegation; and, finally, for control of the acts of the subordinate.

Sanction

Even if the superior official is successful in demonstrating appropriate, prudent, and diligent personal behaviour, the superior remains responsible for the errors and misdeeds of the subordinate. In such circumstances, however, when assessing the appropriate response to the actions of a superior whose subordinate or delegate has erred or been guilty of misconduct, the authorities may be justified in selecting a penalty or sanction of lower order, or no penalty or sanction whatsoever.

Knowledge

It is the responsibility of those who exercise supervisory authority, or who have delegated the authority to act to others, to know what is transpiring within the area of their assigned authority.

Even if subordinates whose duty it is to inform their superior of all relevant facts, circumstances, and developments fail to fulfil their obligations, this does not absolve the superior of responsibility for what has transpired.

Where a superior contends that he or she was never informed or lacked requisite knowledge with regard to facts or circumstances affecting the proper discharge of organizational responsibilities, it is relevant to understand what processes and methods were in place to ensure the adequate provision of information. Also germane is an assessment of the extent to which the information in question was notorious or commonly held and whether the result that occurred could reasonably have been expected or foreseen. Moreover, how the managerial official responded upon first discovering the shortfall in information is often of import.

SPECIFIC DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES

We find that the standards just discussed have not been well guarded recently. The hierarchy of authority in National Defence Headquarters, and especially between the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, and the Judge Advocate General, has become blurred and distorted. Authority within the Canadian Forces is not well-defined by leaders or clearly obvious in organization or in the actions and decisions of military leaders in the chain of command. Moreover, we find that governments have not carefully exercised their duty to oversee the armed forces and the Department of National Defence in ways that ensure that both function under the strict control of Parliament. Consequently, responsibility and accountability in the armed forces and the Department of National Defence are wanting, and control of the armed forces and the department by Parliament is impaired.

To this point we have concentrated on defining terms and attempting to set out guiding principles. We now move to a consideration and analysis of practical issues that raise accountability concerns.

The Government's action in curtailing our investigation has had the effect of preventing us from exploring the full extent of, and accountability for, personal failures. Nevertheless, we have had ample opportunity to investigate fully issues pertaining to individual misconduct and personal shortcomings in relation to the pre-deployment phase of the Somalia mission as well as in relation to the phase of our proceedings in which we explored issues

surrounding the disclosure of documents by DND and the CF through the Directorate General of Public Affairs (DGPA). Our findings and conclusions in this regard are found in Volume 4 of this report, entitled "Failures of Individual Leaders".

More generally, we are in a position to identify certain specific institutional or systemic deficiencies in existing accountability mechanisms and processes.

These are apparent in the military itself and in the military-civilian/political relationship. We are also in a position now to advance proposals for reforms designed to improve accountability in practical terms.

Before setting out these reforms, we summarize the most significant deficiencies bearing on accountability that emerged from our consideration of the testimony and the research undertaken. Each deficiency plays a role in diminishing or impeding accountability. The list and description below should be of assistance to the future efforts of policy makers, although we do not regard it as exhaustive.

1. As we detail at various points in this report,¹³ official reporting and record-keeping requirements, policies and practices throughout DND and the Canadian Forces are inconsistent, sometimes ineffective, and open to abuse. This situation should be compared with that in the Australian services. As regards consistency and effectiveness, a useful counterpoint is provided by the precise and detailed orders that are given to an Australian commander for a peace support mission. They provide a remarkable contrast to the terms of reference given to Col Labbé for the Somalia deployment. Notable in the Australian orders is the value clearly placed on reporting, record keeping, investigating, and keeping concerned parties informed of progress of investigations with respect to activities generally and significant incidents in particular. These documents show that orders given can carry with them inherent accountability requirements, demonstrate the integrity of the operation of the chain of command with respect to accountability requirements, and demonstrate the intention of superior commanders to monitor and supervise the carrying out of assigned tasks. Regarding the potential for abuse in loose record-keeping practices, we have seen that, in some cases (e.g., daily executive meeting records and minutes), as publicity regarding the Somalia operation increased, records appear to have been obscured deliberately or not kept at all, to avoid later examination of views expressed and decisions made.¹⁴
2. In Chapter 39, describing the document disclosure phase of our hearings, we demonstrate the presence of an unacceptable hostility within the department toward the goals and requirements of Access to Information legislation, an integral aspect of public accountability.

There appears to be more concern at higher levels with managing the agenda and controlling the flow of information than with confronting and dealing forthrightly with problems and issues.

3. The specific duties and responsibilities inherent in many ranks, positions, and functions within NDHQ are poorly defined or understood.¹⁵ Further, the relationship between officers and officials in NDHQ and commanders of commands, as well as officers commanding operational formations in Canada and overseas, is, at best, ambiguous and uncertain.¹⁶
4. The nature and extent of the duties and responsibilities of superiors to monitor and supervise are unclear, poorly understood, or subject to unacceptable personal discretion. Accountability for failure to monitor and supervise seems to be limited to the assertion that the superior trusted the person assigned the task to carry it out properly.
5. The current mechanisms of internal audit and program review, which are the responsibility of the Chief of Review Services (CRS),¹⁷ are shrouded in secrecy. Reports issued need not be publicized, and their fate can be determined at the discretion of the Chief of the Defence Staff or the Deputy Minister, to whom the CRS reports. The Chief of the Defence Staff or the Deputy Minister, as the case may be, retains unfettered discretion concerning follow-up and whether there will be outside scrutiny of a report. The CRS has no ability to initiate investigations. No mechanism exists for follow-up or independent assessment of their reports or recommendations for change.¹⁸
6. A disturbing situation seems to exist with respect to after-action reports and internally commissioned studies.¹⁹ These reports and studies can serve an accountability purpose, provided they are considered seriously and their recommendations are properly monitored and followed up. While requirements to produce evaluations and after-action reports are clear in most cases, no rigorous and routine mechanism exists for effective consideration and follow-up. We have numerous examples of problems being identified repeatedly and nothing being done about them or about recommendations in reports addressing and suggesting remedies for the problems.²⁰ Their fate seems to rest within the absolute discretion of officials in the upper echelons, who can and often do reject suggestions for change without discussion, explanation, or possibility of review or outside assessment.
7. Mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of the Department of National Defence and military activities are ineffective. We base this conclusion to a large extent on the analysis conducted on our behalf by Martin

Friedland and detailed in his study, *Controlling Misconduct in the Military*.²¹ A 1994 joint parliamentary committee was unanimous in support of the view that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament in defence matters. We do not see Parliament playing an extraordinary supervisory role with regard to military conduct but, clearly, it can and should do more. We agree with Professor Friedland that Parliament is particularly effective in promoting accountability when it receives, examines, and publicizes reports from bodies with a mandate to report to Parliament (as would be the case, for example, with the responsibilities we propose be entrusted to an inspector general).

8. We identify numerous deficiencies in the operation of more indirect accountability mechanisms, such as courts-martial and summary trials, MP investigations and reports and the charging process, personnel evaluations, mechanisms for instilling and enforcing discipline, and investigating and remedying disciplinary problems and lapses, training evaluations, declarations of operational readiness, and so on. These are the subject of close examination in other chapters of this Report.
9. Leadership in matters of accountability and an accountability ethic or ethos have been found seriously wanting in the upper military, bureaucratic and political echelons. Aside from platitudes that have now found their way into codes of ethics,²² and the cursory treatment found in some of the material tabled by the Minister of National Defence on March 25, 1997,²³ the impulse to promote accountability as a desirable value or to examine seriously and improve existing accountability mechanisms in all three areas has been meagre.
10. There also appears to be little or no interest in creating or developing mechanisms to promote and encourage the accurate reporting, by all ranks and those in the bureaucracy, of deficiencies and problems to properly specified authorities and then to establish and follow clear processes and procedures to investigate and follow up on those reports.²⁴

The Need for an Office of Inspector General

The foregoing description of notable deficiencies in the accountability of the upper echelons as revealed by the experience with the Somalia deployment suggests a range of possible solutions. Some of these suggestions are proposed and discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this report. However, one particular suggestion dealing with the creation of a new office of inspector general merits consideration here, since its entire *raison d'être* is the

promotion of greater accountability throughout the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

A comprehensive listing of our proposals for reform, including the creation of the Office of Inspector General, is offered at the end of this section.

Control by Parliament is essential to democracy in Canada and to the well-being of the relationship between the CF and society, but this is made difficult by the vast amount of information in the CF and DND and by the technical nature and necessary secrecy of defence policy and defence relations with other states.

Ministers of National Defence depend mainly on the advice and guidance of the CDS and the Deputy Minister when formulating policies and making decisions. This expert consultation usually serves governments well, but ministers have no established way to examine the CF or DND except through the eyes of their own military officers and officials. At times, ministers have organized evaluations, reviews, and inquiries into the activities of the armed forces and DND, but these studies have been restricted in scope and in time.²⁵ The Auditor General of Canada routinely undertakes assessments of the CF and DND and produces valuable reports on specific issues, but they are also limited.²⁶

Parliament is also dependent mostly on advice emanating from the same two sources and on occasional studies that do not always meet its needs. Clearly, from the evidence before us, ministers require a body to review and report on an ongoing basis on defence affairs and the actions and decisions of leaders in the CF and DND.

Canadian soldiers also lack information and assistance in their dealings with higher defence authorities. Although they voluntarily surrender some rights and freedoms when they join the CF, they retain an expectation that they will be treated fairly by their officers and by officials of DND. Most soldiers are well treated and serve with justifiable pride in their units but occasionally, and too often recently, this trust has been broken.

Members of the CF have reported that they are confused about their rights. They complain also that the chain of command is often unresponsive to their concerns and that those who file grievances may be met with informal reprisals and adverse career actions.²⁷ Members of the armed forces who feel the need to initiate a complaint often feel they face two unpalatable choices — either to suffer in silence or to buck the system with all the perils such action entails. In our view, Canadians in uniform do require and deserve to have a dedicated and protected channel of communication to the Minister's office.

In other countries, offices of inspectors general and ombudsmen have been established to accommodate respectively these two requirements of review and reporting, and fair hearing for grievances.²⁸ At present, Canada

has no inspector general or ombudsman with jurisdiction to oversee or investigate military affairs. There are also no routine reports to Parliament by the CDS or DND beyond those provided during the annual departmental budget estimates process.

This handicaps Parliament in its role of supervising military affairs because it does not have easy access to critical analyses of defence matters. The evidence before us suggests that this has resulted in a serious deficiency in the oversight of the CF and DND by Parliament and in the treatment of members of the CF who have grievances against individuals in the chain of command.

There is evidence that Canadians and members of the CF want a review process that is straightforward and independent.²⁹ We also believe that a civilian inspector general, properly supported and directly responsible to Parliament, must form an essential part of the mechanism Canadians use to oversee and control the CF and the defence establishment. While the CF and its members would merit the primary attention of this new office, the close ties between the CF and DND, and public servants in DND, especially at NDHQ, requires that the Inspector General must act in and for members of both institutions.

The Inspector General of the Canadian Forces

The Inspector General of the Canadian Forces should be appointed by the Governor in Council and made accountable to Parliament. The Inspector General should be a civilian and have broad authority to inspect, investigate, and report on all aspects of national defence and the armed forces. The Inspector General, moreover, should be provided with resources including auditors, investigators, inspectors, and support personnel gathered in the Office of the Inspector General of the Canadian Forces.

In our view, the Inspector General should incorporate the concepts of both a military inspector and an ombudsman. These two concepts, while focused on different areas, are plainly related but might be established as separate branches under the Inspector General.

Mission of the Inspector General of the Canadian Forces

The Inspector General's mission should be to initiate and to inquire into, and periodically report on, any aspect of national defence that the Inspector General determines is important. These matters would include among other things, discipline, efficiency, economy, morale, training, operational effectiveness and readiness, the conduct of operations, and the functioning of the military justice system.

The Inspector General would also have an important responsibility regarding personnel and personal matters in the CF. These duties would include overseeing the efficiency and effectiveness of personnel policies such

as promotions, selection of commanding officers, and the conditions of service for members of the CF. The Inspector General would also supervise and report on the redress of grievance system in the CF and provide opportunities for members of the CF to report matters that they think need to be investigated outside the chain of command.

The Inspector General should report to Parliament annually or whenever serious issues come to the attention of the Office of the Inspector General.

Functions of the Inspector General

The Inspector General should have four main functions:

- Inspections: focused on systemic issues in the CF and DND, including systemic problems within the chain of command and the military justice system.
- Investigations: focused on complaints about misconduct of individuals of any rank or position, about injustices to individuals within the CF, and about misconduct related to the roles, missions, and operations of the CF and DND.
- Overseeing the military justice system:³⁰ focused on the application of the *National Defence Act* (NDA) and allegations of:
 - abuse of rank, authority, or position: for example, a failure to investigate, failure to take corrective actions, or unlawful command influence; and
 - improper personnel actions: for example, unequal treatment of CF members, harassment, racist conduct, failure to provide due process, reprisals.
- Assistance: focused on helping to mediate conflicts between individuals and the CF and DND, and to help redress injustices to individuals.

Powers of the Inspector General

The Inspector General should be empowered:

- to inspect any documents, plans, and orders of the CF and DND;
- to initiate studies and reviews of any defence issue or matters without prior authorization of the MND, CDS, or DM of DND;
- to initiate investigations of any complaint of wrongdoings against any officers or members of the CF and any public servants or officials of DND without prior authorization of the MND, CDS, or DM of DND;
- to visit any unit or element of the CF or any defence establishment without prior warning;

- to interview any member of the CF or public servant of DND without prior approval of superiors and in complete privacy and confidence.
- to review all military police documents and reports, and documents pertaining to the military justice system;
- to conduct interviews of members of the CF charged under the NDA, to review the use of all disciplinary proceedings and administrative processes related to discipline or career assessments, including reproofs and reports of shortcomings;
- to review and inspect all career-related documents, boards, or assessments pertaining to individual members of the CF or the CF personnel system generally;
- to review and inspect commanders, units, or elements of the CF assigned to any operation in Canada or abroad and to report on the operational effectiveness and readiness of those commanders, units or elements; and
- to make public any reports or recommendations flowing from inspections and investigations as the Inspector General sees fit to release.

The Inspector General and Members of the CF and DND

Any member of the CF, and any public servant in DND should be permitted to approach the Inspector General directly for whatever reason and without first seeking prior approval of any other member of the CF or DND.

There should be no need to report a complaint to a superior or reveal any conversation or correspondence between the member and any superior.

Inspections, audits, investigations, or reports that arise from complaints made by members of the CF or DND need not identify the complainant in any way.

Members of the CF or DND who believe that reprisals have been taken against them because of complaints made before the Inspector General should have special access to and protection provided by the Office of the Inspector General. In this regard, a few words concerning our experience with the subject of intimidation, harassment, and reprisals are in order.

From the earliest days of this Commission of Inquiry, concerns were expressed, in the media and elsewhere, that the Inquiry might not be able to get to the bottom of the matter because some witnesses from the military, especially those in the lower ranks, would fear reprisals from the authorities or prejudice to their military careers. In our public pronouncements on this subject we indicated that, at the time, we saw little evidence to suggest that threats of any kind were being made to potential witnesses before the Commission. While there was little real, tangible, or objective evidence to sustain

these concerns, we knew that they existed and we were sensitive to them. Looking back on the entire course of our Inquiry, we have come to the conclusion that these concerns were far from fanciful. Certain witnesses who appeared before us did so against a backdrop of fear and intimidation.

We have publicly recognized the great courage that individual soldiers have shown in coming forward to assist the Inquiry in its work and by providing testimony at our proceedings that was not always favourable to the Canadian Forces. Among these we would number Maj Buonamici, Maj Armstrong, Cpl Purnelle, and Cpl Favasoli.³¹ Cpl Purnelle and Maj Buonamici, in particular, were victims of threatening behaviour and attempts at intimidation. Maj Armstrong had to be protected in theatre against physical reprisals for bringing his important allegations of misconduct to the attention of his superiors. We believe that these officers and non-commissioned members have served as examples to all ranks, particularly soldiers of lower rank, and we are indebted to them for their courage and support of our work.

We publicly undertook, on several occasions, to do everything in our power to protect these soldiers against any recrimination or prejudice to their careers that might flow from their co-operation with us. At the beginning of the in-theatre phase of our proceedings on April 1, 1996 we summarized our activity and plans in this regard:

...a number of steps have been taken to favour the establishment of the truth and protect those who seek to contribute to the inquiry process, including adopting a rule of practice and procedure which treats as confidential the information the Commission receives from whatever source; allowing testimony in camera where necessary, undertaking the investigation of any allegation, complaint or evidence of ongoing reprisals against potential witnesses while the inquiry is in progress; and, if we find it necessary, we are prepared to include in our final report a proposal for a review mechanism whereby a committee of the House of Commons acting as a sort of ad hoc Ombudsman would be called upon to review upon request and systematically every five years the file and career progression of those who will have testified before this Commission of Inquiry.

The Commission is confident that these measures are sufficient to eradicate the possibility of reprisals and protect those who may be vulnerable in the military system.

Those who have testified before us under threat or peril to their careers are entitled to receive protection with respect to their future careers within the military. Regrettably, we have concluded that the reality exists that, for so long as these soldiers remain within the military, both their personal and professional reputations must be protected. Because of the past actions of the chain of command, there must be a mechanism available to these officers and non-commissioned members to redress any reprisals that may be taken against them after the Commission of Inquiry has issued its report.

We therefore believe that there is an urgent need for a new and more effective form of military career review procedure to deal with these cases. Such career review boards should be entirely independent and impartial committees. Also, any career review boards that may be convened with regard to individuals who have rendered assistance to the Inquiry should contain representatives from outside the military (perhaps including judges or other respected members of the larger community) in order to insure transparency and objectivity in the process. Career review board decisions should be subject to a further effective review by someone other than the Minister alone (as is currently the case), such as a committee of the House of Commons or Senate.

A career progression review procedure should provide soldiers who have assisted the Inquiry, and others in similar circumstances, with a mechanism for applying to have their career progression reviewed effectively.³² Individuals who have testified before us and allege that their career progression has been adversely affected as a result of their testifying should be given the right to apply to an independent career review board to have their career progression reviewed. They should possess, as well, an ability to seek a further review of the findings of these special career review boards.

In the event that reprisals have occurred and career advancement has been adversely affected, a mechanism for redress should also be included in the new procedure.

We believe that a systematic, periodic annual report should be prepared by the Chief of the Defence Staff for the benefit of a select committee of the House of Commons or Senate that reviews the career progression of all those who have testified before the Inquiry.

We support the creation of a specific process, under the purview of an independent inspector general, designed to protect soldiers who, in the future, bring reports of wrongdoing to the attention of their superiors.³³

In addition to the foregoing and in light of the experience of Cpl Purnelle,³⁴ we are struck by the fact that individual free speech in the Canadian military has been stifled to an unacceptable degree. While reporting requirements and relationships must be observed and dissident activities that threaten unit effectiveness and cohesion must be checked, the military must be open and receptive to legitimate criticism and differing points of view.³⁵ Members of the military should enjoy a right of free expression³⁶ to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the need to maintain good order, discipline, and national security. This should be reflected in official guidelines and directives.

Recommendations

We recommend that:

- 16.1 The *National Defence Act*, as a matter of high priority, be amended to establish an independent review body, the Office of the Inspector General, with well defined and independent jurisdiction and comprehensive powers, including the powers to
 - (a) evaluate systemic problems in the military justice system;
 - (b) conduct investigations into officer misconduct, such as failure to investigate, failure to take corrective action, personal misconduct, waste and abuse, and possible injustice to individuals;
 - (c) protect those who report wrongdoing from reprisals; and
 - (d) protect individuals from abuse of authority and improper personnel actions, including racial harassment.
- 16.2 The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister of National Defence institute a comprehensive audit and review of
 - (a) the duties, roles and responsibilities of all military officers and civilian officials to define better and more clearly their tasks, functions, and responsibilities;
 - (b) the adequacy of existing procedures and practices of reporting, record keeping, and document retention and disposal, including the adequacy of penalties for failures to comply; and
 - (c) the duties and responsibilities of military officers and departmental officials at National Defence Headquarters in advising government about intended or contemplated military activities or operations.
- 16.3 The Chief of the Defence Staff incorporate the values, principles, and processes of accountability into continuing education of officer cadets at the Royal Military College and in staff training, command and staff training, and senior command courses. In particular, such education and training should establish clearly the accountability requirements in the command process and the issuance of orders, and the importance of upper ranks setting a personal example with respect to morality and respect for the rule of law.

- 16.4 To strengthen the capacity of Parliament to supervise and oversee defence matters, the *National Defence Act* be amended to require a detailed annual report to Parliament regarding matters of major interest and concern to the operations of the National Defence portfolio and articulating performance evaluation standards. Areas to be addressed should include, but not be limited to
- (a) a description of operational problems;
 - (b) detailed disciplinary accounts;
 - (c) administrative shortcomings;
 - (d) fiscal and resource concerns; and
 - (e) post-mission assessments.
- 16.5 The *National Defence Act* be amended to require a mandatory parliamentary review of the adequacy of the act every five years.
- 16.6 The *Queen's Regulations and Orders* be amended to provide for a special and more effective form of military career review procedure to deal with cases of intimidation and harassment related to the Somalia deployment and this Commission of Inquiry.
- 16.7 Such special career review boards be entirely independent and impartial committees and contain representation from outside the military, including judges or other respected members of the larger community, to ensure transparency and objectivity in this process.
- 16.8 Decisions of these special career review boards be subject to a further effective review by a special committee of the House of Commons or the Senate or a judge of the Federal Court.
- 16.9 In the event that a finding is made that reprisals have occurred and career advancement has been adversely affected, a mechanism for redress be available.
- 16.10 For the next five years, an annual report reviewing the career progression of all those who have testified before or otherwise assisted the Inquiry be prepared by the Chief of the Defence Staff for consideration by a special committee of the House of Commons or the Senate.

16.11 A specific process be established, under the purview of the proposed Inspector General, designed to protect soldiers who, in the future, bring reports of wrongdoing to the attention of their superiors.

16.12 The *Queen's Regulations and Orders* article 19 and other official guidelines and directives be amended to demonstrate openness and receptivity to legitimate criticism and differing points of view, so that members of the military enjoy a right of free expression to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the need to maintain good order, discipline, and national security.

NOTES

1. 'Knowledge' should not be thought of as the complete encapsulation of all aspects of corporate or organizational consciousness. Knowledge need not be actual. It can be imputed. In matters of consequence, wilful blindness does not excuse. As regards individual actions, the notions of intention and recklessness are often germane. Also, in this latter regard, knowledge may not be a useful focus of inquiry — at least in some settings, as, for example, where negligence is in issue. In such circumstances, it may be more appropriate to focus on whether the individual adhered to appropriate standards of care and whether due diligence was exercised.
2. We acknowledge the highly charged debate concerning whether liability should ever be absolute. We incline to the view that in the context of the military and the reality of a soldier's 'unlimited liability' in extreme circumstances, there may be a need for the organization to vindicate itself through a public changing of the guard, even though due diligence may be demonstrated.
3. This is the case where the issue is one of criminal liability.
4. Representative Dan Daniel, United States Congress, Congressional Hearings on the Death of U.S. Marines in Beirut, 1983.
5. Richard A. Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor. A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 87.
6. General Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Times Publishing Co., 1962), p. 63.
7. Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor*, p. 88.
8. Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 73.
9. Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p. 73.
10. Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor*, p. 86.
11. *Queen's Regulations and Orders* (QR&O) 4.20(1).
12. QR&O 4.20(3). For general responsibilities of an officer commanding a command, see QR&O 4.10.

13. See our discussion in Volume 5, Chapter 38, which deals with the March 4th incident.
14. This is discussed in Volume 5, Chapter 39, on disclosure.
15. There are numerous examples of this. The evidence and submissions of the former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff reveal ambiguity and possible confusion about whether the DCDS, as a staff officer with command prerogatives, had responsibility for the declaration of operational readiness; the former Deputy Minister evinced some ambivalence in his testimony about whether it was possible for him to give advice on operational matters; the former Director of Operations (J3 Ops) gave testimony downplaying the significance of his position as regards in-theatre events and liaison, yet he appears in evidence as interacting intensively with key figures in Somalia at crucial points.
16. See the research study we commissioned: Douglas Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 1997).
17. The main functions of the Chief Review Services are to provide expertise on management practices; to carry out program evaluations and independent audits, including the investigation of inappropriate use of resources; and to provide a corporate ethical and conflict of interest focus, all to assist senior managers in DND and the Canadian Forces in meeting their mandates.
18. In our DGPA hearings we witnessed an example of the misuse of the Chief Review Services function, presumably so as to ensure a low-level, low-profile examination of an issue. The CRS was directed to investigate the possible destruction or alteration of documents, when a Military Police or criminal investigation was clearly a more appropriate vehicle.
19. See, for example, BGen I.C. Douglas, *Peacekeeping Operations (PKO's) Review, Interim Report — SPA DCDS* (December 21, 1990); MGen Boyle, "After Action Report — Somalia Working Group", July 29, 1994, Exhibit P-173 Document book 44, tab 3 (unsigned).
20. See the studies of the Chief of Review Services on such subjects as peacekeeping and command and control: Chief Review Services, NDHQ, *Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E1/81 DND Policy/Capability in Support of Peacekeeping Operations* July 1983; and NDHQ *Program Evaluation E3/92 Command and Control*, vol. 7, Summary of Internal Reports Relating to Command and Control (March 1994).
21. Martin Friedland, *Controlling Misconduct in the Military* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 1997), pp. 108–110.
22. See the recently devised Statement of Defence Ethics, in DND, *Defence 2000 News* (December 1996), p. 4.
23. See, for example, Reports to the Prime Minister, [tabled by] Minister of National Defence, "Authority, Responsibility and Accountability" (1997); "Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces" (1997); and "A Comparative Study of Authority and Accountability in Six Democracies" (1997).
24. In this regard see our discussion of the incident of March 4, 1993 in Volume 5, Chapter 38, and note the cases of Maj Armstrong and Maj Buonamici.
25. Such studies include, for example, *Report to the Minister of National Defence on the Management of Defence in Canada*, Report of the Management Review Group (July 1972); Task Force on Review of Unification of The Canadian Forces, *Final Report* (March 15, 1980); *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces* (August 31, 1980); and various internal NDHQ reports prepared by the Chief Review Services.

26. See various reports of the Auditor General to the House of Commons regarding the Department of National Defence.
27. Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit (CFPARU), "Mechanisms of Voice: Results of CF Focus Group Discussions", Sponsored Research Report 95-1 (October 1995), p. DND 403818 and following.
28. We visited and collected information from various foreign defence establishments. In the United States, we were provided with a description of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, and the Inspector General of the Army.
29. CFPARU, "Mechanisms of Voice".
30. This important function is covered in greater detail in Volume 5, Chapter 40, which details our findings and recommendations with regard to the military justice system.
31. A non-exhaustive list of those who have also been of assistance to us, at some personal risk, includes Sgt Little, Sgt Flanders, Maj Pommet, Maj Kampman, Maj Mansfield, Maj Gillam, Cpl Noonan, Cpl Chabot, MWO Amaral, MWO O'Connor, Cpl Smith, Cpl Dostie, WO Groves, and WO Marsh.
32. Reprisals are not restricted, apparently, to enlisted men and women. As we were about to go to press with this report, we were advised (in a letter dated June 6, 1997) by Mrs. Nancy Fournier, a civilian employee of DND, that she has experienced prejudice to her career as a result of providing testimony before the Inquiry in the DGPA/document disclosure phase of our proceedings and in the subsequent court-martial of Col Haswell. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of National Defence dated April 15, 1997, a copy of which she provided to us, Mrs. Fournier complains of being relegated to a position more junior than the one she occupied previously and of being asked to perform menial and demeaning tasks, in what she regards as "an effort to make my life as miserable as possible in the hope that I will up and quit willingly."
33. As they are required to do under the *Queen's Regulations and Orders* 4.02(e) and 5.01(e).
34. An attempt was made to have Cpl Purnelle, an outspoken critic, removed from the military via the career review board process and thereby bypass the more transparent court-martial process. After our intervention on his behalf, a decision was taken to proceed against him first by way of court-martial. Nine charges were laid against Cpl Purnelle under the *National Defence Act*. Two of these charges related to the single incident of Cpl Purnelle leaving his post without permission and attending at the Inquiry's offices in order to bring new evidence to our attention. Others related to media interviews given in contravention of the injunction against speaking to the press. In this latter regard, he alone was initially singled out for disciplinary action from among a group of soldiers who were interviewed for the television program *Enjeux*. Other charges brought against Cpl Purnelle related to his having written and published a book, *Une armée en déroute* (Montreal: Liber, 1996), that was critical of the armed forces. Cpl Purnelle ultimately was court-martialled. His constitutional objections to the proceedings, based on an alleged violation of his rights of free expression, were dismissed and thereafter he pleaded guilty to five charges of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline (NDA, section 129). He was sentenced to a reprimand and a fine of \$2,000. Cpl Purnelle is now facing possible discharge in career review board proceedings begun against him.

35. In this connection we note the severe restrictions that military regulations impose on the disclosure of information (including non-classified information) by any member of the Canadian Forces. In particular the following regulations appear to be unduly restrictive: QR&O 19.10, 19.14(2), 19.36(1), (2) (c) (d) (e) and (j), and 19.38.
36. In the military context, at least, the right to free expression should not be thought to embrace an ability to espouse supremacist causes; foster illegal discrimination based on race, creed, colour, sex, religion, or national origin; advocate the unlawful use of force or violence; or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.



THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

As we have explained, the chain of command is an authority and accountability system linking the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to the lowest level of the Canadian Forces and back to the office of the CDS. It is also a hierarchy of individual commanders who take decisions within their connected functional formations and units. It is intended to be a pre-emptive instrument of command — allowing commanders to actively seek information, give direction, and oversee operations.

A chain of command can be judged from two perspectives: as an instrument of command, exercised through the flow of orders and information, and as a hierarchy of related commanders. These two characteristics — information transmission and the exercise of command and control by (usually) officers — define a chain of command. The measure of a chain of command, therefore, lies in its reliability and effectiveness as a conduit to move information up and down the chain of authority, and as a personal expression of the skills, competence, and diligence of commanders. A rough instrument can disarm the finest commanders, just as the finest instrument can be wasted on indifferent officers. Ultimately, commanders are responsible for shaping the chain of command to their purposes and honing it to sharp perfection.

The chain of command also provides a mechanism for transmitting critical aspects of command authority and responsibility. A properly functioning chain of command helps senior officers understand what is happening in their commands and pinpoint weaknesses and problems. These discoveries can be made through routine inquiries and reports, by staff officers acting for commanders, and directly by the commander's inspections and visits to subordinate units. Whenever the chain of command is brittle or broken, commanders may be left without reliable information with which to make decisions. Ensuring the soundness of the chain of command is therefore a paramount responsibility of command.

The chain of command is not expected to be a mere transmission line between commanders; instead it is established to reinforce the authority of command and to allow officers to do their duty as prescribed in law and regulation. Therefore, when important orders and direction are passed from one level of command to the next, commanders are expected to review the orders for completeness and appropriateness and to take action to correct defects that come to their attention. Furthermore, they are expected to amplify orders to suit the circumstances of their commands and the strengths and weaknesses of their subordinate commanders. Finally, they must supervise implementation of their orders and oversee the successful completion of the assigned mission. The chain of command greatly facilitates these activities.

Before and during the deployment of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS), the chain of command in the Canadian Forces (CF), in our view, was found wanting in both these aspects. It failed as a communications system and broke down under minimal stress. Commanders testified before us on several occasions that they did not know about important matters because they had not been advised. They also testified that important matters and policy did not reach subordinate commanders and the troops or, when they did, the information was often distorted.

FAILURES OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

The chain of command was not functioning properly during the pre-deployment phase, either as a mechanism for passing information or as an effective command network. The failure of the chain of command at senior levels was particularly striking with regard to how commanders came to understand the state of the Airborne Regiment in 1992. Many senior officers in the chain of command, from MGen MacKenzie to Gen de Chastelain, testified that they were ignorant of the state of fitness and discipline of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). Yet they maintained even during the Inquiry that they had faith in the appropriateness of the CAR to undertake a mission because they assumed that it was at a high state of discipline and unit cohesion.

MGen (ret) MacKenzie testified that BGen Beno had not informed him of the serious and dangerous incidents of indiscipline within the CAR. He did not know that weapons and ammunition had been seized during a search of the unit barracks conducted by Maj Seward. Nor did he know that unauthorized weapons had been found in the possession of soldiers. MGen MacKenzie told us that he was unaware that 'Rebel' flags were flown routinely by soldiers in the CAR and that, indeed, 34 such flags had been seized by unit officers. He stated he was also ignorant of the fact that many soldiers and senior non-commissioned members had repeated problems of alcohol abuse in

the weeks and months before deployment of the unit to Somalia. Finally, MGen MacKenzie admitted that he did not know that members of the CAR openly displayed racist and extremist tattoos before their superiors.¹

Even by itself, MGen MacKenzie's ignorance about the true state of discipline in the CAR is a cause for concern. But it is even more serious because the leaders' failure to recognize these facts or to investigate them adequately was compounded in early November 1992 after LCol Morneau was relieved of his command, in part because the CAR was undisciplined. At this point, there could have been no question, in our view, that the unit was in trouble. Still, none of the commanders attempted to seek out the facts of the Regiment's state of discipline.² When MGen MacKenzie was asked during testimony whether "any people above you, any of your superiors" directed him to find out specifically whether the discipline problems that had existed [in the CAR] had been resolved, he answered, "No, sir."³

MGen MacKenzie was also unaware of other problems that should properly have come to his attention. For example, he stated before us that he had no knowledge of reservations about Maj Seward's ability to command 2 Commando.⁴ "In hindsight" MGen MacKenzie admitted before us that no "sane person could deny" that more should have been done by officers in the chain of command to tackle problems in the CAR prior to deployment.⁵ Yet we were astonished to find that no measures were taken by the senior officers to ensure that LCol Mathieu would be adequately warned about the problems in the unit when he assumed command.⁶

LGen Reay testified that before September 1992, during the period when the decision to identify the Airborne Regiment as the unit to go to Somalia was being made, he was not aware of any concerns that BGen Beno had about LCol Morneau's leadership style. His first indication of trouble in the unit came from conversations with LGen Gervais and MGen MacKenzie in "late September or early October," but the only concern seemed to be LCol Morneau's weakness as unit trainer. Nevertheless, LGen Reay knew that "discipline was a small factor but a factor." Yet he testified that he took no action to inquire into this factor.⁷

LGen Reay testified that on or about October 3, 1992, he was informed by MGen MacKenzie that "clearly some disciplinary problems were emerging in Petawawa that needed attention and needed to be resolved."⁸ MGen MacKenzie testified that on or about October 5, 1992, he would have mentioned the illegal use of pyrotechnics and the torching of the car to LGen Gervais and LGen Reay and told them also that the incident had not been resolved.⁹ However, the Deputy Commander of Land Force Command (LFC), LGen Reay, maintained that he was unaware that members of the CAR had attacked the chain of command by burning the car belonging to the unit orderly sergeant (the Commanding Officer's off-duty representative) in early October. Incredibly,

he testified that he remained unaware of the incident for months, even in his capacity as Commander LFC. He stated that he did "not recall ever being told specifically of the car burning episode and when I read of it in the de Faye Board of Inquiry I was really quite surprised because it was the first time that that specific incident was brought to my attention." Though LGen Reay was aware that the unit was in trouble in several respects, he, by his own admission, made no inquiries of MGen MacKenzie or took any other action — by reviewing command Military Police reports, for example — to discover for himself the true situation in the CAR.¹⁰

The Commander Force Mobile Command/Land Force Command (FMC/LFC), LGen Gervais, testified that he was not aware of discipline problems in the CAR when he recommended it as the unit to go to Somalia. He testified also that even in mid-September, after discussing the situation in the CAR with BGen Beno, he knew nothing about any discipline problems. LGen Gervais had two further conversations with BGen Beno during the autumn of 1992, but according to his testimony, he was not informed of the disciplinary problems in the unit. When informed by his executive assistant soon after the event that a car burning had occurred at CFB Petawawa, LGen Gervais did not connect that incident to the CAR, nor did he seek any more information on the incident.¹¹ In fact, even though as Commander FMC/LFC, he had easy access to many experienced staff officers, including Military Police officers, and routine incident reports, LGen Gervais remained ignorant of the true situation in the CAR until after his retirement from the Canadian Forces.¹²

BGen Beno was sufficiently concerned about the state of readiness of the CAR that he mentioned his doubts informally to LGen Gervais in September 1992. Later, on October 19, 1992, in his letter to MGen MacKenzie asking for the dismissal of LCol Morneau, he wrote specifically that "the battalion has significant unresolved leadership and discipline problems which I believe challenge the leadership of the unit."¹³ BGen Beno testified, however, that prior to that letter he had not mentioned the state of indiscipline in the CAR to any officer in the chain of command. Nevertheless, he did assume that the serious incidents which occurred in October 1992 were known to commanders, because he believed "that military police reports [of the incidents were] passed to the various headquarters which would include the area and the command [headquarters]."¹⁴

The former Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen (ret) de Chastelain, explained to us that "control and administration indicates or means that the control of how [the CF] are used and the day-to-day administration of them in terms of organization, supply, discipline, all come under the Chief of Defence Staff." When he was asked if such things as hazing rituals and the wearing of unauthorized and inappropriate clothing by members of the CAR suggested to him

a breakdown in either discipline or leadership in the Airborne Regiment, Gen de Chastelain replied that he knew nothing of these matters until sometime in 1994. He admitted that had he known of the serious disciplinary problems in the unit, "I would have taken it up with the commander [LGen Gervais], and had he known that, I'm sure he would have taken it up with his [subordinates]." But Gen de Chastelain testified that he did not know anything about problems of indiscipline in the CAR in 1992.¹⁵

Gen de Chastelain emphasized that indiscipline in any unit is a serious matter. He made the point strongly "that in any case of a serious discipline problem within a unit, I think it is incumbent on the commander of that unit to let his immediate superior know that that has happened and what measures he has taken to fix it and that either he has fixed it or he needs further assistance." He admitted that if commanders had been aware that the issues of the change of command and discipline and the challenge to authority were linked, someone ought to have taken strong action. Nevertheless, Gen de Chastelain insisted that no negative information about the CAR came to him through the chain of command, through the so-called technical network, or through the police or security staffs at any time.¹⁶ This we find remarkable and a strong indication that the chain of command in the CF and the staff system in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) were unreliable.

BGen Beno's letter of October 19th explicitly made the link between disciplinary incidents and challenges to authority, yet no action beyond dismissing LCol Morneau was taken by any commander.¹⁷ According to Gen de Chastelain's testimony, the commanders failed to inform him of serious matters as he would have expected, and they also failed to react appropriately to the problem. What is not clear is whether the failures were caused by oversight and carelessness or by a concerted effort within the LFC chain of command to hide the true situation from the CDS.

One senior officer at LFC headquarters, BGen Zuliani, did attempt to initiate a comprehensive investigation of the state of readiness and fitness in the CAR following the dismissal of LCol Morneau. He suggested in his testimony that LGen Gervais and his commanders were reluctant to explore the full extent of the problems in the CAR. He spoke directly with the Commander LFC shortly after LCol Morneau was relieved and asked that a board of inquiry be established to investigate the context in which the decision was taken and to root out any underlying weaknesses in the CAR. Specifically, he asked that the internal inquiry examine the circumstances that led to the relief of command of LCol Morneau; conflicts involving him and officers at the Special Service Force (SSF) Headquarters; incidents or conflicts within the CAR during the June 24–October 19, 1992 period; the process by which the chain of command was notified of the existence of various problems within the CAR; and the evaluation process that led to

the decision to replace LCol Morneault.¹⁸ BGen (ret) Zuliani testified that his advice was first accepted by LGen Gervais, but later rejected following discussions with MGen MacKenzie and LGen Reay. Here, we see the chain of command explicitly rejecting an offer to discover the true extent of the problems in the CAR and, therefore, wilfully remaining uninformed.

Throughout the period from early 1992 to the deployment of the CAR to Somalia in December 1992, several serious disciplinary problems — one, at least, of a criminal nature — occurred in the CAR. These incidents, among other things, were so significant that they led to the dismissal of the Commanding Officer of the CAR, itself a unique and remarkable event in Canada's peacetime army. Yet we were told that few officers in the chain of command, from MGen MacKenzie to the CDS, Gen de Chastelain, were even aware of the problems.

We are asked to believe that the scores of staff officers responsible for managing information from units for senior officers and commanders in SSF Headquarters, Land Force Central Area (LFCA) Headquarters, Land Force Command (LFC) Headquarters, and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) never informed them of these grave incidents. Indeed, we must assume that the specialized and dedicated MP reporting system, composed of qualified non-commissioned members (NCMs) and officers who routinely file police reports and investigations specifically for the use of commanders, failed to penetrate the chain of command. In other words, we must believe that the commanders did not know what was happening in their commands and therefore the chain of command failed. But the evidence is that the chain of command provided enough information that commanders ought to have been prompted to inquire into the situation and act.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND: OPERATION DELIVERANCE

During the planning and pre-deployment periods, the chain of command for Operation Deliverance began at Gen de Chastelain, passed to LGen Gervais, to MGen MacKenzie (after early September 1992), to BGen Beno, to LCol Morneault and, after his replacement on October 23, 1992, to LCol Mathieu.

During the deployment period, beginning in mid-December 1992, the structure of the chain of command was altered by the creation of CJFS under the command of Col Labbé. Therefore, at the moment of deployment and during the initial stages of operations in early January 1993, the chain of command, according to the CDS's orders, flowed from the CDS, Gen de Chastelain, to

the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Intelligence, Security and Operations (DCDS ISO), MGen Addy, to the Commander CJFS, Col Labbé, thence to the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, LCol Mathieu, and from him to the officers commanding the commandos and attached sub-units.

Subsequently, several key officers changed positions and assumed new responsibilities. Gen de Chastelain retired and was replaced by Adm Anderson on January 28, 1993. LGen Reay replaced LGen Gervais as Commander LFC in January 1993. MGen Addy was promoted and replaced as DCDS by VAdm Murray in late February 1993. The names changed, but neither the responsibilities of officers in those positions nor their command relationships to the CJFS changed at all.

We were told without further explanation and supporting evidence that "the Forces had an administrative concept of organization and command control...[and] still do."¹⁹ However, in our view, the confusion of responsibilities in NDHQ and the lack of precise definitions of command authority in the CF and in NDHQ are such that it raises worrisome questions about the reliability, or even the existence, of a sound concept of command in the CF generally.

LGen Addy recalled that "several incidents in the late 1980s...brought to light major planning and command and control shortcomings at the national level [of the CF]."²⁰ Although LGen Addy believes that some command problems were resolved in 1991, he states that this was not the case regarding "command and control issues between the Environmental Commanders, the DCDS, and the Joint Force Commander."²¹ This is a very serious admission of a deep systemic weakness within the highest levels of the command structure of the CF because officers in these positions are the principal operational commanders and staff officers in the CF. By his own admission, LGen Addy knew of these problems when he became DCDS (ISO) in 1992 and was aware of these serious defects as early as 1986.²²

LGen Addy also presented to us a document entitled, "Deputy Chief of The Defence Staff, Intelligence, Security, and Operations" to explain his terms of reference and describe his functions as DCDS (ISO) in 1991 and 1992. The document still reflects this confusion of responsibilities and ambiguity of command authority. It confirms the DCDS (ISO) as having "major responsibilities...as the focal point for planning, controlling, and coordinating the NDHQ Joint Staff" and that "he acts as a Commander of a Command for all peacekeeping units/formations."²³

Planning for Operation Deliverance circumvented in some respects the established chain of command of the CF. First, Gen de Chastelain, and his NDHQ staff acting in his name, took all important decisions concerning the CJFS command, organization, manning ceiling, logistical support, budget,

deployment timings, mission statement, operations orders, rules of engagement, and public affairs issues. The commanders of commands served merely (and obligingly) as 'force generators' and advisers.

Second, on deploying the CJFS, Gen de Chastelain established a unique and separate chain of command for the mission, which remained in effect until the mission was completed. Apparently, none of the formation commanders or their headquarters in the army, including the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, were considered capable of heading this mission or the appropriate choice for the task. So Gen de Chastelain authorized the creation of an ad hoc headquarters for Col Labbé.

Third, the selection and the appointment of Col Labbé as the Commander of CJFS was made by Gen de Chastelain, whose orders stated that Col Labbé would act under his direction (then under the new CDS, Adm Anderson, in late January 1993). Notwithstanding these orders, it is obvious from the evidence that from the beginning of the operation the Chief of the Defence Staff was only Col Labbé's notional superior, for it was in fact the DCDS who commanded Col Labbé in every important respect until the mission was completed.

CONFUSION IN COMMAND FROM THE CDS TO THE COMMANDER CJFS

Gen de Chastelain indicated in his warning order of December 5, 1992, that the "Commander Joint Force Headquarters has [operational command] in-theatre for employment (phase three)" and that the "[Canadian] joint force, when formed will be under the command of the CDS."²⁴ This instruction is repeated in the CDS's subsequent operation order of December 9, 1992, with the additional remark that "operational control of elements of CJFS will be transferred to commander U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Somalia (CJTf-S)."²⁵ But as the operation developed, the national chain of command as it extended into NDHQ became increasingly ambiguous. No witness could explain to us clearly and with confidence the national chain of command for Operation Deliverance.

In accordance with a Ministerial Organization Order (93073), a Canadian Forces Organization Order (CFOO) "to state the organizational status of the CJFS" was issued by Adm Anderson, the Chief of the Defence Staff, on February 10, 1993,²⁶ assigning the CJFS to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. It confirmed Col Labbé's appointment and that he had operational command of the CJFS. The order made Col Labbé "responsible to the DCDS for the effective and efficient administration [and] for disciplinary matters

of the CFJS", and for all matters involving policy. Moreover, the order also made the DCDS responsible for national aspects of technical support, financial matters, and contacts between the CJFS and other parts of the Canadian Forces. Routinely during the operation, Col Labbé reported to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and took all his orders from him.

Yet the testimony of both LGen Addy (DCDS (ISO) until late February 1993) and VAdm Murray (DCDS through the remainder of the deployment) contradicts doctrine and illustrates the obvious ambiguity in the command relationships between Col Labbé and NDHQ. LGen Addy testified that "in joint operations the tasked command is required to prepare the forces, they select them, they declare them operationally ready to the [CDS] at which time they are handed over to the [CDS] and on his behalf I would be acting as the commander of the command for him." He explained that the CJFS existed officially only as it arrived in theatre, and that was where the formal change in command occurred. "Until it is all deployed [in theatre] it isn't there, but the elements thereof, as they come in theatre, come under my command through the commander joint task force."²⁷ When asked directly, at what date he assumed command of Col Labbé and the CJFS, LGen Addy replied, "when the joint force [was] deployed."²⁸ Therefore, by his own testimony and according to CF doctrine and common sense, LGen Addy was in command of Col Labbé.

VAdm Murray testified that:

I have no difficulty saying that *I was the one principally responsible for the conduct of operations in Somalia*. That is certainly true. But I think, to be absolutely accurate and precise, we should...have a clear understanding of what command and control relationships actually existed in that scenario. And in that scenario, the commander in-theatre, Colonel Labbé, was responsible to the commander in Ottawa, the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Anderson. As Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, *I functioned on Admiral Anderson's behalf and oversaw the operation*. So in a formal command and control sense, the commanding relationship was between Colonel Labbé and with me functioning on behalf of Admiral Anderson in terms of operations.²⁹

He emphasized, however, that the "formal relationship in the chain of command for Col Labbé" was to the CDS, but always "through me." However, VAdm Murray could not have been "the one principally responsible for the conduct of operations in Somalia" without being the *de facto* commander of the operation in Somalia. In a military organization, "in a formal command and control sense," responsibility and command are indivisible.

It is clear to us that this kind of ambiguity in the command arrangements of the CF cannot be permitted. If it were allowed, then accountability, and thus civil control of the military, would suffer. Officers either command or they do not. Once LGen Addy and VAdm Murray were given control of the

execution of the operation and the force commander, they became part of the chain of command for all practical purposes and, consequently, assumed command responsibilities. Moreover, neither doctrine nor custom allows staff officers to command units, and attempts to bend this concept, even (or especially) at the highest levels of command, distort and obscure responsibility and accountability. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the command of CJFS above Col Labbé was unclear and that, particularly at NDHQ, the fundamental importance of establishing unambiguous command relationships was not well understood or practised.

It is not as though the issue of problems in the structure for the command and control of the CF on operations in Canada and overseas was new to leaders. Studies ordered by the CDS as early as 1985 to inquire into the continuing confusion in NDHQ concerning operational planning, confirmed this issue. One of these warned the CDS and the Deputy Minister that NDHQ could not be relied on to produce effective operational plans or as a base for the command and control of the CF in operations.³⁰ In 1988, the weaknesses in plans for CF operations near Haiti prompted yet another study into authority and planning responsibilities in NDHQ. This report found: no agreed upon concept for the operation of the CF in wartime; that NDHQ was inappropriately organized for command functions; that the responsibilities of the CDS and DM were blurred; and that "the most complex issue dealt with" was the relationship between the DCDS and the commanders outside Ottawa. None of these problems was resolved satisfactorily.³¹

A report prepared for the CDS and the Deputy Minister in September 1992 confirmed that these problems had not been properly addressed. Among other things, the evaluators found "undue complexity in the current command and central structure...and too much room for misinterpretation." Further, "the evaluation [showed] that there is a critical need for a simplified command and control structure, one which will bring to an end the current ad hoc approach."³² Thus, from their own studies and experiences, senior CF officers should have been well aware that the existing structure for the command of the CF was, at least, suspect and required their careful attention as Operation Deliverance was being planned.

FAILINGS OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND DOWNWARD

In our view, the chain of command failed also as an instrument of command. For example, the commanders who were ordered to prepare the troops for the Somalia mission appeared content to allow the CDS and his staff at

NDHQ to control every critical decision regarding the mission. Nevertheless, any of these officers could have intervened at any time in the planning process if they were at all concerned about the plan, the selection of commanders, the command and logistical arrangements, or the resources that were to be deployed to Somalia. They had a particular opportunity to influence the course of events when Gen de Chastelain issued his operations order, because that event should have caused them to review at every level the adequacy and completeness of the orders they received before they issued their own orders to the formations and units under their command.

Senior commanders are not compelled to pass on orders with which they disagree. They have customary discretionary powers to try to influence their superiors' decisions and to ask for clarification of orders and directions, especially when commanders are concerned with the safety of their troops or the plans for their employment. For example, Gen de Chastelain testified, with regard to rules of engagement, that when he was "satisfied [with the ROE] they would be issued to the commander who would then put them into effect with the caveat that if he found anything in these Rules of Engagement that did not meet his requirement he could come back and ask for changes."³³

The commanders took no significant action in this regard, however, nor did they question or modify the plan or orders produced at NDHQ. The commanders, therefore, at a minimum, acquiesced in the disruption of the chain of command and ought to be held accountable and responsible for the consequences of the orders they did issue.

Not only did the chain of command function improperly in passing information upward to commanders, but it also failed as a mechanism to pass orders, instructions, and "concepts of operations" to subordinate commanding officers, especially during the planning for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. As noted in the chapter on mission planning, the chain of command proved cumbersome and ineffective in many cases and neglected CF doctrine developed especially to facilitate the passage of orders. As well, officers complained that the chain of command became confused and cluttered because many officers failed to respect it, and because of the intrusion on it of so-called 'technical networks'.

For example, BGen Crabbe, Commander of the Special Service Force in 1991, issued his planning guidance for Operation Python to the commander of the CAR, Col Holmes. He specifically warned Col Holmes to obey only orders issued by the Commander SSF, because he worried about a tendency in many CF agencies and headquarters to become involved inappropriately in the planning and execution of operations. If there was one major lesson to be learned from previous operations of this nature, it was the need to maintain a clear and inviolate chain of command.³⁴

In addition, officers declared for example, that the chain of command was too convoluted; that too many officers at NDHQ were involved in the vetting of what should have been routine demands; and that senior staff officers at NDHQ were calling the CAR directly or vice versa. Members of the CAR also violated the chain of command upward but defended the action because of necessity. In his after action report, Col Holmes complained:

The Cdn AB Regt was frequently chastised, sometimes quite harshly, for not passing information up, or for violating the [chain of command]. This we did. We had to! The information flow from the [chain of command] was next to non-existent. Routine [Situation Reports] did not start arriving until well into the mounting process. In-theatre information was non-existent until the CAR managed to send an LO (liaison officer) for a two week visit. We had numerous diplomatic, military, and UN sources that were not exploited [by NDHQ] for the benefit of the CAR. It was also obvious that after a significant delay in deployment, staffs at the higher level started to lose interest in the operation despite the Regiment's continued commitment.³⁵

Other officers complained that it was improper to dispense with tried and true procedures concerning chains of command, lines of communication, and the delineation of responsibilities.

For example, Maj Desnoyers, a senior staff officer at LFCA Headquarters wrote:

As we have introduced additional levels of staff to the chain of command we have failed to redistribute the responsibilities so that in peace, minor ops and war the same devolution is apparent. Policy decisions should be made at higher levels and detail should be the business of lower levels with no more than the normal 'consider two down' rule being applied. This fault is equally true of NDHQ as it is of FMC or the LFAs [Land Force areas] and must be tackled if we are to produce a system in which all concerned know their function. Without such enforced compliance, chaos will continue to reign with ad hoc arrangements for each class of, if not each individual, operation.³⁶

As discussed elsewhere in this report, the chain of command from NDHQ to Col Labbé failed early. He was appointed to command the CJFS although he was inexperienced, was outside Canada during the pre-deployment period, took no part in the pre-deployment planning, training, and supervision of the force, and was given only five days to prepare himself and his headquarters for this dangerous and unusual operation. The selection of Col Labbé by the CDS, even if he had well-founded faith in Col Labbé's ability, is open to question and placed inordinate demands on Col Labbé, even though he was obviously highly motivated to seize the opportunity the command presented to him.

A critical function of commanders is the selection of subordinate commanders at whatever level. Commanders have to be diligent in selecting commanders to lead members of the CF and they cannot simply rely on faith and trust and then hope inexperienced subordinates will perform well. "Hope is not a method," and mere faith in subordinates is not command.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE SSF AND THE CAR

The CAR was disrupted in mid-1992 by its continuing reorganization under the direction of a chain of command rife with internal dissension and distrust. Major Seward, the officer commanding 2 Commando, complained that orders were confused and information was not being passed down the line to him.³⁷ This type of problem continued during training and was mentioned as a problem in the evaluation of Exercise Stalwart Providence. The exercise director, Col Macdonald, testified that he "was concerned that the debriefs and the evaluations, assessments that we were doing were not being passed down to every soldier in the battalion."³⁸ He believed that this was a significant problem in a unit about to undertake a UN mission:

To conduct this type of mission, all the soldiers have to have every bit of information available to the battalion, because they may be the lead person on that convoy escort or they may be the first person on a site. And we were feeding in points that we felt each soldier had to have and, in some cases, that did not get down to the soldiers who needed that information.³⁹

The cause of the problems in the chain of command was more complex than simple errors of procedure and experience. WO Murphy testified that distrust of the leadership in the regiment was "causing dissension amongst the non-commissioned officers."⁴⁰ There was also a significant breakdown in communications between MWO Mills and Maj Seward, which further compromised the passage of information and the integrity of the information circulating in 2 Commando. As a result, the inevitable and usually benign informal chain of command that exists in all organizations became especially active and disruptive. Capt Koch testified that in his opinion "soldiers looked more towards their senior NCOs, their warrant officers, than to their officers" for information and leadership.⁴¹ The dissension in the ranks and especially in 2 Commando led to open challenges to leaders, symbolized in some instances by the flying of the rebel flag in barracks after such a practice had been banned by officers.⁴²

The problems in the command relationship between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault, discussed elsewhere in this report, inevitably affected the working relationship between officers in SSF Headquarters and the CAR. Maj Kyle testified that he noticed that his Commanding Officer, LCol Morneault, was "very, very concerned" about the amount of attention that BGen Beno was giving to regimental training, in the sense that BGen Beno was interfering in CAR affairs. Maj Kyle also complained that he thought senior staff officers at SSF Headquarters were distorting his information.⁴³

Maj Turner testified that he observed the working relationship between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault often. On more than one occasion he noted that BGen Beno was critical of the Commanding Officer's priorities and methods of command. For example, he was present when BGen Beno conveyed to LCol Morneault his opinion that "he thought the priority of the CO's effort should be on training and that the table of organization and equipment [on which the Commanding Officer was working at the time] was best left to one of his staff officers."⁴⁴ Maj Turner reported that "Gen Beno himself was feeling some frustration with [LCol] Morneault and in the course of a conversation did confide in me that Colonel Holmes had had reservations about the appointment of [LCol] Morneault." It was remarkable that a commander would express his lack of confidence in one of his commanding officers to a staff officer. Surely the remarks upset the relationship and trust between LCol Morneault and senior staff officers at SSF Headquarters.

During the summer and autumn of 1992, the CAR was in turmoil, not only because it was preparing for overseas duty, but also because it was in the throes of a fundamental reorganization compounded by an annual posting in and out of personnel. Moreover, on October 23, 1992, the Commanding Officer was relieved of command, a stunning blow to the unit's confidence. Yet no officer in the chain of command visited the unit to critically assess its readiness or to gauge the morale of the soldiers. Leadership from the chain of command was lacking when it was most needed.

CONCLUSION

Armed forces allow commanders extraordinary powers over the lives and safety of Canadians and give them control over lethal weapons and their use. Officers also are trusted to defend society, sometimes with deadly force. Civil control of the armed forces through officers given authority over military units depends on a clear delineation of responsibility and accountability in the armed forces and between the armed forces and civil authorities. For these reasons, the concepts of command, authority based in law, and the chain

of command — linked authority defined in degrees — evolved early. They have been the hallmark of civil–military relations and military organization for centuries.

There is no evidence that the concept of a chain of command is faulty. Indeed, evidence suggests that governments should insist on an easily identifiable, direct, and unencumbered chain of command in the Canadian Forces. If the chain of command is not entirely unambiguous, then accountability for decisions and actions in the CF will not be obvious, and that is a danger to civil control of the armed forces.

There is considerable evidence that the chain of command, during both the pre-deployment and the in-theatre period, failed as a device for passing and seeking information and as a command structure. On one occasion at least, commanders rejected an offer that might have informed them of serious problems in the CAR. These failures can be attributed to commanders, but not to the concepts of command or the chain of command.

There is also considerable evidence that the actions and skills of junior leaders and soldiers overcame many of the defects in the chain of command, allowing the operation to proceed. This is especially true during the period when Operation Cordon was cancelled and Operation Deliverance was authorized and deployed.

Recommendations

We recommend that:

17.1 The Chief of the Defence Staff:

- (a) confirm in doctrine and in orders that the chain of command is the sole mechanism for transmitting orders and directions to the Canadian Forces;
- (b) confirm in doctrine and in orders that staff officers are never part of the chain of command and have no authority to issue orders except in the name of their respective commanders; and
- (c) in the case of a specific operation, improve existing mechanisms for reviewing, confirming, and publishing the chain of command.

17.2 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that technical networks, such as legal, medical, or engineering specialist networks, do not interfere with or confuse the chain of command between commanders.

- 17.3 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish general concepts and principles for the command of Canadian Forces contingents on international operations. These concepts and principles should then be instilled through training and used to frame particular orders for commanders of specific missions.**
- 17.4 For greater clarity, and to remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all commanders of Canadian Forces contingents destined for international operations are given operations orders concerning the chain of command:**
 - (a) within the contingent;**
 - (b) between the Canadian Forces contingent and allied commanders; and**
 - (c) between the deployed contingent and the Chief of the Defence Staff or subordinate commanders.**
- 17.5 The Chief of the Defence Staff conduct national training exercises routinely to test and evaluate the Canadian Forces chain of command in likely or planned operational settings.**

NOTES

1. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8477–8478; 8480; 8482.
2. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8333–8336.
3. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8418.
4. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8407 and 8487.
5. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8415 and 8522.
6. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8479–8481.
7. Testimony of LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 9003–9006.
8. Testimony of LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9008.
9. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8526–8527.
10. Testimony of LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 9008 and 9010.
11. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9436–9445.
12. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9435–9445.
13. Document book 15, tab 18, DND 000573, paragraph 2d.
14. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 8065–8066.
15. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9821, 9907, and 9913.
16. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10109–10110.
17. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10108–10109.
18. Testimony of BGen (ret) Zuliani, Transcripts vol. 181, pp. 37450–37451.

19. Written Submission Filed on Behalf of Lieutenant-General Paul Addy, April 1, 1997, tab 2, p. 8.
20. Written Submission Filed on Behalf of Lieutenant-General Paul Addy, April 1, 1997, tab 2, p. 9.
21. Written Submission Filed on Behalf of Lieutenant-General Paul Addy, April 1, 1997, tab 2, p. 10.
22. Written Submission Filed on Behalf of Lieutenant-General Paul Addy, April 1, 1997, tab 2, p. 9.
23. Written Submission Filed on Behalf of Lieutenant-General Paul Addy, April 1, 1997, tab 19, pp. 2/11–3/11.
24. Document book 20, tab 5, DND 00830.
25. Document book 20, tab 31, DND 006839.
26. Canadian Forces Organization Order 1.327, Exhibit P-72.4.
27. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, pp. 9505 and 9576.
28. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9576.
29. Testimony of VAdm Murray, Transcripts vol. 152, pp. 30987–30988 (emphasis added).
30. See *The Impact of Integration, Unification and Restructuring on the Functions and Structure of National Defence Headquarters*, DND S1/85, July 31, 1985; and *The Canadian Forces and the Department in War and Peace*, DND S3/85, November 15, 1985.
31. DND, *The Report on the Functions and Organization of NDHQ in Emergencies and War* (1988).
32. NDHQ Evaluation E3/92, "Command And Control: Executive Summary and Recommendations", p. i.
33. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10127.
34. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibit 35, "Memorandum: Op Python — Mounting Documentation", Ref A, "Op Python/CCMINURSO — Western Sahara: Planning Guidance and Direction," July 17, 1991, p. 1/7, DND 009966.
35. Document book 2 LCol Morneau, tab 12, "Op Python — After Action Report", Annex A, "Operations Annex: Op Python — After Action Report", A-1/4, DND 292956.
36. Maj Desnoyers, A G1/G4 Ops, to LCol Kennedy, G3 Plans & Ex of Land Force Command Headquarters, "Memorandum: Op Python After Action Report", July 17, 1992, Document book 9, tab 16, p. 1/3, DND 008358.
37. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5783–5785.
38. Testimony of Col Macdonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4976.
39. Testimony of Col Macdonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4976.
40. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6586.
41. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4202.
42. See testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4585–4587; and LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3417–3418; LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6940–6941.
43. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3828 and 3950.
44. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3430 and 3547.

18

DISCIPLINE

Among the issues facing us, discipline has proven to be critical in understanding what went wrong in the Somalia mission. Much of the problem of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) as a unit, most of the incidents that occurred during the preparation stage in Canada, and the many troubling incidents involving Canadian soldiers in Somalia all have a common origin — indiscipline. For the ordinary citizen, little exposed to the military, discipline is understood to be the cornerstone of armies, the characteristic that one would have expected to be much in evidence in an army as renowned for its professionalism as the Canadian Forces (CF). It was the difference between this public expectation and actual events in the Somalia mission which captured the attention of Canadians and contributed to the call for this Inquiry.

MEANING OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE

It is important to understand the critical role which discipline plays in the military — its meaning, purpose and goals.

The *Oxford Concise Dictionary* gives at least eight definitions for the word 'discipline', the majority of which convey the sense of training, instructing, or conditioning with the purpose of establishing order and control (especially control of conduct). Interestingly, only one definition is given regarding the notion of chastisement, punishment, or controlling misconduct.

The word 'discipline' would seem to have a distinct meaning when associated with the military as opposed to its application to society at large, as manifested in judicial, legal, and police usage. In the larger societal context,

discipline has come to mean the enforcement of laws, standards, and mores in a corrective and, at times, punitive way. The same connotation certainly pertains to the military as well, and, in fact, is the focus of much of this chapter.¹

However, it should be understood that the more important usage in the military entails the application of control in order to harness energy and motivation to a collective end. The basic nature of discipline in its military application is more positive than negative, seeking actively to channel individual efforts into a collective effort thereby enabling force to be applied in a controlled and focused manner.

Much has been said in the course of our hearings about over aggressiveness. It is generally recognized that soldiers are, by the very nature of their work, aggressive. As Anthony Kellett stated, "If an army is to fulfil its mission on the battlefield, it must be trained in aggression".² The control of aggressivity so that the right amount of force can be applied in exactly the right circumstances is central to the military. The means of effecting such control is discipline.

PURPOSE AND GOALS

The military profession, in general, understands and respects the meaning of the word 'discipline', in intent at least, if not always in fact.³ Few other professions are as dependent on discipline. An army is best seen as a collection of individuals who must set aside their personal interests, concerns, and fears to pursue collectively the purpose of the group. The marshalling of individual wills and talents into a single entity enables an army to face daunting challenges and great adversity, and therefore to achieve objectives unattainable except through this concerted effort. The means by which this is accomplished is discipline.

The chief purpose of military discipline is the harnessing of the capacity of the individual to the needs of the group. The sense of cohesion which comes from combining the individual wills of the group members gives unity of purpose to the group. The group which achieves such cohesiveness is truly a *unit*. Good discipline is a critical factor at all levels of the military, nowhere more so than at the unit level. Much of this chapter is concerned with the Canadian Airborne Regiment as a unit, or with its various parts, the sub-units of the battalion.

Discipline plays a vital role at all levels within the military. Too frequently, armies tend to treat discipline as the concern mainly of the lower levels, a matter to be attended to primarily by non-commissioned officers, and needed

only at the unit level and below. But discipline is important for the proper functioning of the chain of command throughout the military. Undisciplined staff officers or commanders who hold themselves above the rigours of discipline can do far more harm to the collective effort of the military than can any soldier in the ranks.

IMPOSED DISCIPLINE

Discipline seeks to draw out the best from individuals, relying ideally on their sense of co-operation and teamwork to support the group. Of course, since it is usually unnatural for aspiring soldiers to willingly forgo their own self-interest, discipline must initially be imposed. It must also be imposed on those soldiers who, even though trained and experienced, do not learn to discipline themselves. However, the goal of effective discipline is to gradually bring individuals to a point where, of their own volition, they control their own conduct and actions.⁴

SELF-DISCIPLINE

Only experienced soldiers, who accept the responsibility for disciplining themselves, are fit to lead others. No one should be given command of anything unless they first meet this most basic prerequisite. This applies in the first instance to the corporal on appointment to master corporal. It applies with increasing relevance at each subsequent level of rank. In turn, the task of ensuring the discipline of subordinates is perhaps the first priority of commanders. Necessarily, they must expect that the discipline they use within their commands must, in the main, be externally imposed. But it should be their goal to steadily move their command toward an effective level of self-discipline. This is accomplished in large part through setting a good example themselves and requiring all those in whom they have entrusted authority to do the same. As amplified in Chapter 15, good leadership is characterized by self-discipline, steady and dependable standards of justice, fairness in treating subordinates, and putting the needs of the troops ahead of one's own comforts and interests.

Such leadership produces a disciplined unit, platoon, or army ready for and capable of operational tasks. To ensure such a unit is the basic purpose of military discipline.

OBJECTIVES OF DISCIPLINE

The following are the objectives for good discipline in a military organization:

- A standard of discipline high enough to assure that the aggressiveness necessary for military actions is controlled, so that the right amount of force can be applied in exactly the right circumstances (this is especially critical in tasks demanding the application of *minimum* force).
- A standard of imposed discipline which leads all members to set aside individual interests, preferences, concerns, and fears in order to pursue collectively the purpose of the group.
- A unit (or an army) wherein the pursuit of a single common purpose or goal draws all members together as a cohesive whole.
- A standard of imposed discipline wherein laws, orders, and customs of the Service are observed by all members and wherein punishment is meted out justly, promptly, and to a dependable standard known to all.
- A unit in which it is clearly the commander's goal to elevate individual members to a standard of self-discipline, where individuals control their own conduct and actions of their own volition.
- A unit in which no one is entrusted with the leadership of others without having reached a high standard of self-discipline.
- A unit in which leadership is characterized by the example of self-discipline, steady and dependable standards of justice, fairness in treating subordinates, and putting the needs of the troops ahead of one's own comforts and interests.
- A unit sufficiently well disciplined and well led that obviates the challenge of an informal leadership.
- An armed forces whose leadership throughout all rank levels holds discipline to be an elemental quality of soldiering, a responsibility of all officers and non-commissioned officers whether in command or on staff, and a fundamental responsibility of the chain of command, one which cannot be delegated.

The degree to which these objectives of discipline were met during the Somalia mission, in the CAR and Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG), as well as the responses of the Canadian Forces in general, will now be assessed.

STATE OF DISCIPLINE IN THE CAR BEFORE SEPTEMBER 1992

Background

The Hewson Report

On September 26, 1985, MGen C.W. Hewson submitted a report concerning disciplinary infractions and anti-social behaviour within Force Mobile Command (FMC). The report had been ordered a month earlier by Gen G.C.E. Thériault, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). In complying with this order, LGen C.H. Belzile, Commander of FMC, stipulated that MGen Hewson was to assess whether there was an unusual number of disciplinary infractions and incidents of anti-social behaviour within the Special Service Force (SSF) and the CAR.⁵

Concern that SSF soldiers were not conducting themselves with proper discipline was not new. In a memorandum of May 7, 1984, BGen R.I. Stewart, Commander of the SSF, noted the generally lax control over soldiers, disobedience, impaired driving offences, inadequate control of stores, ammunition, pyrotechnics, weapons, and equipment resulting in thefts or losses, and instances of assault.⁶ However, it was an incident at Fort Coulonge in July 1985, when a CAR soldier murdered a civilian with a machete during a barroom brawl, which led to the Hewson investigation.⁷

MGen Hewson concluded that the SSF displayed a higher rate of violent crime than other FMC formations. The CAR along with the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) both manifested more assaults than other SSF units. Although the CDS, Gen Thériault, had considered disbanding the CAR in the wake of the Fort Coulonge incident,⁸ MGen Hewson refrained from making radical recommendations.⁹

Hewson Recommendations for Improving Discipline

MGen Hewson's recommendations for improving discipline provide instructive background for understanding the disciplinary problems affecting the CAR as the Somalia deployment approached. In MGen Hewson's view, only mature trained infantry soldiers should be eligible to serve in the CAR. Regiments and career managers needed to co-operate to ensure that the CAR was staffed with suitable personnel. He asserted that the CAR's junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) needed to establish closer rapport with the soldiers.¹⁰ While he acknowledged that most NCOs were outstanding soldiers and leaders, he commented that some weak junior NCOs contributed directly to a breakdown of discipline.¹¹ Further, he advocated

that the officers with authority to enforce discipline be identified more clearly and consistently,¹² than was the case at the time, given that organization orders¹³ and their implementation¹⁴ had created the confusing situation in which both the commanding officer (CO) of the Regiment and the officers commanding the commandos had equal disciplinary powers. However, the confusion resulting from this situation ended with the reorganization in the summer of 1992 that stripped the commando commanders of the status of a CO.¹⁵

Another source of confusion noted by MGen Hewson was the reluctance of certain COs to empower NCOs to lay charges.¹⁶ He referred specifically to the anomalies surrounding corporals: they were employed as senior privates and yet treated as NCOs for purposes of discipline.¹⁷ Finally, he recommended that qualified specialists examine the incidence of alcoholism at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Petawawa.¹⁸

Follow-Up to Recommendations of the Hewson Report

MGen Hewson provided useful strategies for strengthening discipline and reducing anti-social behaviour in the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Initially, his recommendations were taken seriously. In a memorandum of November 25, 1985, LGen Belzile advised the CDS that he intended to act speedily on those problems falling within his competence.¹⁹

On September 4, 1986, LGen de Chastelain, then Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), stated in a letter to Mobile Command Headquarters that he considered this particular episode of disciplinary infractions and anti-social behaviour closed. He added that action regarding disciplinary infractions and anti-social behaviour would continue within a broader context.²⁰

Over the long term, MGen Hewson's specific recommendations attracted less attention. Col Holmes, the CO of the CAR from 1990 to 1992, testified before us that the Hewson report never came up in any discussions accompanying the handover from the previous CO, Col M.J.R. Houghton.²¹ Further, Col Holmes stated that he neither received a copy of the Hewson Report nor asked to see it.²² Yet we received evidence showing that during Col Holmes' tenure as CO, the types of misconduct which triggered BGen Stewart's condemnation on May 7, 1984, were again evident within the CAR.

Incidents in 2 Commando and Responses

2 Commando as a Disciplinary Challenge

Col Houghton, who commanded the CAR from 1987 to 1990, testified that 2 Commando was a cause of concern regarding discipline, in particular because its members were exceptionally aggressive.²³ In the early 1990s, disciplinary

infractions took place in 2 Commando but did not result in comprehensive and effective remedial measures. MGen de Faye's board of inquiry in 1993 singled out 2 Commando as displaying flawed discipline and found that the CAR was deployed to Somalia with serious disciplinary problems in 2 Commando.²⁴

The Rebel Flag

Col Holmes testified that during his tenure as CO of the CAR, 2 Commando displayed the Confederate or Rebel flag in its quarters.²⁵ 2 Commando was not the only commando to show a flag: 1 Commando used the fleur-de-lis flag. For Col Holmes, Quebec's fleur-de-lis flag was acceptable.²⁶ However, he viewed the display of the Confederate or Rebel flag in 2 Commando quarters as a potential disciplinary challenge. He construed the flag not as showing racist attitudes but as perhaps symbolizing a unit seeking a separate identity.²⁷ The flag was often taken out after punishment was imposed on members of 2 Commando. In our view, it signalled a form of rebellion against constituted authority. Col Holmes dressed down the CO of 2 Commando, Maj Davies, and banned any public display of the flag.²⁸ Yet the flag reappeared within the CAR in early October 1992,²⁹ when various disciplinary infractions were taking place, some involving members of 2 Commando.

Aggressivity, Bonding and the Wall of Silence

When Col Holmes was CO of the CAR, disciplinary infractions suggesting aggressive, even violent attitudes within 2 Commando took place. When the Military Police attempted to investigate, they were often unable to pinpoint the culprits, encountering a 'wall of silence'. For example, in 1990 an automobile belonging to Capt Ferraby, an officer in 2 Commando, burned under suspicious circumstances. Despite investigation, the culprits were never found.³⁰

The de Faye board of inquiry reported that in the spring of 1992 equipment assigned to Maj Davies and his sergeant-major was slashed during exercises in the United States, but an investigation failed to identify the perpetrator.³¹ Similarly, investigation did not reveal the parties responsible for breaking into and vandalizing the room at CFB Petawawa of Pte Gatske, a member of 2 Commando, in May 1992.³²

Col Holmes suggested that the 'wall of silence' among members of the CAR resulted from bonding.³³ He asserted that bonding began not at the commando level but at the platoon level.³⁴ We recognize that while bonding can help to make a platoon, company, or battalion operationally effective, it often did not promote good discipline within the CAR and its commandos. Loyalty among soldiers is important but misguided loyalty is dangerous and erodes official discipline.

Incidents in Other Commandos

Focus on 1 Commando and 3 Commando

A snapshot of discipline in the Regiment, provided by the board of inquiry for LCol Morneault's change of command in June 1992, shows a comparison of the three rifle commandos:³⁵

- Personnel awaiting military or civilian trials:
 - 1 Commando — one soldier awaiting court-martial for absence without leave
 - 2 Commando — one soldier awaiting court-martial for theft
 - two soldiers (one a sergeant) facing civilian assault charges
 - one master corporal awaiting civil trial for driving while impaired
 - 3 Commando — nil
- Personnel on counselling and probation (C&P) or recorded warnings
 - 1 Commando — two soldiers on C&P
 - nine soldiers on recorded warnings (including a sergeant) for alcohol abuse
 - 2 Commando — five soldiers on C&P
 - 17 soldiers (including three sergeants) on recorded warning
 - 3 Commando — one soldier on C&P
 - seven soldiers (including one sergeant) on recorded warning

If 2 Commando offered the most formidable disciplinary challenge by the early 1990s, 1 Commando took second place, and 3 Commando was by comparison the tamest commando.³⁶ Both 1 Commando and 3 Commando displayed disciplinary problems, and attempts to investigate, especially in 1 Commando, met the same 'wall of silence' that investigative work in 2 Commando encountered.

Disciplinary Problems in 1 Commando

The strongest sign of disciplinary problems in 1 Commando was the initiation party for incoming members of 1 Commando that took place at CFB Petawawa in August 1992. A video taken at the party depicts the activities in which the new members engaged: they urinated on one another; they consumed urine-soaked bread; they did push-ups in feces; and they simulated anal sex.³⁷ This list is not complete. Gen de Chastelain, the CDS at the time, testified before us that the video depicting the initiation party of August 1992 for 1 Commando members showed that leadership and discipline had both broken down.³⁸ When the final Military Police report concerning this initiation party appeared on May 9, 1995, Capt Langs affirmed that the participants were known and that several senior personnel had known of the initiation party either before or after it occurred. However, even then no individuals had undergone disciplinary action.³⁹ Some participants suggested to the Military Police that an unofficial 'discipline', under the aegis of informal leadership and existing alongside the official discipline, encouraged participation. While there was no formal requirement to participate, those who stood apart might not be accepted in the same way as those who experienced initiation.⁴⁰ Cpl Purnelle testified that when he joined 1 Commando in 1990, he had not participated in the initiation and suffered some ostracism as a result.⁴¹ Nevertheless, not all participants entered the initiation party out of a sense of compulsion.⁴²

Another manifestation of 'discipline' promoted by informal leadership was the profession of ignorance that various participants made when Military Police investigators asked who organized and controlled the party.⁴³ According to a Military Police report of January 22, 1995, the initiation party was announced through 1 Commando's chain of command at an orders group (O group) meeting.⁴⁴ If this conclusion is correct, the inference is that the professions of ignorance indicated a 'wall of silence' like that encountered in 2 Commando.

Disciplinary Problems in 3 Commando

While 2 Commando and, to a lesser degree, 1 Commando displayed disturbing signs of indiscipline, the state of discipline in 3 Commando before the deployment to Somalia was significantly better. However, disciplinary problems had occurred in 3 Commando during the early 1990s at CFB Petawawa when Military Police seized illegally stored personal weapons and subsequently discovered ammunition being held without authorization. Most suspects identified in the ensuing investigation belonged to 3 Commando.⁴⁵

Factors in the CAR's Disciplinary Problems

Evidence showed that the following factors played an important role in fostering disciplinary problems within the CAR and specifically, 2 Commando, around the time that preparations to deploy to Somalia began in September 1992:

- CAR used as a 'dumping ground' for problem soldiers
- Quality of junior officers and NCOs
- Recruiting practices
- Relationship between master corporals and soldiers
- CAR turnover rates
- Tasking of junior officers
- Conflicts among officers and NCOs
- Suitability of CAR personnel
- Lack of regimental cohesion
- Downplaying of disciplinary infractions
- Evading responsibility for disciplinary infractions

CAR as a 'Dumping Ground' for Problem Soldiers

The parent regiments of the commandos sometimes used the CAR as a dumping ground for soldiers and officers who were less experienced or had shown themselves to be exceptionally aggressive.⁴⁶ Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), the feeder regiment for the 2 Commando, did not always send its best members to the CAR; nor did the PPCLI willingly take back troublesome members.⁴⁷ Both the Royal 22^e Régiment (R22^eR) and The RCR, the feeder regiments for 1 Commando and 3 Commando respectively, proved easier for Col Holmes to deal with in personnel-related matters.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the R22^eR also contributed officers of questionable quality to the CAR. Occasionally, parent regiments sent their best NCOs to the CAR for training; once these NCOs were well trained, the parent regiments would call them back and substitute less experienced replacements.⁴⁹

Quality of Junior Officers and NCOs

The quality of the junior officers and especially the NCOs was a particularly important factor, especially in light of MGen Hewson's recommendations. BGen Beno, who took command of the SSF in August 1992, appreciated the potential role that the NCOs could play in upholding discipline. In a briefing on September 9, 1992, to senior NCOs, he qualified discipline as the

“realm of the NCO”.⁵⁰ Evidence, however, suggested that the quality of the NCOs was problematic before NDHQ issued its warning order for Operation Cordon on September 4, 1992.⁵¹

The quality of the master corporals was particularly doubtful. One important contributing factor was the CAR's approach to recruiting master corporals. While privates, corporals, sergeants, and officers could be posted in from other regiments, the CAR recruited master corporals solely within its own ranks.⁵² This was significant. Master corporals are the NCOs closest to the soldiers⁵³ and represent the first level of leadership that the soldiers encounter.⁵⁴ Master corporals recruited from other regiments would have brought with them experience in alternative leadership techniques, but master corporals who came exclusively from the CAR had a narrower background.⁵⁵

A related factor was the Delegated Authority Promotion System (DAPS). If there were too few master corporals in a unit, the commanding officer could submit names of privates or corporals he deemed suitable to be appointed master corporals.⁵⁶ Cpl Matchee became a master corporal under the DAPS, even though for the same promotion he had not been successful in competition with his peers in the regular NDHQ merit boards.⁵⁷ The DAPS also led to the appointment of exceptionally inexperienced master corporals.

The CAR's visit of February 1992 to Camp Lejeune in the United States showed the inability of its NCOs to exercise effective disciplinary control over their soldiers. During the visit, some senior NCOs themselves got into a fight in a club at the camp⁵⁸ — hardly a sterling example for their subordinates.⁵⁹

Recruiting Practices

Recruiting practices specific to 2 Commando worsened the quality of its NCOs and the consequences were unfortunate. There was testimony that Maj Davies actively sought NCOs of lesser calibre in order to allot high Performance Evaluation Report (PER) scores to those who were outstanding or superior (the personnel management system limited the number of outstanding and superior ratings).⁶⁰ There was testimony that the senior NCOs in 2 Commando, while keen and fit, lacked the experience and maturity of their counterparts in 3 Commando.⁶¹ Several witnesses intimated that some NCOs in 2 Commando were afraid of their soldiers;⁶² if this is true, the NCOs of 2 Commando were less likely to take vigorous disciplinary measures against troublemakers. Indeed, various soldiers in 2 Commando reportedly exercised an informal leadership over their comrades that paralleled and sometimes opposed the official leadership.⁶³

Relationship Between Master Corporals and Soldiers

The relationship between the CAR's master corporals and the soldiers was ambiguous, and hampered the ability of the master corporals to act as effective agents of discipline. On the one hand, the master corporals lived in the same quarters as the soldiers and socialized with them; on the other, they were expected to supervise them and report disciplinary infractions.⁶⁴

CAR Turnover Rates

The turnover rate within the CAR was fairly high in 1992, about 30 per cent of all other ranks (that is, non-officer ranks).⁶⁵ Between June and December 1992, the CAR had three COs: Col Holmes, LCol Morneault, and LCol Mathieu. The de Faye board of inquiry was told that 50 per cent of the CAR's officers and 33 per cent of its NCOs changed in 1992.⁶⁶ This influx of new members presented a challenge for the officers and NCOs, who needed time to establish unit standards of discipline. New officers and NCOs were either inexperienced in discharging the disciplinary responsibilities of their rank, or, if they were posted in from another regiment, were unfamiliar with the particular challenges of upholding discipline in the CAR.

Tasking of Junior Officers

Junior officers received tasks that took them outside the CAR periodically. This practice was common throughout Land Force Command (LFC) and resulted from the cutbacks in personnel levels.⁶⁷ Although taskings were probably necessary, they had a negative effect upon unit discipline. When junior commanders are taken away from their troops, they lose whatever standards of discipline they have attained and the troops are not afforded steady, even-handed leadership.

Conflicts Among Officers and NCOs

Good leadership depends on relationships among the leaders and followers that are built on confidence, trust, and mutual respect. Unfortunately, we have found overwhelming evidence that there was a marked absence of these qualities in the CAR during the pre-deployment period.⁶⁸ Relations were strained between the commander of the Special Service Force (SSF) and the CO of the CAR, and between the CO and the senior staff of SSF Headquarters. Testimony before us described a lack of confidence and mutual respect among the senior leaders in the CAR and open animosity among the regimental sergeant-major (RSM), certain senior officers, and the company sergeants-major (CSMs). This situation impeded the teamwork essential for maintaining good discipline in the CAR during this critical period.

It is also likely that the lack of trust and, at times, open hostility among senior ranks in the CAR encouraged the same qualities among the junior ranks, fostered dislike and disrespect for their own leaders, and encouraged the emergence of informal leadership.

Suitability of CAR Personnel

There were people in key positions in the CAR in 1992 whose suitability for their appointments was questionable (see Chapter 19). This factor undoubtedly contributed to the general state of indiscipline and played a role in the breakdown of discipline after the Regiment deployed to Somalia.

Lack of Regimental Cohesion

Evidence indicated that the three commandos maintained a high level of independence from each other.⁶⁹ Sometimes the relations between the commandos degenerated into conflict.⁷⁰ In the spring of 1992, for example, a porch party at CFB Petawawa including members of 1 Commando and 2 Commando got out of hand: a group from 1 Commando stole 2 Commando's Rebel flag, and a group from 2 Commando absconded with and may have burned 1 Commando's fleur-de-lis flag.⁷¹ The events of the porch party suggest antipathy between Francophone and Anglophone members of the CAR. Testimony also suggested that the three rifle commandos were sufficiently independent that the RSM, CWO Jardine felt himself handicapped in attempting to enforce discipline across the Regiment as a whole.⁷²

Downplaying of Disciplinary Infractions

Disciplinary infractions were sometimes overlooked. In 1990, a vehicle belonging to Capt Ferraby, commander of a platoon within 2 Commando, was set on fire.⁷³ As senior officers testified, the burning of the car was a significant incident.⁷⁴ Yet Col Holmes, who assumed office shortly after the burning of Capt Ferraby's vehicle, admitted that he never gave the incident a great deal of thought.⁷⁵ The de Faye board of inquiry also found that the slashing of Maj Davies' equipment, mentioned earlier, was not pursued thoroughly.⁷⁶

Evasion of Responsibility for Disciplinary Infractions

CAR members often successfully evaded responsibility for disciplinary infractions. The burning of Capt Ferraby's vehicle provided a case in point: the culprits were never discovered and Capt Ferraby, described as strict with his men,⁷⁷ was posted out prematurely.⁷⁸ The matter of the drunken fracas at a club at Camp Lejeune in February 1992 was not pursued.⁷⁹ This encouraged further violations of discipline.

Remedial Measures

From the beginning of the 1990s, remedial measures to correct the CAR's and, specifically, 2 Commando's disciplinary problems were discussed. When MWO Mills became company sergeant-major of 2 Commando in July 1991, his career manager advised him to sort out 2 Commando's disciplinary problems;⁸⁰ apparently, a state of affairs known within DND's hierarchy.

In May 1992, Maj Davies acceded to MWO Mills' request to ban alcohol from the barracks.⁸¹ In MWO Mills' view, alcohol had played a role when 2 Commando members physically damaged the barracks.⁸² The porch party mentioned earlier also influenced Maj Davies to accede to MWO Mills' request.⁸³ Summary trials of violators took place almost weekly in the course of MWO Mills' attempts to enforce discipline.⁸⁴ However, senior officers did not always support stern measures. Col Holmes was described to us as unsympathetic to Maj Davies' ban on alcohol from private quarters.⁸⁵ LCol Morneault's attitude towards the ban was a subject of contradictory testimony: MWO Mills asserted that LCol Morneault abrogated it,⁸⁶ while LCol Morneault claimed that he allowed Maj Seward to decide whether the ban would be lifted.⁸⁷

The non-medical use of drugs by CAR members brought punitive measures during the autumn of 1992 as it had earlier. Testimony suggested that 1 Commando had a considerable drug problem and that Maj Pommet took measures to curb drug abuse.⁸⁸ Two members of 1 Commando were prevented from being deployed to Somalia in December 1992 pending a drug-related court-martial.⁸⁹ Two members of 2 Commando, including MCpl Matchee, received counselling and probation for drugs during the five years before the CAR deployment to Somalia.⁹⁰ Two members of the Combat Support Commando were placed on counselling and probation for drug use in April 1992 and January 1993.⁹¹

BGen Beno's memorandum of September 24, 1992, concerning the administration of discipline within SSF units, attempted to expedite the summary trial process in 2 Commando and the CAR, and in other units.⁹² He stated that summary trials took place too long after soldiers had been advised that charges against them were forthcoming.⁹³ While he recognized that the appropriate check of documents remained necessary, he instructed COs to ensure that specialist advice was obtained only when necessary and not as a matter of course.⁹⁴ In his view, his instruction would reinforce the sense of purpose and personal responsibility of officers and NCOs.⁹⁵ Moreover, soldiers would be disciplined by the officers and the NCOs commanding them day by day rather than by the system.⁹⁶ His instruction was germane to the CAR and specifically 2 Commando, where the summary trial was the most common method of handling disciplinary charges. From 1988 through 1992

only one court-martial took place within the CAR,⁹⁷ whereas in 1992 alone, 62 summary trials took place.⁹⁸ This is comparable with other infantry battalions.⁹⁹ However, as Martin Friedland points out, the use of summary trials decreased by half between 1982 and 1992.¹⁰⁰

This illustrates that the enforcement of discipline had apparently become less of a priority. It may also be indicative of apprehension about the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* that caused the leadership of the CF generally to draw back from its responsibilities for discipline.¹⁰¹ Indeed, some officers may have seen the impact of the Charter as justifying their own inaction and as an excuse for avoiding their disciplinary obligations.

The disciplinary problems which surfaced within the CAR and, specifically, 2 Commando, from the beginning of the 1990s cried out for special remedial measures. Although measures were applied, they evidently were not comprehensive enough to be effective.

DISCIPLINE DURING THE PRE-DEPLOYMENT PHASE

Incidents in 2 Commando

Background: Training Preparations of September–October 1992

The incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, which indicated a troubling lack of discipline in 2 Commando, took place as the Canadian Airborne Regiment battalion group was undergoing training for operations in Somalia. After National Defence Headquarters issued its warning order for Operation Cordon on September 4th,¹⁰² training began on September 8, 1992, and continued through October,¹⁰³ culminating in Exercise Stalwart Providence from October 14 to 18, 1992.¹⁰⁴

The training during September was not free of disciplinary problems.¹⁰⁵ However, during Exercise Stalwart Providence, disciplinary deficiencies were quite apparent within 2 Commando. Senior NCOs from the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), the Regiment that appraised the battalion group's performance, reported that 2 Commando's soldiers lacked discipline in their order of dress.¹⁰⁶ Maj Kampman noted that the soldiers of 2 Commando were much quicker to escalate the use of force than soldiers of 3 Commando.¹⁰⁷ Further, he found that they displayed a more aggressive attitude toward the local 'civilian' population, a role played during Exercise Stalwart Providence by the members of the RCD.¹⁰⁸ These observations suggest that grounds

existed, at this stage, for questioning whether 2 Commando's members would adopt a disciplined approach in applying the rules of engagement when serving in Somalia.

Incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992

Three incidents on October 2 and 3, 1992 demonstrated the lack of discipline within 2 Commando at that time. The evening of Friday, October 2, 1992, marked the start of the first free weekend for a majority of the CAR members since training had begun.¹⁰⁹ On the evening of October 2nd, military pyrotechnics were set off illegally at a party at the Kyrenia Club, the junior ranks' mess at CFB Petawawa.¹¹⁰ Testimony before us suggested that the Confederate flag was once again in evidence.¹¹¹ In the early morning of October 3rd, a vehicle belonging to the 2 Commando duty NCO, Sgt Wyszynski, was set afire; Sgt Wyszynski had allegedly called the Military Police concerning the disturbances at the Kyrenia Club.¹¹² As LCol Morneault testified, the burning of Sgt Wyszynski's car displayed alarming parallels with the burning of Capt Ferraby's car in 1990.¹¹³ In both cases, a member of 2 Commando, whose duties included the enforcement of discipline, incurred the enmity of some of the soldiers; his car was burned and the burning of the car preceded his removal from the CAR.

On October 3, 1992, various members of 2 Commando, perhaps fearing that their rooms would be inspected for pyrotechnics the following Monday,¹¹⁴ discharged illegally held pyrotechnics and ammunition during a party in Algonquin Park.¹¹⁵ The initial evidence suggested that members of commandos other than 2 Commando might have been involved. MWO Mills testified that Sgt Wyszynski told him on the evening of October 2, 1992, that the Kyrenia Club party included about 50 personnel belonging to all five commandos within the CAR.¹¹⁶ As inquiries proceeded, however, growing suspicion fell on 2 Commando. By October 9, 1992, LCol Morneault informed BGen Beno that 2 Commando members were likely the culprits in the first incident, and that a 2 Commando member might have torched Sgt Wyszynski's car.¹¹⁷

Initial Reactions to the Incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992

Most officers and NCOs responsible for discipline within the CAR acknowledged before us that the incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, were significant.¹¹⁸ On October 6, 1992, BGen Beno demanded from LCol Morneault an explanation for "the disgraceful turn of events involving your soldiers during the evening of 2 October 1992."¹¹⁹ The issue confronting BGen Beno, LCol Morneault, and their subordinates was how to identify the perpetrators.

On the morning of October 5, 1992, Cpl Matchee, Pte Brocklebank, and a third individual approached WO Murphy to report that they had participated in the party in Algonquin Park, where they consumed alcohol

and fired off pyrotechnics.¹²⁰ However, Pte Brocklebank informed WO Murphy that he accepted sole responsibility for the pyrotechnics discharges.¹²¹ Both WO Murphy and MWO Mills testified that they viewed Pte Brocklebank as 'taking the fall' for the other participants.¹²² MWO Mills charged Pte Brocklebank with a minor service offence, but in effect,¹²³ this discouraged further investigation. Although the visit of the morning of October 5, 1992, to WO Murphy might appear at first to be an instance of co-operation with the CAR's disciplinary authorities, in reality, it represented a variation of the 'wall of silence'.

During the afternoon of October 5, 1992, all ranks of the CAR assembled on the parade square, where LCol Morneault castigated them.¹²⁴ He affirmed that those who admitted to their role in the incidents by 0900 hours on Friday, October 9, 1992, would be treated firmly but justly; those who did not confess their role but were subsequently found out would be treated severely.¹²⁵ He then dismissed all of the commandos except 2 Commando, and then told 2 Commando collectively that he considered them the main suspects.¹²⁶ LCol Morneault subsequently addressed 2 Commando's officers, and the Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO Jardine sternly lectured the NCOs.¹²⁷ CWO Jardine reportedly made it abundantly clear that the Rebel flag was not to reappear within the CAR.¹²⁸

LCol Morneault ordered a surprise inspection of the rooms and lockers of 2 Commando's members on October 5, 1992.¹²⁹ Maj Seward testified that the goal of the inspection was to locate pyrotechnics, ammunition, and Rebel flags.¹³⁰ The inspection reportedly netted 34 Rebel flags as well as pyrotechnics and ammunition.¹³¹ Maj Seward conducted five summary trials of 2 Commando members as a result of the inspection.¹³² He referred Cpl Ford, arrested for possession of pyrotechnics and live ammunition, to LCol Morneault for trial.¹³³ The room inspection, however, did not identify the men who had expended military pyrotechnics illegally at the Kyrenia Club on the evening of October 2, 1992.

Later that day, Maj Seward marched 2 Commando to High View Tower in the training area.¹³⁴ Training continued at High View Tower for the rest of the week,¹³⁵ but the real purpose was to persuade the parties responsible for the incidents to come forward.¹³⁶ This exercise did not adequately clarify the situation. Only Cpl Powers confessed to Maj Seward that he had thrown pyrotechnics at the Kyrenia Club on the evening of October 2, 1992.¹³⁷ The training at High View Tower ended when it became clear that nothing further was to be gained by continuing with it.¹³⁸

As early as October 5, 1992, LCol Morneault contemplated the much more radical step of not permitting 2 Commando to be deployed to Somalia unless the perpetrators of the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992,

came forward.¹³⁹ By late morning that day, CWO Jardine, Maj Seward, and MWO Mills all assented to LCol Morneault's plan of threatening to leave 2 Commando behind. LCol Morneault advised BGen Beno of the plan. However, when BGen Beno informed MGen MacKenzie of the plan, MGen MacKenzie responded negatively.¹⁴⁰

We view the controversy surrounding the plan as forming part of a broader controversy concerning the most effective way to combat the 'wall of silence', and certainly the Military Police encountered it as they sought to identify the parties responsible for the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992.

On October 5, 1992, a soldier from 2 Commando confessed to his platoon warrant officer that he had participated in discharging military pyrotechnics illegally at the Kyrenia Club, but the platoon warrant officer did not report his admission to his commando sergeant-major.¹⁴¹ Additionally, when the Military Police reinterviewed a soldier of 3 Commando, on November 26, 1992 about the torching of Sgt Wyszynski's car, he affirmed that his platoon warrant officer had informed him not to take a polygraph test.¹⁴² The attitude of both WOs hindered the investigation of the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992.

A further dimension to the aftermath of the early October incidents was the relief from command of LCol Morneault. Relieving LCol Morneault of command sent an inappropriate message concerning discipline to CAR members and, especially, 2 Commando. Even before the incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, 2 Commando NCOs and junior officers who were responsible for enforcing discipline had not always encountered a co-operative attitude. MWO Mills testified that around 1990 someone fired a bullet through the window of the office of the then Company Sergeant-Major, MWO Stevens.¹⁴³ Capt Ferraby's car was set afire, and he was posted out. MWO Mills testified that relieving LCol Morneault of command and transferring Sgt Wyszynski from the CAR suggested that troublemakers within CAR could challenge lawful authority with impunity.¹⁴⁴

The Senior Chain of Command and the October Incidents

Evidence indicates to us that the chain of command above the CAR and the SSF became generally aware of the October 2nd and 3rd incidents chiefly in the context of BGen Beno's recommendation to relieve the CO of the command of the Regiment.

MGen MacKenzie had visited CFB Petawawa on October 2nd to address the leaders of a 1 RCR company about to be deployed to the former Yugoslavia, but he did not visit the CAR.¹⁴⁵

It was that same evening that the Kyrenia Club incident began the weekend of disciplinary problems in the Regiment. On October 5th, MGen MacKenzie received a general overview of those incidents but learned

little about the torching of Sgt. Wyszynski's car.¹⁴⁶ BGen Beno acknowledged in his testimony that he never spoke directly to MGen MacKenzie or his chief of staff about the incidents,¹⁴⁷ nor did he call either LGen Gervais or MGen Reay about them.¹⁴⁸

Rather, in this period, BGen Beno's direct contacts with his commander, MGen MacKenzie, concerned the performance of the CO of the CAR, LCol Morneault, and unresolved disciplinary problems were cited as only part of BGen Beno's dissatisfaction with LCol Morneault.¹⁴⁹

We find it significant that MGen MacKenzie acknowledged in his testimony before us that, in retrospect, further measures should have been taken to counter the problems afflicting the CAR before the deployment to Somalia. We presume that disciplinary problems would have been among the problems he had in mind.

On October 9th, BGen Beno advised MGen MacKenzie that he was getting closer to asking that LCol Morneault be replaced,¹⁵⁰ and on October 19th, he wrote to MGen MacKenzie that the CAR displayed, among other shortcomings, unresolved disciplinary problems but that "there is a potential to turn things around if there is good leadership at the top."¹⁵¹ The letter was undoubtedly superseded when, on October 20th, BGen Beno telephoned MGen MacKenzie to formally request LCol Morneault's replacement. The discussion focused on training rather than disciplinary problems.¹⁵² On the same day, BGen Beno faxed a letter to MGen MacKenzie confirming the request in writing which, while it cited "significant unresolved leadership and discipline problems", devoted attention to the issue of training.¹⁵³ MGen MacKenzie testified that when he received the letter, disciplinary problems in the CAR were not his chief concern.¹⁵⁴

During these events, MGen MacKenzie was at Fort Leavenworth in the United States with his commander, LGen Gervais, and the rest of the Army Council. He was therefore able to discuss at first hand with his immediate superior BGen Beno's recommendation to replace LCol Morneault.

These discussions took place intermittently during the course of the visit to Fort Leavenworth.¹⁵⁵ They led the Army Commander, LGen Gervais, to take the final decision on October 20, 1992, to relieve LCol Morneault, based on advice from MGen MacKenzie and LGen Gervais' Deputy Commander, MGen Reay.¹⁵⁶

MGen Reay testified that MGen MacKenzie telephoned him, perhaps during the week of October 5th, and spoke about disciplinary problems within the CAR — but only in broad terms.¹⁵⁷ According to MGen Reay, MGen MacKenzie did not give him any details regarding the disciplinary incidents of October 2nd and 3rd. MGen Reay informed us that he made no specific inquiries.¹⁵⁸ By October 9th, MGen Reay knew that CAR members had expended pyrotechnics illegally, but he was unaware that the Kyrenia Club

had been the venue. He believed, however, that the gap in his knowledge was closed October 20th.¹⁵⁹ He knew generally of the illegal discharge of pyrotechnics at Algonquin Park.¹⁶⁰ The torching of Sgt Wyszynski's car was undoubtedly the most serious of the disciplinary incidents of October 2nd and 3rd, but he said he learned of it only when he read the report of the de Faye board of inquiry in 1993.¹⁶¹

LGen Gervais, for his part, conceded that MGen Reay might have briefed him generally about discipline in the CAR, but if so, he did not recall that any details were mentioned.¹⁶² He stated that he had no recollection of BGen Beno's letter to MGen MacKenzie nor did he remember that MGen MacKenzie raised disciplinary issues with him at Fort Leavenworth.¹⁶³ Indeed, he testified that no discussion of CAR disciplinary issues took place during the visit.¹⁶⁴ If anything, he told us, he first learned of the disciplinary problems in 2 Commando after he retired from the Canadian Forces.¹⁶⁵ Gen de Chastelain's evidence was that he learned of the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, only in 1993, when he was serving as Canadian ambassador to the United States.¹⁶⁶

MGen Reay, LGen Gervais, and Gen de Chastelain knew that BGen Beno seriously doubted LCol Morneault's leadership capabilities.¹⁶⁷ Gen de Chastelain agreed before us that good leadership is important to a unit's cohesiveness and discipline.

Thus, the senior levels of the chain of command became engaged in the disciplinary problems of the CAR in the fall of 1992 only indirectly through the issue of the replacement of the CO of the Regiment. We have no evidence of any further action or involvement.

Discipline, October 23rd to Deployment

LCol Mathieu replaced LCol Morneault as CO of the CAR on October 26, 1992.¹⁶⁸ BGen Beno testified that he had full confidence in LCol Mathieu,¹⁶⁹ and this led to a shift in his approach to promoting good discipline within the CAR. While LCol Morneault was CO, BGen Beno maintained close surveillance, and after LCol Morneault's departure he ensured that LCol Mathieu was aware of the CAR's disciplinary problems. As early as October 23, 1992, he composed an aide-mémoire listing the subjects on which he intended to brief LCol Mathieu, and disciplinary issues figured prominently.¹⁷⁰ BGen Beno testified that his briefings to LCol Mathieu made him aware of the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992.¹⁷¹ BGen Beno's evidence indicates, however, that he subsequently relied upon LCol Mathieu's assurances that the incidents had been investigated and that the officers in the unit were entirely satisfactory.¹⁷² MGen Reay acknowledged before us that in retrospect, BGen Beno should have been more aggressive

in seeking answers about the unresolved disciplinary problems he had detected.¹⁷³

According to MGen MacKenzie's testimony, he inquired of BGen Beno about the CAR's state of leadership and discipline under LCol Mathieu¹⁷⁴ and in his policy letter of November 20, 1992, he expounded generally on the command responsibilities for upholding discipline and good order.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, there is no evidence suggesting that he asked whether BGen Beno or LCol Mathieu took measures to restore discipline, trust, or obedience among the soldiers in the wake of the incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, and what those measures were.

MGen MacKenzie testified that his superiors gave him no special instructions concerning leadership and discipline.¹⁷⁶ LGen Gervais testified about his visit of November 12, 1992, to the CAR, when he asked how training was progressing. He also received BGen Beno's assurances that the CAR no longer suffered from inadequate cohesion, as well as LCol Mathieu's affirmation that he had encountered no difficulties in his new post.¹⁷⁷

LCol Morneault's replacement by LCol Mathieu may have lifted the morale of some officers. Maj Kyle testified that he believed that the CAR now had the requisite leadership and direction.¹⁷⁸ BGen Beno expressed full confidence in LCol Mathieu.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Maj MacKay asserted that he detected no profound changes in the Regiment during the interval between LCol Morneault's departure and the date five weeks later when it was about to be deployed to Somalia.¹⁸⁰ There is no evidence of effective measures taken by LCol Mathieu to remedy the unresolved disciplinary problems identified earlier.

BGen Beno declared the CAR operationally ready on November 13, 1992.¹⁸¹ BGen Beno affirmed that he consulted with LCol Mathieu when appraising the CAR's operational readiness.¹⁸² Yet when LCol Mathieu became CO, the majority of the soldiers were on embarkation leave, where they remained until November 8, 1992.¹⁸³ BGen Beno acknowledged that LCol Mathieu first saw the entire Regiment on November 9, 1992.¹⁸⁴ Was BGen Beno subject to pressure to declare the CAR operationally ready? Col O'Brien telephoned him earlier in the day on November 13, 1992, to inquire how operational preparations were advancing, and BGen Beno told us in testimony that a failure to declare the Regiment operationally ready could be construed as reflecting adversely on him.¹⁸⁵

Incidents in Other CAR and CARBG Sub-Units

The evidence brought before us indicates that the CARBG sub-units apart from 2 Commando appear to have contributed much less to disciplinary problems before deployment. No noteworthy disciplinary infractions for

personnel serving in Headquarters Commando, A Squadron RCD, or 1 Airborne Field Engineer Squadron came to our attention. The members of 1 Commando and, to a lesser degree, 3 Commando and the Service Commando were, however, implicated in some disciplinary infractions.

Disciplinary Incidents in 1 Commando

One disciplinary incident involving 1 Commando took place on October 9, 1992, when the Red Cross convened a special blood donor clinic at CFB Petawawa. Capt N.E. Gibson, the CAR's Medical Officer, and Maj R.J. Brown, an anaesthesiologist also belonging to the medical team slated for Somalia, had established that CAR members should be tested to confirm their blood group and that fresh blood would be necessary in theatre.¹⁸⁶ One way to bolster the fresh blood supply in Somalia was to take blood from CAR volunteers before the Regiment deployed to Somalia. The clinic's purposes were thus twofold: to test for the blood type of CAR members and to obtain blood from donors.¹⁸⁷ When the Red Cross team arrived, only 1 Commando was available. October 9, 1992 was a Friday, and 2 Commando and 3 Commando had already been stood down for the weekend.¹⁸⁸ Yet the medical team's work was supposed to profit the entire CAR, and in our view, to schedule the blood donor clinic without ensuring that the whole Regiment would be available to participate was poor planning. LCol Morneau conceded before us that he had allowed Capt Gibson to schedule the blood donor clinic too hastily.¹⁸⁹ Some soldiers did not appear.¹⁹⁰ A number of the 1 Commando members who presented themselves were reluctant to undergo tests. A senior NCO advised them that the Red Cross intended to test for AIDS, and they were asked to sign a declaration authorizing this particular test.¹⁹¹ Various members perceived AIDS-testing as a screening device and believed that those who tested positively would be barred from being deployed to Somalia.¹⁹² Most members present did not volunteer to donate blood;¹⁹³ approximately 40 to 60 members reportedly gave blood.¹⁹⁴ Maj MacKay admitted before us that the soldiers should have received a better advance briefing on the purposes of the blood donor clinic.¹⁹⁵ Linguistic differences between some Red Cross team members and some 1 Commando members contributed further to the failure of communication: some Red Cross team members were unilingual Anglophones, whereas some 1 Commando members were unilingual Francophones.¹⁹⁶ When the Red Cross team attempted to obtain blood donations, they suffered verbal abuse.¹⁹⁷

Occurring so soon after the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, the conduct of some 1 Commando members at the blood donor clinic on October 9, 1992, was troubling. Their conduct raised less concern than the burning of Sgt Wyszynski's car or perhaps even the illegal discharge of pyrotechnics and ammunition, but it showed that concern for the CAR's

disciplinary level could not be restricted totally to 2 Commando. On October 19, 1992, BGen Beno wrote to Dr. A. Guilivi, Medical Director of the Ottawa Centre of the Red Cross, apologizing for the way some soldiers conducted themselves at the blood donor clinic.¹⁹⁸ Four days later, LCol Morneau informed BGen Beno that he planned to counsel 1 Commando on their lack of co-operation and poor conduct.¹⁹⁹ The blood donor clinic incident became known higher in the chain of command. MGen Reay informed us that after the meeting at Fort Leavenworth, he was generally aware of it.²⁰⁰ He testified further that he connected the incident with the broader issues of discipline and challenges to lawfully constituted authority that were pressing, about the time of the Fort Leavenworth meeting.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, we received no evidence suggesting that any 1 Commando members were subjected to disciplinary proceedings because of their conduct at the blood donor clinic.

Incidents in 3 Commando

We cannot affirm categorically that no 3 Commando members participated in the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992. Various 3 Commando members were questioned by the Military Police in connection with the burning of Sgt Wyszynski's car,²⁰² and some responses obtained suggest that a 'wall of silence' about disciplinary infractions was present in 3 Commando as well. One soldier affirmed during his interview, for example, that even if he possessed pertinent information, he would not reveal it.²⁰³ As far as we are aware, however, the Military Police investigation did not elicit evidence directly implicating 3 Commando members in the burning of Sgt Wyszynski's car or any other disciplinary infraction of October 2 and 3, 1992; no 3 Commando member was subject to charges or other measures.

Service Commando

The Military Police interviewed only one member of Service Commando about the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992 (actually, a member of 2 Commando who was on assignment to Service Commando).²⁰⁴ More specifically, they questioned him regarding the illegal expending of pyrotechnics and ammunition in Algonquin Park on October 3, 1992; he professed that he brought no pyrotechnics and that no one discharged pyrotechnics in his presence.²⁰⁵ To the best of our knowledge, the evidence against him was not compelling and he too was not subject to charges or other measures.

Possible Ways to Remedy Disciplinary Problems

During the final month before CAR members began to be deployed to Somalia on December 13, 1992, additional steps were contemplated as measures to improve discipline within the CAR. These included: further

screening out of weak officers and troublemakers; reassigning personnel within the Regiment; and, ensuring the contingent included an adequate number of Military Police.

Screening Out Weak Officers and Troublemakers

According to LCol Morneault, BGen Beno raised questions about “numerous people”, including the Deputy Commanding Officer, Maj MacKay, Maj Seward, and Capt Rainville.²⁰⁶ However, LCol Morneault testified that BGen Beno never explicitly ordered him to move or to replace anyone.²⁰⁷ While he was CO, LCol Morneault compiled a list of CAR members that officers commanding (OCs) and senior NCOs considered troublemakers, but he did not pass it on to BGen Beno or LCol Mathieu.²⁰⁸ By the time LCol Mathieu replaced LCol Morneault on October 26, 1992, Military Police reports concerning the investigation into the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, were beginning to appear. One Military Police report of October 26, 1992, described the results to that point of the investigation into the expending of illegally held pyrotechnics and ammunition at Algonquin Park.²⁰⁹ The report suggested that various participants in the party at Algonquin Park were known; the report did not, however, affirm that their role in the discharging of illegally held pyrotechnics and ammunition was clearly established.²¹⁰

On October 13, 1992, a Military Police report was issued concerning the illegal discharge of military pyrotechnics at the Kyrenia Club on October 2, 1992: the report noted that Cpl Powers admitted his role in throwing a smoke grenade and a thunderflash but otherwise made no findings against anyone.²¹¹ On October 26, 1992, a Military Police report concerning the burning of Sgt Wyszynski’s car appeared: no witnesses or persons with information regarding this incident had come forward.²¹² Although by late October 1992, the results of the two later investigations were meagre, at least the investigation of the Algonquin Park party of October 3, 1992, gave some indication of who some of the probable troublemakers were.

BGen Beno acknowledged in his testimony that he possessed the authority to approach a CO and to instruct that particular soldiers not to be deployed to Somalia — an administrative action rather than a disciplinary one.²¹³ However, he affirmed that by dealing with a soldier administratively before impending disciplinary procedures took place, he would very possibly affect the disciplinary action.²¹⁴ MGen MacKenzie also stated unequivocally that administrative procedures are available for leaving soldiers behind.²¹⁵

BGen Beno’s evidence suggests that he left it to LCol Mathieu to make the decisions on whether to take weak officers or troublemakers to Somalia. BGen Beno testified that he told LCol Mathieu that he would fire Maj Seward,²¹⁶ but he did not wish to intervene as long as LCol Mathieu felt comfortable

with Maj Seward; Maj Seward remained OC of 2 Commando. Capt Rainville, who was to figure prominently in the March 4, 1993 incident in Somalia, provides another example of an officer whose fate BGen Beno left to LCol Mathieu. LCol Morneau administered a verbal warning to Capt Rainville on October 23, 1992: the verbal warning arose from his conduct at la Citadelle in Quebec City on February 7, 1992, and in two incidents at CFB Gagetown, one in April and the second in May, 1992.²¹⁷ When BGen Beno wrote on December 15, 1992, to LCol Mathieu about Capt Rainville, he expressed "grave doubts about this particular officer".²¹⁸ Nevertheless, LCol Mathieu decided to take Capt Rainville to Somalia and even kept him as OC of the Reconnaissance (Recce) Platoon.

In the end, six 2 Commando members were removed from the deployment list by LCol Mathieu, who advised BGen Beno accordingly in writing.²¹⁹ BGen Beno advised us that he did not know in which disciplinary incident the six were suspected of having participated.²²⁰ He testified further, to our amazement, that he did not know their names except for Pte Brocklebank.²²¹ He claimed that he would be interfering in CAR discipline merely by receiving their names.²²² We find this claim to be unconvincing.

Reassigning Personnel within the Regiment

As an alternative strategy to combat disciplinary problems within the CAR, BGen Beno recommended shuffling CAR members within the Regiment. More specifically, according to the additional information in a briefing for the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), he recommended that LCol Morneau and LCol Mathieu move from 2 Commando ten privates, six corporals, six master corporals, three sergeants and one platoon commander and, from the Reconnaissance (Recce) Platoon, two corporals, two master corporals and one sergeant.²²³ In his evidence, he acknowledged that he had recommended that LCol Mathieu move various CAR members within the unit;²²⁴ he added that he had heard that some CAR personnel were, in fact, moved.²²⁵ He testified that he recommended a shake-up without reference to names.²²⁶ MGen MacKenzie, speaking about 2 Commando, observed that sprinkling about 25 members throughout the unit would ultimately achieve little.²²⁷ We endorse this view.

An Adequate Military Police Contingent

As discussed in detail in Chapter 25, Mission Planning: Military Planning System, and Chapter 40, Military Justice, Military Police can play an important role in helping to bolster discipline within a unit. The decision to deploy the CARBG to Somalia with only two Military Police was to bear heavily on the state of discipline experienced in theatre.

THE SENIOR CHAIN OF COMMAND AND DISCIPLINE

There are a number of troubling aspects in the chain of command's reaction to the disciplinary incidents in the CAR in early October 1992. These include supervision; passage of information; timely reaction including advice, guidance, and intervention; and follow-up.

In Volume 4, *Failures of Individual Leaders*, we discuss the adequacy of the supervision by the Commander of the SSF of the preparations of the CAR. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that superiors above him were taking appropriate steps to supervise the CAR in any meaningful way. When the disciplinary incidents occurred, although the Commander of the SSF reacted, his superiors were not involved. Evidence suggests that there was a practice to await the receipt of incident reports, together with actions proposed or already put in place by the subordinate commander, before superiors involved themselves. While this practice may have the virtue of allowing the subordinate to command without interference from superiors, it has the decided weaknesses of delaying or indeed preventing senior reaction, withholding the greater authority one might expect the superior to bring to bear on the problem, and closing the possibility of higher levels of the chain of command applying more experienced, and perhaps more objective, judgement in remedying the situation.

The events of October 2 and 3, 1992, signalled a significant disciplinary problem within the CAR. The car-burning incident was particularly compelling. These events, especially the challenge to authority evident in the burning of the duty officer's car, should have elicited an immediate and decisive response from all levels of the chain of command. They did not. Instead, the superior levels became engaged only after they were presented more than two weeks later with the request that the CO be relieved of command. The rationale for that action in part rested on the failure of discipline in the CAR.

There is considerable evidence that the chain of command above formation level did not exercise adequately its responsibilities of supervision. Passage of information was intermittent. Timely reaction through advice, intervention, or remedial action was not sufficiently exercised. This state of affairs can be attributed to the responses of individuals. There are, however, systemic aspects to it as well. Such response appears frequently in evidence in a variety of situations involving a number of different officers, and indicates a pattern of practice which differs from doctrine and recurs often enough to suggest that it had become the custom.

We encountered in testimony many instances where supervision was almost routinely foregone, as if close supervision might be mistaken for a lack of

confidence in a subordinate. We have been troubled by the poor passage of information, despite adequate standing procedures and satisfactory methods of communication. And we are deeply concerned that the chain of command almost invariably took little action to inform itself even when incidents were clearly signalling serious problems.

We were particularly disturbed by the apparent laissez-faire attitude of seniors to the subject of discipline generally. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, discipline must not be seen to be the sole purview of the lower end of the chain of command, a subject safely left in the hands of the NCO corps. While NCOs do indeed play a vital role in the application of discipline, they deserve and need the active participation of all levels of the chain of command. That participation should take the form of evident interest and concern expressed through close supervision. It should be demonstrated by senior commanders appearing among the troops, especially in difficult times. And it should show convincingly the readiness of senior commanders to lead by example. One may contemplate, in hindsight, the salutary effect on the standard of discipline in the CAR in the autumn of 1992, had the most senior leaders appeared on the scene and made quite clear to the troops exactly what their standards of discipline were.

DISCIPLINE DURING THE IN-THEATRE PHASE

Events in Somalia were to demonstrate the effects on operations of the standard of discipline evident in the CAR during the pre-deployment phase. The Canadian contingent included a number of units and sub-units in addition to the Regiment, some of which encountered disciplinary problems as well. But in the main, the focus of our analysis continues to rest on the Regiment as it faced the challenges of operations in Somalia as part of Unified Task Force (UNITAF). In light of the truncation of the Commission's deliberations, we have not been able to hear all the evidence covering the in-theatre phase. However, sufficient evidence was amassed to permit a partial summary of events and incidents typifying the state of discipline in Somalia.

The evidentiary base for analysis comprises the list of incidents in Chapter 40, Military Justice, testimony taken during hearings on events occurring up to the middle of March 1993, and the detailed examination of the March 4th incident presented in Chapter 38. Here, we will concentrate in summary fashion on those indices of performance and conduct which bear upon discipline.

The indices include problems of conduct, misuse of alcohol, indications of over-aggressiveness, evidence of poor standards of self-discipline, and the disciplinary record of convictions under the Code of Service Discipline.

To look first at incidents recorded during the in-theatre phase, we note that of a total of 102 listed in Chapter 40, some 58 are considered to have been incidents of a disciplinary nature. Eight of these are by any standard deemed to be minor, involving such service offences as short absences without leave, improper dress, and the like. These were dealt with by summary trial. Two others of these 58 incidents, however, were the March 4th and the March 16th incidents. They were of such profound consequence as to jeopardize history's assessment of the entire mission. In between these two extremes, the list of disciplinary incidents along with evidence presented to us contain some troubling indicators.

There were 10 recorded incidents which could be considered serious breaches of the Code of Service Discipline, although a number of them were never prosecuted. In addition to the abandonment of a personal weapon during the March 4th incident,²²⁸ there was, in our opinion, evidence of negligence in another case of a loss of a weapon.²²⁹ There was one case of a false statement²³⁰ and there were four cases of theft or suspected theft²³¹ (plus another case wherein cash disappeared from the troops' own canteen fund but no suspects were found). Stealing, in particular, stealing from a fellow soldier, has historically been one of the gravest of service offences, constituting an assault on trust and mutual confidence, upon which depends soldiers' capacity to live in the close environment demanded by the operation and to rely on one another in life-threatening situations.

There were two incidents involving insubordination,²³² and one case where a soldier assaulted a superior.²³³ These incidents are troubling indications that assault on official authority was still prevalent in the Regiment even in theatre. More alarming was an incident in which an officer struck a subordinate,²³⁴ an event signalling a breakdown of the most basic standards of leadership by demonstrating disrespect for soldiers and a lack of self-discipline.

We have heard considerable evidence on the issue of alcohol abuse in the contingent. Home videos routinely showed soldiers drinking. In many scenes, alcohol was being consumed by soldiers while armed with their weapons. We heard evidence of heavy drinking among soldiers while travelling on civilian aircraft,²³⁵ and extensive testimony reported to us the drinking indulged in by some NCOs and officers. The list of incidents includes eight cases of alcohol abuse²³⁶ which resulted in convictions under the Code of Service Discipline. Yet we have had to conclude that the number of alcohol-related convictions does not begin to describe the pervasive influence that misuse of alcohol had on the performance of troops in Somalia.

As early as New Year's Eve 1992, an ominous precedent was signalled in the rumour of misuse of alcohol by the Commanding Officer (CO) and the Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) who permitted troops on duty to see them while they were allegedly under the influence of alcohol.²³⁷ We do not

have to rule, and we refrain from doing so, on the actual physical state of the CO and the RSM. What is important for our purposes here is the negative perception that the troops acquired early on of their leaders. Coupled with the laxity that came to prevail with respect to the enforcement of the alcohol policy, the observance of the rules of engagement (ROE), the handling of personal weapons and discipline in general, alcohol abuse contributed to setting the stage for the inevitable.

Indeed, the issue of the rules of engagement and their observance is dealt with in detail in Chapter 22, and in even sharper focus in Chapter 38 on the March 4th incident. However, there were also incidents under the broader umbrella of discipline related to the attitude of troops in Somalia. These include the conviction of an officer for inciting his troops to abuse detainees. In addition, two other cases were alleged in which senior officers were rumoured to have incited the troops to aggressiveness.²³⁸ We stress that in neither of these two cases was culpability proven. However, we do note the unfortunate rapidity with which rumours of these remarks spread through the contingent and the inevitable influence they surely had on the attitude of soldiers towards their mission.

Other incidents pertaining to the attitude of troops involved the handling of detainees. Apart from the tragic abuse which Shidane Arone suffered as a detainee of Canadian troops, one of the lesser incidents involved allegedly giving Somali nationals noxious substances to drink and painting the hands of Somali thieves white before releasing them.²³⁹ Further, it had become widespread practice to take trophy-like photographs of restrained detainees made to wear condemnatory signs.

The attitude of troops was most graphically illustrated in the photos and home videos which eventually came to light. As noted, many of these involved detainees. Others contained scenes of individual soldiers using abusive language, obscenities, and racial epithets.

Evidence before us shows that the contingent suffered many cases of careless weapon handling including accidental discharge of personal weapons. Of these, 19 cases led to convictions.²⁴⁰ One of these resulted in the death of a fellow soldier; another involved a senior officer. Taken together the frequency of this offence is alarming and far higher than experienced in units of similar size and with comparable operational conditions. The average experienced by units in Yugoslavia in 1992–93 was four to six cases. When 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (1RCR) served in Croatia in 1994, they experienced one accidental discharge in the six months they were deployed on operations. All combat arms soldiers are intensively trained in the safe handling of personal weapons, training that is regularly refreshed in operational units. This included the CAR and other units of the SSF. The mis-handling of personal weapons is therefore a sign, not of inadequate training,

but of laxity and carelessness. The problem was made worse by the poor example set by leaders themselves committing the same offence. The record of the CARBG for accidental discharges of weapons is one of the most damning indicators of the lack of self-discipline in evidence before us.

Finally, Maj Armstrong was advised to wear a flak jacket and to leave the theatre prematurely for fear that one of his fellow soldiers might, under the influence of alcohol, take reprisals against him for his responsible stand on the shootings of March 4th.²⁴¹ No incident speaks more eloquently of the state of discipline in the CARBG in Somalia than this.

FINDINGS

- *The CAR was again experiencing signs of poor discipline in the early 1990s, despite the remedies recommended in the Hewson report.*
- *The state of discipline within the CAR's 2 Commando caused particular concern at that time. Over aggressiveness, defiance of authority symbolized by the Rebel flag, and misdirected bonding as evidenced in the pervasiveness of the 'wall of silence' all characterized the state of discipline in that sub-unit during the years preceding Operation Cordon.*
- *Disciplinary problems were apparent in 1 Commando as well. The strongest evidence is the initiation party for incoming members of 1 Commando that took place at CFB Petawawa in August 1992. Attempts to investigate the party again encountered a 'wall of silence'.*
- *Evidence of serious disciplinary disturbances in 3 Commando before preparations began for the deployment to Somalia is restricted to the seizure of illegally stored personal weapons by the Military Police. Some members of 3 Commando were convicted of offences involving the improper possession of weapons or ammunition.*
- *There is little evidence pointing to unusual disciplinary problems in the Service Commando or the Headquarters Commando before the CAR began preparing for Somalia.*
- *A number of factors contributed to disciplinary problems in the CAR and specifically in 2 Commando prior to deployment including periodic lack of commitment on the part of the CAR's parent regiments to ensure that their best members were sent to the CAR; inferior quality of some junior officers and NCOs; doubtful practices in 2 Commando for recruiting NCOs; ambiguous relationships between master corporals and soldiers; high turnover rate within*

the CAR and the sub-units; mutual distrust and dislike among some of the CAR's officers and NCOs; questionable suitability of individual officers for the CAR and the ranks they occupied; a tendency to downplay the significance of disciplinary infractions or to cover them up entirely; and, the continuing ability of CAR members to evade responsibility for discipline.

- The tendency to downplay disciplinary problems was especially troubling, both in underrating the significance of specific infractions and, more generally, in undervaluing the influence of poor discipline as a criterion of operational readiness.
- Evidence showed that the CAR's three commandos functioned almost independently. The CAR's lack of cohesion undoubtedly impeded attempts to enforce discipline within the Regiment.
- There were attempts to correct the CAR's and specifically 2 Commando's disciplinary problems such as alcohol and drug abuse during the early 1990s. Officers and NCOs received encouragement to adopt a purposeful, responsible attitude when conducting summary trials. However, these measures seemed unable to address the problems that faced the Regiment by then.
- As we explain in greater detail in Chapter 19, *Suitability and Cohesion*, the CAR was unfit to undertake any mission in the autumn of 1992, let alone deployment to Somalia and this state of affairs was due in part to the CAR's disciplinary problems.
- The three incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, demonstrated a significant breakdown of discipline in 2 Commando during the critical period of training and preparing for operations in Somalia. Military pyrotechnics were expended illegally at a party in the junior ranks' mess; a car belonging to the duty NCO was set on fire; and, various 2 Commando members expended illegally held pyrotechnics and ammunition during a party in Algonquin Park.
- These incidents were so serious that LCol Morneau proposed to leave 2 Commando in Canada unless the perpetrators came forward. BGen Beno, after consulting MGen MacKenzie, opposed this plan. In the end, the leadership was unable to identify the perpetrators.
- Although LCol Mathieu was informed of the weakness of Maj Seward, the problems with Capt Rainville, the indiscipline in 2 Commando, and the general lack of cohesion in the Regiment, almost everyone suspected of participating in the October incidents was permitted to deploy. Several of them created difficulties in Somalia.
- In view of the serious disciplinary problems in the CAR, the failure to include an adequate Military Police component in the CARBG was a major shortcoming in planning the operations in Somalia.

Returning to the objectives of discipline, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, we find further that:

- *The standard of discipline was not sufficiently high to control the aggressiveness of troops in the CARBG.*
- *The standard of imposed discipline did not adequately contribute to the cohesiveness of the unit and in particular to the sense of collective purpose of the group.*
- *The standard of imposed discipline did not ensure that all members observed the laws, orders, and customs of the service to an acceptable degree.*
- *The lack of an adequate standard of self-discipline was especially evident both in the attitude of troops to the task at hand and in the example set by their leaders.*

Finally, with respect to the senior levels of the chain of command, we find that:

- *Despite doctrine, established practice, procedures, and resources, there were problems at the senior levels of the chain of command of inadequate supervision, poor passage of information, untimely or slow reaction through advice or intervention, and ineffective remedial action. Such problems appear to be so frequent as to indicate a significant systems failure in the exercise of command.*
- *The attitude of all ranks, from junior soldiers to the most senior commanders in the CF, towards the importance of good discipline was fundamentally weak. With insufficient respect for and attention to the need for discipline as a cornerstone of professional soldiers, military operations must be expected to fail. In respect of the issue of discipline, the mission to Somalia was undoubtedly a failure.*

DISCIPLINE IN THE FUTURE

It is clear from these findings that the leadership of the CF faces a major challenge in ensuring that the disciplinary problems experienced in the Somalia mission do not recur. That challenge is more difficult because discipline involves every member of the forces. It is a function of both individual and group attitudes and effort, and it pervades virtually every facet of military activity.

Moreover, it presents a special challenge for leadership at the officer level. In a few cases, officers themselves breached the Code of Service Discipline. In general, discipline seems to have been simply taken for granted. It seems to have been assumed that trained soldiers in a professional military would naturally be well-disciplined. It was tracked and reported upon

indifferently, with no central co-ordination or sharp focus at the highest levels. Above all, it was the subject of inadequate supervision, guidance, or remedy by the senior levels of the chain of command.

In facing the future, the first requirement is to take steps to recognize as a matter of fundamental policy the importance of discipline and the role it must play. Not only does it need policy definition and emphasis in doctrine and in training and education material, it also demands a prominent and visible place in the interest and concerns of the most senior leadership.

Recommendations

We recommend that:

- 18.1 The Chief of the Defence Staff institute an official policy on screening aspirants for all leadership positions, beginning with the selection of master corporals:**
 - (a) identifying self-discipline as a precondition of both commissioned and non-commissioned officership; and**
 - (b) providing for the evaluation of the individual in terms of self-discipline, including the ability to control aggressive and impulsive behaviour.**
- 18.2 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the importance, function, and application of discipline be taught in all officer leadership training, including the Royal Military College, staff and command college courses, and senior command courses.**
- 18.3 The Chief of the Defence Staff modify the performance evaluation process to ensure that each individual's standard of self-discipline is assessed in the annual performance evaluation report form, along with the individual's performance in applying discipline when exercising authority.**
- 18.4 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish the head of Canadian Forces personnel (currently the Assistant Deputy Minister Personnel) as the focal point for discipline at the senior staff level in National Defence Headquarters, with advice and support from**

the Director General of Military Legal Services and the Director of Military Police. To this end, the head of personnel should establish and review policy on discipline, monitor all Canadian Forces plans and programs to ensure that discipline is considered, and assess the impact of discipline on plans, programs, activities and operations, both as they are planned and regularly as they are implemented.

- 18.5 The Chief of the Defence Staff emphasize the importance of discipline by reviewing frequent and regular reports of the Inspector General, and by requiring the head of personnel to report at least monthly at a daily executive meeting on the state of discipline throughout the Canadian Forces, both inside and outside the chain of command, and by personally overseeing any necessary follow-up.
- 18.6 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and practice that discipline be identified as a determining factor in assessing the operational readiness of any unit or formation.
- 18.7 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and practice that during operations, all officers and non-commissioned officers must monitor discipline closely; and that the head of personnel oversee and, at the end of each mission, report on discipline.
- 18.8 To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Chief of the Defence Staff undertake regularly a formal evaluation of the policies, procedures, and practices that guide and influence the administration of discipline in the Canadian Forces.

NOTES

1. It is noteworthy that discipline is not defined in either the *National Defence Act* (NDA), R.S.C. 1985, Chapter N-5 (as amended), or the *Queen's Regulations and Orders*, even though the NDA offence, "Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline", is the most commonly used offence in the CF.
2. Anthony Kellet, *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle* (Boston: Klusver Nijhoff, 1982), p. 10.
3. In chapter 8 of *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat* (New York: Praeger, 1988), Ben Shalit, a former commander of a military psychology unit in the Israeli Defence Force, provides particularly useful insights into the meaning and application of discipline in armed forces.

4. DND, Operational Training Manual, vol. 2, "Unit Administration" (B-GL-304-002/FP-001, July 7, 1987) addressed discipline in article 501 as follows:
 1. The objectives of military discipline are to ensure prompt and willing obedience to authority and to establish order and cohesion among individuals.
 2. Obedience is the basis for sound discipline. It should not have its origin in fear of punishment but rather, should emanate from the individuals' understanding that orders are given by superiors who have proven their knowledge and ability. Properly administered, discipline imparts respect and confidence in soldiers and supports cohesiveness in the unit. Laxity in discipline creates unit disorder which can be disastrous in war.
5. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1, Annex A.
6. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1, Annex U.
7. Testimony of MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 537.
8. Testimony of MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 537.
9. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1.
10. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1.
11. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1. The schedule to the *National Defence Act* qualifies Canadian army members holding ranks from general to officer cadet as 'officers'. Officers include generals of every stripe, colonels and lieutenant-colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants. Officers holding the ranks from chief warrant officer down qualify as non-commissioned members (NCMs); these include chief and master warrant officers, sergeants, and corporals. According to the *Queen's Regulations and Orders* 1.02 (vol. I), an NCO is a member holding the rank of sergeant or corporal.
12. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1.
13. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1, Annex V.
14. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1.
15. Testimony of MGen (ret) Hewson, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 347-348; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 660-661; Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3331; Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8608; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8954. On March 6, 1992, however, National Defence Headquarters approved an establishment change proposal for the reorganization of the CAR that did not explicitly transform the commando commanders from COs to officers commanding (OCs). See DND 286507.
16. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1, p. 19, paragraph 15.
17. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1, p. 54, paragraph 81(a).
18. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1, p. 21, paragraph 27(m).
19. Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 3, p. 2.
20. Exhibit P-82.4, Document book 32D, tab 1.
21. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 756.
22. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 637.
23. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2254-2255.
24. Exhibit P-20.11, Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol. XI, p. C-2/8.
25. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 595.
26. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 715.
27. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 597.
28. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 598. Indeed, Gen de Chastelain, CDS at the time Col Holmes prohibited any public display of the flag, included the flag among "unacceptable symbols" when he testified before the Inquiry. Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9906.

29. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4319–4320, and vol. 24, p. 4443; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5716; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6966.
30. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3; testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2239.
31. Exhibit P-20.11, Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol. XI, p. D-3/7.
32. Exhibit P-51.1, Document book 4A, tab 1.
33. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 606.
34. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 708.
35. Document book 89, tab 3G, DND 344071–344074.
36. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 611.
37. Exhibit P-53.
38. Exhibit P-53; testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9917.
39. Exhibit P-52, Document book 5, tab 6.
40. Exhibit P-52, Document book 5, tab 5.
41. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6822–6823.
42. Exhibit P-52, Document book 5, tab 2.
43. Exhibit P-52, Document book 5, tab 2.
44. Exhibit P-52, Document book 5, tab 1, 14(u), DND 060137.
45. Exhibit P-51.1, Document book 4A, tab 2.
46. Testimony of MGen (ret) Gaudreau, vol. 3, pp. 552–554; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4557–4558; and MWO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6592.
47. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 613; Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2771; and CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4672.
48. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 619.
49. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4916–4917.
50. Exhibit P-63, Document book 14, tab 15, p. D-2/5.
51. Exhibit P-77, Document book 28, tab 12.
52. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4548.
53. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4549.
54. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4886.
55. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4547.
56. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4882, 4885.
57. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4887.
58. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 605–606, 676.
59. DND has recognized how essential good leadership is for discipline. When a course for sergeants nearing promotion to warrant officer took place in March 1994 at CFB Gagetown, the Leadership Package Handout #0412 (Document book 118, tab 26) contained the following observation (p. 12/26): “Discipline begins with the leader himself, for without self-discipline, he cannot expect discipline in his subordinates.”
60. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5687–5688.
61. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5189.
62. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4841–4842; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5721, 5725.
63. Exhibit P-20.5, LCol Mathieu, testimony to Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol. V, p. 1194; testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5742–5743; and MWO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6592–6593, and vol. 35, p. 6744.

64. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4561; WO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6594; and MWO O'Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, pp. 21798, 21912–21913.
65. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4905.
66. Exhibit P-20.2, BGen Beno, testimony to Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol. II, p. 254.
67. Testimony of MGen (ret) Hewson, Transcripts vol. 2, p. 353; and LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 502.
68. This evidence is amplified in Volume 2, Chapter 19, Suitability.
69. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4550; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5209; Exhibit P-64, Document book 15, tabs 17, 19.
70. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4583.
71. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5662–5663, 5666.
72. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4640.
73. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3; Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2239, 2241.
74. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2239; Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8048; and MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8388.
75. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 595.
76. Exhibit P-20.11, Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol. XI, p. D-3/7.
77. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2243.
78. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6939.
79. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 606.
80. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4417.
81. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4276.
82. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4274.
83. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5662.
84. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5964.
85. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4275.
86. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4277.
87. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6948.
88. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6830, 6865–6866; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6951.
89. Document book 118, tab 22L, DND 106932; Document book 118, tab 21, DND 310801.
90. Document book 89A, tab 8.
91. Document book 89A, tab 8.
92. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4C.
93. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4C.
94. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4C.
95. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4C.
96. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4C.
97. DND Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Volume X, Exhibit 115. During the same interval the number of courts-martial in The RCR, the R22°R and PPCLI was 11, 22 and 18 respectively.
98. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 1.

99. In 1992, other infantry battalions were making comparable use of summary trials, as shown in the following table, compiled from Document book 4, tab 1, pp. 3191–3200:

1 RCR	52
2 RCR	45
1 R22 ^e R	52
2 R22 ^e R	62
1 PPCLI	80
2 PPCLI	44.
100. Martin L. Friedland, *Controlling Misconduct in the Military* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), p. 94.
101. Professor Friedland states, "It may well be that apprehension about the constitutionality of the military justice system after introduction of the Charter...[was] partly responsible for this decline in the use of the military justice system". Friedland, *Controlling Misconduct in the Military*, p. 101.
102. Exhibit P-77, Document book 28, tab 12.
103. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2334.
104. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3529, 3744; Exhibit P-64, Document book 15, tab 19.
105. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7303; Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7741; Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5866–5867, and vol. 32, pp. 6198–6199; MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20809.
106. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5196–5197.
107. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5198.
108. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5198. MWO O'Connor also found 2 Commando too aggressive in its training: Transcripts vol. 109, pp. 21793–21794.
109. Compare with testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2334.
110. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4291–4294; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, pp. 4605–4608; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5711; WO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6615–6616; and LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6963–6966.
111. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5716; and LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6966.
112. Testimony of WO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6619; Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
113. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6939.
114. Testimony of WO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6620–6621.
115. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
116. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4441.
117. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4.
118. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4613; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5728; MWO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6617; LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6967; and MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8320.
119. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4.
120. Testimony of WO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6621–6622.
121. Testimony of WO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6623.
122. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4316; and WO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6624.

123. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4328.
124. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4301; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5718, and vol. 31, p. 5874; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6979; Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4.
125. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4.
126. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4616; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6979; Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 4.
127. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4516; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4618; LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6980; and MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 105, p. 20834.
128. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5719.
129. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5725; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7465, 7468.
130. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5716, 5725.
131. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4321; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5726.
132. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5728.
133. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4299–4300; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5726–5728.
134. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5874–5875.
135. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 6041; and MWO R.A. Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6631–6633. According to Maj Kyle, the transfer of 2 Commando to High View Tower was the sole change in training attributable to the disciplinary incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992. His evidence was that massive modifications to the training plan were not considered necessary (Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4037–4038).
136. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5730–5734.
137. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5734, and vol. 32, pp. 6103–6104.
138. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5734.
139. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, p. 6169; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6967–6969.
140. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8320, and vol. 43, pp. 8351, 8548.
141. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4308–4309, 4317, 4389, and vol. 24, p. 4523; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5735–5736.
142. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
143. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4470–4471.
144. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4464–4465.
145. Testimony of MGen MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8298.
146. Testimony of MGen MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 42, pp. 8318–8319.
147. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 8065–8066.
148. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 8064–8065.
149. For example, in an October 19, 1992, letter to MGen MacKenzie, BGen Beno identified several deficiencies in the CAR, of which the discipline problem was only one: Document book 15, tab 18.
150. Testimony of MGen MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8337.
151. Exhibit P-64, Document book 15, tab 18, p. 2.
152. Testimony of MGen MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8351.
153. Exhibit P-78, Document book 29, tab 7.

154. Testimony of MGen MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8533.
155. Testimony of LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9027; and LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9453. LGen Gervais' testimony suggests that minutes of the Army Council's deliberations were kept: Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9488–9489. Nonetheless, the record of decision taken by the Army Council on October 20 and 21, 1992, contains no mention of the decision to replace LCol Morneault: Document book 118B, tab 6, DND 443565.
156. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9455–9456, 9462.
157. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9010.
158. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9010.
159. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9192.
160. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9192.
161. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9008.
162. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9452.
163. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9456, and vol. 48, p. 9699.
164. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9699.
165. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9441.
166. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9980–9981.
167. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9464–9467.
168. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8118; Exhibit P-54, Document book 7, tab 6; Exhibit P-82, Document book 32, tab 15.
169. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8103.
170. Exhibit P-65, Document book 16, tab 1.
171. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8108.
172. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8057.
173. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9301.
174. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8404.
175. Exhibit P-82.1, Document book 32A, tab 8.
176. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8404–8405.
177. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9482–9483.
178. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4051.
179. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8103.
180. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6348.
181. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 8016–8017; Exhibit P-66, Document book 17, tab 5.
182. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8118.
183. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2335; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3924–3925.
184. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8118.
185. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 8016–8017, and vol. 42, pp. 8242–8243.
186. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6343.
187. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6343.
188. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6344.
189. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7195.
190. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, p. 7480.
191. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6344; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7195.
192. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7195.

193. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7195.
194. Exhibit P-64, Document book 15, tab 27, Annex A, p. 7.
195. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6345.
196. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6345.
197. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 5, DND 003192.
198. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 5, DND 003194.
199. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 5, DND 006566.
200. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9054.
201. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9054.
202. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
203. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
204. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3; Exhibit P-72, Document book 23, tab 2.
205. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
206. LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, pp. 7175–7176.
207. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7177.
208. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7579–7580.
209. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
210. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
211. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
212. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 3.
213. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 7919–7920.
214. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 7920.
215. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8410.
216. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7998.
217. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 6; Document book 84, tab 2, DND 424291.
218. Exhibit P-51, Document book 4, tab 6.
219. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7925; Exhibit P-68, Document book 19, tab 9.
220. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7938–7939.
221. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7943, 8002.
222. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7943.
223. Exhibit P-72, Document book 23, tab 2.
224. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7940.
225. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7995.
226. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7991–7992.
227. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8513.
228. Testimony of Cpl Smetaniuk, Transcripts vol. 138, pp. 28008–28013.
229. Incident 86 (see annex to Volume 5, Chapter 40, Military Justice).
230. Incident 7 (see appendix to Chapter 40).
231. Incidents 24, 42, 43, and 80 (see appendix to Chapter 40).
232. Incidents 22 and 62 (see appendix to Chapter 40).
233. Incident 68 (see appendix to Chapter 40).
234. Incident 9 (see appendix to Chapter 40).
235. Testimony of LCol Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, p. 19005.
236. Incidents 4, 37, 41, 70, 71, 73, and 90 (see annex to Chapter 40).
237. Testimony of Sgt Little, Transcripts vol. 110, pp. 22052–22054, 22058, 22064, 22073, 22091; and Sgt Flanders, Transcripts vol. 110, pp. 22112, 22115.
238. Incidents 2 and 54 (see annex to Chapter 40).

239. Incident 8 (see annex to Chapter 40).
240. Incidents 3, 6, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 38, 48, 56, 58, 59, 69, 76, and 83 (see annex to Chapter 40). Two of the incidents described involved two Canadian Forces members.
241. Testimony of Maj Armstrong, Transcripts vol. 179, pp. 36908, 36910.



SUITABILITY AND COHESION

Our terms of reference required us to assess the suitability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) for service in Somalia. Our approach to this task involves examining the specific suitability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment for the Somalia mission (mission-specific suitability). Was the CAR adequately manned, organized, equipped, and trained for that particular mission?

The inherent suitability of the CAR is also an important issue. Inherent suitability involves a consideration of several issues, including whether there is an appropriate correlation between the capabilities of the unit and the tasks assigned; adequacy of the organization in terms of command and control; and the adequacy of its resources, the nature of its training, discipline, and the attitudes of its members. Armed forces are composed of functional units, each with specific characteristics and capabilities. Each military unit is designed to be inherently suitable to perform certain types of tasks: air transport squadrons are suitable for air transport tasks, as mine hunting ships are suitable for mine hunting. Similarly, an infantry unit is the appropriate organization to launch an assault on a defended location. To say that a unit possesses inherent suitability, however, does not necessarily mean that a unit is in all respects suitable for every mission. It is at this point that every aspect of mission-specific suitability must be considered. The unit must be ready to assume its particular assigned mission.

Readiness is the state of preparedness of a unit to perform its assigned role. It is not enough that a unit be found inherently suitable to take on a mission of the kind that it ultimately is asked to perform. As regards its actual assignment, the unit must be able to demonstrate that it is operationally ready.

Finally, suitability cannot be assessed solely in terms of role, structure, resources or, indeed, readiness. Unless soldiers work together as a *unit*, trust and depend on one another, and strive for the same goal, they are unlikely to succeed in any endeavour they undertake. The degree to which there is unity or cohesion in a unit is a critical measure of its fitness or suitability for any mission.

Unit cohesion is the product of leadership, training, discipline, and high morale. It gives members of a unit the feeling that they can depend implicitly on their comrades. A strong and cohesive unit acts together under the direction of its official leaders. It is this sense of predictable dependability that gives a unit its strength, especially in stressful situations. On the other hand, a unit lacking in cohesion tends to act in an unpredictable manner, often on the direction of its informal rather than its formal leaders. Again, this tendency emerges most notably when the unit is under stress. Thus, fostering unit cohesion is a cardinal responsibility of leaders, and the degree of unit cohesion is a key measure of operational readiness and, therefore, of suitability.

DETERMINING SUITABILITY AND COHESION

Before a unit can embark on any mission, it must meet certain standards. These standards form the basis for our evaluation of whether the Canadian Airborne Regiment, in the fall of 1992, was fit to go on any mission.

A consideration of the suitability of the CAR would be incomplete without reference to its recent history and the effects of the reorganization of 1992. Against this backdrop we will consider the following questions, which all bear on the issue of the suitability of the CAR for service in any theatre: Was it a formed unit? Had it been assigned missions and tasks from a higher formation? Did it function as a unit? Was it adequately manned? We will then proceed to determine cohesion by addressing these questions: Was there a sound standard of leadership? Was there an acceptable standard of discipline? Did the leaders and subordinates act together? Was there excessive instability or turbulence? Was the unit suitably trained? Finally, we will address the inherent and mission-specific suitability of the CAR.

Some of the factors in determining a unit's suitability and cohesion for a given mission are assessed elsewhere in this report. For example, leadership, discipline, training, and the adequacy of manning are treated in separate chapters.

Suitability

Was the Canadian Airborne Regiment a Properly Formed Unit?

Effects of the Move to CFB Petawawa in 1977

The move of the Canadian Airborne Regiment to CFB Petawawa in 1977,¹ which was the subject of considerable controversy, resulted in manpower reductions and structural changes that significantly reduced the combat power of the Regiment.² Also, the CAR lost its special status-exemption from external taskings — a feature which differentiated it from every other unit of the Army. As a result, the CAR felt its combat readiness had been eroded. In 1982, LCol Harries, Deputy Commander of the CAR, wrote a paper describing the structure and operation of the Regiment at that time:

The truth of the matter is that the Canadian Airborne Regiment is simultaneously the best and worst organization in the army and, arguably, in the CF [Canadian Forces]. It is the best because the Regiment is a collection of very fit and very dedicated young Canadians who temporarily volunteer to leave the comfort, security and relative uniformity of more than a dozen parent Regiments, branches and trades to commit themselves to an elite which strives for the ultimate professional performance.... Notwithstanding its code and the soldiers who practice it, the Regiment is one of the worst organizations in the CF. This because the circumstances under which it must work and play and celebrate its heritage are complex, confused and illogical, and therefore frequently counterproductive...³

The paper argued that, among other things, the move of the Regiment to CFB Petawawa signalled the end of its operational capability as a ready force by its subordination to another formation headquarters. For example, although the role of the Special Service Force (SSF) since September 1980 had been that of a Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group in support of NATO, the CAR was specifically excluded from that commitment. This meant that for a large part of the year, SSF Headquarters was focused on issues not involving the Regiment.

The role of the Regiment was that of a ready, regimental-size force for the Defence of Canada Operations. However, it was impossible for the Airborne Battle Group to form a coherent and effective force by living and training together because the sub-units needed to carry out a full airborne operation of regimental size (i.e., gunners and engineers) were not part of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Rather, they now belonged to non-airborne units committed to CAST. The result was a perceived degradation of unity among unit, airborne battle group, and Special Service Force.⁴

Thus, from the perspective of the CAR, the reduced assignment of CAR as part of the Special Service Force created operational and organizational problems that inhibited the ability of the Regiment to effectively carry out its role as a quick reaction unit in defence of Canada's North. This situation fostered disharmony between the CAR and the SSF, and weakened the regimental structure of the CAR.

The Hewson Report

As discussed more fully in our chapter on discipline, problems within the CAR became apparent by the mid-1980s. This led the Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen Thériault, to order a study in 1985 to review disciplinary infractions and anti-social behaviour within Force Mobile Command (FMC), and, in particular, the Special Service Force and the CAR. This study, known as the Hewson report, after MGen Hewson, then Chief of Intelligence and Security, reached several important conclusions about the state of the Regiment at that time.⁵

On the question of command, the report described the Canadian Airborne Regiment as a unique, continuing "organizational phenomenon" that made it difficult for the regimental commander to exercise disciplinary authority.⁶ The Canadian Airborne Regiment was unusual in that under Canadian Forces Operational Order (CFOO) 3.21.5 it could be both a unit within the SSF or a formation operating independently, and the commandos could be either sub-units or units within an independent formation. The CFOO did not identify the commandos as units, but they were perceived as such. The Commander SSF found it necessary to designate as commanding officers each of the five officers commanding commandos, an awkward and unbalanced arrangement. The result was that five of the subordinates of the regimental commander had the same disciplinary powers as the regimental commander. Although practical arrangements evolved whereby the commanding officers voluntarily restricted their powers in deference to their regimental commander, MGen Hewson noted that this total reliance on an unofficial arrangement "must be detrimental to the due process of military law", and concluded that the organization was an impediment to discipline.⁷

LGen Belzile, Commander FMC, wrote to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in response to the report. He emphasized, in part, that commandos must continue to have unit status and be commanded by commanding officers. He warned, to little avail, that a failure to make these arrangements would impair morale in the Regiment and result in further anti-social behaviour.⁸

Independence of the Commandos

The three infantry commandos retained a separate and distinct character. This distinctiveness was encouraged in a number of ways: separate residences for each commando at CFB Petawawa, 'friendly' competitions such as athletics and, most importantly, a vertical command structure linking each commando to the level above it but not to other commandos. For example, the Airborne Indoctrination Course had formerly been held for all Airborne initiates collectively, but by 1991, each commando conducted its own indoctrination course.

The commandos acted in concert on training exercises. However, each commando platoon was responsible for a specific task and, consequently, members did not mix with each other during training. This may have enhanced cohesion at the platoon level but at the expense of fostering cohesion at the commando and regimental levels.

Testimony also showed that the commandos differed from one another. According to the Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO (ret) Jardine, in 1992 the soldiers in 2 Commando were mostly young and single; most lived in quarters and exhibited somewhat less professionalism than members of 1 Commando and 3 Commando. The behaviour of the 2 Commando soldiers was aggressive, and CWO (ret) Jardine testified that 2 Commando seemed to have a love/hate relationship with the other commandos.⁹

There was an ongoing rivalry among all commandos, particularly in relation to 1 Commando, a Francophone unit. Although, CWO Jardine and others believed no particular antipathy existed between the Francophones and Anglophones,¹⁰ contrary evidence emerged. LCol Morneau observed tension between the two groups, but considered it to be normal, reflecting Canadian society.¹¹ However, Maj Kyle observed that the announcement of 1 Commando's victory in the 'march and shoot' competition for that year failed to elicit even polite applause from the other commandos at the annual Christmas dinner — an indication that there was something more negative than mere rivalry involved.¹² Cpl Purnelle of 1 Commando noted that the Francophones in 1 Commando were not very concerned with what was going on in the other commandos, and there was generally little intermingling among platoons.¹³

Several witnesses criticized the structure of the CAR for its lack of integration of the commandos, contrary to the situation earlier in the Regiment's history. CWO Jardine believed that the structure of the Regiment — in effect, the independence of the commandos — made it difficult to deal effectively with discipline in 2 Commando. The structure of unit independence, he said, made the top of the regimental structure a "sort of guiding hand" to control the commandos. Thus, each commando had its own unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).¹⁴

Maj Seward, at that time the Officer Commanding (OC) of 2 Commando, testified that separating the commandos along strong regimental lines had not been wise, since such a system made unit cohesion difficult to attain.¹⁵ Similarly, CWO Jardine testified that the change resulted in loss of control, as evidenced by the fact that the commandos were no longer working together.¹⁶ Moreover, Maj Kampman of the Royal Canadian Dragoons testified that since the rifle commandos had previously been trained essentially to operate independently in battle, he was concerned about the ability of the commandos to work closely together, after restructuring, as part of a more integrated unit. He observed that after Exercise Stalwart Providence in the fall of 1992, integration had not developed to the point where the commandos operated effectively together, although this was expected of companies in an infantry battalion.¹⁷

However, other witnesses, generally of more senior rank, disagreed with this assessment. For example, LCol Morneault said that the CAR had been acting effectively as a unit, even prior to the transition in the summer of 1992.¹⁸ Maj MacKay testified that despite differences among the commandos, there was a level of cohesion based on their belonging to the same organization and sharing the same maroon-beret spirit.¹⁹ The CDS, Gen de Chastelain, and the Commander of the Army, LGen Gervais, and others did not believe that the independence of the commandos in itself would affect the stability of the Regiment.²⁰

Indeed, even in the wake of the Somalia deployment, the high command continued to support the regimental affiliations between regular infantry regiments and the CAR. In his 1993 response to the CDS's direction to examine leadership and discipline within the CAR, LGen Reay, at that time Commander of the Army, argued that manning the Regiment would become more difficult to sustain in the long term without the affiliation, although he did not explain why. He therefore did not recommend termination of the regimental affiliation between the regular infantry regiments and the CAR. He said that it was clear, however, that the commanding officer could not indefinitely retain the assigning of personnel to the sub-units along absolute regimental lines. For this reason, the commanding officer would eventually be granted the unfettered authority to determine the employment of every person in the Regiment.²¹ This in itself is clear evidence that in 1992 the commanding officer did not have the control over the Regiment that he should have had.

In his 1993 paper, "The Way Ahead", BGen Beno, Commander of the SSF, submitted before the de Faye board of inquiry the following comments on regimental affiliations:

The regimental method of manning 1, 2 and 3 Commando leads to a sense of independence. There is the potential for cliques to develop where otherwise undesirable individuals might be protected. Offsetting weaknesses in one sub-unit by moving personnel to another is generally not done because of current regimental affiliations.²²

FINDINGS

- *Even before the restructuring of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1992, there were recognized deficiencies in the organization and leadership of the Regiment. These differences were exacerbated by the reorganization of 1992, which failed to eliminate the independence of commandos. There is compelling evidence that the CAR was not a properly formed unit.*
- *Francophones and Anglophones generally did not work together, and the relationship between 1 Commando and 2 Commando in particular went beyond mere rivalry, at times becoming hostility. Cumulatively, the result was a lack of cohesion at the most basic level.*

Did the CAR Have a Properly Assigned Mission and Tasks from Higher Headquarters?

Downsizing of the Regiment

As of February 7, 1992, the Regiment had an established strength of 749 members. A proposed reorganization would entail a reduction to 601.²³ At the same time, the units of the Regiment were to be formally disbanded and would become sub-units, although their existing names (1 Commando, 2 Commando, and 3 Commando) would be retained when referring to the three rifle companies of the new battalion.²⁴ One unit, the Airborne Headquarters and Signal Squadron, would no longer exist.²⁵

Col Holmes, the Commanding Officer of the CAR at the time of the transition, testified about the changes resulting from the restructuring. The nature of the Service Commando also changed. Before the change, the CAR could conduct operations and sustain itself for extended periods. Limiting the Service Commando to what was essentially a unit resupply organization, however, meant that it could only look after the needs of the Regiment for a very brief period. The Regiment had therefore lost its capability for self-sustainment. The Mortar Platoon was eliminated from the organization and a new weapons support company created.²⁶ The CAR had been reduced to capabilities similar to those of a smaller line infantry battalion.

LCol Morneault described the transition as a huge team effort, involving much hard work by almost every leader in the Regiment. He pointed out that the transition eliminated the ability of the Regiment to operate without additional support. LCol Morneault looked forward to the Regiment becoming a battalion and the greater cohesion such a change would bring: "It would be a familiar structure to newcomers, coming from other infantry battalions; and, again, sometimes simpler is better."²⁷

The restructuring and downsizing took time. When the warning order for Operation Cordon was received in early September 1992, the Regiment had not physically completed the transition. The Regiment was still turning in excess vehicles and equipment. Planned moves to new building locations had not been finished, nor had buildings been renovated. Also, the regulations, orders, and instructions for the Regiment had not yet been rewritten, although a plan had been drawn up for this purpose.²⁸

Still, LCol Morneault concluded, to our surprise, that aside from the disruption caused by the turnover in personnel during the normal Active Posting Season (APS), the transition itself had no adverse impact on the Regiment.²⁹ Given the extent of the transition and other activities, we must consider whether this assessment was accurate.

Role and Tasks of the CAR during Reorganization

At the time of its deployment to Somalia, the role of the Regiment was to provide rapid-deployment airborne/air-transportable forces for operations in accordance with assigned tasks, primarily in support of national security and international peacekeeping. This role had remained unchanged since it was assigned in 1978. The operational tasks of the CAR were detailed in three Special Service Force (SSF) Defence Plans (DPs):

- SSF DP 200, Civil Aid Operations, assigned tasks to be conducted on order when the Regiment was designated the SSF Immediate Reaction Unit (e.g., armed assistance to federal penitentiaries);
- SSF DP 310, Defence of Canada Operations, assigned the Airborne the following tasks pursuant to receipt of a warning order from SSF Headquarters: maintain the Pathfinder Platoon at 48 hours notice to move and be prepared for airborne operations anywhere in Canada; maintain a commando group at 72 hours notice to move and be prepared for airborne operations anywhere in Canada; and maintain the remainder of the Regiment at 96 hours notice to move and be prepared for airborne operations;
- SSF DP 700, Stability Operations, designated the Regiment as the light infantry battalion component of a United Nations peacekeeping unit. The Regiment's primary task in the normal peacetime state (standby phase) was to be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world as a light infantry battalion for peacekeeping operations.³⁰

The CAR was capable of performing the first two tasks. On a tight schedule, it would have been difficult for the CAR to meet the task as a light infantry battalion, since this task required a slightly different organization and mix of equipment.

The Concept of Employment

Although the CAR did have assigned roles and tasks, consideration of these nevertheless seemed to take a back seat to the restructuring of the Regiment in 1992. For example, by the time the CAR had been downsized to a battalion in June 1992, discussion was still continuing within Land Force Central Area, the Special Service Force, and the Regiment about the appropriate 'concept of employment' for the Regiment.

The purpose of the concept of employment was to detail the appropriate mission and implied tasks of the CAR and its affiliated combat support and combat service support elements.³¹ Land Force Command approved a final concept of employment for the Regiment on November 4, 1992.³² It is clear that the Regiment was reorganized before it was given a new concept of operations. We believe it would have been more logical to develop the concept of employment first, and then design the unit to implement the concept.

In the new concept of employment, the primary role of the Regiment was to "provide a parachute-deployable, combat-capable force in support of Canadian interests at home and abroad." A secondary role was to operate as a light infantry battalion group in low- to mid-intensity operations or in peace-keeping operations anywhere in the world.³³ The proposed organization for Active Posting Season in the summer of 1993 called for a regiment of 665 personnel, including a mortar platoon (unlike the restructured Airborne of the summer of 1992), and a direct fire support platoon (which had not been included in the original planning).³⁴ A subsequent reorganization would be necessary after the Somalia deployment.

Before the deployment of the Regiment to Somalia, senior officers in Land Force Command Headquarters had recognized that to carry out its concept of employment, the Regiment needed additional integral components, including a mortar platoon and a direct fire support platoon. These were never added.

Moreover, under restructuring plans of November 1992, designed for implementation in 1993, the CAR was once again to become an independent unit capable of acting under national or allied control.³⁵ The Regiment was to come under command of the Land Force Central Area (LFCA) Commander.³⁶ BGen Beno, the Commander SSF, was concerned in the fall of 1992 about the plans for the independence of the Regiment, arguing that it should be left as a unit integral to the SSF and detached for tasking to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) or Area Headquarters as desired. He added: "If there was a battalion that needed...firm direction and leadership, it is the [CAR]."³⁷

FINDING

- *The restructuring of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1991 and 1992 by downsizing the Regiment to battalion size took place without first deciding the appropriate 'concept of employment' for it. What emerged was poorly conceived. As in 1977 with the move to CFB Petawawa, the downsizing of the CAR in 1992 occurred without due consideration being given to the appropriate mission, role, and tasking of the CAR. There is some question as to whether the mission and tasks were fully appropriate given the capabilities of the restructured CAR.*

This lack of definition concerning concept of employment, role, and tasking contributed to the impression that the CAR was unsuitable for the Somalia mission.

Was the CAR Adequately Manned?

The Hewson report emphasized the requirement for experienced, mature, and continuous leadership at section and platoon levels, but noted that the relationship between the soldiers and their immediate leaders had deteriorated badly over the preceding 10 years.³⁸ A primary cause was the increase of tasking within Force Mobile Command, which meant that many of the junior leaders were away from the units for months at a time. The turbulence caused by this instability increased due to the need for leaders to attend career courses. Since they lacked effective leadership from junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), many soldiers looked to informal leaders among themselves. As is often the case when informal leadership emerges, many of these informal leaders could not cope with the challenge in a responsible manner.³⁹

The report also noted that although most of the NCOs were outstanding soldiers and leaders, from time to time weak junior NCOs, attracted by the airborne option, had joined the Regiment. They became liabilities contributing directly to a breakdown in discipline. Care had not been taken to ensure that only above-average NCOs, particularly junior NCOs, were chosen for service with the CAR.⁴⁰ Moreover, it became clear that junior leaders were not equipped with the necessary tools to detect personality irregularities that might manifest themselves during training.⁴¹

Clearly, the Hewson report was concerned about deficiencies in leadership of the junior ranks and NCOs in the Regiment. However, while noting the instability within the CAR, MGen Hewson did not view the organizational structure, involving the organization of the Regiment around three independent commandos, as warranting change.

The Opinion of the Director of Infantry

Col Joly, the Director of Infantry, testified in 1993 before the de Faye board of inquiry about the situation of the CAR prior to 1992. He identified a tradition of establishing a rotation among the regiments so that a senior colonel in each of the regiments who had formerly commanded a battalion would be appointed to command the Regiment. Also, a very good lieutenant-colonel was ordinarily selected as deputy commander. The regimental operations officer and regimental major were typically experienced majors with good prospects for promotion to lieutenant-colonel. The commanding officers of the commandos were considered to be leaders with excellent potential for future progression. The aim, in ideal terms, was to place the best leaders in the CAR so that they would, in essence, improve their leadership skills.⁴²

This tradition of quality appointments changed with the downsizing of the CAR. The downgrading of the rank of the commanding officer position had a ripple effect, causing further reductions of ranks in other positions. At that point in time, according to Col Joly, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) majors were not of the highest calibre. (One senior officer had concluded that many of the CAR's field officers were older, and not of the mould that was traditionally expected in the Regiment). Col Joly believed that when commanded by a full colonel, the CAR had been much better served in its assigning of personnel and recruitment because the colonel had participated in the Infantry Council process as an active co-equal, and had been able to garner the support of the regiments involved.

According to Col Joly, the CAR was a special unit, requiring care and attention; otherwise, by default, its quality and efficiency would suffer. The difficulty was that there had been a great deal of confusion brought on by downsizing, and "perhaps as part of this process, the Airborne Regiment has been a casualty in the way it has been manned, for reasons that are not clear but may be more of a parochial nature related to the regiments having other priorities in these changing times."⁴³

In an overview probably written in late 1992, Col Joly also concluded that the Regiment had been manned "with second-and third-string majors, and the third-string ones clearly had no potential." He recognized the possibility that some of the personalities would not be able to cope in Somalia and anticipated that there might be some problems. Col Joly claimed that sometime in January 1993 he had sent a message to LCol Mathieu. The message raised concerns about seven of LCol Mathieu's majors. However, Col Joly stated that the intent had been misinterpreted by LGen Reay, who subsequently directed that his message be destroyed because it caused confusion. The issue was handled by normal staff action.⁴⁴

In his testimony before us, Col Joly reiterated that the overall quality of the majors in the CAR, at least as far as the PPCLI was concerned, had been generally substandard and certainly below the outstanding level — that is, in his words, “second” or “third string”. By second string, he meant that the person would probably not gain command or be promoted to lieutenant-colonel or had not demonstrated the potential to be promoted. By third string, he meant that the person was not likely ever to be promoted. For the CAR, he said, strong leadership skills had been required, including, in the case of majors, the potential to become a lieutenant-colonel commanding officer of a field unit in the Canadian army.⁴⁵

In addition to quality concerns, there was a concern regarding numbers. When the CAR was eventually deployed as the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) to Somalia, it did so under a manning cap of 845 personnel. To meet this restriction, difficult cuts were made. Needed personnel were left behind in Canada. The CAR was sent on a potentially dangerous operation with known shortages in areas such as line infantrymen, security forces, and combat support. They also went without an adequate reserve.

In fact, following the Somalia incidents, senior commanders severely criticized the leadership of the officers and NCOs in the CAR. LGen Reay, for example, commented that the poor quality of some of the regiment’s officers and soldiers posted to the CAR in recent years, ultimately resulted in leadership shortcomings, indiscipline, and the emergence of a small lawless element within the Regiment.⁴⁶

FINDING

- *There was a deterioration in the quality of some personnel assigned to the CAR. This was exacerbated when the Regiment was downsized to a battalion. In addition, there were personnel shortages in several critical areas. Because of this combination of factors, we find that the CAR was not properly manned.*

Did the CAR Function as a Unit?

The reorganization of the CAR in 1992 was substantial.⁴⁷ The preface to “The Canadian Airborne Regiment Transition Plan” describes the transition as involving:

...the simultaneous disbandment of five units; a change of command, the loss of 150 personnel; the reorganization of virtually every platoon in the regiment; the assimilation of Base personnel into our quarters, the RCR into our messes; and a normal posting cycle this summer. All the while we must continue to prepare our soldiers for a possible UN contingency ...and prepare an extensive individual and collective training plan for this fall.⁴⁸

This reorganization, in fact, interfered with the normal routine and appears to have continued beyond the summer into the fall of 1992. The Regimental Commander, Col Holmes, was ordered to minimize unit training as of May 29, 1992, to give the reorganization top priority.⁴⁹ The board of inquiry convened to look into the change of command noted that when LCol Mathieu replaced LCol Morneault as Commanding Officer of the CAR in October 1992, and the Regiment had been reduced to battalion status, "some of the necessary follow-on activity [had] not yet been completed, particularly in the areas of role, organization, equipment and garrison accommodation."⁵⁰ It also noted that the cumulative effect of Operation Python and Operation Cordon over the same time frame as the reorganization and reduction of the Regiment would necessitate a large stocktaking, and that the Regiment would face a daunting challenge to clean house after its return from Operation Cordon.⁵¹

What effect would this reorganization have on the capability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment to go to Somalia? Opinion on this issue was divided. Some senior military officers, including the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Commander Land Force Command (LFC) and his deputy testified that the restructuring was not so great as to prevent consideration of the CAR for selection. It appears that the further up the chain of command one went, the less seriously the problem was regarded.⁵²

However, others of lower rank were much more critical. Col Holmes, the Commanding Officer of the CAR before LCol Morneault assumed command, criticized the restructuring of the CAR. On the question of whether the reorganization had impaired the ability of the Regiment to train for Somalia, he concluded: "From a soldier's perspective I would suggest no; from an administrative perspective, I must question whether the Regiment would be capable of undertaking the operation."⁵³

The plan for the transition, he said, was more long than short term. Although some expertise remained in the Regiment as a result of the extensive training done for Operation Python, downsizing and the Active Posting Season nonetheless meant that a considerable number of new soldiers as well as officers needed to be brought up to the necessary level of expertise. The reorganization, in fact, extended into the fall. Moreover, the CAR had to reorganize and retool itself for Operation Cordon and, since it went to Somalia with armoured vehicles which were not part of the CAR's inventory, it had to re-equip again for the Operation Deliverance mission.

Col Holmes equated the process to the re-engineering of a medium-sized business: an organization with 750 people was being reduced to about 600 and the process was changing virtually every aspect within that organization, including personnel, equipment, vehicles, and administration.⁵⁴ He stated:

"So there's a lot of things in the equation here that in my view, contributed to the possibility of it being slightly off balance, if not more so."⁵⁵

When asked whether tasking the CAR for the Somalia mission had been a wise choice given the tremendous changes in the organization, Col Holmes replied: "It would not have been my choice...it would have been difficult for anyone to pick up the pieces and be ready to go in that short of order, in my view. That's my own personal opinion."⁵⁶

Col Joly, who in 1993 was Director of Infantry at Land Force Command Headquarters, also pointed to deficiencies resulting from the downsizing. Given the various tasks assigned, the CAR had inadequate ready resources to undertake the full range of expected missions, not only domestically but also internationally. Consequently, some of the components needed to augment the CAR could not be adequately trained. Moreover, it would be difficult to bring the components together in the time allowed for deploying (a seven-day response time). If committed to deploy without those resources, the CAR would have had serious difficulty performing its tasks.⁵⁷

MGen (ret) Loomis, author of a recent book on the Somalia deployment, argues that the downsizing of the CAR rendered the CAR ineffective as a functioning regiment. He maintains that the central problem with the Regiment was that by the time it went to Somalia, "it was neither fish nor fowl, neither a brigade nor a conventional Canadian infantry battalion".⁵⁸

According to MGen (ret) Loomis, as long as the CAR was a mini-brigade, with three different mini-battalions under their own commanding officers, with its own attached airborne artillery battery, engineer squadron and logistics unit under a regimental headquarters organized like a brigade headquarters, the situation was tolerable. However, if constituted in this way, every unit would be grossly under strength. In his view, when further reductions forced the CAR to be reorganized into an infantry battalion and partially mechanized for Somalia, it should have been dispersed back to its parent regiments. This would have ensured that the proper checks and balances of the regimental system were working.

FINDING

- *The restructuring changes that occurred within the CAR during 1991–92 left the Regiment ill-prepared to undertake a mission. During restructuring, it was not functioning as a unit.*

Cohesion

The capacity of soldiers to work together as a unit is highly dependent on structure. The infantry battalion constitutes one of the most developed and reliable military structures. It features a chain of command — the classic interrelationship between officers and NCOs — and a place for every member of the unit.

Military analysts agree that cohesion is fundamental to the performance of an army unit.⁵⁹ Leaders continuously encourage and build unit cohesion, especially during training exercises. Cohesion is instilled by emphasizing group loyalty and identification through ceremonies, common traditions, unique uniforms, and distinct practices. When a unit is warned for an operation, a commanding officer must make an extra effort to bring the unit together by providing a clear purpose for a unit's mission and by reinforcing through training, unifying procedures, orders, tactics, and other operating methods. It is critical during this period to demonstrate and exercise the formal leadership system or the authority of the chain of command to establish confidence in the leaders, and to eliminate questions about who is directing the unit in the field.

Any experienced officer asked to evaluate the cohesion of a unit would therefore look for evidence that members of the unit at all levels understand the unit's mission; are performing their tasks according to agreed standing operating procedures; and that orders and directions are flowing through the unit from top to bottom in an efficient manner.

To determine the level of cohesion in the CAR the following questions will be addressed. Was there a sound standard of leadership? Was there an acceptable level of discipline? Did leaders and their subordinates act together? Was there excessive turbulence? Was the unit suitably trained?

Was There a Sound Standard of Leadership?

In this section, we summarize some of the findings illustrating the level of leadership⁶⁰ in the CAR and its impact on cohesion. Strong leadership is associated with high levels of cohesion.⁶¹

Leadership problems were evident at all levels. Officers in the chain of command had lost confidence in LCol Morneau and had him removed as Commanding Officer. The RSM, CWO Jardine, argued with LCol Morneau about the readiness of the unit and openly contradicted his Commanding Officer in front of warrant officers and sergeants.⁶²

LCol Morneau was not the only officer whose ability as a leader was doubted by senior officers and others. Testimony before us shows that senior officers and some senior non-commissioned officers did not trust Maj Seward

or consider him fit for duty in Somalia.⁶³ BGen Beno remarked that he “would fire Seward based on [his] observations and what [he] heard from Col MacDonald,” who conducted Exercise Stalwart Providence.⁶⁴

Immediately before departure for Somalia, the CAR exhibited undisciplined behaviour, including the misuse of pyrotechnics, ammunition, and weapons, engaging in anti-social activities, and acting with hostility towards superiors. This behaviour can be attributed, at least in part, to failures by the unit leaders. Commanders and leaders were not only unable to maintain good order and discipline in the CAR, but were also unable to resolve these problems satisfactorily before the CAR departed for Somalia. Even as late as October 19, 1992, BGen Beno complained to MGen MacKenzie that “the battalion has significant unresolved leadership and discipline problems which I believe challenge the leadership of the unit.”⁶⁵

Officers were not the only poor leaders in the CAR. In 2 Commando, in particular, many non-commissioned officers were young, inexperienced, and demonstrated poor leadership. Two sergeants were found to be unsuitable and returned to their parent units six months after they were posted to the CAR. Another failed to report a soldier known to be involved in an unlawful activity. According to testimony, the RSM, CWO Jardine, was not respected by some soldiers and some officers.⁶⁶

Indeed, leadership problems were so great that in late 1992, BGen Beno identified the deputy commanding officer, the officer commanding 2 Commando, the officer commanding the Reconnaissance Platoon, and as many as 12 NCOs as leadership risks whom he felt should not be deployed to Somalia.

In his letter of October 19, 1992, recommending the replacement of LCol Morneault, BGen Beno wrote that LCol Morneault should be replaced “forthwith” because “for many reasons...including leadership and discipline problems...the Canadian Airborne Regiment is not a steady unit at this time.”⁶⁷

FINDING

- *Significant problems at several levels of leadership undermined the cohesion of the CAR to the point where the Regiment ceased to operate effectively.*

Was There an Acceptable Level of Discipline in the CAR?

The CAR was experiencing signs of poor discipline,⁶⁸ despite the remedies suggested in the Hewson report. This was particularly evident in 1 Commando (initiation rites) and 2 Commando (excessive aggressiveness, defiance of authority). There were also troubling incidents in 3 Commando, Service Commando, and Headquarters Commando, but nothing as remarkable as the others.

The factors that contributed to discipline problems included the quality of some junior officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs); high turnover rates and out-of-unit taskings; mistrust and dislike among some of the officers and NCMs; a tendency to downplay the significance of disciplinary infractions; and the continuing capacity of CAR members to evade responsibility for disciplinary breaches.

In order to attain cohesion, a unit must demonstrate that it can function effectively in a disciplined fashion by promoting recognized standards of conduct. As we indicated elsewhere, this was not the case in the CAR.

FINDING

- *Lack of discipline was one of the reasons the CAR failed to reach a workable level of cohesion.*

Did Leaders and Their Subordinates Act Together?

The command relationship between BGen Beno, Commander of the SSF, and LCol Morneault, Commanding Officer of the CAR, deteriorated throughout the fall of 1992 to the extent that BGen Beno eventually recommended the replacement of LCol Morneault.

Conflicts between senior officers seldom go unnoticed. Some staff members within both SSF HQ and CAR HQ were aware of the differences of opinion between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault. This caused additional stress between the two headquarters and was counter-productive to a strong sense of cohesion.

Relations Between Officers and NCOs

Evidence of low unit cohesion in the CAR immediately prior to its deployment to Somalia was presented to us by other witnesses as well. Among other indicators of poor relations and cohesion within the CAR, they described a significant degree of tension and distrust between some officers and non-commissioned officers.⁶⁹

An officer's task is the command of a unit or sub-unit. The officer is responsible for leading and for devising plans to achieve the objectives for which the officer has been assigned. Those who lead must provide inspiration to their soldiers and be responsible for their well-being. The officer is also responsible for all the paperwork and administration of the officer's organization.

The NCO is responsible to the NCO's superior officer for the day-to-day running of the platoon, for discipline, for seeing that the troops are ready at the right place at the right time, with the correct equipment to carry out the officer's plan. As the eyes and ears of the officer, the NCO is responsible

for keeping superiors informed of the morale, discipline, and well-being of the soldiers and acts as an intermediary between the lower ranks and superiors. The NCO is also responsible for seeing that the officer's policies and commands are passed on down the ranks.

The team of officer and NCO should embody the ideal working relationship at every level of the organization. The officer–NCO relationship represents the nexus between the officers and the troops and the quality of this relationship determines the overall success of the hierarchy. If the officer and NCO can work together co-operatively and transmit a positive impression to the soldiers and to those higher in the hierarchy, there is much less stress on the structure.

The importance of NCOs was emphasized by senior Canadian officers who testified that because officers pass through a unit more quickly than NCOs, the enforcement of discipline within a unit often rests on the shoulders of the regimental sergeant-major, sergeants-major, warrant officers, sergeants, and master corporals. These NCOs have a closer familiarity with the soldiers in the unit. If there is a strong regimental sergeant-major or a strong cadre of NCOs, leadership problems disappear or are minimized. If these leaders are weak, however, problems will arise. Therefore, an important aspect of unit cohesion is the ability of NCOs and officers to co-operate with and trust one another.

Many critical observations were made about the officer–NCO relationship within the CAR before its deployment to Somalia. Maj Kampman of the Royal Canadian Dragoons observed that the more frequent rotation of officers than of NCOs in the CAR made it very difficult for officers to impose their control and their command on their sub-units. Thus, almost by default, the senior NCOs became the old hands in the unit to whom the soldiers looked for leadership.⁷⁰

Maj Seward, Officer Commanding of 2 Commando, observed a change in the composition of the Regiment between his first tour with the CAR while it was at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Edmonton, and his later experience in the Regiment in 1992. Notably, in 1992, the soldiers did not have the infantry qualification-level courses that were available to soldiers in the 1970s and 1980s. There were also more privates than corporals, and the soldiers were younger. This suggests the need for superior NCOs.⁷¹

The Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) was concerned that the authority of NCOs was being eroded. He testified that he disagreed with the posting-out of two sergeants from 2 Commando. The RSM, CWO Jardine, believed that these NCOs were not accepted, and that there was pressure from above (Maj Seward) and below (the junior ranks) to get rid of them.⁷²

CWO Jardine testified that he found it appalling that someone in authority had not known of or taken steps to prevent the controversial hazing or initiation rites involving 1 Commando personnel in 1992, given that orderly corporals, orderly sergeants, and the orderly officers within the CAR itself were on duty in all the barrack blocks. CWO Jardine perceived a problem in the fact that the commando orderly sergeants living in the quarters were actually master corporals and were fairly young. Because they shared the same quarters, they socialized with the soldiers: "You could be socializing with the soldiers at night and the next day you would be out telling them what to do." According to CWO (ret) Jardine, the master corporals should have been segregated from the corporal and private ranks.⁷³

As well, there were numerous instances of poor judgement and bad advice from senior NCMs. For example, when Cpl Powers of 2 Commando first admitted to being responsible, at least in part, for the Kyrenia Club incident, he was advised by his sergeant not to come forward at that time. In CWO (ret) Jardine's view, such advice was "totally wrong".⁷⁴

Evidence of Distrust and Conflict⁷⁵

The quest for excellence and the spirit of competition, when properly harnessed, are positive forces. However, when they are uncontrolled and differences are allowed to fester, they can be counter-productive. In a cohesive unit, differences of opinion are quickly and diplomatically confronted and constructive criticism is encouraged and issues resolved. In a unit lacking cohesion, these problems remain uncorrected and can become divisive.

The level of distrust and conflict emerged clearly from the evidence of the officers and non-commissioned members who appeared before us. In a unit it is not imperative that all individuals like each other, but they must have mutual respect and trust. Unfortunately for the CAR, there was a significant level of distrust and conflict between officers and NCOs. As a result, cohesion suffered greatly.⁷⁶

The examples offered in the preceding section represent only a small part of the overall picture of dysfunctional interpersonal relationships within the CAR presented to us. The image of strained relationships and conflicting views among so many of the officers and NCOs of the Regiment is striking, particularly in light of the singularly weak response of the senior leadership to these problems in the days leading up to the deployment to Somalia.

FINDINGS

- *There was a lack of cohesion among the officers and non-commissioned members of the CAR — leaders and their subordinates did not act together.*
- *Generally, the failure to separate master corporals from the rest of the troops in barracks weakened the NCO chain of authority.*
- *The officer–NCO cohesion within the Canadian Airborne Regiment was weak. Conflict and distrust existed among several officers and NCOs within the Regiment. This affected the proper functioning of the chain of command.*

Was the CAR Suitably Trained?

Our evidence shows that the mission-specific training provided to the CAR for its tour of duty in Somalia was poorly planned, poorly delivered and, in some instances, clearly inadequate.⁷⁷

Surprisingly, a systematic approach to the training of peacekeepers was almost totally absent in the CF. Training on peacekeeping-related matters was left to the ad hoc exigencies of pre-deployment training. Adding to this deficiency was the fact that the CAR received insufficient support and consideration from NDHQ, Land Force Command Headquarters and Land Force Central Area Headquarters during its pre-deployment preparations.

Training is an important aspect of cohesion. It serves to instil the personal self-confidence that individuals need to do their job. Training builds trust by demonstrating the value of teamwork. Without proper training, teamwork, and unit cohesion suffer.

FINDING

- *Problems encountered in training the CAR also served to lower the cohesion in the unit.*

Was there Excessive Instability in the CAR?

In the days leading up to its deployment, the CAR was characterized by instability or turbulence, possibly due to a high turnover rate of personnel in the unit. Instability results from postings in and out, the movement of personnel from one position to another within the Regiment, and readjustments made when individuals leave their positions to take career courses. Other reasons for turnover include high priority taskings outside the unit, the need to augment training establishments, and the need to find individual replacements for other peacekeeping missions. Typically, in peacetime, the number of personnel in a unit is well below the number required in times of war. Also, when

preparing to embark on peacekeeping missions, some reorganization is always necessary. As a result, there is always more work to do in a unit than there are people to do it. Excessive turnover and less than adequate resources can cause breaks in the chain of command and may adversely affect cohesion in a unit.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment not only experienced a change in leadership at the commanding officer level but three of the four commando OCs were also changed.

Within 2 Commando itself, from 1990 to the summer of 1993, the commanding officer or officer commanding changed six times and the sergeant-major was changed four times.⁷⁸ Similarly, a considerable turnover of the corporals and privates occurred in 1991 and a substantial turnover of officers and non-commissioned officers took place in 1992.⁷⁹ The CAR, which had just undergone a major reorganization, was profoundly affected by the turnover in positions within 2 Commando.

Maj Seward testified that when he took over command in 1993, 2 Commando consisted of about 136 persons of all ranks, of whom about 50 per cent had changed during the Active Posting Season of 1992. Most of the changes had occurred at the rank of private and corporal. Also, two of the three platoon commanders had changed, although the platoon warrant officers had not.⁸⁰

FINDING

- *There was a substantial turnover of personnel within the Canadian Airborne Regiment during the Active Posting Season of 1992. Such a rate of changeover was not unique to the Regiment itself, but was nonetheless excessive and contributed to lowering the cohesion of the unit during the period of preparation for Operation Deliverance.*

Inherent Suitability

The selection of the Canadian Airborne Regiment also raises the issue of whether such units are inherently suitable for peacekeeping or peace-making operations.⁸¹

A defence publication lists air mobility, quick reaction, flexibility and lightness of arms as characteristics that set airborne forces apart from more conventional forces.⁸²

A former commander of the Airborne, LGen (ret) Foster, identified several other characteristics that are, in his view, unique to an airborne regiment: a high state of readiness (available within 48 to 96 hours); independence; ability to dramatically increase in size; an enhanced rank structure; maximization

of fire power; an exceptional fitness requirement among soldiers; and a direct line to the senior commander.⁸³

Despite this list of impressive qualities, LGen (ret) Foster conceded that generally speaking, the past operations of the CAR had not required the specific characteristics he had listed.⁸⁴ He denied, however, that the CAR had been a regiment in search of a mission, one that could be considered a luxury. Instead, he compared the CAR to an insurance policy, in that it was ready to go and was cost-effective.⁸⁵

Paratroopers and the Constabulary Ethic

The question remains whether paratroops, as opposed to other infantry, are appropriate for peacekeeping or peace-making activities. Equally important, from the perspective of the Somalia operation, is the question of whether paratroopers believe themselves to be appropriate for such activities.

An American study conducted on the attitudes of paratroopers as peacekeepers, presented data pointing to a potential incompatibility between the parachutists' creed and what the study refers to as 'the constabulary ethic'. The same study also indicated a greater potential for problems such as boredom among such troops on peacekeeping missions.⁸⁶ This conclusion is supported by a 1990 examination of peacekeepers in the Sinai which concluded that although paratroopers had served well as peacekeepers, a "significant minority" had experienced attitudinal conflicts with the constabulary ethic.⁸⁷

Another American study published in 1985 suggested that the ability of paratroopers to adapt to peacekeeping operations depended largely on the expectation of career enhancement. According to this study, paratroopers who expressed a positive orientation toward a combat role and negative feelings about undertaking a peacekeeping assignment, could nonetheless adapt to the relative passivity and boredom of peacekeeping operations, provided such assignments were perceived to be career-enhancing.⁸⁸

The studies of American paratroopers suggest that many, albeit a minority, felt that peacekeeping could not be effectively performed without the use of force; that peacekeeping did not require special skills; and that peacekeeping was not the kind of job that paratroopers should be called upon to do. Such soldiers were seen as likely to question the appropriateness of a peacekeeping mission for their unit. Inasmuch as the CAR trained regularly with its allied counterparts, it is possible that these attitudes may have influenced some members of the CAR or that they may have had such attitudes quite independent of any outside influence. It is the responsibility of leaders to see to the elimination of such attitudes.

Mission-Specific Suitability

Mission-specific suitability simply means that the unit selected for a mission was chosen on an appropriate selection basis and, when properly prepared for its mission, was capable of conducting the mission successfully.

One factor cited as favouring the CAR's selection for Somalia was the Regiment's designation as Canada's UN standby unit, and the high state of readiness that this designation implied. Many witnesses emphasized the CAR's standby status as a major factor in its selection.⁸⁹

Gen (ret) de Chastelain, in response to criticism of the choice of the CAR for peacekeeping missions, pointed out that the CAR had been the UN standby unit for more than 20 years and had done "exemplary service in Cyprus during the Turkish landings in 1974". He added, "We should not apologize in any way for the [CAR] being a UN force."⁹⁰ He was supported by LGen Reay, Commander of Land Force Command, who saw the paratroop nature of the Regiment as an additional advantage in its selection as the UN standby unit.⁹¹

Policy for Selecting Peacekeeping Units

The instructions for designating a UN standby unit are found in the CDS's 1990 "Direction to Commanders 1990-96", and contain the CDS's personal and primary operational direction to the Canadian Forces. The mission of Mobile Command was to maintain combat-ready general-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence commitments. Among Mobile Command's tasks was the need to contribute to land forces as directed in support of international peacekeeping obligations.⁹²

According to NDHQ Instruction DCDS/85, in keeping with government policy to support peacekeeping operations, the Canadian Forces was required to maintain at an advanced state of readiness, for deployment anywhere in the world, a force designated "PK" standby unit, comprising three components:

- a combat arms unit, configured as a light infantry battalion, including support weapons detachments;
- a tactical air transport element; and
- a communications element capable of providing communications for a brigade-size force.

The view of the Canadian Forces in the late 1980s, it appears, was to deploy operational units on peacekeeping duties. The Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90, Peacekeeping,⁹³ stated:

During the Cold War there was an apparent reluctance to reduce the effectiveness of formations and units by removing components for peacekeeping duties. This concern was exacerbated by the 1970s when a number of Canadian peacekeeping contributions had come to comprise primarily support personnel committed to long-term operations. In turn, the option was seen to lie in the creation of ad hoc units and sub-units for peacekeeping, drawing on support trades from across the CF. Recently, there has been a trend back to deploying contributions drawn from a formed unit. Sources stated that this was related to a number of factors: superior unit cohesion and performance; the end of the Cold War; UN requests for a better balance of combat and support contributions; and, usually, finite six-month mandates.⁹⁴

The Quick-Deployment Issue

The capability to deploy quickly, in accordance with the status of a UN standby unit, was one of the factors in the selection of the CAR for Somalia. However, as matters developed, despite its status as a light infantry unit specializing in deployment by parachute, there was nothing in the designation of the CAR as Canada's UN standby unit that uniquely suited it for the Somalia mission.

Although, in theory, the CAR could have deployed within seven days, it was highly questionable whether it was capable of conducting the mission in Somalia immediately after the seven-day deployment period. LCol Morneau testified that although the CAR could have deployed within the seven-day period, its preparation for the mission would have been less well done; thus, any declaration of operational readiness would have been delayed until the unit was in theatre.⁹⁵ LGen (ret) Foster testified that peacekeeping missions often took from weeks to months to be put in place, "So that's not a 48-hour to 96-hour kind of business."⁹⁶

Ordinarily, the seven-day notice period meant that the CAR would be basically equipped with the soldiers' personal equipment and the weapon systems that they could carry into a mission area. However, the Somalia deployment called for the kind of equipment that was suited to the work of a mechanized battalion. Therefore, large quantities of equipment not normally belonging to the CAR had to be transferred to the unit, packed into sea containers, and loaded onto ships. Also, members of the CAR had to be trained to a new role as a mechanized unit. As a result, the CAR could not possibly deploy within seven days for the Somalia operation and, initially, 30 days' warning was given.⁹⁷

In our view, the lack of objective standards for declaring operational readiness⁹⁸ and a perceived rush to deploy caused a premature declaration of operational readiness of the CAR.

The CAR had major defects that hindered its operational readiness. It was in the midst of a fundamental reorganization in addition to a change in its concept of operation. The reorganization had been taking place for some time but all the issues involving the new organization had not been resolved. Although primarily trained as an airborne light infantry battalion, it was expected to operate in Somalia as a mechanized infantry battalion, a considerably different concept.

The difficulty in making this adjustment was seriously downplayed. Only rudimentary training had been completed, and then, only at the section and platoon levels. The cohesion necessary to employ the commandos in support of each other and the integration of the infantry and armoured resources were never exercised. Had the CAR been forced to deploy as a battle group or combat team (believed to have been a distinct possibility prior to their departure from Canada), it would have done so without the benefit of any familiarization training or common standing operating procedures. Also, the logistics concept needed to support the operational concept was neither practised nor tested.

FINDING

- *By any realistic standard, the CAR was neither sufficiently cohesive nor operationally ready to take part in operations in Somalia.*

CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed two significant aspects of military operations: suitability and cohesion.

To be suitable for any type of deployment, a unit must meet certain conditions, be properly formed, have properly assigned missions and tasks, and be adequately manned. We have found that the CAR was not a properly formed infantry battalion because it was beset by organizational stresses and limitations of a kind that should not have been placed on an infantry battalion. In addition, compounding the CAR's difficulties was the fact that the CAR was not properly manned because due care and consideration were not taken in selecting many of the key personnel, especially the leaders.

To possess the cohesion necessary for deployment to Somalia, the CAR had to meet certain conditions: it had to possess sound leadership and exercise acceptable discipline; it also had to have leaders and subordinates act in concert. This could only occur with proper training and relative stability in the ranks.

We found significant leadership failings, at several levels, which were serious enough to weaken the cohesion of the CAR to the point that it ceased to operate effectively. In this regard, there was less than an acceptable level of discipline which, in turn, reduced the level of cohesion in the CAR. The leaders and their subordinates failed to act in unison and, in many cases, were in conflict. These shortcomings also served to reduce the level of cohesion within the CAR.

Although, in theory, the CAR was inherently suitable for the mission to Somalia, its actual state of leadership, discipline, and unit cohesion rendered it unfit for any operation in the fall of 1992.

From a mission-specific perspective the CAR had been improperly prepared and inadequately trained for its mission, and by any reasonable standard, it was not operationally ready for employment on Operation Deliverance.

Although the CAR may have been suitable for its mission by virtue of the fact it was a major combat arms unit, its dysfunctional organization, poor cohesion and low mission suitability rendered it unsuitable for deployment to Somalia.

NOTES

1. A brief history of the Canadian Airborne Regiment is provided in Chapter 9.
2. David A. Charters, *Armed Forces and Political Purpose: Airborne Forces and the Canadian Army in the 1980s* (Fredericton, New Brunswick: Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1984), pp. 74–75. See also Document book 120C, tab 3, pp. 73–74.
3. LCol J.D. Harries, "The Canadian Airborne Regiment — A Proscribed Elite", November 22, 1992, Document book 120A, tab 2A, p. 2.
4. Harries, "The Canadian Airborne Regiment", p. 7.
5. MGen C.W. Hewson, "Report on Disciplinary Infractions and Anti-Social Behaviour within Force Mobile Command with Particular Reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment" (Ottawa: September 1985), Exhibit P-48, Document book 1, tab 1 (the Hewson report).
6. Citing Canadian Forces Organizational Order (CFOO) 3.21.5 (March 1, 1985), MGen Hewson pointed out that although the order stated that the officer appointed to command the Canadian Airborne Regiment was a commanding officer holding the appointment of a regimental commander, it also said that when the Canadian Airborne Regiment was deployed as an independent unit or formation, the regimental commander was designated as an officer who could exercise the powers and jurisdiction of an officer commanding a formation (Hewson report, pp. 33–34).

7. Hewson report, pp. 34–35.
8. Letter, LGen Belzile to Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), “Disciplinary Infractions and Anti-Social Behaviour within FMC”, Document book 1, tab 3, Annex A, p. A-4.
9. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4583.
10. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, pp. 4669–4670; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5691. In his testimony Maj Seward talks about one of his men referring to 1 Commando personnel as “spies” because they spoke a different language.
11. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 7183–7184.
12. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3930–3931.
13. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6827–6829. More specifically, the Francophones of 1 Commando concerned themselves very little with what was going on in 2 Commando and 3 Commando. Anglophones and Francophones were brought together only in platoons outside the commando structure — the Reconnaissance, Mortar, and Direct Fire Support platoons. Paratroops of 1 Commando lived in their own barracks and did not involve themselves very much with the Anglophone commandos.
14. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4640.
15. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5690–5691.
16. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4544–4545.
17. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5209.
18. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7029–7030.
19. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6333–6335.
20. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9898–9907; and LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9387–9393.
21. LGen Reay, “Response to Leadership and Discipline Issues — Canadian Airborne Regiment Board of Inquiry”, confidential, October 28, 1993, Document book 48AH, tab 2.
22. “The Way Ahead — Canadian Airborne Regiment Command, Control, Manning And Internal Operations”, service paper attached to letter, BGen Beno to MGen Vernon, May 5, 1993, Document book 32, tab 5.
23. “Canadian Airborne Reorganization Order”, Exhibit P-54, Document book 7, tab 19, Annex A.
24. “Regimental Considerations — Reorganization of the Canadian Airborne Regiment”, Exhibit P-54, Document book 7, tab 21, p. 2.
25. “The Canadian Airborne Regiment Transition Plan”, Exhibit P-54, Document book 7, tab 17, Serial 5, pp. 5–4/5.
26. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 648–649.
27. Evidence of LCol Morneau to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1443.
28. Evidence of LCol Morneau to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1444.
29. Evidence of LCol Morneau to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1444.
30. “Board of Inquiry, Change of Command, Canadian Airborne Regiment”, June 12, 1992, Document book 123, tab 6, p. 11/114 [hereafter, Board of Inquiry (Change of Command)]; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), November 13, 1992, Document book 7, tab 6, Annex C, p. 12/92.
31. “Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment”, First Draft, Document book 7, tab 18, p. 1/6.

32. "Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment", November 4, 1992, signed by BGen Vernon, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Land Force Command Headquarters, and containing typed signature of LGen Gervais, Commander, Document book 29, tab 19.
33. "Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment", November 4, 1992, pp. 9/12 to 10/12.
34. "Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment", November 4, 1992, Appendix: "Outline Organization Canadian Airborne Regiment: APS 93", p. A-1/11.
35. "Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment", November 4, 1992, p. 10/12.
36. LGen G. Reay, "The Canadian Airborne Regiment: Recommendations for Consideration", April 19, 1994, Document book 56G, tab 9, p. 2/2.
37. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, Commander Land Force Central Area, September 24, 1992, Document book 13, tab 28, DND 003179.
38. This is discussed more fully in Volume 2, Chapter 20, which deals with personnel selection and screening.
39. Hewson report, pp. 29–30.
40. Hewson report, p. 29.
41. Hewson report, p. 29.
42. Evidence of Col Joly to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1316–1317.
43. Evidence of Col Joly to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1318–1319.
44. Evidence of Col Joly to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1320–1321; 1328–1329.
45. Evidence of Col (ret) Joly to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 3190–3192.
46. LGen Reay, "Response to Leadership and Discipline Issues — Canadian Airborne Regiment Board of Inquiry", p. 2/5.
47. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 20, Personnel Selection and Screening, and Chapter 21, Training.
48. "The Canadian Airborne Regiment Transition Plan", Document book 7, tab 17, Preface, p. i.
49. Canadian Airborne Regiment Reorganization Order, February 7, 1992, Document book 7, tab 19, p. 1.
50. Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), November 12, 1992, Document book 17, tab 4, Executive Summary, p. 4/92.
51. Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), Executive Summary, p. 5/92.
52. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9894–9901; LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9387–9393; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8951–8956.
53. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 665.
54. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 647.
55. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 668.
56. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 693.
57. Testimony of Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 17, pp. 2936–2939.
58. Dan G. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Ottawa: DGL Publications, 1996), p. 40.

59. See J.C.T. Downey, *Management in the Armed Forces: An Anatomy of the Military Profession* (London: McGraw Hill, 1977), p. 62, quoted in LCol C.A. Cotton, "A Canadian Military Ethos", *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 12/ 3 (Winter 1982-83), p. 11:
An armed force is a body of men organized to achieve its ends irresistibly by coordinated action. Cohesion is, therefore, the essence of its being.
See also James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 171, quoted in Cotton, "A Canadian Military Ethos":
Before anything else, we must recognize that a functioning military requires bonds of trust, sacrifice, and respect within its ranks, and similar bonds of support and respect between an army and the nation it represents.
See also, Col (ret) Reuven Gal, "Unit Morale: From a Theoretical Puzzle to an Empirical Illustration — An Israeli Example", *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 16 (1986), p. 559:
[T]he strength of unit cohesion has been shown, time and time again, to be a key factor in the soldiers' level of morale and combat efficiency...
60. The leadership issue is a central theme of this report and is discussed more fully in Chapter 15, Leadership, and Chapter 20, Personnel Selection and Screening, both in this volume; chapters 24 and 25, Mission Planning, in Volume 3; and chapters 26 through 37, on the failures of senior leaders, in Volume 4.
61. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978).
62. Evidence of LCol Morneau to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1474-1475; and evidence of CWO Jardine, vol. IV, pp. 855-856.
63. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4579.
64. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7998.
65. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8063.
66. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6251-6252, and vol. 34, p. 6560.
67. Document book 15, tab 18, pp. 1/2-2/2, DND 000573 and DND 000574.
68. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 21, later in this volume.
69. This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 18.
70. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5250.
71. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5670.
72. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4594.
73. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4560-4561.
74. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4620-4622.
75. This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 21.
76. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5671-5676, 5682-5683, 5685-5687, 5702-5704, 5718-5725, 5735-5736, 576057-657601; WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 32, pp. 6703-6705, 6714-6715, vol. 34, pp. 6584-6587, 6633-6634, 6628-6629; Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4984-4986; Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6245-6252, 6277-6278, 6544-6546; Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3883; and Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6836.
77. A full discussion of training is provided in Chapter 21.
78. Evidence of LCol Mathieu to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1203.

79. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, pp. 253–254. By contrast, LCol Morneau testified that the rate of turnover for officers (53 per cent) was close to normal for Airborne officers, whose tours of duty were two years. Moreover, to our surprise, he was of the view that the 60 per cent turnover rate was not overly high for new master warrant officers, given the seniority of the former master warrant officers before the transition. The practice of the CAR was usually to keep senior NCOs for a maximum of four years (two tours of two years each).
80. Evidence of Maj Seward to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1215.
81. This issue is also referred to in Chapters 21 and 23.
82. DND, *Airborne*, vol. 1, Airborne Operations (B-GL-310-001/FT-001, 1990), p. 1-2-1.
83. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 381–385.
84. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 439–443.
85. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 444–446.
86. David R. Segal, Jesse J. Harris, Joseph M. Rothberg and David H. Marlowe, "Paratroopers as Peacekeepers", *Armed Forces and Society* 10/4 (Summer 1984), p. 504.
87. David R. Segal, Theodore P. Furukawa and Jerry C. Lindh, "Light Infantry as Peacekeepers in the Sinai", *Armed Forces and Society* 16/3 (Spring 1990), pp. 386–387.
88. David R. Segal and Barbara Foley Meeker, "Peacekeeping, Warfighting, and Professionalism: Attitude Organization and Change among Combat Soldiers on Constabulary Duty", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 13 (Fall 1985), pp. 179–180.
89. Testimony of Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 16, p. 2999; LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3412–3413; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7857, and vol. 42, pp. 8256–8258; LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8951–8952; and Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9899–9901.
90. Document book 125, tab 5.
91. LGen G.M. Reay, Commander Land Force Command. "The Canadian Airborne Regiment: Recommendations for Consideration", April 19, 1994, Document book 125, tab 6R, Annex A: "Justification for an Airborne Capability in the Canadian Forces", pp. A/8-10-9/10.
92. CDS Direction to Commanders, 1990–1996, Part 1 (Red Book), Document book 120A, tab 3, DND 363849–363873; CDS Directive to Commanders, 1992–1998, Part 1, Document book 86, tab 1, DND 441651.
93. DGPE, "Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90, Peacekeeping, 1258-77", June 30, 1992, DND 293220.
94. DGPE, "Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90", Part IV: Issues and Findings, p. 135.
95. As well, the selection of the CAR for Operation Cordon came over the summer period (during the Active Posting Season), at which time "just about every unit in the Canadian Armed Forces is ripped to pieces in one way or another...and then you grab everybody back together at the end of that posting season" (testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7623–7628).
96. LGen (ret) Foster distinguished a peacekeeping mission from a combat situation: in a combat situation, the troops would be ready within a 48-hour period (Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 485–486).
97. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3608–3609.
98. Operational readiness is discussed in full in Chapter 23.



PERSONNEL SELECTION AND SCREENING

The key question in assessing the adequacy of the selection and screening of personnel for the Somalia deployment is whether the system, and those who operated it, took unacceptable risks — either knowingly or negligently — in the manning of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) (which made up more than 70 per cent of the Canadian Forces personnel who served in Somalia) and in deciding which members of that unit were suitable to participate in that mission. In answering the question, we must consider these processes in their proper context.

The public should be entitled to assume that members of our standing, professional armed forces who are employed in line units of the Regular Force, and who are available and eligible for peace operations, are sound and reliable individuals — even in the absence of significant pre-mission screening. As discussed in Chapter 8, the Canadian Forces (CF) has a comprehensive and highly structured system for selecting, training and employing its members. While career progression and prospects differ, the path is the same for all members of a given military occupation. This standardization does permit a certain amount of faith that members of the forces are reliable, suitable and competent to perform their duties. However, such faith must not be blind; and those within the system must not allow themselves to become complacent, regardless of how highly developed it is.

Chapter 8 revealed certain gaps and limitations in the screening of CF recruits. Persons with potential for criminal and anti-social behaviour can and do slip into the system and, once inside, may even thrive for a time on some aspects of military life. Unlike the case in most police forces, a criminal record is not a bar to enrolment in the CF, and individual recruitment centres have considerable discretion in assessing the significance of past criminal convictions. There are, moreover, significant restrictions on the uses that can be made of *Young Offenders Act* convictions in the recruit screening

process.¹ Also, unlike applicants to many police forces, CF recruits are not normally subject to psychological stability testing and assessment.² Finally, information obtained during the security clearance process can be used only for that purpose and not for other administrative, disciplinary, or investigative purposes.³

Further, in terms of post-enrolment, there are widespread reservations within the CF about key aspects of the career management system, such as the fairness and effectiveness of the performance evaluation reporting system; the accountability of National Defence Headquarters career managers; and general perceptions that career management in the CF appears often to be more preoccupied with individual career development than with operational imperatives.⁴

This raises the pervasive and vexing problem of careerism. Careerism is the phenomenon whereby the individual's need or desire for career advancement in an institution takes precedence over the needs of the mission or the well-being and effectiveness of the institution. Careerism is inconsistent with the performance of duty in pursuit of the needs of the service. It is a problem that is by no means unique to the military. Nonetheless, the military, more than other institutions in society, has as part of its ethos — and, indeed, part of its *raison d'être* — the notion of sacrificing personal interest for the common good. Even more to the point, it is the military, more than almost any other institution, that prides itself on translating this ideal into practice. So we consider it appropriate, and indeed incumbent upon us, to comment on this phenomenon.

The precepts of careerism seem to have become entrenched in the attitudes of many members of the CF. This is particularly noteworthy in the upper echelons, where some senior officers have tended to hitch their stars to selected superiors, cultivated their performance to the personal standards of their bosses, and rationalized their actions — and sometimes their sense of values, particularly loyalty — on the basis of their understanding of their bosses' imperatives. As discussed in Chapter 15 on leadership, this has had the effect of shifting individual senior officers to the transactional form of leadership, trading institutionally required qualities of transformational leadership for unduly loyal performance to the standards of their superiors.

It is only human, of course, for people to be concerned with the development and progress of their careers — or for mentors to be concerned with the promotion of their protégés. Moreover, it is entirely appropriate for an institution to take an interest in the development and well-being of its employees, including the meaningful development of their careers with that institution. This is important not only for employee morale, but also in ensuring that talent and potential are fully exploited or, at least, not squandered. In the case of the military, the further dimension of this obligation rests

on the concept that individuals are encouraged to forgo self-interest in favour of the group in the understanding that the group will look after them. Attention to rational career development therefore serves both institutional and personal interests. Indeed, the attention paid to personal and career development by the Canadian Forces is to some extent a worthy example for other employers and institutions. But to the extent that such concerns find systemic expression in the institution, it must be clear at all times that the interests of the institution come first and that considerations of individual career development are legitimate only to the extent that they coincide with the needs of the institution.

Unfortunately, we have seen strong evidence of careerism creeping into and distorting the integrity of the personnel system as well as other crucial systems of accountability. Potential candidates for important jobs in various units were excluded from consideration if they were likely to be promoted during the normal term of such a posting.⁵ In selecting someone to fill a key sub-unit command position in the Canadian Airborne Regiment in the summer before the Somalia mission, the most desirable candidate was sent on course by his parent regiment rather than to the CAR. The career manager and the member's regiment believed that a tour with the CAR at that time would delay the member's career advancement.⁶ In another case, a platoon commander in the CAR was allowed to continue with a course in the United States during critical pre-deployment training in the fall of 1992, leaving the platoon in the hands of the second-in-command.⁷

It is bad enough when line units take a back seat to the needs and preferences of individual candidates and their mentors and proxies. But careerism also contributed to a performance appraisal system that was overly reluctant to criticize and to record instances of shortcomings. It led to the downplaying of misconduct by subordinates and reluctance to take appropriate remedial measures in some cases. At its worst, careerism inspired the cover-up, or attempted cover-up, of serious incidents of negligent, and even criminal, misconduct.

So, while the phenomenon of careerism is often associated with the personnel and career development system, both its roots and its implications extend much further, with the potential to threaten all aspects of the institution.

In addition to these systemic gaps and shortcomings, the CF personnel system is subject to a variety of constraints that affect its capacity to screen and select members rigorously. First, recruitment and promotion in the military are a response to organizational and operational imperatives as well as to the relative merit of individuals.⁸ Vacancies in the authorized establishment must be filled. Second, in the appointments process, the best candidates for the job may not always be available. They may require further education, training, or work in a different position for their long-term career development.

And although the needs of the service are supposed to take precedence over individual career development,⁹ those institutional needs have both a long- and a short-term dimension to them. After all, it is in the interests of the CF that members with superior potential progress more rapidly so that their talents can be put to optimum use. Paradoxically, then, the more members excel in particular jobs, the more they will ultimately be needed elsewhere. The chain of command is responsible for establishing the proper balance between short- and long-term needs, always recognizing the primacy of operational readiness and effectiveness.¹⁰ Third, the military is subject to federal laws governing human rights and privacy which tend to restrict the potential intrusiveness of the military in vetting its members.¹¹ Finally, concerns about morale within the military also serve to restrain any impulse to overly aggressive screening and monitoring of CF personnel.

Recognizing these limitations, all members of the chain of command with personnel responsibilities must be vigilant and conscientious in discharging these responsibilities, including responding to lapses in discipline and professionalism by their subordinates. The personnel system is only as good as those who operate it. If those with personnel-related responsibilities simply rely on the other components of the system, or are otherwise lax in performing their duties, problems will inevitably develop and recur.

This is not to say, however, that the CF should be looking to get rid of members at the first sign of difficulty. The CF should continue to be, as some witnesses described it, "a rehabilitative institution".¹² However, operational effectiveness and good order and discipline must be the priority, and the CF personnel system is not, and never will be, a substitute for diligence on the part of supervisors and commanders at all levels in discharging the full range of their personnel responsibilities. These include getting to know their subordinates — their strengths and weaknesses; taking or recommending appropriate disciplinary or administrative action, or informal forms of counselling and guidance; conscientious and candid performance evaluation reporting; and recommending and appointing only the best available candidate for the job, based on appropriate criteria.

Thus the adequacy of the selection and screening of personnel for the Somalia deployment depended on the effectiveness of both the personnel system itself and the actions and decisions of individuals at all levels of the chain of command who were operating and overseeing that system.

We turn now to the particular processes used to select and screen personnel for the Somalia mission, including posting to the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and pre-deployment screening.

MANNING OF THE CANADIAN AIRBORNE REGIMENT

As indicated in Chapter 8, very few participants in an operation like the Somalia deployment are selected individually for that mission. The Force commander is the notable exception. Most other personnel are deployed because their unit is selected and dispatched by the national chain of command. Thus, in the case of the Somalia deployment, the quality of personnel selection for service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment was obviously crucial to the success of subsequent screening for the mission itself. It is to this aspect of the question that we turn first.

Selection Criteria for the Canadian Airborne Regiment

Apart from being parachute-qualified and volunteering for airborne duty, there were no formal standards for posting to the CAR. There was, however, a widely shared perception of the attributes considered desirable for Airborne personnel. It had long been recognized in Land Force Command (LFC) that the CAR had a special need for physically fit, experienced, and mature soldiers at all levels of the organization — non-commissioned members, the junior leadership ranks, and the commando and regimental leadership alike. Yet these criteria were never formalized. What informal criteria there were and the rationale for them are discussed in more detail below.

The Special Challenge of Selecting Airborne Soldiers

Airborne forces, characteristically, need to be at a higher state of readiness than non-airborne troops. They need to be ready for action within 48 to 96 hours, and they are intended to be employed in areas where other ground forces do not have access and tend to operate in high-intensity situations on their own resources for short periods.¹³ These employment characteristics were reflected in the concept of operations for the CAR. The unit's conceived role included being ready for rapid deployment anywhere in Canada and being Canada's standby unit to conduct UN operations on short notice.¹⁴

As a result of this concept of operations and the demands of parachuting, there was generally a higher physical fitness requirement for Airborne soldiers.¹⁵ Because of these physical demands, service in the CAR was voluntary.¹⁶ Naturally, an applicant for service in the CAR had to be parachute-qualified, or had to be willing to become so.¹⁷

Given the CAR's planned operational role and the physical demands on its members, it was also generally recognized that Airborne soldiers needed to be somewhat more aggressive than other soldiers.¹⁸ But as one CF behavioural scientist wrote in a 1984 study, there is an implicit risk of inappropriate behaviour in an organization that selects for aggressiveness:

...it may be extremely difficult to make fine distinctions between those individuals who can be counted upon to act in an appropriately aggressive way and those likely at some time to display inappropriate aggression. To some extent, the risk of erring on the side of excess may be a necessary one in an organization whose existence is premised on the instrumental value of aggression and violence.¹⁹

Land Force Command was aware of the special challenges in selecting personnel for the Canadian Airborne Regiment well before the Somalia mission.²⁰ They knew that particular care had to be taken to ensure that experienced and mature personnel were appointed to the CAR — including junior and senior leaders who could manage the natural enthusiasm and aggressiveness of Airborne soldiers.²¹

Informal Selection Criteria for Junior Ranks

It was widely acknowledged that soldiers should be posted to the CAR only after they had had the chance to adjust fully to military life through service with a regular infantry battalion after battle school.²² The Hewson study of 1985 found that, with the benefit of this prior experience, junior non-commissioned members (NCMs) exhibited better self-discipline during their Airborne service and were less apt to be led astray by misguided informal leadership or peer group pressure.²³ Land Force Command leadership at the time agreed with these recommendations and reiterated to the feeder regiments the Canadian Airborne Regiment's special need for mature non-commissioned members who had one to two years' experience in a regular infantry battalion, as well as above-average performance and excellent physical condition. However, it was consciously decided at that time not to insist on the rigid application of these criteria, for fear of being unable to keep the CAR at its required 90 per cent strength as a high-readiness unit, bearing in mind the voluntary nature of service with the Regiment.²⁴

Informal Selection Criteria for Leadership Positions and Impact of the 1992 Restructuring

It was also well understood that particularly strong leaders were needed to command Airborne soldiers.²⁵ For the regimental commander's position, there was the additional challenge of commanding personnel from different

regiments and being able to bring them together to function as a cohesive unit.²⁶ The CAR's brigade commander observed in the fall of 1992 that the Canadian Airborne Regiment "is the hardest unit to command."²⁷ Hence, it was considered desirable that the commander of the CAR be an experienced unit commander.²⁸ In addition, the need for above-average, mature and conscientious non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior officers to temper the enthusiasm of Airborne soldiers was recognized several years before the Somalia deployment.²⁹

When the CAR was restructured in 1992 and downgraded to a status equivalent to that of a battalion, the position of regimental commander went from being a post-command appointment in the rank of colonel to a regular unit command in the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In other words, before the appointment of LCol Morneault in 1992, commanders of the CAR would have had previous battalion command experience with their parent regiments before commanding the CAR. But even though the unit Commanding Officer (CO) position was being reduced from colonel to lieutenant-colonel, there was some debate about whether it should become a first command or should continue as a post-command appointment.³⁰

Normally, a candidate for battalion command would have completed the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College course as well as the CF Command and Staff College course. Officers are selected to attend command and staff college while in the rank of major. They are selected in one of two ways: from the top half of the merit list for majors, or by the chain of command immediately following their tour as a sub-unit commander on the basis of superior or outstanding performance as assessed in their performance evaluation reports and by their regiments. They should also have commanded a rifle company and would normally have served in a series of staff appointments at various levels of Land Force Command.³¹

In the absence of official selection criteria for the position of commanding officer of the CAR, the NDHQ career manager for lieutenant-colonels in 1992, Col Arp, developed some unofficial criteria. According to these criteria, the successful candidate would be at the lieutenant-colonel rank (having been appointed to that rank within the last five years) in the combat arms, preferably infantry; would have prior successful command at the company level; would be at least functionally bilingual (since a third of the unit was drawn from the predominantly Francophone Royal 22^e Régiment); would have a desire to command; would have previous Airborne experience, preferably including an operational deployment; would have completed a range of combat and command courses (much of which would be implicit in achieving the rank of lieutenant-colonel); would have good potential for subsequent promotion; would be recommended by the relevant regimental council; and, ideally, would have previous command experience as a lieutenant-colonel.³²

Another consequence of downgrading the CAR to battalion status was that commanders of the CAR commandos went from being more senior majors — with at least five to seven years in rank, with previous command experience in that rank (usually command of a rifle company in an infantry battalion), and who had commanding officer status — to being more junior majors in their first command role in that rank.³³ Aside from losing the greater disciplinary powers of a commanding officer, the drop in the status of the appointment implied different qualifications and different assumptions about the command potential of the appointee. The incumbent went from being someone with previous company command experience as a major, and often senior officer education at the CF Command and Staff College, to being a junior major without senior officer training and without necessarily having commanded at the sub-unit level.³⁴ According to Col (ret) Joly, a former director of infantry and former regimental colonel of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, it is at the level of captain and especially major where "it becomes apparent who the best people are" and who should rise to command companies, battalions, and brigades. Hence, the 1992 reorganization of the CAR meant that command of the Canadian Airborne Regiment commandos went from being a job for senior majors with definite potential for higher command,³⁵ to being a proving ground for majors.

The Selection Process

The CAR was composed essentially of personnel posted from the three regular infantry regiments: The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) and the Royal 22^e Régiment (R22^eR). While some CAR members remained for several years, personnel were posted to the CAR with the expectation that they would return to their parent regiments.³⁶ Members had a career affiliation with their parent regiment, rather than with the CAR. This feature of service with the CAR was underscored by the fact that, since the late 1970s, the three line commandos of the CAR were manned strictly on the basis of regimental affiliation: 1 Commando by the R22^eR, 2 Commando by the PPCLI, and 3 Commando by The RCR.³⁷

The effect of this arrangement was that the parent regiments retained an oversight and advisory role for promotions and appointments in the Canadian Airborne Regiment.³⁸ So, for example, in the case of the appointment of the commander of 2 Commando, the appointee would be from the PPCLI and that regiment's representative, usually the regimental colonel, would consult with the career manager and the branch adviser and make the recommendation to Land Force Command Headquarters, subject to any objections by the CAR commander.³⁹

In the case of appointing the CAR commander, all three regimental councils would be asked for recommendations. The deputy commander of Land Force Command would meet with the three regimental colonels, and they would select the CAR commanding officer, subject to the approval of the Commander Land Force Command.⁴⁰ Generally, an attempt was made to rotate the appointment among the three parent regiments, although this was by no means strictly observed.⁴¹

Another distinctive practice was the so-called 'Airborne Offer' promotion. Since service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment was voluntary, it was sometimes necessary to allow a member to be promoted earlier than would otherwise be the case, to ensure that all positions in the CAR were filled at the appropriate rank levels.⁴² Land Force Command policy limited a member to one such promotion in a career.⁴³

Selection of NCMs for the CAR was an informal process within the parent regiments, involving infantry battalion COs and regimental career managers.⁴⁴ Each battalion kept a list of those applying for parachute training and Airborne service.⁴⁵ Although service with the CAR was voluntary, the parent regiment chain of command suggested it to an individual if they deemed it appropriate.⁴⁶

CWO Cooke, who served as NCM career manager for the PPCLI from 1991 to 1994, testified about the process for selecting soldiers for service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment.⁴⁷ Physical fitness and job performance were said to be the main selection criteria.⁴⁸ Regimental merit lists were consulted, and candidates had to pass a physical training test. Ideally, the candidate would have at least 18 months' service in the parent regiment before applying to the CAR. Candidates would also be expected to have completed a primary combat function course and a specialty qualification, such as reconnaissance patrol or mortar. An applicant's conduct was said to have been a factor in selection. According to CWO Cooke, if members selected for parachute training subsequently experienced disciplinary or administrative problems, they would be removed from the unit's list for Canadian Airborne Regiment service.⁴⁹ The most significant selection factor was the recommendation of the company commander and the company sergeant-major.⁵⁰ However, the battalion CO made the final recommendation.⁵¹

Postings of personnel from the parent regiments to the CAR were finalized at the annual infantry NCM merit boards. The boards were composed of all the battalion COs and regimental sergeants-major for the three regiments, who met to decide on promotions and extensions of service contracts. During these proceedings, participants met separately by regiment and conducted regimental business, including deciding on postings to the CAR.⁵²

The CAR commander always had the authority to return members to their original units if they did not measure up, but this was not done often. Essentially, the CAR had to trust the parent regiments to send the right people.⁵³

Tour lengths in the CAR varied, but generally the more junior ranks stayed for longer periods. The normal tour for an officer was two to three years; for senior NCOs it was generally two to four years. However, members could stay with the CAR indefinitely if they were willing to continue to volunteer for Airborne service.⁵⁴ Some NCOs did stay for many years. There was evidence, however, that this was often not a positive phenomenon for either the individuals or the CAR. It was felt to limit individuals' experience, perspective, and career advancement unduly and to create the potential for inappropriate situations of informal leadership.⁵⁵

Adequacy of the Manning of the Canadian Airborne Regiment at the Time of the Somalia Deployment

We heard detailed evidence on the selection of particular individuals for key positions in the CAR in 1992.⁵⁶ This was a critical year for the Canadian Airborne Regiment in two ways. First, the Regiment was being reorganized from a regiment to a battalion. This had implications for how the unit functioned, both operationally and administratively.⁵⁷ Second, as we have seen, the reorganization had implications for the level of experience required of those occupying the key command positions — all this at a time when the CAR would be deployed on its first UN mission in several years.⁵⁸

Evidence presented before us called into question the suitability or relative quality of a number of personnel selections for the CAR. In reviewing this evidence, it is not our purpose to criticize the individuals in question but to evaluate the process for manning the CAR, including the actions and decisions of those responsible for that process.

Evidence of Problems with the Process

At times, the personnel system seemed to rely blindly and bureaucratically on formal appraisals and was not responsive to other sources of relevant information that were often more revealing. A key tool in selecting CF personnel for promotions and appointments, the annual performance evaluation report, was known to downplay a member's weaknesses.⁵⁹ Yet they were heavily relied on, while informal yet often more candid comments were often ignored or rejected. For example, while LCol Morneault was given a 'superior' rating in 1991–92 as the Deputy Commander of the CAR by his superior, Col Holmes, the latter nonetheless had reservations about LCol Morneault's

suitability to succeed him as Airborne Commander.⁶⁰ According to Col Holmes, the jobs of commander and deputy commander were different and required different strengths.⁶¹ He and the Brigade Commander at the time, BGen Crabbe, made their concerns known to Land Force Command.⁶² But MGen Reay and LGen Gervais preferred to rely on the career manager's assessment of the personnel records and the discretion of the regimental senate of the R22^eR,⁶³ or La Régie, which had nominated LCol Morneau for the job in the first place. By the same token, criticisms of the proposed selection of Maj Seward as Officer Commanding (OC) 2 Commando from his predecessor, Maj Davies, were ignored by the career manager and not forwarded to the chain of command.⁶⁴ Similarly, Maj Seward failed to heed a warning about Cpl Matchee when selecting him for a master corporal appointment just before the deployment.⁶⁵ In the case of Capt Rainville, his personnel files contained no references to la Citadelle or Gagetown incidents (see Chapter 18, Discipline), even though his Brigade Commander had recommended that his letter about the matter be placed on Capt Rainville's file.⁶⁶

Although 'the best person for the job' was supposed to be the prevailing ethic in CF appointments — particularly for key posts, such as battalion and company commander — a variety of extrinsic factors were allowed to influence the process.

At times, career management plans for individuals were permitted to take precedence over the needs of a key combat arms unit like the CAR. As we have seen, candidates likely to be promoted during the normal term of a posting were excluded from consideration,⁶⁷ and the preferred candidate for appointment as officer commanding 2 Commando was sent on a course instead of to the CAR in 1992. The career manager and the member's regiment thought that a tour with the CAR at that time would delay the member's career advancement.⁶⁸

More arbitrary administrative imperatives were also allowed to distort the selection process. For example, NDHQ refused to allow any exceptions to its decision not to promote any infantry captains in 1992. For the CAR, this resulted in two contenders for the 2 Commando OC job being dropped from further consideration — one of whom was particularly highly regarded.⁶⁹

Even completely irrelevant factors, such as inter-regimental and national politics, were sometimes allowed to influence key appointment decisions. It was precisely these factors that resulted in the selection of LCol Mathieu over two other candidates,⁷⁰ both of whom had already commanded battalions successfully with their parent regiments,⁷¹ while LCol Mathieu had not.⁷² It was decided by the Commander Land Force Command, LGen Gervais, that the Royal 22^e Régiment should be given a chance to redeem itself following the relief of LCol Morneau.⁷³ It was also considered desirable to avoid a perceived slight to the R22^eR at that particular time because of the impending

referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.⁷⁴ Amazingly, considerations of this type were allowed to carry the day even though the CAR was a few weeks away from its first UN mission in several years and the Land Force chain of command was aware of problems in the unit that had contributed to the highly unusual step of relieving the Commanding Officer of his command.⁷⁵

In selecting personnel for key leadership positions in the CAR, the chain of command showed considerable deference to the judgement of the regimental councils of the parent regiments. These bodies are outside the chain of command and are not accountable for their personnel selections. Yet, a career manager testified that the recommendations of regimental councils were practically decisive in matters of personnel appointments. While regiments normally have to live with the results of a poor choice,⁷⁶ even this constraint did not apply to external postings, such as those to the CAR. One might have expected that this would make the chain of command more inclined to review and second-guess the regiments' nominations for the CAR. But this was not the case.

The PPCLI knew that Maj Seward was not the best choice to lead 2 Commando.⁷⁷ The Commander of the CAR at the time, Col Holmes, also felt that the PPCLI could have done better in that case.⁷⁸ But when told that PPCLI would not put forward any more nominees, Col Holmes refrained from pressing the matter further, as he could have done.⁷⁹ The Commander and Deputy Commander of LFC, LGen Gervais and MGen Reay, were similarly disinclined to go beyond the Royal 22^e Régiment's nominations for commanding officer of the CAR in 1992.⁸⁰ This was in the face of actual concerns expressed by the outgoing CAR and Special Service Force (SSF) commanders with respect to LCol Morneau.⁸¹ Furthermore, after LCol Morneau was relieved, the new nominee of the R22^eR, LCol Mathieu, was accepted immediately even though he had not previously been selected to command one of its own battalions — in contrast with the nominees of the PPCLI and The RCR.⁸²

Even when the NDHQ career manager, Col Arp, asked for more nominees from the R22^eR after questions had been raised in the LFC chain of command about LCol Morneau, the president of the R22^eR, BGen Zuliani, simply reconfirmed LCol Morneau's nomination and did not attempt to provide alternative candidates.⁸³

Furthermore, before the Somalia deployment, there were no official Land Force Command criteria for the key positions of commanding officer of the CAR and the officers commanding the commandos — beyond the most obvious, such as holding the right rank and being parachute-qualified.⁸⁴ What unofficial criteria there were would be waived to accommodate regimental nominees. Neither LCol Morneau nor LCol Mathieu had previously commanded a battalion, even though this experience was desirable in

a CAR commander.⁸⁵ Likewise, Maj Seward had not previously commanded a rifle company.⁸⁶ Yet, in all these cases, other candidates who had the desired attributes were available, or could have been made available.⁸⁷ In this context, it is worth noting that the CAR was the CF standby unit for rapid response and UN operations⁸⁸ and that combat arms unit commands (such as command of the CAR) were supposed to be among the CF's top staffing priorities, second only to UN force commands.⁸⁹

Another weakness in the personnel system was the manner in which the Delegated Authority Promotion System (DAPS) was applied to the CAR.⁹⁰ As described in Chapter 8, the DAPS allowed Land Force Command combat arms units to promote soldiers to master corporal who did not have the minimum prescribed time in rank but were otherwise qualified for the appointment.⁹¹ Master corporal is an important appointment, representing the first level of leadership in the CF,⁹² and NDHQ would authorize a DAPS only where the normal promotion system could not produce a sufficient number of them.⁹³ But the CAR had a practice of using the DAPS to avoid posting in master corporals from the parent regiments, thus allowing the unit to reward good performance among soldiers already serving in the CAR.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, because of the CAR's policy of manning commandos along the lines of parent regiment affiliation, this practice significantly reduced the selection base (from battalion to company). This in turn greatly increased the risk of promoting to a junior leadership position soldiers who had insufficient experience and maturity and who would be overly familiar with their subordinates⁹⁵ — precisely the opposite of what the CAR needed, as indicated in the Hewson report.⁹⁶

Cpl Matchee was appointed to master corporal through the DAPS on November 30, 1992.⁹⁷ He received this promotion even though he had participated in the Algonquin Park incident of October 3, 1992;⁹⁸ he was removed from a section at the request of the sergeant commanding that section just before deployment because his behaviour and attitude were disruptive;⁹⁹ and his platoon warrant officer and platoon commander objected to the appointment because of concerns about his attitude and discipline.¹⁰⁰ Cpl Matchee's platoon second in command even recommended to the Platoon Commander, Capt Sox, and the Company Sergeant-Major for 2 Commando, MWO Mills — and through them to Maj Seward — that Cpl Matchee be left behind during the forthcoming deployment to Somalia.¹⁰¹

Evidence of Problems with CAR Personnel

Land Force Command long knew of the special need for mature and experienced soldiers and leaders in the CAR, and the Hewson report of 1985 provided an explicit and detailed reminder to LFC of these needs. The chain of command also knew that the CAR depended on the three regular infantry

regiments to meet these needs by sharing their best personnel¹⁰² and that this situation created at least the potential for a conflict of interest, since the regiments had an obvious interest in keeping as many of their better soldiers and officers as possible.¹⁰³ Further, the 1991–92 reorganization meant that for the first time, key leadership positions in the CAR would be open to persons who had not already been selected for equivalent positions in their parent regiments.

Despite these warnings and signals, and although the CAR had been designated as Canada's standby unit for emergency UN operations, key figures in the LFC chain of command would later concede that insufficient care had been taken in selecting personnel for the Airborne Regiment.¹⁰⁴

There was evidence of persistent suspicions that the parent infantry regiments deliberately sent less than their best personnel to the Airborne Regiment, or sent those they found too aggressive.¹⁰⁵ For example, despite the excessive actions of Capt Rainville during exercises while he was serving with the R22^eR in 1991–92 — actions that the chain of command considered inappropriate at the time — he was posted to the CAR in 1992. The CAR was not even informed of these incidents until Capt Rainville had been with the unit for a few months.¹⁰⁶ To give another example, Pte E.K. Brown apparently got drunk and broke a window in his barracks in Calgary on the eve of his departure for Petawawa.¹⁰⁷ While appropriate officials in 2 Commando were made aware of this, it certainly did not delay his new posting.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, in the case of Cpl Matt McKay, given that the DND's Special Investigation Unit had information about his activities in 1990¹⁰⁹ and that a photograph of him giving a Nazi salute had been published in a Winnipeg newspaper,¹¹⁰ together with the fact that his platoon commander in the PPCLI had counselled him about his association with such organizations,¹¹¹ it is likely that his parent unit was aware of his involvement with racist groups when they posted him to the CAR.

According to CWO Jardine, regimental sergeant-major at the time, an official from the PPCLI with whom he spoke in the early 1990s suggested that they made a point of not sending their best soldiers to the Airborne.¹¹² Moreover, there was evidence that at least one of the parent regiments was reluctant to take back non-commissioned officers who had been with the CAR for a number of years when this was suggested by the CAR commander and the regimental sergeant-major.¹¹³

Maj Seward alleged that the previous commander of 2 Commando had deliberately sought inferior NCOs from the PPCLI for the Airborne to achieve a better distribution of performance evaluation report (PER) ratings among senior NCOs in 2 Commando.¹¹⁴

Although he testified that he felt that the screening of soldiers from the R22^eR was generally adequate, the Officer Commanding 1 Commando in

1991–93, Maj Pommet, indicated that, on at least one occasion during his tenure, a soldier was sent to 1 Commando while on counselling and probation. This is contrary to CF regulations. Maj Pommet sent the soldier back to his original unit.¹¹⁵

Also in contrast to the spirit of the Hewson report, there was evidence that the parent regiments would often try to use the CAR as a training ground for NCOs. If an NCO did well, he would sometimes be called back and replaced by someone less experienced.¹¹⁶ LCol (ret) Mathieu testified that he felt that the battalions of the parent regiments would sometimes use the CAR as a “training centre” for soldiers presenting discipline problems in garrison.¹¹⁷

Whether the Airborne was used as a dumping ground for problem personnel or not, it is clear that the parent regiments did not always send the right people to the CAR. Moreover, at least in the case of the PPCLI, a number of key people in the LFC chain of command and in the parent regiments were aware of this in the period leading up to the Somalia deployment.¹¹⁸

Despite the Hewson report’s emphasis on the CAR’s particular need for mature and experienced personnel, a number of witnesses indicated that, at least in the early 1990s, the Airborne was receiving too many soldiers — both NCMs and NCOs — who were younger and less experienced than had formerly been the case.¹¹⁹ Maj Seward, (the OC in 2 Commando in 1992–93) for example, noticed a much greater proportion of privates among the NCM ranks when he took over 2 Commando in the summer of 1992, than during his previous tour in the late 1970s.¹²⁰ Moreover, some soldiers were still being sent to the CAR fresh from regimental battle school, even though this was generally considered undesirable.¹²¹

In particular, the calibre of the selections from the PPCLI in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed to decline.¹²² Correspondingly, 2 Commando — which consisted entirely of members from the PPCLI — was experiencing discipline problems throughout this period. Key personnel in the CAR, the PPCLI, and the LFC chain of command were aware of this, or came to be aware of it at some point.¹²³ Despite the efforts of 2 Commando’s Company Sergeant-Major, MWO Mills, to reassert discipline in the sub-unit during the previous year, Maj Seward conceded that 2 Commando definitely had more than its share of discipline problems in 1992–93.¹²⁴ Personnel of that commando generated more charges and administrative action, both at CFB Petawawa and in Somalia, than any other sub-unit of the CAR.¹²⁵ Moreover, it was predominantly 2 Commando members who were the subjects of general court-martial arising from events in theatre.

Nor were the problems confined to the junior ranks. Senior NCOs in 2 Commando seemed to lack the experience and maturity of those in other commandos.¹²⁶ During preparations for the Somalia operation in the fall of 1992, two sergeants had to be replaced.¹²⁷ Maj Seward had problems

with another sergeant who had advised a soldier to delay coming forward to confess his involvement in setting off illegally obtained military pyrotechnics at the junior ranks' club in early October of that year.¹²⁸ Maj Seward also had problems that fall with a warrant officer who had failed to follow his directions while in command of his platoon during training.¹²⁹ Significantly, two officers (Maj Seward and Capt Sox) and two senior NCOs (Sgt Boland and Sgt Gresty) from 2 Commando were among those court-martialled in relation to the beating death of a civilian prisoner in Somalia on March 16, 1993. Both Maj Seward and MWO Mills had to be replaced by LCol Mathieu during the deployment.¹³⁰

LCol (ret) Mathieu testified that, after the March 16th incident, he realized that the PPCLI had sent weak leaders for the top three posts of 2 Commando in 1991–92: the officer commanding, the second-in-command, and the company sergeant-major.¹³¹

Yet the suitability of Maj Seward as Officer Commanding 2 Commando was an issue even before the March 16th incident. Several officials, including the PPCLI's regimental colonel, were dissatisfied with the selection of Maj Seward in the first place, or at least felt that PPCLI should have been able to come up with a better candidate.¹³² During preparations for the Somalia mission, the Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons — which was helping the CAR with a pre-deployment training exercise — and the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, both recommended to the CAR CO that Maj Seward be replaced.¹³³ Later, during a review of the personnel files of CAR majors conducted during the mission, Land Force Command concluded that Maj Seward did not meet the newly established criteria for Airborne Regiment majors.¹³⁴

During the Somalia deployment, Maj Seward was a disappointment to his CO, LCol Mathieu.¹³⁵ He discharged his weapon accidentally on one occasion and was convicted of negligent performance of duty; he was later given a reproof by LCol Mathieu for this incident as well as for failing to control his soldiers on certain occasions; and after the beating death of a civilian detainee by 2 Commando soldiers, LCol Mathieu replaced Maj Seward and sent him back to Canada.¹³⁶ Maj Seward was later court-martialled in connection with that homicide for having instructed his subordinates to abuse prisoners as a deterrent to infiltrators to the camp. He was convicted of negligent performance of duty and sentenced to a severe reprimand.¹³⁷ On appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court, his sentence was increased to three months' imprisonment and dismissal from her Majesty's Service.¹³⁸ Maj Seward's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.¹³⁹

Problems with the suitability of key personnel were not confined to 2 Commando and the PPCLI during this crucial period. Many people in the unit questioned the appropriateness of CWO Jardine (from The Royal

Canadian Regiment) as Regimental Sergeant-Major — or at least found him difficult to work with.¹⁴⁰ Some also questioned whether The RCR could not have come up with a better candidate than Maj MacKay for Deputy Commanding Officer of the CAR.¹⁴¹ He, along with Maj Seward and the Officer Commanding Service Commando, Maj Vanderveer (from the PPCLI), was found not to meet the newly announced LFC guidelines for CAR majors in March 1993.¹⁴² While LFC found no fault with the performance of Maj MacKay and Maj Vanderveer, it was felt that both lacked battalion command potential, and Maj MacKay was older than the optimal age for a CAR major (35).¹⁴³

Another source of problems was the CAR's Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, Capt Rainville, who was posted to the Airborne from the 2nd Battalion of the Royal 22^e Régiment in the summer of 1992. The SSF and CAR's Commanding Officer found out several months later that Capt Rainville had been involved in some troubling incidents during exercises in the winter of 1991–92. During training operations at CFB Gagetown, he had been too aggressive in his treatment of 'prisoners of war'. In February 1992, he exceeded his authority in conducting a simulated raid on la Citadelle in Quebec City to check security at that site. He used prohibited or restricted weapons to threaten and frighten security guards into opening the vault where weapons were stored. Civilian police were called, and the incident was reported in the news media. The incident became the subject of a significant incident report to higher headquarters.¹⁴⁴ In a letter to BGen Beno, Capt Rainville's superior commander, BGen Dallaire wrote that Capt Rainville had shown a serious lack of judgement.¹⁴⁵ BGen Beno instructed LCol Morneau to give Capt Rainville a verbal warning.¹⁴⁶

Later, there were newspaper photographs of Capt Rainville with knives strapped to his belt, contrary to dress regulations.¹⁴⁷ The *Journal de Montréal* published an article where Capt Rainville is reported as conveying the impression that Airborne Regiment soldiers were trained or had a mandate for such activities as assassinations, kidnappings, and counter-terrorist operations.¹⁴⁸ BGen Beno recommended to both LCol Morneau and LCol Mathieu that they seriously consider leaving Capt Rainville behind during the Somalia mission.¹⁴⁹

In Somalia, Capt Rainville planned and led the security patrol that resulted in the shooting death of one Somali civilian and the wounding of another on the night of March 4, 1993. He was court-martialled and acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm and negligent performance of duty in relation to this shooting.

The CAR even had problems with the two commanding officers supplied by the Royal 22^e Régiment in 1992–93. Neither LCol Morneau nor LCol Mathieu was at the top of the Regiment's command list, and neither had been offered command of a R22^eR battalion.¹⁵⁰ LCol Mathieu had been

a lieutenant-colonel for seven years at the time, so it was highly unlikely that the Royal 22nd Regiment had any intention of ever offering him command of one of its battalions.

Only four months after LCol Morneault took command of the CAR, the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, formally requested that LCol Morneault be relieved of command. BGen Beno indicated that he could not declare the unit operationally ready as long as LCol Morneault remained CO.¹⁵¹ He believed that LCol Morneault did not properly appreciate the unit's training priorities and failed to involve himself sufficiently in the direction of the training.¹⁵² As a result, the unit was behind in its training for the mission, according to BGen Beno.¹⁵³ The Commander SSF also noted problems with internal unit cohesion, as well as "unresolved leadership and discipline problems which... challenge the leadership of the unit."¹⁵⁴ BGen Beno recommended that LCol Morneault be replaced, and his superiors in the LFC chain of command accepted the recommendation.¹⁵⁵ The Commander Land Force Command, LGen Gervais, took the decision to relieve LCol Morneault of command on October 20, 1992.¹⁵⁶ He was succeeded by LCol Mathieu a few days later.

LCol Mathieu led the unit during the Somalia deployment, but he was relieved of his command in September 1993 and charged with negligent performance of duty in relation to orders, given while the CAR was in Somalia, concerning the use of deadly force. LCol Mathieu was twice acquitted of this charge by a general court-martial, and he took voluntary release from the CF in October 1994.

In general, there was significant dissension and a lack of confidence among key personnel in the CAR's chain of command, both before and during the deployment. The following account is by no means exhaustive. The Base Commander at Petawawa and head of the Canadian contingent for United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), Col Cox, and the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, did not get along with LCol Morneault. LCol Morneault thought that his Operations Officer, Capt Kyle, was inexperienced. For his part, Capt Kyle, along with BGen Beno and the latter's Operations Officer, Maj Turner, did not have confidence in LCol Morneault; the same officers also lacked confidence in the Officer Commanding 2 Commando, Maj Seward, as did the Officer Commanding the CARBG's Engineer Squadron, Capt Mansfield. Maj Seward, for his part, distrusted the Deputy CO, Maj MacKay, and Capt Kyle. There were significant problems between Maj Seward and the Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO Jardine, and even his own Company Sergeant-Major, MWO Mills. Indeed, most of the other senior personnel in the CAR — including the officers commanding the other commandos, the company sergeants-major, the platoon warrant officers, and the senior NCOs — seemed to have a problem with CWO Jardine. There was also mistrust between CWO Jardine and MWO Mills and between CWO Jardine and the senior NCOs of 2 Commando.¹⁵⁷

**Table 20.1: Courts-Martial
Canadian Airborne Regiment, 1993**

Name	Incident	Charges	Results
Pte Brown	16 Mar 93	1. Murder (NDA s. 130-CC s.235.1) 2. Torture (NDA s. 130-CC s.269.1)	1st GCM terminated (18–21 Oct 93) 2nd GCM completed (7 Feb–19 Mar 94) Found guilty of manslaughter & torture 5 yrs in prison + dismissal with disgrace Appeals to CMAC by both Parties dismissed on 6 Jan 95 Leave to appeal to SCC denied on 1 Jun 95
Pte Brocklebank	16 Mar 93	1. Torture (NDA s. 130-CC s.269.1) 2. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124)	1st GCM terminated (8–8 Nov 93) 2nd GCM completed (11 Oct–7 Nov 94) Aquitted on both charges Prosecution's appeal to CMAC dismissed on 2 Apr 96.
MCpl Matchee	16 Mar 93	1. Murder (NDA s. 130-CC s.235.1) 2. Torture (NDA s. 130-CC s.269.1)	1st GCM terminated (13–13 Dec 93) 2nd GCM completed (25–25 Apr 94) Found unfit to stand trial
MCpl Smith	3 May 93	1. Criminal Negligence Causing Death (NDA s. 130-CC s.220) 2. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124)	GCM completed (11–13 Apr 94) Pleaded guilty on 2nd charge (1st stayed) 4 months in prison which includes reduction in rank) CMAC dismissed Defendant's appeal on 10 Apr 95
Sgt Boland	16 Mar 93	1. Torture (NDA s. 130-CC s.269.1) 2. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124)	1st GCM terminated (29 Nov–Dec 93) 2nd GCM completed (25–30 Apr 94) Pleaded guilty on 2nd charge (1st stayed) 90 days in prison with reduction in rank CMAC increased the sentence to one year imprisonment 16 May 95
Sgt Gresty	16 Mar 93	1. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124) 2. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124)	GCM completed (21 Mar–11 Apr 94) Aquitted on both charges no appeal

Table 20.1: Courts-Martial
Canadian Airborne Regiment, 1993 (cont'd)

Name	Incident	Charges	Results
Capt Rainville	4 Mar 93 + 5 Aug 93	1. Unlawfully Causing Bodily Harm (NDA s. 130-CC s.269) 2. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124) 3. Act to the Prejudice of Good Order & Discipline (NDA s. 129) 4. Possession of Prohibited Weapon (NDA s. 130-CC s.90)	GCM completed (7 Sept–1 Oct 94) Acquitted on 1st & 2nd charge Pleading guilty on 3rd & 4th charge Reprimand and \$3000 fine (no appeal)
Capt Sox	16 Mar 93	1. Unlawfully Causing Bodily Harm (NDA s. 130-CC s.269) 2. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124) 3. Act to the Prejudice of Good Order & Discipline (NDA s. 129)	GCM completed (9 Jan–20 Mar 95) Acquitted on 1st charge Found guilty on 2nd charge (3rd stayed) Severe reprimand with reduction in rank. Appeal to CMAC dismissed on 4 Jul 96
Maj Seward	16 Mar 93	1. Unlawfully Causing Bodily Harm (NDA s. 130-CC s.269) 2. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124)	GCM completed (9 May–3 Jun 94) Acquitted on 1st charge but found guilty on 2nd and sentenced to a severe reprimand On appeal the CMAC changed the sentence to 3 month's imprisonment and dismissal from the CF on 27 May 96 Leave to appeal to SCC denied on 5 Dec 96
LCol Mathieu	In theatre orders re the use of deadly force Jan to Mar 93	1. Negligent Performance of Duty (NDA s. 124)	GCM completed (30 May–24 Jun 94) Acquitted Prosecution's appeal to CMAC was allowed and a new trial ordered on 6 Nov 95 2nd GCM completed (22 Jan–13 Feb 96) Acquitted (no appeal)

Senior NCOs, warrant officers and officers need to have confidence in each other and must, at the very least, have open lines of communication between and among themselves. Those in positions of responsibility need timely information on — among other things — the state of discipline and morale among the soldiers as well as other personnel matters. Inevitably, there are occasions when, for example, platoon warrant officers or company sergeants-major prefer to raise a matter with the next higher non-commissioned member in the unit, rather than directly with the officer to whom they report. They may even have problems with that officer. Therefore, a good level of trust and communication throughout the NCO/warrant officer network, as well as in the formal chain of command is essential in a unit. We found it particularly disturbing that in the CAR, and especially in 2 Commando, there was significant evidence of problems on both fronts.

Furthermore, the CAR experienced serious discipline problems while in theatre, as demonstrated by 10 general courts-martial involving personnel of all rank levels in the unit (see Table 20.1).

In addition to the courts-martial, personnel were sent back to Canada during the mission for disciplinary reasons in five cases, including the Mortar Platoon commander and a warrant officer. The mission was also plagued with a high number of accidental weapons discharges, 18 of which resulted in charges against CARBG personnel, including three master corporals, a lieutenant and a major (Maj Seward, the Officer Commanding 2 Commando).¹⁵⁸

FINDINGS

At the time of the Somalia deployment, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) had not been well served by the personnel system, especially the process for manning that unit. Inadequacies in these processes and deficiencies in the actions and decisions of those responsible for their operation significantly contributed to the problems experienced by the CAR in 1992 and 1993.

- *Performance evaluation reports, which form the basis of key decisions concerning a member's career development (promotion, appointments, and selection for courses) were known to downplay a candidate's weaknesses. Yet they were relied on heavily, even blindly, in promotion and appointment decisions.*
- *The chain of command repeatedly ignored warnings that candidates being chosen for important jobs were inappropriate selections.*
- *As a matter of common practice, career managers refrained from passing on comments about candidates when they were made by peers or subordinates. Nor did they accept advice from officers about their replacements.*

- Except for formal disciplinary or administrative action, information about questionable conduct on the part of CF members was not normally noted in files or passed on to subsequent superiors.
- There were no formal criteria for selecting candidates for key positions, such as the unit commanding officer and officers commanding sub-units.
- Land Force Command waived its own informal criteria in order to accommodate the parent regiments' nominees, even though candidates who met the requirements more fully were available, or could have been made available.
- Representatives of the regimental councils of the parent regiments, who are outside the chain of command and therefore unaccountable, had too much influence in the process. This was particularly problematic for the CAR, since these officers were virtually the only source of nominees from their regiments for postings to the CAR, and since any repercussions of a poor choice would be felt by the CAR and significantly less by their own regiments.
- In the appointment process, individual career management goals were too often allowed to take precedence over operational needs.
- Bureaucratic and administrative imperatives also were allowed to dilute the merit principle in the appointments process and override operational needs.
- In some cases, the chain of command allowed completely irrelevant factors, such as inter-regimental and national politics, to influence key appointment decisions.
- Although the CAR was known to require more experienced leaders than other units, in 1992, the chain of command knowingly selected less qualified candidates for key positions in the CAR when better candidates were available, or could have been made available.
- The Delegated Authority Promotion System (DAPS) promoted less experienced soldiers to master corporal — an important rank, representing the first level of leadership in the Canadian Forces.
- The CAR abused the DAPS by using it to avoid posting in master corporals from the parent regiments, and promoting from within instead. Unfortunately, because of the lack of mobility of personnel between the CAR's three rifle commands, this practice meant that DAPS appointments in the CAR were much less competitive than those in the parent regiments. In the parent regiments, a new master corporal was selected from anywhere in the battalion, whereas in the CAR, the commanding officer was effectively limited to choosing from a company-sized sub-unit. This practice increased the risk of selecting junior leaders at the NCO level with insufficient experience who were overly familiar with the soldiers they would then be called on to supervise.

- Cpl Matchee was appointed to master corporal through the DAPS, even though he already satisfied the basic prerequisites for that promotion through the normal route and had not been successful in competition with his peers; he had participated recently in the Algonquin Park incident of October 3, 1992; and even though the second in command of his platoon and his platoon commander raised concerns about the appointment — and even questioned his suitability for deployment to Somalia.
- There were problems with appointees to leadership positions in the CAR in 1992–93: two COs, one officer commanding a commando, and a commando sergeant-major were replaced. One of those COs and the OC, along with two platoon commanders and two section commanders, were court-martialled in connection with events in Somalia.
- It was generally recognized by Land Force Command well before the Somalia deployment that the CAR was a special unit with a particular requirement for mature and experienced leaders at all levels — senior NCOs, as well as platoon, company, and unit command positions. Yet by the time of the Somalia deployment, there was an apparent trend toward younger and less experienced soldiers and junior leaders. Promotion practices such as the so-called 'Airborne offers' which used promotions to fill vacancies in the CAR, and the Delegated Authority Promotion System — particularly as it was used in relation to the Airborne Regiment — contributed to this trend.
- There were no strict standards for selection of soldiers for the CAR.
- While the CAR could veto selections and post soldiers back to parent regiments, initial selection of soldiers for the CAR was entirely in the hands of the sending units.
- The informal selection process for the CAR — operated, as it was, by the sending units and regiments — left the CAR vulnerable to being used as a dumping ground for overly aggressive or otherwise problematic personnel.
- Despite the recognized need of the CAR for more mature soldiers, some soldiers with a record of recent misconduct were sent to the CAR.
- Parent regiments would call their best NCOs back from the CAR and send less experienced replacements; in other words, they used CAR as a training ground.
- The feeder battalions were in a conflict of interest when it came to sending their top-quality personnel, and the CAR undoubtedly suffered when parent regiments experienced particular shortages of such people.

- *The practice of manning the CAR commandos according to regimental affiliation aggravated the impact of personnel problems in parent regiments by preventing the CAR from drawing more heavily from the healthier regiments.*
- *The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry experienced a slump in personnel quality in the early 1990s. As a result of the system of selecting for the CAR, this had a direct impact on 2 Commando.*
- *In general, despite warnings in the 1985 Hewson report about the CAR's special need for mature and experienced soldiers and leaders, Land Force Command and the parent infantry regiments too often failed in their duty to the CAR in this respect.*

Recommendations

We recommend that:

- 20.1 The Chief of the Defence Staff enforce adherence to the following principles in the Canadian Forces promotion and appointment system:**
 - (a) that merit be a predominant factor in all promotion decisions; and**
 - (b) that the operational needs of the Service always have priority over individual career considerations and administrative convenience.**
- 20.2 To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, and to avoid minimization or concealment of personnel problems, the Chief of the Defence Staff modify the Performance Evaluation Report system to ensure that a frank assessment is rendered of Canadian Forces members and that poor conduct or performance is noted for future reference by superiors (whether or not the matter triggers formal disciplinary or administrative action).**
- 20.3 The proposed Inspector General conduct periodic reviews of appointments to key leadership positions in the Canadian Forces to ensure that the proper criteria are being applied and that such appointments are as competitive as possible.**

- 20.4 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that good discipline is made an explicit criterion in all promotion and appointment decisions.**
- 20.5 The Chief of the Defence Staff develop formal criteria for appointment to key command positions, including unit and sub-unit commands, deviation from which would require the formal approval of the Chief of the Defence Staff.**
- 20.6 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that, for any future composite combat arms unit (such as the Canadian Airborne Regiment),**
- (a) formalized criteria for selection to the unit are established;**
 - (b) the Commanding Officer have maximum freedom in selecting personnel for that unit; and**
 - (c) the Commanding Officer have maximum freedom to employ personnel as the Commanding Officer deems appropriate.**

PRE-DEPLOYMENT SELECTION AND SCREENING

The focus of standard pre-deployment screening in the Canadian Forces at the time of the Somalia deployment was to avoid costly and disruptive repatriation and replacement of personnel from an operational theatre.¹⁵⁹ The emphasis of the formal process was on factors such as administrative, medical, and family problems.¹⁶⁰ As observed in Chapter 8, central considerations, such as behavioural suitability and professionalism, are matters of discretion for the chain of command within the deploying unit. Until very recently (May 1994), there was little formal guidance on how that discretion should be exercised.¹⁶¹

Improper behaviour of CF personnel during a mission can be costly in a number of ways — in terms of lives, property, operational success and in terms of the reputation of Canada and its military. As the 1995 manual for peacekeeping operations puts it, our soldiers function as “goodwill ambassadors”.¹⁶² Moreover, as Franklin Pinch noted in a 1994 article, peace operations “tend to be complex, ambiguous and stressful environments, where individual weaknesses are likely to be magnified and where a high degree of occupational fitness — including psychological and sociological fitness — are necessary for effective adaptation and performance.”¹⁶³ In such a context, proper screening for behavioural suitability assumes the utmost importance.

As Capt (N) Allen, who commanded HMCS *Preserver* during Operation Deliverance, observed, "even identifying one individual with a potential personal problem which may later cause considerable grief, is cause enough to take the time and trouble long before deployment."¹⁶⁴

Appointment of the Joint Force Commander

Unlike most CF personnel who served in Operation Deliverance, the overall Canadian Task Force Commander, Col Labbé, was chosen specifically for the mission. There are no formal criteria for such a position, apart from being at the right rank level to command a force of the size and composition in question.

Col Labbé, then serving as the Chief of Staff at 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, was appointed Force Commander of CJFS by the Minister of National Defence on the advice of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).¹⁶⁵ The Commander Land Force Command, LGen Gervais, recommended Col Labbé to the CDS on the basis of his personal knowledge of him as a "very competent and thorough officer" with some experience in joint operations.¹⁶⁶ For his part, the CDS, Gen de Chastelain, knew of Col Labbé's reputation as a commanding officer and from his staff appointments and, on that basis, considered him "an outstanding officer" who "seemed ideal for the task."¹⁶⁷ According to LGen (ret) Gervais, Col Labbé would have been among the group of colonels being considered for promotion to brigadier-general in 1992.¹⁶⁸ Col Labbé was informed on December 4, 1992 that he would be the Commander of Canadian Joint Force Somalia.¹⁶⁹

LGen (ret) Reay testified that there would have been advantages in selecting Col Cox, who was already in Somalia at UNOSOM Headquarters and would therefore have been familiar with the personalities involved and with the theatre of operations. But because the proposed intervention was beginning to evolve into a multi-national peace enforcement operation, it was more convenient to select Col Labbé, who was available for liaison with U.S. military officials on tactical matters relating to the mission.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, Col Labbé, as Chief of Staff at 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, was then overseeing a joint headquarters structure that was involved in higher-level operational planning and was analogous to what was being envisaged for the Canadian task force deploying to Somalia.¹⁷¹

Pre-Deployment Screening

Pre-deployment screening of most CF personnel for Somalia had both a formal and an informal component.¹⁷² The formal component was based on administrative, medical and family considerations set out in the Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs); these were the focus of Departure Assistance Groups conducted by the bases concerned.¹⁷³ Formal Departure Assistance Group screening was conducted for CAR personnel and available augmentees at CFB Petawawa on September 10 and 11, 1992.¹⁷⁴ Joint Force headquarters staff were similarly screened at 1st Canadian Division Headquarters at CFB Kingston on December 14th.¹⁷⁵ But apart from a direction not to send personnel with a record of "repeated misconduct", the assessment of members' behavioural suitability was left to the discretion of unit COs, who bore ultimate responsibility for certifying the fitness and suitability of each member of the unit.¹⁷⁶ Given the nature of problems that arose during the Somalia deployment, it is these informally assessed aspects of conduct and performance that are of concern to this Inquiry.

According to testimony before us, the unit chain of command generally did consider soldiers' recent performance and conduct in determining their suitability for deployment on a mission.¹⁷⁷ Our Inquiry was told that discipline was assessed on the basis of actual records of charges and convictions, as well as minor misconduct not necessarily resulting in charges, and that recent misconduct would be of greater concern than older incidents.¹⁷⁸ However, the ultimate screening decision was normally based on the member's overall record, rather than on a single incident.¹⁷⁹

Although responsible for all personnel in the unit, in practice, the CO personally screened only immediate subordinates — the company commanders — although the CO would certainly consider his platoon commanders as well.¹⁸⁰ Company commanders usually made the screening decisions about the vast majority of personnel in the unit, although company sergeant-majors, platoon commanders, and warrant officers would all have input.¹⁸¹

Adequacy of Screening for Operation Deliverance

Some personnel were screened out for reasons of poor conduct or performance.¹⁸² Most notably, the Commanding Officer of the CAR, LCol Morneau, was relieved of command after the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, lost confidence in him.¹⁸³ Furthermore, at least 10 members of the 64-member rear party of the Canadian Airborne Regiment were initially excluded from the Somalia deployment for disciplinary reasons: one from Headquarters Commando,

three from 1 Commando, four from 2 Commando, and two from 3 Commando.¹⁸⁴ Two other members of 2 Commando had been posted out of the CAR in the fall of 1992 as a result of misconduct.¹⁸⁵ Two senior NCOs of 2 Commando were also replaced before deployment because of poor performance.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, six reservists who completed pre-deployment training were sent back to their units for poor conduct or performance.¹⁸⁷ A Squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons also left behind a couple of soldiers because of disciplinary concerns.¹⁸⁸

However, two of the ten Airborne members initially left behind for disciplinary reasons were later sent to Somalia. One was a corporal from 2 Commando who had been placed on counselling and probation in December 1991 for misconduct and misuse of alcohol.¹⁸⁹ The other was a private, also from 2 Commando, who was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sentenced to 30 days' imprisonment on October 28, 1992 for an incident in June of that year.¹⁹⁰ This member was also present during the Kyrenia Club and Algonquin Park incidents in early October 1992.¹⁹¹ Both members were sent to Somalia in April 1993 as replacements.¹⁹²

Moreover, other members of the CAR whose behaviour or performance had been the subject of negative attention before the mission were deployed to Somalia. At least 47 members of the CAR were subjects of such attention in 1992, in the form of criminal/disciplinary charges, administrative action for misconduct or poor performance, verbal warnings, or involvement in the incidents of October 2–3, 1992, when stolen military pyrotechnics were set off illegally at CFB Petawawa and Algonquin Park and a duty sergeant's car was torched.¹⁹³ Twenty-eight of these members — including 12 of the 14 involved in the incidents of early October — were sent to Somalia.¹⁹⁴ While the majority apparently served without incident, at least nine were involved in further misdeeds in theatre, ranging from accidental weapons discharges and drunkenness to torture and murder.¹⁹⁵

Although it is difficult to second-guess the judgement of the leaders responsible in specific cases without knowing the nuances of each case and other considerations, in some of these cases there were clear antecedents to the misconduct that occurred during the mission.

A member of Headquarters Commando was involved in an incident aboard HMCS *Preserver* on New Year's Eve — just days after his arrival in theatre. He was sentenced to 30 days' detention for drunkenness and conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline and was sent back to Canada.¹⁹⁶ The CO subsequently recommended him for substance abuse counselling and release from the CF.¹⁹⁷ This same member had previously been involved in incidents of misconduct related to alcohol abuse and had been charged by civilian police with leaving the scene of an accident in the spring of 1992.¹⁹⁸

A soldier in 2 Commando who went to Somalia with the CARBG was arrested for assault while on leave in Canada in February 1993.¹⁹⁹ He was convicted of this offence, reassigned to the CAR rear party at CFB Petawawa, given a recorded warning, and apparently released from the CF a few months later.²⁰⁰ This same member had been convicted of assault causing bodily harm in September 1992 for an incident the previous December.²⁰¹ He also participated in the Algonquin Park incident on October 3, 1992, where beer was consumed and weapons and stolen military pyrotechnics were discharged.²⁰²

Another soldier from 2 Commando was also involved in the pyrotechnics incidents of early October 1992. He ultimately admitted to stealing the pyrotechnics and setting them off in Algonquin Park on the night of October 3rd.²⁰³ He was charged under the Code of Service Discipline and was sentenced to a \$100 fine and seven days' confinement to barracks.²⁰⁴ Although his superiors were initially going to leave him in Canada,²⁰⁵ this soldier went to Somalia with his unit. Maj (ret) Pommet, the Officer Commanding 1 Commando in 1991–93, testified that, based on these infractions alone, he would have left this soldier in Canada during the mission had the soldier been in 1 Commando.²⁰⁶

During the mission, the soldier in question was charged with torture and negligent performance of duty in relation to the March 16, 1993 beating death of a 16-year-old civilian detainee; he was acquitted by a general court-martial. He was alleged to have witnessed much of the incident and failed to intervene or report what was happening. He was subsequently convicted of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline for his conduct in a homemade video which was recorded in Somalia.²⁰⁷

Even before the Algonquin Park incident, this soldier had accumulated a noteworthy disciplinary/administrative record: in June 1991, he was convicted of negligent performance of duty and was sentenced to seven days' confinement to barracks; in March 1992, he was sentenced to a \$100 fine and seven days' confinement to barracks for being absent without leave; and in September 1992 — less than a month before the Algonquin Park incident — he was given a recorded warning for his "military conduct".²⁰⁸ Comments from his personnel file indicated that, while he had a positive attitude, he was someone who required "maximum supervision during stressful situations."²⁰⁹

While the soldier's superiors in 2 Commando did have some concerns about him because of his recent misconduct and because they considered him somewhat gullible and impressionable,²¹⁰ they believed that he was nonetheless a good soldier and could be controlled in theatre. But WO Murphy also indicated that this soldier's deployment to Somalia was attributable, at least in part, to a perceived lack of suitable replacements. There was concern about the relative calibre of anyone already slated for the rear party; and by that time, all the allotted reservists had been integrated elsewhere in the unit.²¹¹

This case seems to have been symptomatic of a more general weakness in personnel screening in 2 Commando, which had more discipline problems before and during the Somalia deployment than any other sub-unit in the battle group.²¹² The personnel problems in the PPCLI and problems in the selection process for the CAR that contributed to this phenomenon were discussed earlier in this chapter. Based on documents and testimony before the Inquiry, a majority of the 47 members of the CAR whose behaviour was the subject of negative scrutiny in 1992 came from 2 Commando (including 13 of the 14 individuals implicated in the incidents of October 2–3 and as a result of the barracks search of October 5th).²¹³ When only those members of this group who were sent to Somalia are considered, 2 Commando's share rises to two thirds.²¹⁴ Finally, seven of the nine members who got into further trouble in theatre were in 2 Commando.²¹⁵ These figures suggest not only that 2 Commando had more than its share of discipline problems to begin with, but also that it was less effective than other sub-units in screening out personnel the commando leadership should have known required closer scrutiny.

Part of the problem was the attitude and approach to pre-deployment screening of the Officer Commanding of 2 Commando, Maj Seward. From the perspective of selection and screening, 2 Commando had the advantage of being significantly over-strength for the Somalia deployment. (It had to reduce its establishment by a quarter to stay within the manning ceiling for the mission.)²¹⁶ Yet Maj Seward, for reasons of sub-unit morale and cohesiveness, was loathe to leave anyone behind — particularly if it meant having more reservists assigned to the commando.²¹⁷ Moreover, in the aftermath of the pyrotechnics and car-burning incidents at Petawawa in October 1992, Maj Seward became even more defensive of his soldiers.²¹⁸ While he recognized that there were potential troublemakers in his sub-unit,²¹⁹ he and others in the commando leadership apparently felt that they could monitor those soldiers better in theatre.²²⁰ It was in this spirit that Maj Seward and MWO Mills, the Company Sergeant-Major, apparently rejected the alleged warnings of WO Murphy and Capt Sox that MCpl Matchee and Pte E.K. Brown should not go to Somalia because of concerns about their attitudes and discipline.²²¹ Ironically, then, factors that should have encouraged a more vigorous screening of personnel — a personnel surplus, known discipline problems, and the availability of Reserve Force personnel as substitutes — actually led Maj Seward to be more lenient in screening personnel for Somalia.

Maj Seward was not the only one who failed to heed warnings and advice about personnel in the period leading up to the deployment. LCol Morneault rejected the advice of LCol MacDonald, Commanding Officer of the Royal

Canadian Dragoons, that Maj Seward should be replaced as Officer Commanding of 2 Commando.²²² Both LCol Morneau and LCol Mathieu rejected the same advice from the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno.²²³ BGen Beno also recommended to LCol Morneau and LCol Mathieu that they should seriously consider leaving Capt Rainville behind.²²⁴ But both COs expressed confidence in him, and Capt Rainville went to Somalia as Commander of the battle group's Reconnaissance Platoon.²²⁵ According to LCol (ret) Mathieu, BGen Beno also had concerns about the Deputy Commanding Officer, Maj MacKay.²²⁶ LCol Mathieu had known Maj MacKay since 1968, and they had served together on operations before, so he had confidence in the DCO's abilities and did nothing further in response to BGen Beno's concerns. LCol Mathieu did not know Maj Seward or Capt Rainville, however, so he did some checking with LCol Morneau and with the relevant NDHQ career manager, Maj Priestman. LCol Morneau endorsed both of them, and their personnel files looked good. Capt Rainville's file contained no reference to the serious and telling la Citadelle and Gagetown incidents, although LCol Mathieu was aware of the former.²²⁷

The Regimental Colonel of the PPCLI, Col Gray, the outgoing Commanding Officer of the CAR, Col Holmes, the Director of Infantry and Chief of Personnel for Land Forces, Col Joly, the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, and the Commander Land Force Command, LGen Reay, all had concerns about the selection of Maj Seward to lead 2 Commando.²²⁸ Yet despite these concerns, and even in light of problems earlier in the deployment, Maj Seward was allowed to remain in command of 2 Commando until after the March 16, 1993 homicide.²²⁹

LCol Mathieu did not follow BGen Beno's suggestion about moving 25 members of 2 Commando and six members of the Reconnaissance Platoon to other parts of the CAR as a means of dealing with problems of discipline and challenges to authority in the unit.²³⁰ LCol Mathieu felt that the idea was not a practical solution, since the troublemakers were not identified and because of the different working languages of 1 Commando and 2 Commando.²³¹

Although problems with the structure and system for manning the CAR, as well as specific problems with some selections from the PPCLI, may have stacked the deck to some extent against the unit in Somalia, the personnel screening conducted for that mission by the CAR, and particularly by 2 Commando, did little to root out problems already known to exist. Ironically, but not surprisingly, omissions of the type just described — apparently motivated by the desire to preserve the integrity of the CAR in the short term — helped to undermine it in the long run.

FINDINGS

The screening of soldiers in the Canadian Airborne Regiment on behavioural grounds for participation in Operation Deliverance was inadequate. We find that:

- *There was no formal system or standard for assessing or reviewing behavioural suitability. While CFAO 20-50 precluded the deployment of personnel with "a history of repeated misconduct", there was no definition or elaboration of this standard. In practice, therefore, the attention and weight accorded past misconduct or misbehaviour was effectively at the uncontrolled discretion of the commanding officer or the officer commanding the sub-unit.*
- *Poor judgement was shown in screening CAR personnel for the mission, especially in 2 Commando. Short-term morale appears to have taken precedence over discipline.*
- *Discipline and behavioural suitability did not receive sufficient emphasis in the screening and selection process.*
- *The unit leadership rejected significant warnings about the suitability of some personnel.*
- *Appointments to key positions in the CAR were allowed to stand despite serious misgivings on the part of senior officers and members of the chain of command, and despite the fact that the unit was on its first overseas deployment in several years.*

Recommendation

We acknowledge amendments to CFAOs 20-46 and 20-50 in May 1994 that now require commanding officers to decide explicitly on the behavioural suitability of soldiers under their command for overseas operations and that provide specific guidance on the factors that should be considered in this assessment.

We recommend that:

- 20.7 Canadian Forces Administrative Orders 20-50 and 20-46, which deal with the screening of Canadian Forces personnel for overseas deployments, be amended to:**
- (a) **place priority on discipline as a criterion for selecting personnel for overseas deployment;**

- (b) make consideration of the behavioural suitability indicators mandatory; and
 - (c) make it clear that although the behavioural suitability indicators listed in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 20-50, as well as the option of referring cases for assessment by behavioural specialists, can assist commanding officers in screening personnel for deployment, they in no way displace or qualify commanding officers' responsibility or accountability for screening personnel under their command.
-

A CAVEAT ON DISCIPLINE AND SELECTION AND SCREENING

A recurring theme in the findings and recommendations in this chapter is that discipline should receive greater emphasis in the selection and screening of personnel, from recruitment through deployment. While we believe that this is entirely appropriate on the basis of the evidence considered by this Inquiry, it is important to recognize that good leadership is an essential ingredient in selecting, training, developing, employing, and supervising soldiers. New procedures and guidelines can help, but they are no substitute for thorough, professional, and accountable leadership.

It is quite proper that indicators of undisciplined conduct be given greater and more explicit prominence in personnel selection and screening decisions, but we would not want such decisions to become so mechanical as to displace command judgement and accountability.²³² The CF recruiting system and the chain of command have been, and should continue to be, mindful of the fact that a person's potential (for good or bad) cannot always be summed up in a criminal record or a personnel file. While needless risks should not be taken in the face of significant warning signs, a rigid and bureaucratic approach could lead to selection and screening decisions made solely with a view to preserving the decision maker's blamelessness, rather than conscientiously assessing the individual.

Again, while guidelines, regulations, and orders that compel specific attention to behavioural suitability are useful improvements, they are only part of the story. Unless leaders at all levels have an appreciation of the intrinsic value of discipline in relation to the overall success of military operations; unless the responsible officials have sufficient authority, information, and resources to select and screen their personnel; and unless there is accountability for bad judgements, much of the problem will remain unaddressed.

THE PROBLEM OF RACISM

*"I came to Somalia to shoot me a nigger."*²³³

*"The presence of white supremacists and neo-nazis in the Armed Forces or racists was a contributing factor of the disruptions in the military."*²³⁴

Apart from the normal personnel considerations of conduct, performance, and discipline, the deployment to Somalia should have raised concerns about racism. Incidents in the Canadian Airborne Regiment before and during the Somalia deployment bear this out.

The Policy at the Time of the Deployment

At the time of the deployment, the Canadian Forces had no policies denying enrolment to active racists, prohibiting involvement in racist organizations or participation in their activities, or even excluding active racists from UN duties.²³⁵

This is somewhat surprising for several reasons. For one thing, since 1978, the Canadian Forces — like all federal institutions — has been prohibited from engaging in practices that discriminate on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, or sex, among other prohibited grounds.²³⁶ Moreover, since 1983, the CF has been legally responsible for exercising "all due diligence" in preventing harassment or other discriminatory treatment of CF members and applicants by fellow members.²³⁷ Furthermore, it was obvious long before the Somalia deployment that Canada's commitment to UN operations would bring Canadian soldiers into close contact with people of different cultures and races.

By way of comparison, the U.S. military has had rules prohibiting active participation by its soldiers in such extremist groups since 1986.²³⁸

Furthermore, the CF lacked — and continues to lack — any procedure, apart from the normal chain of command, for complaining about racist conduct.²³⁹ A 1994 U.S. congressional report found that the factors identified by armed services members as making the complaints system most effective included options for raising complaints outside the chain of command, having strong support from top leadership, including a demonstrated commitment to protecting complainants from reprisal, adhering to established time lines for investigation and action, and providing detailed feedback to the complainant.²⁴⁰

Racially motivated conduct was addressed by the CF before 1993 only through general laws and rules. As of December 1992, the following provisions applied to CF members regarding human rights and provided the basis for dealing with any and all racist conduct in the CF:

- *National Defence Act*, section 129(1): "Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline";
- *Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&O)* 19.14: "Improper Comments" that may discredit the CF if overheard by the public or that might make subordinates of the speaker dissatisfied with their condition or duties.
- QR&O 19.44: "Political Activities and Candidature for Office", which prohibits officers and NCMs from active participation in a political organization and from making political speeches.
- Canadian Forces Administrative Order (CFAO) 19-39: "Personal Harassment" policy and procedures to deal with improper behaviour based on personal characteristics, including race but also including physical characteristics or mannerisms.
- CFAO 19-40: "Human Rights — Discrimination" policy, which provides a procedure for handling complaints to the Canadian Human Rights Commission.
- *Security Orders for the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces*, Chapter 22 — "Security Clearances", where a member's security clearance could be affected where there is a change in personal circumstances such as actions that support extreme ideological views that are considered detrimental to DND or national security, or association with extremist cults when association appears to be causing adverse behavioural changes.

Members of the CF are also subject to the *Criminal Code* provisions relating to hate crimes:

- section 319(1), inciting hatred against an identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, and section 319(2), wilfully promoting hatred against any identifiable group.²⁴¹

Finally, article 4.02 of *Queen's Regulations and Orders* states, among other things, that officers shall promote the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of all subordinates. Article 5.01 gives the same direction to non-commissioned members.

Project SIROS and the CAR

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Department of National Defence began to have concerns about possible right-wing extremist involvement in the CF, in light of the extremist ideology and violent tendencies of some of these groups and their potential threat to security.²⁴² In 1990–91, the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) of the Department of National Defence began a program, Project SIROS, to track such members.²⁴³ By June 1992, some 40 CF members had been identified as having possible involvement in right-wing extremist and racist organizations.²⁴⁴

At the time of the Somalia deployment, however, efforts like Project SIROS did little beyond monitoring the problem. As with much of the information obtained during security clearance checks (e.g., criminal record information from the RCMP, subversive indices from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and information from any other outside source²⁴⁵), the intelligence and information gained through SIROS tended to be kept within the security directorate at NDHQ, unless evidence of criminal activity was uncovered. There was no consistent practice of briefing commanding officers about racist extremists under their command until 1993.²⁴⁶ Whatever briefings of commanding officers did take place before that time were done at the conclusion of an SIU investigation, rather than at the outset.²⁴⁷ Further, with respect to SIROS investigations, while the SIU would forward relevant information to staff of the Director of Security Clearance, it is not clear that information would flow in the opposite direction: the SIROS data base was maintained separately from the one for security clearances.²⁴⁸

Nine of the 40 CF members identified by Project SIROS by June 1992, were at CFB Petawawa, and six had been members of the CAR. Not only was CFB Petawawa an “area of concern” for Project SIROS, but the problem of active racists at Petawawa was apparently centred in 2 Commando of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.²⁴⁹

In the case of two members of the CAR who went to Somalia, the SIU had information before the deployment linking them to racist extremist activities. In the case of one of these individuals, the SIU received information about him in December 1991 and again in May 1992. SIU deemed the information insufficient to warrant an investigation at that time. However, an investigation was conducted from May to August 1993. The result was that there was no conclusive evidence in the case and, indeed, it was thought that it might have been a case of mistaken identity.

The other individual was Cpl McKay of 2 Commando. The SIU first received information on him in 1990, before the start of the SIROS program, while Cpl McKay was still with 2 PPCLI in Winnipeg.²⁵⁰ On his posting

to CFB Petawawa in 1991, Cpl McKay claimed to have ceased his white-supremacist activities, after being advised to do so by his platoon commander in Winnipeg.²⁵¹ Not being convinced of this, the SIU launched an investigation in early 1992 that ended in May 1992.²⁵² The results were inconclusive: the SIU could not confirm Cpl McKay's continuing involvement in right-wing/white-supremacist activities following his posting to Petawawa.²⁵³ In the summer of 1992, the second in command of Cpl McKay's platoon, WO Murphy, was shown a photocopy of a Winnipeg newspaper photograph from the previous year; it showed Cpl McKay with his head shaved giving a Nazi salute. According to WO Murphy, he interviewed Cpl McKay about the photograph and asked him whether he belonged to a white supremacist group. Cpl McKay said that he had been involved with such groups while posted in Manitoba with 2 PPCLI, but that he had quit and no longer espoused such views.²⁵⁴ WO Murphy claimed to have informed either MWO Mills, the Company Sergeant-Major, or the Platoon Commander, Capt Sox, or both, about his counselling of Cpl McKay.²⁵⁵ Cpl McKay's superiors were not briefed by the SIU until April 1993.²⁵⁶ The SIU reopened its investigation of Cpl McKay in April 1994; the investigation ended when Cpl McKay was released from the CF for disciplinary reasons in May 1995.²⁵⁷ In 1996, Matt McKay was arrested and charged in a hate-related homicide in Winnipeg that occurred in 1991 while he was serving with 2 PPCLI.

Another CF member from a different unit at CFB Petawawa, who allegedly attended skinhead rallies and was linked to the violent Aryan Resistance Movement, was released from the CF in December 1992 and so did not participate in Operation Deliverance. Despite this background, however, and in spite of criminal convictions for robbery and assault and a Canadian Police Information Center notation that he should be considered "violent", this individual re-enrolled in the CF in March 1994.²⁵⁸

After the CAR was deployed to Somalia, the SIU became aware of information linking five additional members of the unit to racist groups or activities,²⁵⁹ including one CF member who was apparently a member of the Ku Klux Klan.²⁶⁰ Among these five were MCpl Matchee and Pte E.K. Brown.²⁶¹ In February 1993, the SIU received information alleging that Pte E.K. Brown of 2 Commando had been involved with racist skinheads before his posting to the CAR in July 1992.²⁶² The information received was sufficient to warrant an investigation, but before one could be launched, the SIU was asked to halt its investigation so as not to compromise the criminal investigation and prosecution flowing from the March 16, 1993 homicide of a civilian detainee in the 2 Commando compound at Belet Huen, Somalia.²⁶³

Racist Conduct in the Airborne Regiment

Notwithstanding testimony that CFB Petawawa had a zero-tolerance policy with respect to racist behaviour and symbols,²⁶⁴ other evidence demonstrated a persistent problem of racist behaviour among some CAR members.

Racial slurs were uttered without any disciplinary response.²⁶⁵ In September 1991, a Nazi flag and paraphernalia were found hanging on the wall in a 2 Commando barracks used for orders group meetings.²⁶⁶ Other questionable behaviour at Petawawa included the symbolic display of a Confederate or Rebel flag by some soldiers.²⁶⁷ However, many, including LCol Morneau, expressed the belief that the Rebel flag did not have racist connotations and saw it solely as a rallying symbol for 2 Commando. The Rebel flag was removed as a sanctioned symbol and was banned, but for disciplinary, not anti-racist reasons.

However, it was the treatment of Cpl Robin, shown in a video of hazing in the CAR in August 1992, that demonstrated the clearest lack of guidance and understanding of racially motivated behaviour in the CAR. Cpl Robin, the only Black man in the hazing group, had the letters 'KKK' written on his shoulder. Cpl Robin was also tied to a tree, had flour put on his face, and was referred to as "Michael Jackson's secret"; he was also required to crawl on all fours with a collar around his neck while being called 'Fido'.²⁶⁸ However, the other treatment of Cpl Robin was not much different from what others received during the hazing. Cpl Robin explained that he was indifferent to the experience; he did not see his hazing treatment as an act of racism on the part of CAR members, although he did admit that marking 'KKK' on his shoulder was a racist act.²⁶⁹

Other racist behaviour directed at Cpl Robin included being called "nigger" or "nègre" by fellow CAR members, although Cpl Robin said he saw this as a joke.²⁷⁰

It is possible that at least some of this ostensibly racist behaviour could be ascribed to a consciously cultivated and inculcated xenophobia (in the generic sense of that term) as part of internal bonding, rather than to malicious racial hatred or contempt of their colleague on the part of other CAR members. Cpl Robin himself provided an example of this perspective. Even when he reviewed the hazing video, he still did not want to hurt the good name of the CAR and was reluctant to criticize.²⁷¹

Racist conduct and association with racist groups were not a factor in pre-deployment screening by units at the time of the Somalia deployment.²⁷² The SIU was not asked to provide input on the screening of personnel for overseas missions. Nor did the training process assess soldiers' understanding of, or reaction to, Somalis or Somali culture.²⁷³

Once the CAR reached Somalia, members used derogatory terms to describe the local population. In testimony it was noted that the terms "Nig Nog",²⁷⁴

"Nigger",²⁷⁵ "Slomali",²⁷⁶ "Smuffy",²⁷⁷ "Moolie",²⁷⁸ and "Gimme"²⁷⁹ were coined and used often by CAR members to refer to Somalis. We were surprised to learn that many of these terms were not necessarily considered derogatory or racist by CAR members.²⁸⁰

Post-Deployment Action

Racism was recognized by the military as a significant issue only after media reports in the spring of 1993. As a result of the events in Somalia, a review of DND regulations, orders, and policies regarding racism and the involvement of CF members with racist organizations was conducted.

As a result of evidence revealed during the de Faye board of inquiry, a specific policy on racism was developed and issued in a general message from the Chief of the Defence Staff in August 1993. The result was CFAO 19-43, issued in February 1994.

CFAO 19-43 defines racist conduct as

conduct that promotes, encourages or constitutes discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religion, including participation in the activities of, or membership in, a group or organization that a CF member knows, or ought to know, promotes discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religion.

CFAO 19-43 also states the CF policy on racist conduct, which is that

the CF are committed to the principle of equality of all people, and the dignity and worth of every human being, without regard to, among other things, race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religion. CF members must always be guided by this principle in their relationships with each other, with members of the public, and with all those with whom they come in contact both within and outside Canada.

and that

racist attitudes are totally incompatible with the military ethos and with effective military service, and any conduct that reflects such attitudes will not be tolerated. Racist conduct is therefore prohibited, and will result in administrative action, disciplinary action, or both, and may include release. An applicant for enrolment in the CF who is unable or unwilling to comply with the CF policy against racist conduct will not be enrolled.

CFAO 19-43 also provides examples of racist conduct related to membership in racist organizations. Some of these examples are making, publishing, distributing, displaying, or issuing literature of the group or organization; donating or raising funds for the group or organization; and speaking publicly on behalf of the group or organization.²⁸¹

CFAO 19-43 points out that racist conduct can consist of individual actions that are unrelated to any organization: using racial epithets or derogatory terms, inequitable assignment of duties, etc. The order also notes Canadian law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, principally the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, and the *Criminal Code*.

The order attempts to provide guidance and direction to COs, to the Military Police, and to the SIU for dealing with racist conduct. It outlines administrative measures a CO can take, which range from informal counselling to a recommendation for release from the CF. It also contemplates suspension from duty in serious cases and states that the CO can take disciplinary action as well as administrative action, that is, laying a formal charge under the *National Defence Act*.

The anti-racism CFAO directs that racist conduct be reported to NDHQ and that a program of education and training to prevent racism be developed. At the recruitment stage, it directs that enrolment be refused to anyone not prepared to sign a statement of understanding signifying their willingness to comply with the CF anti-racism policy. In addition, a questionnaire is now given to all entrants asking specifically about racist activities and affiliations.²⁸² Of course, providing false information during recruitment is itself grounds for involuntary release from the CF.²⁸³

Separate from the development of CFAO 19-43 but related to it, a screening procedure was developed by CF behavioural scientists to assist COs in screening members for UN or other overseas duty and to identify those with the potential for aberrant or anti-social behaviour. If the CO had any doubts about an individual, that member can be referred to a personnel selection officer — a qualified psychologist — for a more detailed assessment.

In another separate but related activity, a CF Employment Equity Project was started in 1992 in recognition of the need for the CF to reflect and represent the country's cultural diversity. The following employment equity principles were promulgated by the CDS in May 1993:

1. CF endorses a proactive, purposeful recruiting program, which includes attracting candidates from diverse ethno-cultural backgrounds who meet all prescribed recruiting standards.
2. CF provides equitable opportunities to all serving members for training and development to enhance their abilities.
3. CF is committed to the elimination to the maximum extent possible of any policy or practice that results in arbitrary barriers to the advancement, promotion, and retention of all its members.
4. CF promotes awareness, understanding, and acceptance of all ethno-cultural groups with a view to enhancing their contribution to the operational effectiveness of the CF.

Under the Employment Equity Project, a review of the recruiting system has been completed to identify and remove systemic barriers, and a Forces-wide census self-identification survey has been completed to determine current representation of designated groups in the CF.

FINDINGS

We find that inadequate attention was paid to the problem and risks of racism in the Canadian Forces.

- *There was no policy or process for screening out active racists from deployment on missions, nor was there a policy precluding such persons from joining or serving in the CF in the first place.*
- *At least with respect to the Canadian Airborne Regiment, existing laws, regulations, orders, and policies were not used adequately or uniformly by the chain of command.*
- *There was no procedure, aside from the chain of command, to complain about racism.*
- *Proper policies and procedures did not exist for the adequate sharing and communication of information and intelligence among all the agencies concerned, including the environmental commands and unit leadership.*
- *The CAR's mission training did not test soldiers for their attitudes and responses to racial and cultural differences.*
- *Use of racist language and racist conduct on the part of some CAR members before and during the Somalia deployment suggest, in some cases, a lack of cultural understanding and training, as well as the presence of persons who freely exhibited racism.*

Recommendations

We believe that, well before the problems revealed during the Somalia deployment, the vast majority of CF members recognized that racist conduct is incompatible with military service. But a key lesson from the Somalia experience is that even a few extremists can have a pronounced and dysfunctional impact on the CF's bond with the Canadian public at large. Clearly, leadership by example, meaningful education and a zero-tolerance attitude are essential attributes of any attempt to deal with racism in the CF.

We acknowledge and commend the anti-racism policy of the Canadian Forces, issued in February 1994 in the form of CFAO 19-43, which prohibits racist conduct and makes it grounds for denial of enrolment in the Canadian Forces and, in the case of serving members, for administrative action up to and including involuntary release, as well as a possible charge of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline under the *National Defence Act*.

We recommend that:

- 20.8** The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and issue clear and comprehensive guidelines to commanders at all levels regarding prohibited racist and extremist conduct. The guidelines should define and list examples of racist behaviour and symbolism and should include a list and description of extremist groups to which Canadian Forces members may not belong or lend their support.
 - 20.9** The Canadian Forces continue to monitor racist group involvement and affiliation among Canadian Forces members.
 - 20.10** The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces clarify their position on the extent of their obligations under applicable privacy and human rights laws in screening applicants and members of the Canadian Forces for behavioural suitability, including racist group affiliation.
 - 20.11** The Department of National Defence and the Government of Canada review their security policies and practices to ensure that, within the limits of applicable privacy and human rights legislation, relevant information concerning involvement by Canadian Forces members or applicants with racist organizations and hate groups is shared efficiently and effectively among all responsible agencies, including the chain of command.
 - 20.12** The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces establish regular liaison with anti-racist groups to obtain assistance in the conduct of appropriate cultural sensitivity training and to assist supervisors and commanders in identifying signs of racism and involvement with hate groups.
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NOTES

1. DND, *Recruiter's Handbook for the Canadian Forces* (Publication AL 1/99, April 1, 1995), p. 2-5, section 215, paragraph 4.
2. Maj K.W.J. Wenek, Directorate of Personnel Selection Research and Second Careers, "The Assessment of Psychological Fitness: Some Options for the Canadian Forces", Technical Note 1/84 (NDHQ: July 1984), Document book, tab 1.1, p. 2, paragraph 4a; Chief Review Services, Program Evaluation Division, "Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E-4/86: Special Review of DND Security Screening Policy and Procedures" (May 13, 1987), p. 80, paragraph 237; and J.-P. Brodeur, *Racism and Accountability in a Peacekeeping Context: The Canadian Forces in Somalia*, study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 1997).
3. Chief Review Services, "Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E-4/86", p. 78, paragraph 233, p. 98, paragraph 291, p. 99, paragraphs 297-298, and p. 112, paragraph 341; and DND, *Security Orders for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces* (A-SJ-100-001/AS-000), vol. 1, paragraph 22-18.
4. Director General Program Evaluation, "Pre-Evaluation Report PRE-E4/93: CF Personnel Planning and Management", August 1994, pp. 35-36 (Document R2841/DND 424834).
5. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 11, p. 2179; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9060.
6. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2697 and 2701.
7. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5865-5866.
8. Chief Review Services, "Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation Assessment Study — EA 1/86: Personnel—Recruiting, Development and Distribution", May 13, 1988, p. 11, paragraph 27 (Document 2841/DND 426035).
9. Chief Review Services, "Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation Assessment Study EA 1/86: Personnel", p. 6, paragraph 14, p. 11, paragraph 27, and p. 49, paragraph 162.
10. Chief Review Services, "Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation Assessment Study EA 1/86: Personnel", p. 6, paragraph 14.
11. *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, sections 1, 2, 8, 32(1), and 52(1); *Canadian Human Rights Act*, R.S.C. 1985, Chapter H-6, sections 2, 3(1), 7, 8, 10(a), 14(1)(c), 64, and 66, but see also section 15(a) re exception for bona fide occupational requirements; and *Privacy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, Chapter P-21, sections 2, 5, 7, 8, and 76 and Schedule 3.
12. Testimony of MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 578; and MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8515.
13. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 382 and 384.
14. BGen Vernon and LGen Gervais, "Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment", November 4, 1992, Document book 29, tab 19, pp. 9-10, paragraphs 25(c), 26(c), and 27(c); and testimony of Col (ret) Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2267.
15. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 384.
16. Canadian Forces Administrative Order [CFAO] 10-6; and testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9850 and 9855.
17. CFAO 10-6; and testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9850.

18. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 382 and 384; and Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 664; and Wenek, "The Assessment of Psychological Fitness", p. 13, paragraph 23.
19. Wenek, "The Assessment of Psychological Fitness", p. 13, paragraph 23.
20. MGen Hewson, *Mobile Command Study: A Report on Disciplinary Infractions and Anti-Social Behaviour within Force Mobile Command with Particular Reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment*, September 1985, Document book 1, tab 1 (hereafter, Hewson report); and Letter, LGen Belzile, Commander Force Mobile Command, to Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), November 25, 1985, re Disciplinary Infractions and Anti-Social Behaviour within FMC, Document book 1, tab 3.
21. Hewson report, p. 52, paragraph 118, and p. 54, paragraph 131e; and Letter, LGen Belzile to CDS, Annex A, paragraphs 3–7, Document book 1, tab 3.
22. Hewson report, p. 18, paragraph 47, p. 19, paragraph 50a, p. 48, paragraph 108a, and p. 52, paragraphs 115 and 118; letter, LGen Belzile to CDS, Annex A, p. A-1, paragraph 4; and testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9863.
23. Hewson report, p. 18, paragraph 47, and p. 48, paragraph 108a.
24. Hewson report; and letter, LGen Belzile to CDS, Annex A, p. A-1, paragraphs 4 and 5.
25. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 664; Hewson report, pp. 29–31, paragraphs 75, 76, 78a and 78f; and letter, LGen Belzile to CDS, Annex A, p. A-2, paragraph 6.
26. Testimony of MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 569.
27. Aide-mémoire, BGen Beno, October 21, 1992, re CO CDN AB REGT [Commanding Officer, Canadian Airborne Regiment] Discussion with Commander SSF, 21 Oct 91 [sic], Document book 32A, tab 6, p. 1.
28. Testimony of MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 569; LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, pp. 296; Col (ret) Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2259; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8955–8956.
29. Hewson report, pp. 29–31, paragraphs 75, 76, 78a, and 78f; and letter, LGen Belzile to CDS, Annex A, p. A-2, paragraph 6.
30. Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, pp. 294–297 and 319–320.
31. Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, p. 294; and Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2696.
32. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 11, pp. 2161–2163, 2170 and 2174.
33. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 660–661.
34. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2807.
35. Testimony of Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3248–3305.
36. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 614–615.
37. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 408–409.
38. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4546.
39. Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, pp. 277–278; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 680; and Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2738 and 2742.
40. Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, p. 276.
41. Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, p. 277; and Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 11, p. 2171, and vol. 12, p. 2106.1.
42. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9859–9860.
43. Letter, LGen Belzile to CDS, Annex A, p. A-2, paragraph 7d; and testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9861.

44. Hewson report, p. 18, paragraph 46.
45. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4873.
46. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2730.
47. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4868–4938.
48. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4875 and 4913; and MWO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6591.
49. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4873 and 4932.
50. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4874–4875.
51. Testimony of Col (ret) Houghton, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8831.
52. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4878.
53. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 413; and CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4896.
54. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 614.
55. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 613–614; Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4204 and 4206; and CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4733.
56. See testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 11, p. 2157 and following, and vol. 12, p. 2081.1 and following; Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2686 and following; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 671–678, 682–685 and 802; MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 570; CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4886–4891; MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4330; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5884–5887, and vol. 32, pp. 6077–6080; WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6676–6677; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7880–7892; MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8378–8398; LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8955–8956, 8998–9001, 9014–9018, vol. 46, pp. 9025, 9058–9061, 9071–9074 and 9222, and vol. 47, pp. 9271–9273; and LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9462–9468.
57. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2816; and Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 647–651 and 665.
58. Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, pp. 294–297; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 660–661; Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2807; and Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 18, 3305.
59. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2119.1.
60. Document book, LCol Morneault, No. 1; and testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 671–672.
61. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 813.
62. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 675; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8998–8999, and vol. 46, p. 9216.
63. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2095.1 and 2097.1; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 677 and 729; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9222.
64. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2731 and 2733.
65. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, p. 6080.
66. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, p. 34648.
67. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 11, p. 2179; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9060.
68. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2697 and 2701.
69. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2697–2709.

70. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2131.1–2134.1; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7883–7884 and 7892, and evidence to the Board of Inquiry on the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, vol. IV, p. 1031 [hereafter, Board of Inquiry (CARBG)]; MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8392–8393; LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9060–9061 and 9071; and LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9462–9464 and 9467–9468.
71. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7881.
72. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9065.
73. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9061 and 9071; and LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9467–9468.
74. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2131.1–2134.1; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7883–7884 and 7892, and evidence to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, p. 1031.
75. See letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, Commander Land Force Central Area, October 19, 1992, Document book 15, tab 18.
76. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2792–2797.
77. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2722.
78. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 683–6; and Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2725–2726.
79. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 686 and 803–804; and Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2727, 2738 and 2742.
80. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2095.1 and 2097.1; LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8998–8999, and vol. 46, pp. 9061, 9071 and 9222; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 677 and 729; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7883–7884; and LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9462–9464 and 9467–9468.
81. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 671–675; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8998–8999, and vol. 46, p. 9216.
82. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9061, 9065 and 9071; LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9467–9468; Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2150.1 and 2215; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7881.
83. Testimony of BGen (ret) Zuliani, Transcripts vol. 181, pp. 37431–37432.
84. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 11, pp. 2162 and 2175; and Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2694.
85. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9065, and vol. 45, pp. 8955–8956; MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 568–569; and Col (ret) Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2259.
86. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2775.
87. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7881; LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9072; and Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2776.
88. BGen Vernon and LGen Gervais, “Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment”, pp. 9–10; and testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9272–9273.
89. Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, pp. 257–258.
90. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4547; and CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4902–4903.
91. CFAO 49-4, Annex B, paragraph 4, and Annex C, paragraphs 6–8, 10, 13–14.

92. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4886; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, p. 6078; and evidence of CWO Raymond to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, p. 1007.
93. CFAO 49-4, Annex B, Appendix 2, paragraphs 2-4.
94. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4548; and CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4902-4906.
95. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, pp. 4546-4548; and CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4902-4904.
96. Document book 1, tab 1, pp. 52, 54.
97. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4886-4887.
98. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5885; and Military Police Investigation Report PET 855-12-92(LD), October 26, 1992, by Cpl Portz, 2 MP Platoon, CFB Petawawa, Document book 4, tab 3.
99. Evidence of Sgt Lloyd, General Court-Martial of Capt Sox, vol. 2, pp. 365-366.
100. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5834, vol. 31, pp. 5884-5885, and vol. 32, p. 6080; MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4330; and MWO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6663, 6676-6677, 6692 and 6788.
101. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6663-6672; and General Court-Martial of Capt Sox, Evidence of WO Murphy, vol. 1, pp. 144 and 152-153, and Evidence of Sgt Lloyd, vol. 2, pp. 366-368.
102. Testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 413; letter, MGen Hewson to LGen Belzile, Commander Mobile Command, 26 September, 1985, Document book 1, tab 1, p. 1/2; and letter, LGen Belzile to CDS, Annex A, p. A-1.
103. Testimony of MGen (ret) Gaudreau, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 542; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 617; and letter, MGen Stewart to Col Holmes, March 5, 1992, Document book 83C, tab 14, p. 4.
104. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8460; Service paper, BGen Beno to MGen Vernon, "The Way Ahead — Cdn Ab Regt — Command, Control, Manning and Internal Operations", May 5, 1993, Document book 32, tab 5, p. 5, paragraph 129(a)(2); and letter, LGen Reay, Commander Land Force Command, to CDS, October 28, 1993, re Response to Leadership and Discipline Issues—Canadian Airborne Regiment Board of Inquiry, Document book 55C, tab 6, pp. 3-4, paragraph 10(c).
105. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 616-617 and 685; Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2725-2726; and CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4564; and letter, BGen Beno to BGen Ashton, Commander, 1st Canadian Brigade Group, April 8, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 4.
106. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6907-6908.
107. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6664.
108. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6775.
109. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1209.
110. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6682.
111. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 14, p. 2574.
112. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4564; and Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 616-617.
113. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 613-614.
114. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5687-5688.
115. Testimony of Maj (ret) Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, pp. 37512-37513.
116. Testimony of CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4916-4917.

117. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, p. 34637.
118. Testimony of Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 17, pp. 3194–3195 and 3239; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947–7949; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 682–683; Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2722; and MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8461.
119. Evidence of Capt Yuzichuk to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. III, p. 672; testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6564–6565; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5670.
120. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5670.
121. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9863.
122. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8461; LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, p. 34637; and Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 17, pp. 3190–3192; and evidence of Col (ret) Joly to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, p. 1316.
123. Testimony of Col (ret) Houghton, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2253–2254; Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 611; MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4271 and 4361, and vol. 24, p. 4417; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5683–5687, and vol. 31, p. 5968; Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6424; LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7569–7572 and 7586–7587; and CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, p. 20889; letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, Commander LFCA, October 19, 1992, Document book 15, tab 18; and letter, BGen Beno to BGen Ashton, Commander 1st Canadian Brigade Group, April 8, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 4.
124. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5685 and 5687, and vol. 31, p. 5968.
125. Board of Inquiry on the Canadian Airborne Regiment, Change of Command [hereafter Board of Inquiry (Change of Command)], June 12, 1992, Document book 89, tab 3G, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), November 13, 1992, Document book 7, tab 6, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), October 27, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 8, Annex B; and Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. X, Exhibits 87 and 88.
126. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5189.
127. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5857; and LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6911–6912.
128. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5735–5736.
129. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5705–5706; and LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6911.
130. Evidence of LCol Mathieu to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1193–1194.
131. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, p. 34638.
132. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 685; Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2722; Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 17, pp. 3194–3195 and 3239; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947–7949; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, pp. 4624–4629; and LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9078–9079 and 9166; and message, LFC HQ to CARBG re COMMAND POSITIONS IN THE CDN AB REGT, 221349Z February 1993, Document book 83C, tab 10, p. 1.
133. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4985–4987, and vol. 27, p. 5077; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947–7949; and LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6906.
134. Message, LFC HQ to AB Regt D INF 035 re MANNING OF MAJORS POSITIONS IN THE CDN AB REGT, 082000Z March 1993, Document book 48X, tab 1, p. 3.

135. Evidence of LCol Mathieu to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1192–1193.
136. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibits 87 and 97, vol. X, pp. 3071 and 3105–3106.
137. *R. v. Maj Anthony Seward*, General Court-Martial, vol. 5, p. 950.
138. *R. v. Seward* (27 May 1996) # 376 (Court Martial Appeal Court), pp. 19 and 21; and *National Defence Act*, Chapter N-5, section 140(c).
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140. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5673, and vol. 31, p. 5855; Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6560; and WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6735.
141. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7804–7805, and vol. 41, p. 7996; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5673; and LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6900; and evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 1027–1028; and LCol Mathieu, vol. V, pp. 1186 and 1192.
142. Message, LFC HQ to CARBG re MANNING OF MAJORS POSITIONS, pp. 2–3.
143. Message, LFC HQ to CARBG re MANNING OF MAJORS POSITIONS, pp. 2–3.
144. Letter, BGen Dallaire to BGen Beno, “RAPPORT D’INCIDENT — CAPITAINE J.A.M. RAINVILLE”, September 23, 1992, Document book 4, tab 6A, ; and testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6908–6909.
145. Letter, BGen Dallaire to BGen Beno, “RAPPORT D’INCIDENT”.
146. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6963.
147. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7950.
148. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, p. 1023.
149. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947 and 7951–7952; and LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3424–3425.
150. Testimony of Col Arp, Transcripts vol. 12, pp. 2105.1–2106.1.
151. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, Commander LFCA, October 19, 1992, Document book 15, tab 18.
152. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, paragraphs 2, 3, 6 and 7; evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 1014–1019; and testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7737–7741 and 7793–7795.
153. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, paragraphs 2, 3, 6 and 7; Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 1014–1019; and testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7737–7741 and 7793–7795.
154. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, paragraphs 2, 3, 6 and 7.
155. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8370, 8372 and 8379; LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9038; LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9455; and Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9964 and 9967.
156. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9455.
157. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3845–3849; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5672–5673, 5686, 5703–5704 and 5722–5724, and vol. 31, p. 5855; Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6560; MWO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6584–6587, and vol. 35, p. 6735; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, pp. 4610–4612, 4624–4629, and vol. 105, pp. 20924–20929; LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6972, and vol. 38, p. 7332; MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20651–20656, 20749, 20789, 20807–20809, and vol. 105, pp. 20829 and 20831–20835; Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21449–21453, and vol. 109, p. 21744; and Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20416–20417 and 20477–20478, and vol. 115, pp. 23041–23043.

158. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibits 87 and 88, vol. X, pp. 3071–3072.
159. CFAO 20-50, paragraph 3.
160. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibit 32, SSF SOP 4003, Annex A, paragraph 4; and Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5222.
161. The only explicit rule on the subject was in CFAO 20-50, paragraph 4a, which stipulated that “Members with a history of repeated misconduct shall not be considered for a posting outside Canada.” Since the Somalia mission, CFAO 20-50 has been amended to require that unit commanders make an explicit determination of the behavioural suitability for deployment of personnel under their command. The amended CFAO also provides a list of specific indicators of behavioural or social unsuitability that COs should take into account in arriving at their decision. See CANFORGEN 023 of 021500Z May 94 from NDHQ re SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SUITABILITY SCREENING, Document book 89A, tab 10.
162. DND, *Operations Land & Tactical Air*, vol. 3, Peacekeeping Operations (Publication B-GL-301-003/FP-001, September 15, 1995), p. 11-3-1, paragraph 3b.
163. Franklin C. Pinch, “Screening and Selection of Personnel for Peace Operations: A Canadian Perspective” (Gloucester, Ont.: November 1994), p. 28.
164. Memo, OP CORDON/OP DELIVERANCE—Lessons Learned to N3, Marland [Maritime Forces Atlantic] HQ, February 19, 1993, Document book 31A, tab 42.
165. Testimony of Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 16, p. 3045.
166. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, pp. 9653 and 9681; and Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10070.
167. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10071.
168. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, pp. 9679–9680.
169. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32737.
170. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9095. See also testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9653.
171. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9088, 9090–9094 and 9096–9097; LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9652; and Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10070.
172. Pinch, “Screening and Selection of Personnel for Peace Operations”, p. 23.
173. See CFAO 20-46 and CFAO 20-50 and Force Mobile Command Operating Procedure 101, November 29, 1997.
174. Letter, LCol O’Brien, SSF Chief of Staff, “DEPARTURE ASSISTANCE GROUP (DAG) PERS COORD INSTR — OP CORDON”, September 8, 1992, Document book 10, tab 30.
175. Memo, Capt Gosselin, Adjutant, 1st Canadian Division HQ and Signal Regiment, “OP DELIVERANCE — DEPARTURE ASSISTANCE GROUP III 14 DEC 92”, December 10, 1992, Document book 89A, tab 1.
176. CFAO 20-50, Annex A, section 1, paragraph 4, and Annex A, Appendix 1, Part H; testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, p. 289; and LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 37, pp. 7171 and 7172. See also Pinch, “Screening and Selection of Personnel for Peace Operation”, pp. 17–18 and 23.
177. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5222 and 5224; LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 37, pp. 7171–7172; and MWO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6662.

178. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5224; MWO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6662–6663; LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7173.
179. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5225.
180. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 37, pp. 7171–7172.
181. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4384; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4763; and MWO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6665.
182. Letter, Capt McMillan, SSF G1, to SSF Commander, "OP DELIVERANCE — CDN AB REGT REAR PARTY COMPOSITION", May 10, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 2; letter, LCol Mathieu to BGen Beno, "INTEGRATION OF RESERVISTS WITHIN AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUP", December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 9, p. 2, paragraph 5; and testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4323, 4325 and 4349; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5822; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5224.
183. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7737–7741 and 7793–7795; evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 1014–1019; and letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, Commander LFCA, "REPLACEMENT OF COMMANDING OFFICER CANADIAN AIRBORNE REGIMENT", October 19, 1992, Document book 15, tab 18.
184. Letter, Capt McMillan, SSF G1, to SSF Commander, "OP DELIVERANCE — CDN AB REGT REAR PARTY COMPOSITION", May 10, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 2.
185. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6592 and 6597; MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4349; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5890.
186. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6674–75; and MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4353 and 4435–4439.
187. Letter, LCol Morneau to BGen Beno, "RESERVE PERSONNEL — OP CORDON", October 9, 1992, Document book 32A, tab 5, p. 3; Memo, Maj Magee, OC 3 Cdo, to CAR CO, "ASSESSMENT OF MILITIA PERSONNEL FOR OP CORDON", October 19, 1992, Document book 89, tab 6; and letters, Maj MacKay, Deputy CO CAR, to CO, Royal Regiment of Canada; CO, Algonquin Regiment; CO, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada; and CO, Princess of Wales Own Regiment, October 30, 1992, Document book 29, tab 16.
188. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5224.
189. Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), June 12, 1992, Document book 89, tab 3G, Annex D; and letter, Capt McMillan, G1 SSF, to Commander, SSF, "OP DELIVERANCE CDN AB REGT REAR PARTY COMPOSITION", May 10, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 2B, Annex B.
190. Military Policy Investigation Report (MPIR) PET 205-25-92, October 8, 1992, LS Brisson, 2 MP Platoon, CFB Petawawa, Document book 89, tab 5, p. 2, paragraph 3(h); and Canadian Forces Conduct Sheet, Document book 89, tab 5N.
191. MPIR PET 855-11-92(LD), October 13, 1992, Cpl Portz, 2 MP Platoon, CFB Petawawa, Document book 4, tab 3, pp. 3-4; and PET 855-12-92(LD), October 26, 1992, Cpl Portz, 2 MP Platoon, CFB Petawawa, Document book 4, tab 3.
192. Message, SSF HQ to G1 and G3, LFCA HQ, "OP DELIVERANCE — Request for Attach-Posting Authorization", April 6, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 3, paragraph 2D; and Message, LFC HQ to G1 and G3, CJFS HQ et al., "OP DELIVERANCE — Cease and Attach-Posting Instruction", April 13, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 5, paragraph 2E.

193. Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), June 12, 1992, Document book 89, tab 3G, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), November 13, 1992, Document book 7, tab 6, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), October 27, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 8, Annex B; MPIR PET 855-11-92(LD), October 13, 1992, pp. 3–4; MPIR PET 855-12-92(LD), October 26, 1992; letter, Capt McMillan, G1 SSF, to Commander SSF, “OP DELIVERANCE Cdn Ab Regt Rear Party Composition”, May 10, 1993; Document book 89A, tab 2B, Annex D; testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4349, 4353, 4435–4439; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5705–5706 and 5735–5706, and vol. 31, p. 5890; MWO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6592, 6597, 6663–6664, 6681, 6704 and 6772–6776; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6911 and 6963.
194. MPIR PET 855-11-92(LD), October 13, 1992, pp. 3–4; MPIR PET 855-12-92(LD), October 26, 1993; and Capt Pupetz, ed., *In the Line of Duty* (1994), pp. 276–282.
195. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibits 87 and 88, vol. X, pp. 3071 and 3072; and letter, LGen PG Addy, ADM (Per), “SOMALIA INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION/ FOLLOW-UP ACTION”, May 16, 1995, Document book 89A, tab 11-O, Annex B.
196. Letter, Capt Yuzichuk, CAR Adjutant, to CJFS J1, “SUMMARY OF INCIDENT...”, January 1993, Document book 111, tab 44C.
197. Message, Adjutant, CARBG to J1, CJFS, “...CO’s Recommendations”, January 22, 1993, Document book 111, tab 44E.
198. Message, Adjutant, CARBG, to J1, CJFS, “...CO’s Recommendations”; and MPIR 710-81-92, May 20, 1992, Cpl Parsons, 2 MP Platoon, CFB Petawawa, Document book 89, tab 2.
199. Message, CARBG to J1, CJFS, “REQUEST FOR REPLACEMENT...”, March 5, 1993, Document book 89, tab 2B.
200. Message, CARBG to J1, CJFS, “REQUEST FOR REPLACEMENT...”; and Recorded Warning from Capt Moolenbeek, April 22, 1993, Document book 89, tab 2C.
201. Letter, LCol Mathieu to NDHQ/DPLS, “CIVIL CONVICTION...”, December 9, 1992, and attached Certificate of Conviction, Ontario Court (Provincial Division), Document book 89, tab 2A.
202. MPIR PET 855-12-92(LD), October 26, 1992, p. 9, paragraph 18.
203. MPIR PET 855-12-92(LD), October 26, 1992, pp. 2–3 and 4.
204. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4316; and memo, Maj Markell to BGen Crabbe, Director General Personnel Careers Other Ranks, “Information Somalia Defendants”, October 18, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 71, Flag F.
205. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4324; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8002.
206. Testimony of Maj (ret) Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37514.
207. Letter, LGen Addy, ADM (Per), “SOMALIA INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION/ FOLLOW-UP ACTION”, May 10, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 11-O, Annex A, p. 12.
208. Memo, Maj Markell to BGen Crabbe, “Information Somalia Defendants”, Flag F.
209. Chart, “SYNOPSIS OF PERS FILES”, Document book 89, tab 1.
210. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6677; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5883.
211. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6677–6678 and 6712.

212. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5685 and 5687, and vol. 31, p. 5968; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), June 12, 1992, Document book 89, tab 3G, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), November 13, 1992, Document book 7, tab 6, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), October 27, 1993, Document book 89A, tab 8, Annex B; and Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibit 87, vol. X, p. 3071.
213. Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), June 12, 1992, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), November 13, 1992, Annex D; Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), October 27, 1993, Annex B; MPIR PET 855-11-92(LD), October 13, 1992, pp. 3-4; MPIR PET 855-12-92(LD), October 26, 1992; letter, Capt McMillan, G1 SSF, to Commander, SSF, "OP DELIVERANCE Cdn Ab Regt Rear Party Composition", May 10, 1993, Annex B; testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4349, 4353, and vol. 24, pp. 4435-4439; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5705-5706 and 5735-5736, and vol. 31, p. 5890; WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6592, 6597, and vol. 35, pp. 6663-6664, 6681, 6704 and 6772-6776; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6911 and 6963.
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215. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibit 87, vol. X, p. 3071; and letter, LGen Addy, ADM (Per), "SOMALIA INCIDENTS INVESTIGATION/ FOLLOW-UP ACTION", May 16, 1995, Document book 89A, tab 11-O, Annex A.
216. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5696-5697; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7930-7931.
217. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5696, 5823-5824, vol. 31, pp. 5879-5880, and vol. 32, p. 6197; MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4322 and 4328-4329; and WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6666 and 6753.
218. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6906 and 6994, and vol. 39, p. 7610.
219. Evidence of Maj Seward to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, p. 1241; and testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5823-5824.
220. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6666, 6669 and 6672.
221. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6666, 6669 and 6672.
222. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4985 and 4987, and vol. 27, p. 5077; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6906 and 6995.
223. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947-7949; LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3576; LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6904-6906; and LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, pp. 34619-34620.
224. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947 and 7951-7952; and LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, pp. 34619-34620.
225. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6907, 6962, and vol. 38, pp. 7535-7536; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7152.
226. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, pp. 34619-34620.
227. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, pp. 34634-34648.
228. Testimony of Maj Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, pp. 2722-2726; Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 17, pp. 3194-3200; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947-7949; LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3576; LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6904-6906; LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9078-9079 and 9166; and LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, p. 34677; and message, LFC HQ to CARBG, "COMMAND POSITIONS IN THE CDN AB REGT", February 22, 1993, Document book 83C, tab 10, p. 1, paragraph 1.

229. Evidence of LCol Mathieu to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1192–1193, and Exhibits 87 and 97, vol. X, pp. 3071 and 3105–3106; message, CARBG to Commander, CJFS, “MAJOR SEWARD—RETURN TO CANADA”, March 25, 1993, Document book 38X, tab 39; and message, CJFS HQ to CO, CARBG, “MAJOR SEWARD — RETURN TO CANADA”, March 25, 1993, Document book 38X, tab 40.
230. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7940, 7945 and 7989–7995.
231. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, pp. 34622–34624.
232. See Pinch, “Screening and Selection of Personnel for Peace Operations”, p. 13: “...nor should formal selection strategies be considered sufficient to overcome other deficiencies in the leadership, management and supervision within the armed forces.”
233. Evidence of a witness to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, p. 887, quoting an unnamed senior NCO or officer of 2 Commando.
234. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 2585.
235. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1201–1202, and vol. 14, pp. 2537 and 2660–2663.
236. *Canadian Human Rights Act*, S.C. 1976–77, Chapter 33, sections 2(a), 4, 7, 10(a), 12, 48(4) and 63(1).
237. S.C. 1980-81-82-83, Chapter 143, section 23.
238. Department of Defense Directive 1325.6, U.S. Department of Defense, September 12, 1969, as amended on October 8, 1986. The following excerpt sets out the U.S. policy:

Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; or, advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading such organizations is incompatible with Military Service, and is therefore prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who actively participate in such groups.
239. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4690.
240. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, December 30, 1994, p. 6.
241. R.S.C. 1993, Chapter C-46.
242. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1185–1186, and vol. 14, p. 2635; and DND, *SIROS Report*, LEIP No. 02/91, October 31, 1991, Exhibit P-55.1, p. 3, p. 10(c).
243. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1185–1186; letter, from LCol Jones, Director of Police Operations, “NEO-NAZI ORGANIZATION — SKINHEADS DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE SIROS LIST”, June 10, 1992, Document book 8, tab 1; and letter, Cdr Jenkins, DG Secur Ops 2, “RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS IN THE CF”, February 4, 1993, Document book 8, tab 2, p. 2, paragraph 5.
244. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1203.

245. Chief Review Services, "Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E-4/86: Special Review of DND Security Screening Policy and Procedures," May 13, 1987, p. 78, paragraph 233, p. 98, paragraph 291, p. 99, paragraphs 297–298, and p. 112, paragraph 341; and DND, *Security Orders for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces* (Publication A-SJ-100-001/AS-000), vol. 1, paragraph 22–18.
246. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1196–1199.
247. Letter, Cdr Jenkins, D Secur Ops 2, "RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS IN THE CF", February 4, 1993, Document book 8, tab 2, p. 2, paragraph 4; and testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1213, 1214, 1215, 1227.
248. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 14, p. 2619.
249. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1209, and vol. 14, pp. 2518 and 2561; and *SIROS Report*, October 31, 1991, p. 3, paragraph 10.
250. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1209–1215.
251. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 14, pp. 2572–2574.
252. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1209–1210.
253. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1210, and vol. 14, pp. 2573–2574.
254. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6682–6683.
255. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6682–6684.
256. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1223–1224; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, pp. 8128 and 8132–8133.
257. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 14, pp. 2571–2572.
258. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1213, and vol. 14, pp. 2557–2561, 2562–2563 and 2655–2659.
259. Briefing note, Cdr Jenkins to Minister of National Defence (MND), "INVESTIGATION OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES", September 13, 1993, Document book 72A, tab 18G, pp. 1–2, paragraph 3; and Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 14, p. 2553–2554.
260. Briefing note, Cdr Jenkins to MND, "INVESTIGATION OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES", p. 2, paragraph 3c; and testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 173, p. 35795.
261. Briefing note, Cdr Jenkins to MND, "INVESTIGATION OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES", p. 2/2, paragraphs 3a and 3b. Also, according to Sgt Boland, MCpl Matchee was good friends with Cpl McKay (General Court-Martial of Sgt Boland, vol. 2, p. 277). Cpl McKay concurred (General Court-Martial of Capt Sox, vol. 2, p. 317).
262. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 14, p. 2582.
263. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 14, pp. 2582, 2590–2592.
264. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 106, p. 21114; LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 173, p. 35775; Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4233; and MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4373.
265. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20430–20431; and MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4470.
266. Document book 118B, tab 3.
267. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4470.
268. Testimony of Cpl Robin, Transcripts vol. 6, pp. 1033–1037.
269. Testimony of Cpl Robin, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1070.
270. Testimony of Cpl Robin, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1066.

271. Testimony of Cpl Robin, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1075.
272. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, pp. 6190–6191.
273. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 5010–5011; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7182.
274. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21467–21468; and MWO O'Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, pp. 21848, 21854.
275. Testimony of MWO O'Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, pp. 21848, 21854–21855.
276. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5838.
277. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20431.
278. Testimony of Sgt Flanders, Transcripts vol. 110, p. 22124.
279. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, p. 21067.
280. Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20431.
281. Paragraph 9.
282. Testimony of Cdr Jenkins, Transcripts vol. 6, p. 1203.
283. QR&O 15.01, Table, Item 1(d), and article 15.32.

21



TRAINING

We were asked to inquire into “the appropriateness of the training objectives and standards used to prepare for deployment of the Airborne Regiment” and to report on “the operational readiness of the CARBG [Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group], prior to deployment, for its missions and tasks.”¹ Fundamental to a unit’s operational readiness are troops well trained to perform all aspects of the mission to which it is being committed. Accordingly, our Inquiry touched on a broad spectrum of issues related to training and included, but was not limited to, a review of the training objectives and standards used for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance.

A well trained unit for peace support operations is one that is ably led; functionally well integrated (that is, its operational components fit together well); cohesive (it displays positive bonding among peers and across rank levels); and focused on an understood mission. It is also — and of primary interest in this chapter — one whose members have the knowledge, skills, outlook and attitudes necessary to meet the challenges that will be faced in theatre. This is especially important when troops are being sent off to represent Canada in foreign environments characterized by a high level of complexity, diversity, ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk,² of which Somalia is but one example.

The responsibility to ensure that units are well trained and their members have the appropriate attitudes to effectively undertake peace support operations begins with the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) and extends through the various levels of command to unit commanding officers and on down to section commanders. We therefore begin by reviewing the peace support operations training arrangements that were in place at the higher levels of the Canadian Forces (CF) before considering the specific training conducted for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. Ultimately, we want to know whether

the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group was properly trained for the Somalia mission and, if not, what the deficiencies were and how they might have been corrected.

TRAINING POLICY FOR PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

The Traditional Approach

Given Canada's long involvement with United Nations peacekeeping endeavours, one would expect that by 1992, the year Somalia became an international issue, the CF would have had a clearly defined and conceptualized training system for peacekeeping missions that reflected changes in the peacekeeping field at that time. (Our discussion of training policy up to 1992 relates primarily to "traditional peacekeeping", characterized by the basic tenets of consent, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defence, as discussed in Volume 1, Chapter 10 — Peacekeeping.) Amazingly, this was not the case. Indeed, at that time, the training policy of the CF was based almost exclusively on a traditional mode of general purpose combat preparation.

The objective of general purpose combat training (GPCT) is to prepare soldiers and units to perform a full range of basic combat functions and to integrate these functions effectively to meet larger operational needs. Before advancing to collective unit training, all soldiers are trained in basic soldiering skills, such as the use of weapons, fieldcraft, communications, biological/chemical defence, basic fitness, and first aid. GPCT was to provide the foundation for peacekeeping, supplemented by mission-specific training during pre-deployment preparations as the need arose.

This reliance on GPCT was based on the conviction that troops well trained for high-intensity warfare would be well prepared for any scenario falling short of combat, including peacekeeping.³ It assumed that peacekeeping would draw on the same set of skills as conventional warfare, but would test them to a lesser degree.

In addition to developing fighting skills, GPCT was seen to instil a strong sense of unit discipline and the ability to work cohesively and efficiently in any military setting, whether in battle, delivering food and assistance, or in other emergencies. Since UN peacekeeping missions involved critical contact with other military or para-military leaders, it was believed that combat-ready troops would be better able to understand, and command the respect of, the military leaders and soldiers of warring factions.⁴ Thirty years' experience in traditional peacekeeping, typified by Canada's involvement in Cyprus, had demonstrated the relevance of unit discipline, cohesion, and basic professional skills in all military endeavours.

It was assumed that any necessary training beyond GPCT was achievable within the relatively short period between the notice of mission and a unit's actual deployment — that is, from several days to a few months. Relegating this training almost exclusively to the pre-deployment phase also reflected the view that each new mission was unique, with few common characteristics that could be prepared for outside a mission-specific context.

This basic CF design of training for war — the 'traditional' approach — was clearly evident in the early 1990s before troops were sent to Somalia.⁵ It was formulated in response to the plans and priorities established by the Government of Canada and expressed in the 1987 Defence White Paper.⁶ While recognizing Canada's continuing participation in UN peacekeeping missions, the White Paper essentially endorsed Cold War defence policy, based on a strategy of deterrence and collective defence in North America and Western Europe. The focus of the CF on general purpose combat readiness flowed from this statement of priorities.⁷

This policy seems to have served our forces well throughout the so-called 'classical' peacekeeping era (1956–1990),⁸ when relatively stable unit rotations to Cyprus were the norm. Indeed, CF peacekeepers were recognized internationally for their high level of professionalism. However, the rapidly changing nature of global conflict and the dynamics of peacekeeping in the late 1980s called for re-examination and change in peacekeeping training approaches.

Peacekeeping Skills Beyond General Purpose Combat Training

Training must be tailored to the tasks required, and this varies, to some degree, from mission to mission.⁹ The modern peacekeeper is called upon to perform an extraordinary range of roles and tasks:

The soldier of the 1990s must be flexible. He must be a diplomat, an aid worker, a policeman, as well as a warrior. He must exercise an unprecedented level of self-discipline by, in effect, programming himself to fit the prevailing situation.

In wartime, roles and objectives are clearly defined. But in operations other than war, the soldier is often forced to change roles from day to day, or even moment to moment. The peacekeeper must draw upon his combat infantry skills if a fire-fight breaks out, and then revert back to his diplomatic or humanitarian self.

The soldier of the 1990s must be better educated than ever before. He must be acquainted with the political, military and socio-cultural dynamics of the crisis area.... He must realize that as a representative of his country, his conduct will be held to extremely high standards.¹⁰

Thus a much wider array of knowledge and skill is required than is normally covered under GPCT. Broadening the knowledge and skill base through education and training is also a way of shaping appropriate attitudes and setting the right expectations to help CF members adapt to the demands of traditional peacekeeping or other peace support missions.

Many generic lists have been developed of the kinds of training generally required for peace support missions.¹¹ Some outline all the skills required; others focus only on non-GPCT skills. To indicate the range of skills and their interrelationship, we include a representative and composite list of key subjects identified as being of particular relevance to peace support missions. They are grouped to include those that usually fall within GPCT (although the exact application of the skills may differ); those not traditionally included in GPCT, but of general application to peace support operations ('generic peacekeeping' skills); and those that must be taught in a mission-specific context.¹²

General Purpose Combat Training

- use of small arms, crew-served weapons and non-lethal weapons
- fieldcraft, including survival techniques, map reading, water purification, navigation
- use of communications equipment
- mine awareness
- Law of Armed Conflict
- first aid, including CPR, hygiene
- patrolling and checkpoint operations
- sentry and guard duties, compound security.

Generic Peacekeeping Training

- overview of United Nations and history of UN peacekeeping
- nature of UN peacekeeping activities
- understanding of a peacekeeper's roles and responsibilities
- review of lessons learned from previous missions
- conflict resolution and negotiation
- intercultural relations training
- use of force policies and rules of engagement (ROE)
- investigation and UN reporting procedures

- establishing buffer zones, supervising a cease-fire, monitoring boundaries
- protecting humanitarian relief efforts, convoy escorts
- establishing and maintaining law and order
- searches, crowd control, handling detainees
- assistance in rebuilding infrastructure, relief work
- co-operation with related agencies (e.g., Red Cross)
- public affairs/media awareness.

Mission-Specific Training

- mission-specific objectives and command and control structures
- geography, history, political background, and threat assessment (military and environmental) in relation to theatre of operations
- theatre-specific cultural and language training
- theatre-specific vehicle, weapons, mines and munitions recognition
- training on mission-specific standing operating procedures and ROE
- theatre-specific health and hygiene
- stress management techniques.

We emphasize that the lists are not exhaustive or authoritative. However, they are sufficiently illustrative of training requirements for peace support operations to serve as a checklist in this chapter.

The lists are striking in at least two respects. First, the topics relevant to training for peace support operations are numerous and complex; we could not imagine them being covered adequately in the pre-deployment phase, particularly in cases where that period is measured in days.¹³ Second, although some topics must be taught in the context of a specific mission, many are applicable more generally to a wide range of UN missions. These generic peacekeeping training topics should be included, along with GPCT, in core training received by members of the Canadian Forces. This cannot be done during the limited pre-deployment period only and calls for a greater use of the individual training system, so that topics can be incorporated over a longer period.

Internal Reassessment

The Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF conducted a number of studies and reviews during the late 1980s and early 1990s examining various peacekeeping-related issues. Common themes of these internal reviews

and studies included the absence of a nationally directed peacekeeping training program; inattention to, or inadequacy of, training structures and processes; and resulting deficiencies in the knowledge, skills and orientations of CF peacekeepers.¹⁴ In 1989, the Lalonde study advocated better co-ordination of peacekeeping deployments between National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and commands, but upheld the general purpose model of training.¹⁵ The same year, the Rowbottom study proposed a specialized approach to peacekeeping policies, procedures and training.¹⁶

In 1990, the Special Peacekeeping Adviser to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff reported that Canada's peacekeeping training efforts had both systemic and training content deficiencies.¹⁷ BGen Ian Douglas observed that "the training of our troops selected for UN operations is not well managed by the central system. Most training activities are ad hoc and, with a few exceptions, take place because field commanders foresee, and cater to, operational training requirements."

BGen Douglas noted that Canadian officers received insufficient education and training in peacekeeping operations. Particularly lacking were education and training in relation to the geopolitical, cultural, interpersonal and international co-operation aspects of UN deployments. In the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) operation, both the Spanish and Venezuelan contingents "were quite superior to the Canadian Contingent, when compared across the board."

As to formed unit preparation, BGen Douglas confirmed the lack of direction from NDHQ to commands to units: "After 26 years of the Cyprus commitment there is still no system directed training package. Units either go back into regimental archives, and update old training plans, or borrow the most recent plan from the unit which preceded them".

The Douglas report recommended the development and management of a training package by Land Force Command Headquarters; introduction of a course of studies to overcome the noted education and training deficiencies; and the establishment of a permanent joint staff (J Staff) to improve NDHQ communication, co-ordination and management of peacekeeping activities.¹⁸ It also called for an in-depth review of all categories of peacekeeping training.¹⁹

A DND Military Review preliminary report, issued in February 1991, observed that there were "no current, officially published, Canadian doctrinal manuals for the guidance of CF members or units training for or serving on peacekeeping duties."²⁰ As well, there was "a lack of coordinated policy direction for training and training standards for units preparing for peacekeeping operations." Force Mobile (now Land Force) Command had no current training policy for formed unit deployments and rotations, and concern

was expressed that general military training, which emphasized a high standard of discipline and aggressiveness, was insufficient for the peacekeeping role. "While there is no question of the requirement for a high state of discipline, time and training are required to prepare the soldier for the passive role of a peacekeeper."

In 1992 an NDHQ program evaluation report identified weaknesses at all levels of peacekeeping training and observed that "command and control and communication systems across the Canadian Forces for peacekeeping do not exist."²¹ The report reinforced the need for the involvement of the individual training system, along with functional commands, to ensure comprehensive peacekeeping education and training; emphasized the importance of "non-traditional" and "special" skills for peacekeepers; and urged the allocation of resources to support peacekeeping training efforts. The evaluation reflected growing concern about the adequacy of both general and specific aspects of peacekeeping training and concluded that "peacekeepers will need more than only general military training."

In early 1991, the United Nations published "Training Guidelines", which included guidance on standards of training for peacekeeping operations among contributing nations.²² One response was a staff paper by the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations depicting a complacent CF attitude (that is, that very little was needed to prepare CF peacekeepers for operations), which was "causing difficulties in competing with other peacekeeping contributors [who were] paying attention to the expressed wishes of the UN [by] upgrading their peacekeeping skills."²³

The paper warned against resisting the guidelines for refresher and special training (e.g., mission orientation and negotiation). The CF had an obligation to meet the UN guidelines, the paper argued, and could "no longer claim that specific peacekeeping training is not needed." Among its recommendations were that training be given priority and that it be tailored to the needs of various categories of peacekeepers, including formed and composite unit contingents (combat and support).

Internal resistance to change was apparent in the early 1990s, particularly around the time when submissions were being made to establish a peacekeeping training centre at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. The centre was to provide more focused expertise and broaden the range of education and skills training being offered to peacekeepers.²⁴ In general, the CF response was to favour maintenance of the status quo, with the (by then) familiar refrain that "the best peacekeeper is a well-trained soldier, sailor or airman who knows his trade", with any required specialized training to be carried out as a pre-mission 'add-on'.²⁵ The traditional list of contingency training (basically, combat-oriented training, conducted annually for the UN standby contingent outside Canada, under jungle, mountain or desert conditions); replacement/

reinforcement/rotation training (primarily for support personnel destined for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, conducted quarterly); and military observer training was offered as evidence of a comprehensive training approach. There were also claims that staff changes in the office of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) in 1988 had improved the peacekeeping training situation.²⁶

In the short term, very little action flowed from any of the study or review findings,²⁷ and it is unlikely that change would have occurred had it not been for external pressure.²⁸ A survey of CF commands, colleges, and schools in March 1993 showed that few of the formations were conducting specific UN training or education,²⁹ and there was no indication of any appreciable influence on the way training was being directed by commands or done at the unit level.³⁰ Also, a comprehensive DCDS instruction of December 29, 1993 — aimed at rectifying deficiencies, making improvements, and formalizing direction and guidance for peacekeeping operations³¹ — had no immediate effect. Problems and limitations in peacekeeping training at the deploying unit level persisted into the mid-1990s.³²

The State of Training Policy in 1992

Thus in 1992, despite numerous internal studies with a consistent message — that peacekeeping training should be critically re-evaluated and changed — an ad hoc, general purpose combat training approach to preparing for UN deployments remained. There was no nationally directed systematic process for determining training requirements for peacekeeping and other peace support operations or for developing training plans and programs. Post-Cold War peace support operations training lacked an appropriately defined concept of operations, a proper needs analysis had not been conducted,³³ and formally developed doctrine, standards and training plans were absent.

Without training objectives and standards at the command level, there was no basis on which to provide guidance as to training priorities or the level to which training was to be conducted, let alone criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of such training. Production of training curricula, training packages, and standing operating procedures at the formation/unit level was indeed hampered by the absence of central direction, a supportive training structure, and a 'corporate memory bank'. Although progress has been made since, the tone set at NDHQ and within commands foreshadowed the problems encountered by the Canadian Airborne Regiment during pre-deployment preparations in the fall of 1992. These can be seen partly as a reflection of higher-level resistance to modernizing the peace support operations training structure and process to meet emerging challenges. In this sense, some of the difficulties experienced by the CAR were highly predictable and preventable.

FINDINGS

- In 1992, there was no formalized and standardized training system for peace support operations. A comprehensive training policy, based on changing requirements, had not been developed, and there was an absence of doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting the training of units being deployed on peace support operations. This situation existed even though deficiencies in training policy, direction, and management had been clearly identified in internal Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces reviews and staff papers before 1992.
- In preparing its forces for peace support missions, the Canadian Forces relied almost exclusively on a core of general purpose combat training, supplemented by mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase. This traditional approach to training was not adequate to give military personnel either the full range of skills or the appropriate orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges presented in post-Cold War peace support missions. There was a failure to incorporate the required generic peacekeeping training, both in the individual training system and in the regular operational training schedule.
- There was no resource centre to provide effective support and assistance to units preparing for deployment, nor was a procedure in place for the systematic compilation and analysis of lessons learned to assist in the planning of and preparation for new peace support missions.

CAR TRAINING BEFORE SEPTEMBER 1992

The Canadian Airborne Regiment was reputed to produce well trained, highly motivated soldiers and was tasked to maintain those soldiers at a heightened state of readiness.³⁴ In this section, we examine briefly the training undertaken by the CAR before it received the warning order for Operation Cordon, with a view to assessing its state of readiness — in terms of training — to undertake preparations for a UN peacekeeping mission in the late summer of 1992.

Induction into the CAR

All CAR members were volunteers. Before applying to the CAR, they would have served for at least 18 months in a parent infantry regiment, successfully completed a parachute jumping course, demonstrated a high level of physical fitness, and achieved a specialty qualification in a combat function.³⁵

For many years, the CAR conducted an Airborne Indoctrination Course (AIC), usually in the late summer, to orient newly arrived members. Until the mid-1980s, the AIC was a formal, intensive course consisting of 10 training days devoted to physical fitness, marksmanship on all infantry weapons, basic fieldcraft and battle drills, continued parachute training, rappelling, unarmed combat, and first aid training.³⁶ The course culminated in a parachute drop, usually at night. Upon completion of the course, the member was presented with a regimental coin — the rite of passage into the ranks of the Airborne.³⁷

By 1985, the AIC had been reduced to a five-day course.³⁸ After Col Holmes took over command of the CAR in 1990, the course was changed so that it was no longer a rite of passage into the Regiment. Instead, it was conducted at the commando level to integrate new members into their sub-units.³⁹

Annual Training

Annual Training Cycle

As with other infantry units, the CAR had an annual training cycle, culminating in a unit-level or formation-level exercise in the late spring.⁴⁰ The CAR's training year was divided into three periods: individual training (September to December), collective training (January to May), and total force training (June to August).⁴¹ The individual training period focused on the development of individual skills and usually included a collective exercise in the fall that built on section- and platoon-level skills. During the collective training period, training up to commando and regimental levels would be followed by a winter exercise. By spring, collective training would normally have been conducted up to the brigade level, culminating in a brigade exercise.⁴² The summer (total force training period) marked a break from regular force training for the unit, with many senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers being assigned at that time to train reserves.⁴³

Mid-June to early September was also the active posting season — the period when units such as the CAR experienced their largest turnover of both officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs).⁴⁴

Over the summer period just about every unit in the Canadian Armed Forces is ripped to pieces in one way or another in what is called the tasking or the posting season...and then you grab everybody back together at the end of that posting season.

If you can, you get some collective training and then you embark again on your individual training period.⁴⁵

For at least a few years before the CAR was sent to Somalia, there were significant disruptions and modifications in its annual training. For example, at the time Col Holmes assumed command in the summer of 1990, the unit had

experienced the recent cancellation of two regimental operations: an exercise to Jamaica, cancelled as a result of Hurricane Hugo, and an exercise to Alaska, cancelled when one of the advance-party planes crashed, killing several soldiers. The resulting loss and disappointment affected morale, and the disruption in unit-level training affected the unit's ability to operate effectively as a regiment.⁴⁶ Further frustration was experienced when, in the summer of 1990, the CAR trained diligently for six weeks for possible deployment to Oka, Quebec, but was not called.⁴⁷

The CAR's Operational Roles

The Canadian Airborne Regiment's training was a function of the unit's assigned roles and operational tasks. The CAR's primary role was "to provide rapid deployment airborne/air transportable forces for operations in accordance with assigned tasks, primarily to participate in support of national security and international peacekeeping."⁴⁸ Operational tasks for which the CAR was to be prepared included Civil Aid Operations (e.g., internal security operations, armed assistance to federal penitentiaries); Defence of Canada operations (which entailed the maintenance of the entire Regiment at 96 hours' notice, and being prepared for airborne operations anywhere in Canada, with the pathfinder platoon and one commando group on shorter notice); and Stability Operations (being a component of a UN peacekeeping force).⁴⁹

In relation to its Stability Operations tasking, the CAR was designated as the UN standby battalion, to be maintained at an advanced state of readiness for deployment anywhere in the world.⁵⁰ The Commander Force Mobile Command was responsible for training the combat arms unit "to the standards outlined in NDHQ Annual Training Directives".⁵¹

The spectrum of conflict for which the peacekeeping standby unit could be employed included enforcement of cease-fire agreements; conventional armed conflict; internal security; and humanitarian assistance.⁵² Being maintained at high readiness for designated operations included the requirement that the CAR be maintained at 90 per cent of its authorized strength, its equipment be maintained at a higher state of readiness than in other units, and it be "capable of executing operations without additional training."⁵³

The unit was supposed to be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on a peacekeeping mission on seven days' notice.⁵⁴ We were advised, however, that such rapid deployment might mean that training and intelligence briefings would have to be conducted in theatre, with the declaration of operational readiness being made after arrival in theatre.⁵⁵

Although the CAR was the UN standby unit, the last time it had participated in a UN operation before the Somalia mission was during a rotation to Cyprus in 1986–87.

Training to Meet the CAR's Operational Roles

To prepare for its operational roles, the CAR directed its training to the honing of light infantry skills, with a focus on physical fitness, musketry, basic battle drills, and the building of team spirit.⁵⁶ Members of the CAR received intensified training beyond that given to other infantry units, with the most obvious difference being that parachute training formed a part of their activities.⁵⁷ Being specialized light infantry, CAR members were not required to train with vehicles or devote time to vehicle maintenance.⁵⁸ Greater emphasis was placed on individual battle craft skills⁵⁹ and unarmed combat training,⁶⁰ and there was a requirement for a higher standard of fitness than in any other unit in the army.⁶¹ We heard CAR members described as “keen”, “aggressive”, and “highly motivated”,⁶² and their training as “more professionally challenging”, with exercises “designed to challenge the individual resourcefulness and self-reliance of the individual soldier at all rank levels.”⁶³ The CAR underwent more exchange training with U.S., British, and French forces than other units⁶⁴ and was trained in jungle, mountain, and desert warfare.⁶⁵

Surprisingly, however, despite being designated as the UN standby battalion, the CAR did not, as a matter of course, conduct any regular training aimed specifically at preparing for its tasking related to peacekeeping operations. They did train for the rapid deployment aspect of the tasking, but not for the conduct of peacekeeping operations once deployed. This was based on the premise that the best peacekeeper is a soldier well trained in combat arms.⁶⁶ As emphasized earlier, basic infantry skills may be essential for soldiers deploying on peacekeeping missions, but they are clearly not enough.

One would expect that as the UN standby battalion, the CAR would have at all times maintained a high level of proficiency in both general purpose combat skills and generic peacekeeping skills. Yet we are not aware that the CAR conducted any training exercises, outside a mission-specific context, aimed directly at the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations.⁶⁷

It was made evident to us that the CAR was made up of self-sufficient and aggressive troops in search of challenge. These characteristics would not necessarily make them unsuitable for service in UN operations, which can range from observation along cease-fire lines to high-intensity conflict. However, additional and continuing training to develop a broader range of skills and attitudes was surely called for, particularly in the case of action-oriented troops who could be called into service on a UN mission at any time. As experience has shown, peacekeeping operations can often be protracted, frustrating, and of uncertain duration, with soldiers coming into daily contact with both civilians and hostile belligerents. To succeed in such missions, compassion and conflict resolution skills are as essential as high-spiritedness and proficiency in arms.

FINDING

- *Sufficient and appropriate training to accomplish its assigned missions and tasks is an essential component of a unit's preparedness. Training in the CAR was focused on physical fitness, rapid mobility, parachute capability, light infantry skills, and deployment in harsh environments. To fulfil its tasking as the UN standby unit, the CAR should have at all times maintained a proficiency in both general purpose combat skills and generic peacekeeping skills (involving, for example, an understanding of the nature of UN operations and the role of the peacekeeper, conflict resolution and negotiation, cross-cultural relations, restraint in the application of force, and standard UN operations). However, the CAR received little or no continuing generic peacekeeping training to prepare it for UN operations, despite having been designated for many years as the UN standby unit. This typified the traditional DND/CF dictum that general purpose combat training provides not only the best, but also a sufficient, basis for preparing for peacekeeping missions.*

Operation Python

In the summer of 1991, the CAR was chosen to participate in the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). The UN mandate was to oversee the conduct of a referendum to determine the political future of the Western Sahara by monitoring a cease-fire, supervising the return of refugees, and identifying and registering voters. The Canadian mission was named Operation Python. The CAR's tasks were to include manning crossing points for refugees, monitoring and patrolling in support of UN military observers and civil police, providing security at UN sites and reception centres, and providing force reserves and basic mine clearing capabilities.⁶⁸

The CAR was given notice for Operation Python on July 13, 1991. The Commander of the Special Service Force (SSF), BGen Crabbe, issued planning guidance and direction to the CAR's Commanding Officer (CO) on July 17, 1991 to permit immediate planning, pending the receipt of an operations order.⁶⁹ The letter ordered, as a first step, that all training activities scheduled during the proposed period of deployment be cancelled and that the normal training activities scheduled for the period before deployment be cancelled or modified. The latter included several exercises, as well as trade qualification and leadership courses that were to be rescheduled for the spring of 1992. With respect to the training requirements for Operation

Python, BGen Crabbe directed the CO's attention to the individual training requirements in the Operation Python planning directive,⁷⁰ emphasizing as well the incorporation of sub-unit and platoon aspects of the operation. He also undertook to have his staff prepare a series of briefings on the climate, geography, demography, background, and current situation in the area of operations.

Col Holmes, Commander of the CAR, quickly issued a preliminary regimental training directive for Operation Python on July 31, 1991.⁷¹ In it, he noted the challenges that would be presented in the deployment, emphasized the need for fitness training to assist the troops in adapting to the harsh conditions that would be encountered, and outlined additional training requirements for the mission.

On August 13, 1991, SSF Headquarters issued the operation order for Operation Python. The order provided detailed direction respecting training priorities and directed the CAR to develop a training plan in conjunction with SSF staff.⁷² A four-to-six-day exercise to simulate in-theatre operations was to be conducted to prepare the battalion group for employment in the UN Western Sahara Operation.⁷³ In keeping with the direction provided by SSF Headquarters, Col Holmes issued a second Operation Python regimental training directive on August 26, 1991,⁷⁴ which included a regimental training timetable for each commando and a schedule of regimental briefings.

In preparing for Operation Python, Col Holmes advised us, the CAR undertook extensive training, including weapons training, individual preparation training (including first aid, emergency CPR, communications), and general peacekeeping training (including road blocks, searches, and perimeter definition).⁷⁵ They also conducted an exercise that began with a parachute assault for two days, followed by three days focused on UN operations. However, because of a lack of vehicles available for training, most of the exercise had to be accomplished on foot.⁷⁶

When asked later what lessons were learned by the Regiment by preparing for Operation Python, Col Holmes replied, "I think the bottom line is...that we had a lot to learn because the peacekeeping experience for the Airborne Regiment at that time was very stale...but the major lesson learned was that the training was of value and we had learned a lot."⁷⁷ Col Holmes characterized the training on the whole as "extremely successful", and he credited that success to the co-operation received from SSF Headquarters and other SSF units.⁷⁸

In sharp contrast to the CAR's preparations a year later for its mission to Somalia, we note that in the context of Operation Python, immediate training guidance was issued by SSF upon receipt of the warning order, a general training directive was prepared by the unit CO, and the SSF issued an operations order containing detailed directions respecting training priorities —

a sequence of events that spanned four weeks. Only then was a detailed training schedule issued. We note as well the apparent good communication and co-operation between the Brigade and the Regiment, which were identified by Col Holmes as key elements in successful training.

Warning and preparation for Operation Python were launched in July 1991. By December 1991, it was obvious that the CAR would not be deployed on the mission.⁷⁹ Furthermore, because of Operation Python, the CAR lost an opportunity to attend a regimental exercise in Jamaica and also lost a rotation to Cyprus in the spring of 1992.⁸⁰ Delays relating to Operation Python, followed by its ultimate cancellation, demoralized the troops.⁸¹ Coupled with budget cuts, which meant fewer exercises, the CAR personnel suffered a loss of motivation and discipline: "people literally let themselves go."⁸²

In testimony before us, Operation Python training was cited as having given the CAR an advantage in preparing for its mission to Somalia,⁸³ and preparation for Operation Python was a factor in selecting the CAR for the Somalia mission itself.

Preparing for Operation Python no doubt provided some training benefits to the CAR: general purpose combat skills were refreshed and some UN tasks were practised. Some personnel preparing for Operation Cordon in the fall of 1992 could draw on the experience they gained in training for Operation Python the previous year.

However, the advantages provided by training for Operation Python, in terms of preparing the CAR for its mission to Somalia, should not be overstated. The tasks and theatres of operations for the two missions differed substantially. No mounted training was done in preparation for Operation Python.⁸⁴ Training was completed almost a year before the preparations for Operation Cordon began, and there were many new and inexperienced personnel in the CAR by the fall of 1992 who had not been with the Regiment during the Operation Python preparations.⁸⁵ The situation was well summed up by Col Holmes: "there was some expertise remaining in the Regiment as a result of the [Operation Python] training but at the same time recognizing the downsizing and posting season, there would be [a] considerable number of new soldiers as well [as] officers and NCOs that needed to be brought up to [speed]."⁸⁶

Training After Operation Python

The CAR's training in the late winter and spring of 1992 was disrupted on several fronts. After Operation Python was cancelled, unit resources had to be devoted to sorting and returning stores and equipment that had been earmarked for the mission.⁸⁷ More significantly, the CAR was beginning to undergo

extensive changes related to regimental restructuring. These changes, and the difficulties they created, are discussed in detail in Chapter 19 (Suitability). We note here, however, that in February 1992 the CAR was instructed to "minimize unit training as of 29 May 92, ensuring that the reorganization then becomes the top priority unit activity."⁸⁸ During this time, it would be fair to say that the unit was either not training, or not training at its normal pace.⁸⁹

Some training activity did nevertheless take place. In the spring of 1992 the CAR conducted general purpose military training at the U.S. Marine Corps base at Camp Lejeune in the United States, and during the brigade concentration in the spring they conducted a regimental level general purpose exercise.⁹⁰ However, as of June 1992, the Regiment had not undertaken any trade qualification courses for almost two years, because of the Operation Python commitment, resulting in a "number of holes" in terms of qualifications within the Regiment.⁹¹

Despite these challenges, Col Holmes testified that, in the spring of 1992, the state of the CAR's training was good in terms of general purpose combat preparation.⁹² However, "the peacekeeping training by that time was getting a bit stale...skills are very perishable, very perishable."⁹³ Col Holmes also advised us that, given the ongoing restructuring and the rotation of personnel during the summer, it is likely that the CAR would have been "off balance" at the time it was selected for service in Somalia.⁹⁴

FINDINGS

- *The restructuring of the CAR, together with the annual rotation of personnel and turnover in senior officers, seriously and adversely affected the CAR's state of training readiness for a new mission in the late summer of 1992. Morale had suffered seriously during the 1991–92 training year. Annual training and individual training had been disrupted. While training in preparation for Operation Python had some residual benefit in preparing individual members for a UN mission, the sub-units as constituted for Operation Cordon differed substantially from the sub-units that trained for Operation Python. These newly constituted sub-units had not as yet had the opportunity to train together as a regiment. Under these circumstances, the unit as a whole could not be considered either combat ready or proficient in peacekeeping skills.*
- *At the time the CAR was warned for Operation Cordon, it was not at a high state of readiness, from a training perspective, to undertake preparations for deployment on a peacekeeping mission.*

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING FOR OPERATION CORDON

On September 5, 1992, the CAR received a warning order for a peacekeeping mission to Somalia under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This mission was called Operation Cordon. As part of its preparation for the mission, the CAR embarked on an intensive period of pre-deployment training. Although initial time lines provided for only four weeks of training, postponements in deployment dates resulted in training being spread out over a three-month period. In early December, the mission was changed to a peace enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and renamed Operation Deliverance. It was under this new mandate that the CAR went to Somalia, with the advance party departing on December 13th and the main body starting to deploy on December 27, 1992.

In this section, we examine and assess the appropriateness and sufficiency of pre-deployment training for Operation Cordon. We begin with an overview of responsibilities for pre-deployment training at various levels in the chain of command. We turn then to an examination of the development of a training plan for the mission and conclude with a review of the training actually conducted.

It must be emphasized that training is one of the fundamental elements of preparing troops for operations. It is the pre-eminent activity during which good leadership is exercised, discipline established, and skills, standards and attitudes transmitted. As such, training is central to the general issue of operational readiness.

Responsibility for Pre-Deployment Training

When the Government of Canada commits CF personnel to operations, the ultimate responsibility for the operation resides in the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). This includes all aspects of preparing troops for the mission, including training preparations. In accordance with standing orders, the CDS holds the Commander of Land Force Command (Commander LFC) responsible for the generation of land forces, a task that includes the training of army personnel and units for the assigned mission.

For army units, authority with respect to pre-deployment training is delegated down the chain of command, first by the CDS to the army commander,⁹⁵ then down to area⁹⁶ and brigade⁹⁷ levels, and, ultimately, to the unit commanding officer.⁹⁸ Delegation of authority, however, does not mean abdication

of responsibility: senior commanders in the chain of command retain control and supervisory responsibility for the training undertaken and are accountable for the results.

It is the CDS and NDHQ staff who in the first instance create the conditions that permit effective training preparations. At this level, the concerns are in relation to mission, resources and time. These include the clarity and 'doability' of the task assigned, as well as the policy, doctrine, and standards that will guide the training; the resources of people, equipment, materiel and money; and the time needed for the trainers to train their troops. In the case of peace support operations, NDHQ should also be expected to oversee the provision of resources for specialist training (such as linguists, area briefs, cultural and ethnic sensitivity training).

It is the Commander LFC, however, who carries the primary responsibility for preparing land forces for operations. Among the main tasks are the direction and general supervision of, and provision of support for, training preparations for these troops. Pre-deployment training is also to be overseen and supported by the appropriate LFC area commander.

Under the terms of the warning order for Operation Cordon issued by Land Force Central Area (LFCA) Headquarters, it fell to the Commander Special Service Force, BGen Ernest Beno, to declare the CAR operationally ready for its mission.⁹⁹ As Brigade Commander, it was his responsibility to provide training guidance and direction to the CO preparing the unit for deployment.¹⁰⁰ BGen Beno was assisted in operational and training matters by Maj Turner, the Brigade Major (G3 SSF), and Capt Thomas, (G3 Operations). The latter two officers maintained regular contact with CAR staff during the pre-deployment phase.

The principal and immediate responsibility for training a unit for a mission rests with its commanding officer. Based on the guidance and direction received from superiors, the CO is responsible for developing a training plan, providing guidance and direction to staff and subordinate commanders, observing field training exercises, and ensuring that the troops are sufficiently trained to execute their mission. In the case of the CAR's mission to Somalia, the CO was LCol Morneault, who was appointed June 24, 1992 — approximately two months before notice of the Somalia mission. He was succeeded by LCol Mathieu, who was appointed October 26, 1992. The CO was assisted by Capt Kyle, the Operations Officer responsible for executing the CO's orders for operational and training matters within the unit, and Capt Walsh, the Training Officer, who was responsible for co-ordinating training and allocating training resources. They were joined by Capt Koch, the CAR's Liaison Officer to SSF HQ, who assisted the CAR's training staff and assumed responsibility for the compilation of standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the mission.

Responsibility for training follows the chain of command, with the Officers Commanding (OCs) sub-units receiving direction from, and being responsible to, the unit CO. Once the CO has given overall guidance to the company commanders, they have some flexibility as to how they train their companies.¹⁰¹ Company commanders entrust responsibility for carrying out the next level of training to platoon commanders, and platoon commanders entrust responsibility for carrying out lower-level training to section commanders.¹⁰²

Development of a Training Plan for Operation Cordon

Essential Elements for the Development of a Training Plan

Before undertaking training for a mission, a training plan must be developed to guide preparations. In accordance with direction provided by the formation commander, the training plan is developed by the unit CO and regimental headquarters staff, with assistance from brigade headquarters. The essential elements of the plan are conveyed in the form of written documentation, supplemented by oral briefings and direction. Once developed, the written training plan is submitted by the unit to brigade headquarters for review and approval.

As the blueprint that guides pre-deployment training activities, a training plan must clearly convey the concept of the operation and the objectives to be achieved; specify the training drills, exercises and briefings to be conducted; establish training priorities and the standards to be attained; and provide for feed-back mechanisms for measuring the progress and sufficiency of training. Timetables for regimental level and sub-unit level training must also be developed. Sub-unit commanders must be given sufficient information and direction to prepare their own detailed training schedules and to conduct their training in accordance with the objectives, standards and priorities established by the CO. All components of the training plan are designed with the following goal in mind: to provide for the delivery of sufficient and appropriate training that will prepare the troops physically, operationally, and psychologically for all aspects of the mission and develop the collective skills and unit cohesion necessary for the success of the mission.

Training for a peace support mission is progressive in nature. Each individual must have a certain level of competence in individual general purpose combat and generic peacekeeping skills, such as weapons handling, fieldcraft, using communications equipment, and negotiation skills. This training provides a foundation for collective training, which progresses from section-level to platoon-level to company-level to unit-level. In addition to building skills, collective training serves to build cohesion among individuals and confidence in their commanders at all levels. Special individual skills tailored

to the specific theatre of operations must also be developed or refreshed, including combat first aid, mine awareness, and familiarity with local customs. Because time frames are often compressed, it is essential that priorities be established and allocated within the time available.

A pre-deployment training plan cannot, however, be created in a vacuum. At the least, the development of a good training plan requires

- a clear statement of the anticipated mission and tasks;
- doctrine or directives that set out training requirements and standards for the type of mission being undertaken. In the case of land forces tasked for a peace support operation, such doctrine would be within the purview of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and Land Force Command;
- direction or guidance respecting training activities and priorities for the mission, to be provided, with increasing specificity, down the chain of command from LFC through to the unit level;
- co-operation and clear communication between all levels of the chain of command, particularly between the formation and unit levels;
- reasonable certainty about the time lines governing the mounting of the mission;
- access to supplementary resources like training plan precedents, training materials, and lessons learned from previous missions;
- accurate and timely intelligence respecting the theatre of operations, which would in turn require that a reconnaissance be conducted early enough to inform the development of the training plan;
- reliable information respecting the availability of vehicles, equipment, and other resources necessary for training; and
- identification of the specialized training resources available.

As we will see, serious deficiencies in relation to many of these supporting elements placed a heavy burden on the CAR staff in designing a training plan for Operation Cordon.

Development of the Training Plan

Although the warning order for Operation Cordon was not issued until September 5, 1992, rumours had been circulating about a possible mission, and plans were being formulated in late August.

LCol Morneault had been advised informally by BGen Beno during the third week of August that the CAR was on a short list of units that might be sent to Somalia.¹⁰³ During the last few days of August, LCol Morneault

prepared his own estimate of the situation,¹⁰⁴ as well as detailed notes for an oral operations order.¹⁰⁵ He held daily meetings with his staff to discuss training and gave an initial briefing to his OCs on or about September 1st.¹⁰⁶

On September 1, 1992, an initial warning order was issued by Force Mobile Command (Land Force Command) Headquarters,¹⁰⁷ stating in general terms that the government had announced a willingness to participate in a UN mission to Somalia, contingent upon further diplomatic agreements; that the CAR, with reinforcements, would probably be assigned to secure the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the north-east sector of Somalia; that the main body would not move before late September, but a reconnaissance and advance party would be required earlier; and that a detailed warning order would be issued within a few days.

CAR staff immediately initiated work on developing a training plan for Operation Cordon. LCol Morneault provided direction to his training officer, Capt Walsh, based on the oral information he had received, the results of an earlier reconnaissance to Somalia, training plans and after action reports from Operation Python, and their own collective expertise.¹⁰⁸ To LCol Morneault's knowledge, there were no written guidelines governing the development of training plans for UN missions,¹⁰⁹ and, indeed, our Inquiry has confirmed this rather startling state of affairs.

While working on the training plan during the first few days of September, the regimental staff operated on a "very short fuse".¹¹⁰ In an attempt to find information to assist with the development of a training plan, the staff did extensive research, going through the files for documents from earlier missions, including those for Cyprus, the Western Sahara, and other operations on the African continent. In Capt Walsh's words:

We looked at experiences and training plans of soldiers and units who had deployed for the Gulf War. We then interviewed people who had deployed on these missions for lessons learned.

We went to the brigade headquarters, the area headquarters and the Army level headquarters, again, looking for lessons learned type document assistance with identifying the key areas that we had to focus on.

We contacted the J3 Peacekeeping cell here in Ottawa in NDHQ. We spoke with both staff colleges in Kingston and Toronto.¹¹¹

Senior staff who had contacts with their parent regiments also contributed to the development of the training plan.¹¹²

Despite these intensive efforts, CAR staff discovered that the available written material was "very limited".¹¹³ Aside from some training direction from SSF Headquarters and some references to documents concerning general purpose skills, Capt Walsh received no information packages on training from NDHQ, LFCA or SSF Headquarters.¹¹⁴

One would be hard pressed to come up with a description of a more ad hoc approach to designing a training plan for a UN mission. The unit was essentially left on its own to develop a plan, with no peacekeeping doctrine, training directives, or standard package of precedents and lessons learned upon which to draw.¹¹⁵ This is astonishing, given Canada's decades of involvement in peacekeeping missions.

FINDING

- *The absence of CF peacekeeping training doctrine, together with the lack of guidelines for the development of training plans for UN deployments or a standard package of precedents and lessons learned from previous missions, placed an undue burden on the CAR's junior staff in the initial stages of designing a training plan for Operation Cordon. Such absence represents a clear and inexcusable failure by the military leadership, particularly at the senior levels, given Canada's decades of involvement in peacekeeping missions. CAR staff went to great lengths to attempt to compensate for this lack of doctrine, guidelines, and materials.*

The first draft training program for Operation Cordon was forwarded by Capt Walsh to Special Service Force Headquarters on September 4, 1992.¹¹⁶ It included a summary of regimental and commando level training activities to be conducted from September 8th to 24th in preparation for deployment. A handwritten training calendar — described in the covering letter as a guideline that would be developed in much greater detail at commando level — was also attached.¹¹⁷

On Saturday, September 5, 1992, SSF was formally warned for Operation Cordon by Land Force Central Area.¹¹⁸ That same day, SSF issued a warning order tasking the CAR to assemble, prepare, and train a 750-person infantry battalion group for operation in the north-east sector of Somalia centred at Bossasso.¹¹⁹ The anticipated in-theatre tasks listed in the warning order included security of the port of entry for relief supplies, convoy security and escort of relief supplies, security of distribution centres, and security of base camp. September 4, 1992, was designated as 'W Day' (Warning Day), with the possible deployment of the advance party indicated as September 25, 1992 (W + 21), and the full contingent to be operationally ready to deploy on October 4, 1992 (W + 30).¹²⁰ No amplifying direction was given at that time regarding the training of the CAR for its mission.

LCol Turner (then Brigade Major, SSF) advised us that the warning order, having set out the anticipated tasks in theatre, provided sufficient information for a CO to commence pre-deployment training.¹²¹ We are not in agreement with this assessment. It is our view that detailed training guidance and direction

should have been immediately provided by brigade headquarters in order to assist the CAR's CO and staff in developing their training plan. This is particularly the case in view of two factors: first, the absence of peacekeeping training guidelines, directives, and materials already noted, and, second, the testimony of BGen Beno indicating that when he reviewed the initial proposed training schedule prepared on September 4th, he had doubts that it would result in the Regiment being ready on time.¹²²

FINDING

- *The CAR's CO and staff should have been provided, on a timely basis, with detailed written direction and guidance regarding the training concept, activities, and priorities to be reflected in their training plan.*

Some training guidance was forthcoming on September 8, 1992, — the same day the CAR started to train for the mission. Capt Thomas (G3 Operations) from SSF forwarded to LCol Morneault an annex ("Annex D") from Land Force Command's draft contingency plan for Operation Cordon, which had been produced at Land Force Command Headquarters on September 3, 1992.¹²³ Although neither SSF nor the CAR was on the distribution list, a copy of the draft contingency plan was received by SSF on September 3rd,¹²⁴ and it was discussed at the Labour Day briefing given by staff from Land Force Central Area to members of the CAR and SSF.¹²⁵ When asked during his testimony why a copy of this useful background document had not been forwarded by SSF to the CAR before September 8th, LCol Turner (then Brigade Major SSF) testified that he may have assumed that LCol Morneault already had a copy. LCol Turner suggested as well that, with only 21 days to prepare, the CAR's CO probably didn't need a lot of training guidance and that, in any event, the contingency plan was an unsigned draft and all the necessary information was contained in the warning order.¹²⁶ LCol Turner stated, however, that he subsequently decided to send Annex D to the CAR on September 8th because he was surprised at the lack of regimental training direction and wanted to encourage LCol Morneault to put more emphasis on training.¹²⁷

Annex D stated that the battalion group would develop its training plan "to attain a combat readiness and be ready for [deployment] by W+30 or before". All designated personnel were to undergo section, platoon, and company level training prior to being dispatched to the theatre of operations. The training concept emphasized that the short time available would dictate a mission-oriented training program, and included a time chart, based on three stages of training, to serve as a planning guide.¹²⁸ Following one

week of administrative preparations (during which individual training might start), the schedule anticipated eight days for general individual training to ensure a proper basis for further training; five days for collective training at the section, platoon, and company levels, followed by five days at the battalion group level, to ensure general purpose combat capability and proficiency in mission-specific tasks; and five days of theatre-specific individual training. Capt Walsh testified that the contents of the training guidance were verbally passed on to him by LCol Morneault, and reflected the progression of the training plan that was being developed by the CAR's staff.¹²⁹

At the level of Land Force Command Headquarters, this general form of guidance regarding the concept, progression, and content of training was appropriate and, for the most part, sufficient.¹³⁰ We would have expected, however, to see it amplified and developed at the area and brigade levels in the form of commander's training guidance and direction, rather than being simply passed down, unaltered, to the unit level.

LCol Morneault and his staff, with input from the sub-unit OCs, continued working together to develop the training plan.¹³¹ There was regular contact between SSF and CAR staff,¹³² and a meeting was held with other units in the SSF to co-ordinate training resources and vehicles.¹³³

Several factors, however, made it difficult to plan and schedule training activities. First, there was an insufficient number of training vehicles to meet the unit's requirements.¹³⁴ Second, there was great uncertainty about the amount of time available for training. Deployment dates had begun to slip almost immediately after the September 5th warning order was received.¹³⁵ Perhaps as early as September 7th, but certainly by the middle of September, it was clear that the CAR would not be deployed before the end of October, due in part to the unavailability of a UN-chartered ship.¹³⁶ This postponement in deployment dates made it difficult to plan and co-ordinate training activities, and the training plan had to be revised as time lines changed.¹³⁷

Deployment dates for Operation Cordon were not known until the 26th of October 1992 and then slipped. This clearly hampered the efficient planning of training, as the total time available for training was constantly changing. To keep pace with slippage of deployment timings, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was forced to revise training plans on two separate occasions.¹³⁸

FINDING

- *Efficient planning of the content and scheduling of training for Operation Cordon was seriously hampered by the uncertainty surrounding deployment dates.*

Not only did changing deployment dates make planning difficult, it also seems to have contributed to disharmony between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault concerning the underlying approach to the training plan and the schedule for its implementation. From the start, LCol Morneault was very aware of the slippage, and appears to have embarked upon his pre-deployment preparations with these changing dates in mind. "[W]e already knew right at the start that things were starting to slip and we would have more training time."¹³⁹ BGen Beno, on the other hand, appears to have continued to emphasize the original dates set out in the warning order: "[N]o matter what the rumours were, it was abundantly clear that our superiors still envisioned...the earlier time lines."¹⁴⁰ This difference in perspective may have contributed to later disagreements between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault regarding their assessments of the progress of training, and the scheduling and purpose of Exercise Stalwart Providence.

A new version of the training plan for Operation Cordon was produced by CAR staff during the week of September 7th or early the following week, and forwarded to SSF by Capt Walsh.¹⁴¹ It expanded upon the September 4th version, with training scheduled until October 2nd, followed by a week-long field training exercise. Neither Capt Kyle nor LCol Morneault were aware of any problems with the training plan at that time,¹⁴² and LCol Turner advised us that there was nothing wrong with the content of the training schedules per se.¹⁴³

However, BGen Beno was not satisfied with the training plan for what it failed to include.¹⁴⁴ He had expected more detail and guidance delineating the Commanding Officer's training concept, training priorities, and the level to which training was to be conducted. According to LCol Turner, a training plan should be something beyond a list of planned activities; the calendars should have been accompanied, either in writing or in an oral briefing to BGen Beno, by a statement of the CO's concepts and priorities. LCol Turner testified that he did not believe that such a statement was ever conveyed to BGen Beno by LCol Morneault.¹⁴⁵

LCol Morneault testified that to the best of his recollection, he was not instructed by BGen Beno to include an aim, scope, and objective section in the training plan.¹⁴⁶ He stated that he had conveyed all of these concepts to his officers, but did not think it necessary to include such guidance in the actual document in order for the training plan to be complete. He pointed out as well that the training plan for Operation Python did not have such a section, and that BGen Beno had indicated previously that it would be a good model to follow.¹⁴⁷

LCol Morneault is correct in stating that his training plan resembles the regimental training directive issued for Operation Python that was comprised of timetables and briefing schedules.¹⁴⁸ However, that Operation Python

training directive was preceded by both a preliminary regimental training directive prepared by the unit commander¹⁴⁹ and an operations order issued by SSF Headquarters,¹⁵⁰ which together provided additional written details concerning the training concept and priorities. Over-reliance on the Operation Python training directive that contained only training schedules resulted in the production of a training plan lacking several essential elements.

FINDING

- *The Operation Cordon training plan should have included a written statement of the training concept and overall objectives, together with an explicit prioritization of the training activities to be conducted. The priorities were especially important given the uncertainty surrounding the amount of time available to conduct the training. A comprehensive training plan which clearly set out the CO's objectives and priorities at the start of the training period would also have fostered a more standardized approach to training among the sub-units and assisted in the development of unit cohesion.*

All three rifle commando OCs testified that they were satisfied with the direction and guidance received from LCol Morneau in terms of training.¹⁵¹ Unit orders groups were held weekly, as well as daily co-ordination conferences to which the sub-units sent their seconds in command.¹⁵² During these meetings, the training requirements of each sub-unit were reviewed.¹⁵³ Oral direction was given weekly by LCol Morneau on training items to be covered by the commandos, and training priorities were established. These tasks were then incorporated by the OCs into their commando training plans, which were subsequently submitted to the CAR Headquarters for approval.¹⁵⁴ According to LCol Morneau, he gave clear direction as to what he wanted the OCs to accomplish, and then gave them latitude as to how to go about doing their jobs.¹⁵⁵

These supplementary oral briefings did provide additional guidance to sub-unit commanders.¹⁵⁶ They were not, however, a valid substitute for written direction establishing an overall training concept and a clear statement of priorities.

BGen Beno, LCol Morneau, Maj Turner, and Capt Kyle met on September 16th and engaged in extensive discussions respecting training. A new package of training schedules and summaries was presented, with training to be conducted until October 2nd, followed by a training exercise ("FTX") from October 3rd to October 9th. Capt Walsh testified that he was told by Special Service Force Headquarters that it was a very good training plan.¹⁵⁷ The training schedules and summaries, or at least portions of them, were

forwarded by SSF Headquarters up the chain of command to LFCA Headquarters and LFC Headquarters.¹⁵⁸ At the September 16th meeting, BGen Beno emphasized that LCol Morneault was to focus on mission-specific training for the CAR, rather than general purpose combat training.¹⁵⁹

On September 22, 1992, BGen Beno sent a detailed training direction for Operation Cordon to LCol Morneault.¹⁶⁰ This document was sent because after having reflected upon their September 16th discussion and reviewing the training plan, BGen Beno continued to have concerns about training and believed it necessary to provide LCol Morneault with clearer direction.¹⁶¹ At the time the training direction was prepared, it was known at SSF Headquarters that the earliest possible deployment date for the CAR was October 30th, "so there was still plenty of time in which to conduct good, useful mission-specific training."¹⁶²

The training direction is a comprehensive document that sets out guiding principles for pre-deployment preparations as well as a prioritized list of skills considered essential for all soldiers being deployed on the mission. In it, BGen Beno outlined the three basic rules that, in his opinion, govern the conduct of any peacekeeping operation and should underlie all of the battalion group's preparatory training: minimum use of force, maximum use of deterrence, and conflict resolution at the lowest possible level.¹⁶³ He also stated that the "Commanding Officer of the battle group...should aim...to deploy and return from Somalia without having discharged a single weapon in anger."¹⁶⁴

BGen Beno then established direction for individual and collective training that was to be completed by October 13th.¹⁶⁵ The list of activities was notably tailored for the UN mission, and assumed that the troops had, or should have had, general purpose combat training. The document stipulated that general purpose combat training was to be considered last and only if time permitted.¹⁶⁶

The pre-deployment training guidance set out in BGen Beno's training direction of September 22, 1992, delineates principles and is instructive. However, evidence presented by BGen Beno indicates that in early September, he had formed the opinion that LCol Morneault was failing to focus properly on training, failing to provide clear direction to his OCs, and failing to provide a satisfactory training plan.¹⁶⁷ It is clear that BGen Beno and LCol Morneault had numerous discussions about training before this direction was issued,¹⁶⁸ and LCol Morneault testified that he had had "plenty of verbal guidance" from BGen Beno.¹⁶⁹ It is, nevertheless, most unfortunate that a written brigade training directive was not provided at an earlier point during the pre-deployment preparations, especially since the Brigade Commander had concerns early on about training and believed that the Commanding Officer needed clearer direction.

LCol Morneault saw BGen Beno's training direction on September 28th on his return from a fact-finding mission to UN headquarters in New York.¹⁷⁰ Although it seemed a bit late for the issuance of written guidance, he did not interpret the letter as an expression of concern on BGen Beno's part,¹⁷¹ particularly in light of the fact that written training direction had been issued by SSF Headquarters for Operation Python a year earlier.¹⁷² Rather, LCol Morneault saw in its contents a more eloquent reflection of both the ideas he himself had previously articulated respecting the aims of the regimental exercise, and the concepts he and BGen Beno had discussed at earlier meetings.¹⁷³

Capt Walsh thought the direction corresponded very closely with their training plan, and this served only to increase his confidence that their training plan had been properly developed.¹⁷⁴ He did not recall whether LCol Morneault told him specifically to follow the directions in the September 22nd letter, but he did recall that LCol Morneault gave him guidance and direction on training on a continuing basis, and that he articulated many of the same principles as those set out in the letter.¹⁷⁵

The training plan continued to evolve as the mission was delayed. In late September, Part II of the Operation Cordon training plan was prepared by CAR staff, covering the period from September 28 to October 18, 1992.¹⁷⁶ Additional time was scheduled for weapons training and commando exercises, and Exercise Stalwart Providence was rescheduled to run from October 14 to 18, 1992. The training plan was sent to SSF, and Capt Walsh received no negative comments in relation to it.¹⁷⁷ In late October, after LCol Mathieu had assumed command of the CAR, an additional training plan was issued for the month of November.¹⁷⁸

FINDING

- *The CAR's CO and staff did not receive timely and sufficient support and information to assist them in the development of a training plan for Operation Cordon. Among other important things, there was a lack of peacekeeping training doctrine and standards; adequate and timely mission-specific training direction and guidance; clear communication between the unit CO and Brigade Commander; reasonable certainty as to deployment dates; access to training materials; accurate and timely intelligence respecting the theatre of operations; and reliable information regarding the availability of vehicles, equipment, and other necessary training resources.*

Content of the Proposed Training

The CAR training plan contains a summary of regimental training activities, accompanied by a brief description of the aim of each activity. The activities include: general training (administration, operations, medical, and exposure

briefings; vehicle familiarization training; armoured vehicle driver training; commando mounted and dismounted operations; officer and senior NCO tactical exercises without troops); and specialty training (mine awareness; desert survival and navigation; communications; sniper; specialty equipment; crisis negotiation; public affairs).¹⁷⁹

A summary of commando level training is also included comprising: fitness training; weapons training; individual preparations training (combat first aid, emergency first aid, communications, nuclear/biological/chemical defence); general peacekeeping training (roadblocks, searches, observation posts, patrolling, escort duties, perimeter defence, airfield defence); specialty training (foreign weapons/equipment recognition, crowd control, fighting in built-up areas, armoured vehicle crew training); and additional training (grenade, generator training/maintenance, shotgun, M-38, padre's hour, field training exercise).¹⁸⁰

The training activities listed in the plan in large measure cover, and indeed amplify upon, the training activities proposed in the training guidance provided in the draft Land Force Command contingency plan.¹⁸¹ Most of the training activities outlined in BGen Beno's training directive are also listed, with the significant exception of establishment and security of distribution centres, incident resolution, arrest and detainment procedures, and rules of engagement.¹⁸² Maj Kyle explained, however, that although incident resolution and rules of engagement were not listed explicitly in the summary of commando level training developed by LCol Morneault and his staff, they would be practised as part of other training scenarios (such as roadblocks and perimeter defence) at the platoon and commando levels.¹⁸³ Moreover, arrest and detainment procedures, as well as establishment and protection of distribution centres, were to be performed during Exercise Stalwart Providence;¹⁸⁴ thus, presumably, it was not considered necessary to include them in earlier training.

The training plan also includes regimental and commando training calendars. Although there are variations among the individual sub-unit training calendars,¹⁸⁵ in general terms, training for the rifle commandos was to begin with an initial focus on weapons training and armoured vehicle driver training (for designated personnel). Additional weapons training and UN standing operating procedures training was scheduled during the second week. Physical fitness training, communications training, first aid, and regimental level specialty training were emphasized during the third week. Additional weapons training and UN SOP training was scheduled the fourth week, followed by UN training and preparatory training for Exercise Stalwart Providence, including mounted training. No provision was made for the battalion group

to train together, outside the context of Exercise Stalwart Providence. Training planned for November was to include mounted training, additional specialty equipment training, and advanced weapons application training.¹⁸⁶

The training schedule does not provide for a neat progression from individual general training to collective training to individual theatre-specific training, as was outlined in the Land Force Command draft contingency plan. Some specialty training was moved forward, and some of the collective training was moved to the end. However, the training plan had to be adapted according to the availability of equipment and vehicles, adjusted to address existing training levels and needs, and expanded to accommodate the extension in deployment dates.

We note that virtually all of the training activities we had previously indicated in this chapter as related to general purpose combat skills necessary for peacekeeping operations are amply covered in the training schedules, with the very serious exception of Law of Armed Conflict training. From our list of generic peacekeeping skills, the following are among the topics that are either not addressed or given very little emphasis in the training plan: the nature of UN peacekeeping; co-operation with related agencies; conflict resolution and negotiation; intercultural relations training; and the handling of detainees. Most notably absent from the mission-specific training list are stress management, theatre-specific cultural and language training, and training on mission-specific rules of engagement which, remarkably, were never developed for Operation Cordon. Insufficient provision is also made for geography, history, political background, and threat assessment (military and environmental) in relation to the theatre of operations (although, as will be discussed later, little intelligence was available upon which to base such training.)

FINDING

- *The training plan for Operation Cordon did not adequately provide for sufficient and appropriate training in relation to several non-combat skills that are essential for peacekeeping, including: the nature of UN peacekeeping and the role of the peacekeeper; the Law of Armed Conflict, including arrest and detention procedures; training on use of force policies, including mission-specific rules of engagement; conflict resolution and negotiation skill development; intercultural relations and the culture, history and politics of the environment; and, psychological preparation and stress management. The failure of the training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills arose primarily from the lack of any doctrine recognizing the need for such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and standards.*

We will be focusing on several of these non-combat skills later in this chapter. We will discuss how providing for training in the above mentioned areas was hampered not only by the absence of peacekeeping doctrine, but also by the lack of intelligence on the theatre of operations, the late development of required policies and standing operating procedures, and insufficient assistance from higher levels within Land Force Command and National Defence Headquarters with regard to specialty training support.

Inadequacies of the Training

In this section, the overall conduct of training for Operation Cordon is reviewed. Also examined are the progress of training, and several issues of particular concern that emerged in the course of our hearings.¹⁸⁷ Specific areas of training requiring a more in-depth review are considered below in the section on essential aspects of training for the Somalia mission.¹⁸⁸ Exercise Stalwart Providence is treated separately.

Conduct of the Training

Training for Operation Cordon began on Tuesday, September 8, 1992, three days after the warning order was issued to the CAR. The initial focus was on refreshing individual general purpose combat skills, which required little preparation time and formed a foundation for later training.¹⁸⁹ The original training concept called for three weeks of commando training, with section-level scheduled for the first week, platoon-level the second, and commando-level the third. However, due to problems with the availability of kit, equipment, ranges, and other resources,¹⁹⁰ as well as the postponement in deployment dates, commando training was actually spread out over four or five weeks. With the arrival of training vehicles in early October, mounted training was conducted during the first week of that month. 1 Commando and 3 Commando each spent one and a half to two days training with the vehicles; 2 Commando trained with the vehicles for only one day.¹⁹¹

The consolidated Operation Cordon training plan for the most part reflects the training actually conducted during September and October, with the exception that 2 Commando found itself somewhat behind and did not complete all the training it was assigned.¹⁹² LCol Morneau was of the view that training in addition to that which had been originally scheduled was either required or, in any event, desirable; before leaving on his reconnaissance on October 12th, LCol Morneau directed his training officer to schedule three weeks of additional training after Exercise Stalwart Providence. Two weeks were to be devoted to catch-up training by the commandos, and the third week was to be devoted to a regimental exercise.¹⁹³

Training reports were periodically prepared by the CAR's training officer, based on information received from Capt Kyle and the commandos' OCs and seconds in command.¹⁹⁴ The reports attempted to reflect the progress of training by simply listing completion rates for various segments of the training. Unfortunately, these reports proved to be at best uninformative and, at worst, unintentionally misleading. The reports indicated what percentage of CAR personnel had "completed" each of the scheduled training topics, but the percentages did not indicate the level to which training had been conducted, the nature of the training activities undertaken,¹⁹⁵ or the proficiency levels achieved.¹⁹⁶

For example, a training report for October 13th stated that 95 per cent of personnel had completed training in general peacekeeping duties, and the covering letter indicated that collective training had been conducted "in depth" by the three rifle commandos.¹⁹⁷ However, collective training was supposed to be conducted at the section, platoon, and commando levels. Given that, it is difficult to reconcile the statement that in-depth collective training had been completed with the fact that 2 Commando had not done any extensive training above the section level before Exercise Stalwart Providence.¹⁹⁸

The ambiguity surrounding a statement that a particular segment of training was "complete" or had been conducted "in depth" stems directly from a lack of clear training standards and evaluation mechanisms. We saw no references to training standards in the training plans or training directives for Operation Cordon other than in relation to physical fitness, weapons handling, and collective battle tasks.¹⁹⁹ Combined with a reliance on sub-unit self-reports and evaluations, assessments of completion levels became highly subjective. Significantly, the confusion about the meaning of training having been "completed" appears to have resulted in a serious misunderstanding between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault about the progress of training.²⁰⁰ The problems associated with a lack of standards and evaluation criteria in relation to training are discussed more fully later in this chapter.

The training report of October 13th also indicated that the CAR would be operationally ready to deploy following the completion of Exercise Stalwart Providence, which had at that time been rescheduled for October 14th to 18th.²⁰¹ The exercise was conducted on the dates indicated while LCol Morneault was away in Somalia on a reconnaissance mission. Following this exercise, the CAR's Training Officer, Capt Walsh, prepared a memorandum suggesting that the following supplementary training be scheduled: specialty training, including armoured vehicle driver training, sniper training, special equipment training (global positioning system and sun compass), turret firing, communications training, weapons training; and general training for commando mounted operations (escort, patrolling) and commando dismounted operations (relief centre procedures).²⁰²

On October 20th, Special Service Force Headquarters reported to Land Force Central Area on the CAR's operational readiness. It was reported that training for Operation Cordon was complete, except for training of augmentees which would take place October 19th to 25th.²⁰³ On October 21st, after returning from reconnaissance, LCol Morneault briefed the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff that training was progressing well, but that some supplementary training was required at the individual and collective levels. The same needs that were identified in Capt Walsh's memo were listed, as well as a need for standardization of procedures and tone.²⁰⁴ Based on reports he received from LCol MacDonald and BGen Beno, LCol Morneault was confident that any weaknesses could be corrected within the next three weeks, provided he could run a regimental exercise to put "his stamp" on the Regiment.²⁰⁵ However, it was also on October 21st that LCol Morneault was advised by BGen Beno that he was to be relieved of command, in part for reasons related to training.²⁰⁶

On October 24th, the CAR went on embarkation leave, and LCol Mathieu assumed command of the CAR on October 26, 1992. Although a training plan for November had been issued for the additional training needs identified by Capt Walsh and LCol Morneault,²⁰⁷ very little training was actually completed after the CAR returned from embarkation leave on November 9th.²⁰⁸ Vehicles were inspected and prepared for departure, equipment was packed for shipment to Somalia,²⁰⁹ but virtually no collective training or mission-specific training was conducted,²¹⁰ nor was a regimental-level exercise conducted.²¹¹ There were, however, some minor training-related activities. Refresher individual training and driver training were conducted.²¹² 2 Commando ran a two-and-a-half-day exercise called Bravo Cordon to practise lessons learned from Exercise Stalwart Providence.²¹³ In mid-November, 2 Commando did a crowd control demonstration and 1 Commando demonstrated a food distribution centre for LGen Gervais.²¹⁴ A platoon 'march and shoot' competition under LCol Mathieu was conducted during the week of November 23rd.²¹⁵

FINDINGS

- *The majority of the CAR's training for Operation Cordon was conducted prior to October 18, 1992. Although most categories of training outlined in the training plans for September and October were covered, the lack of training objectives, standards and evaluation criteria made it difficult for anyone involved to assess the levels to which training had been conducted or the proficiency levels achieved. In addition, there were significant shortcomings due to shortages of equipment and other training resources.*

- *No significant remedial or additional training was conducted for Operation Cordon after LCol Morneault was relieved of command.*
- *Insufficient use was made of the training time that was available in November. Even though vehicles and equipment were being prepared for shipment and unavailable for training, additional briefings and non-mounted scenario training could have been conducted.*

Vehicle Training

The CAR was a dismounted light infantry battalion, designed for airborne deployment. It did not have armoured personnel carriers or dedicated armoured vehicle drivers or crew commanders, nor did it train for mounted operations in the course of its annual training.²¹⁶ Having been selected to serve as the core of a mechanized battalion group for Operation Cordon, the CAR was thus faced with the considerable challenge of being re-equipped with vehicles, refitted as a mechanized unit, retrained, and restructured, all within the constraints of an initial 30-day warning period.

The need to operate with vehicles presented two distinct training challenges. First, from an individual training perspective, selected CAR personnel had to be trained to drive, maintain, crew, and command the armoured vehicles.²¹⁷ Second, the unit collectively had to learn tactical and mounted operations such as convoy escorts and mounted patrols. There was also the very practical problem of obtaining vehicles with which to train. Indeed, LCol Turner testified that he was initially surprised that the CAR was chosen for the mission, given that vehicles had to be taken away from a mechanized infantry unit and given to a dismounted one.²¹⁸

Training for Operation Cordon commenced with a 'crash course' in armoured vehicle driver training during the week of September 8th, with 40 to 50 soldiers selected for the training.²¹⁹ The course was conducted concurrently with the individual training scheduled for other members of the unit, and involved basic driving skills, vehicle maintenance, training on diverse terrain, and driver safety.²²⁰ The Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) set up and ran the course using their own vehicles and all the advanced driving and maintenance instructors in their Regiment.²²¹ The scheduled time frame for the training was considered highly compressed.²²² It is little wonder, then, that concerns were expressed after Exercise Stalwart Providence that the drivers required more training.²²³ The November training plan shows two days scheduled for further armoured vehicle driver training in various terrain conditions.²²⁴ We were told, however, that the CAR did not take advantage of an offer from the RCD to provide additional driver and mounted tactical training after Exercise Stalwart Providence.²²⁵

Early in the preparatory phase, the CAR received vehicles for operational deployment from the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR). However, based on initial time lines, these vehicles had to be painted, serviced and quarantined for use in theatre and so were unavailable for mounted training. Excess army vehicles were eventually obtained for use solely as training vehicles,²²⁶ but some of the vehicles were in poor condition or were not operational when received. Furthermore, a shortage of spare parts caused additional training delays.²²⁷ A week before Exercise Stalwart Providence, the Regiment had adequately prepared 14 vehicles to allow mounted commando-level training.²²⁸ However, the number was only sufficient to allow one commando to train at a time. Handing over the vehicles from sub-unit to sub-unit required administration time which further reduced actual training time on the vehicles.²²⁹ LCol Morneau made repeated requests for more vehicles so he could rehearse his battalion group as a unit.²³⁰ Capt Walsh confirmed that knowledge of the vehicle shortage "filtered up the chain of command."²³¹

As part of sub-unit training, every soldier who would work in theatre with a vehicle received vehicle familiarization training.²³² In mounted operations training, the soldiers would be in the vehicles and go through various scenarios and exercises at the section, platoon, or sub-unit level.²³³ However, the CAR did not conduct combat team training or battle group training as a mechanized battalion because the concept was to use the armoured vehicles as a means of transportation and for platoon-level operations such as convoy escort.²³⁴

The CAR received detailed criticism and feedback on its mechanized operations during Exercise Stalwart Providence. LCol MacDonald believed that it was critical that additional time be dedicated to mounted operations.²³⁵ LCol MacDonald's observations are not surprising. Several witnesses testified to the difficulties faced in preparing the CAR for mechanized operations. The CAR had to train under very tight time lines with few vehicles, and was required to train on armoured vehicles with sophisticated weapons and fire control systems. Not only did selected members of the CAR have to learn to operate these properly at the individual level (drivers, gunners, crew commanders), but the unit had to learn mounted operations collectively at the platoon and company levels. Some of the tasks given to the Regiment, such as convoy escort, are tasks normally performed by armoured reconnaissance units. Even though all CAR members had previously served in line infantry units, this mission involved certain tasks that line infantry battalions would not normally practise during the regular course of their training.²³⁶ Maj Kyle asserted that "[t]o go from a dismounted infantry battalion to an AVGP [armoured vehicle general purpose] mounted battalion took a huge effort in terms of the men and equipment, everything from driver training to mounted company training."²³⁷

FINDINGS

- *Converting the CAR from a dismounted infantry battalion to a mechanized infantry battalion in the short time available presented a considerable challenge that the CAR was not able to surmount appropriately in the time and with the resources allocated. The late arrival and inadequate number of functioning training vehicles, coupled with the need to service and quarantine vehicles to be shipped to Somalia, not only substantially interfered with the scheduling and conduct of mounted operations training at the sub-unit and unit levels, but also prevented the CAR from receiving adequate training and acquiring the needed proficiency in collective mounted operations.*
- *The CAR did not conduct combat team training or battle group training as a mechanized battalion.*

Supervision of Training

Training is one of the fundamental elements of preparing troops for operations, and is central to the overall issue of operational readiness. It is also the principal activity during which leadership is exercised and appropriate attitudes are conveyed. It is therefore to be expected that commanders at all levels of the chain of command, even the highest, pay particular attention to the training preparations of a contingent, both to supervise and assess the preparations and, through their presence, to demonstrate their personal interest in and commitment to the operation that their troops are about to undertake.

We are dismayed at the degree to which leaders at all levels of the chain of command, with the notable exception of the Brigade Commander during the initial stages of training, failed to provide adequate supervision of the training preparations carried out by the CAR for its mission to Somalia. This is particularly so given that at least some of the senior leaders were aware in mid-September and early October that BGen Beno was concerned about LCol Morneault's leadership, as well as the state of training and operational readiness of the CAR. Yet they made little or no attempt to personally follow up on these concerns or to make their own independent assessments as to the state of the CAR's training and readiness.²³⁸

Visits by senior leaders to Petawawa during the CAR's pre-deployment preparations were relatively rare events. MGen MacKenzie visited Petawawa on October 2, 1992, to address the leadership of The Royal Canadian Regiment company that would be deploying to Yugoslavia.²³⁹ LGen Gervais visited the CAR on November 12th to meet with the new Commanding Officer. He made inquiries about training and spent a half day observing the Regiment train.²⁴⁰ Gen de Chastelain and MGen MacKenzie both attended a farewell

Christmas lunch for the CAR on December 1st.²⁴¹ While the presence of these leaders on those occasions no doubt served to boost morale, it is regrettable that no one in the senior chain of command visited the CAR between September 8th and October 23rd, when the most intensive training was conducted, as well as the crucial period leading to the relief of LCol Morneault as commanding officer.

The personal supervision of training is one of the most important priorities of a commanding officer during pre-deployment preparations. Cpl Purnelle, one of the soldiers who testified on pre-deployment training, stated that he saw very little of LCol Mathieu after he assumed command: "before the mission, he was someone who was a little like a ghost." With respect to LCol Morneault, Cpl Purnelle testified that he came to see them during the training, spoke to them, and demonstrated an interest in what was going on.²⁴²

However, LCol Morneault estimated that he spent only approximately 15 to 20 per cent of his time observing training, although he wished he could have done a lot more. He also testified that although he believed that it was appropriate for a commanding officer to visit section- and platoon-level training, he did not view it as his job to evaluate performances at that level; that was the responsibility of the subordinate commanders who would then provide him with a clear picture of the state of training at the lower levels.²⁴³

FINDING

- *Leaders at all levels of the chain of command, with the notable exception of the Brigade Commander during the initial stages of training, failed to provide adequate supervision of the training preparations undertaken by the CAR for Operation Cordon.*

Effect of Standing Operating Procedures

Development on Training

In preparing for a mission, it is essential that standing operating procedures (SOPs) be developed to ensure that operational tasks are conducted in an appropriate and standardized manner. These must be developed as early as possible in the training process so they can be validated, adjusted, practised and confirmed.²⁴⁴

The process by which SOPs were developed for Operation Cordon is striking in terms of the degree to which the CAR was left on its own to attempt to compile, revise, and, in some cases, draft from scratch the SOPs, drawing on a variety of sources with little guidance, assistance or material from Special Service Force, Land Force Central Area, or Land Force Command

as to what the content of the SOPs should be.²⁴⁵ In the case of certain SOPs — those dealing with detention procedures, for example — neither the required intelligence nor policy was in place to inform the development of SOPs tailored to conditions in theatre.²⁴⁶

LCol Morneau directed each sub-unit to expand and develop specific SOPs, based on the main tasks anticipated in the operation: 1 Commando — distribution centres; 2 Commando — arrival in theatre in the base camp; 3 Commando — convoy escort; Engineers — minefield and group clearance; OC Service Commando — administrative portions.²⁴⁷ Within this general direction, preparation of the SOPs was an ongoing process, with drafts prepared in various stages by both commandos and staff officers. Final development and confirmation were to be performed after LCol Morneau completed his reconnaissance to Somalia²⁴⁸ and during the conduct of Exercise Stalwart Providence.²⁴⁹ Draft SOPs were used as the basis for training for Operation Cordon and during Exercise Stalwart Providence.²⁵⁰ The final SOPs were signed by LCol Mathieu on November 19, 1992.²⁵¹ However, most, if not all, of the final SOPs were prepared under LCol Morneau's command, and reflect primarily his direction and planning.²⁵² LCol Morneau testified that during visits to training he would advise his company commanders if he saw that one was performing a task in a better manner than the other. He had intended to standardize the procedures during the regimental exercise.²⁵³

Maj Kyle testified that he had been concerned that the SOPs had not been standardized by the end of September, and that the commandos did not have the information required to standardize their procedures for general peacekeeping tasks.²⁵⁴ LCol Turner also testified that BGen Beno had expressed concern that the commandos were not performing their tasks in a standardized way, and grew increasingly concerned at the lack of standards.²⁵⁵ He was worried that SOPs did not seem to be in place because during the training no two commandos seemed to perform the tasks in the same way. This led BGen Beno to think that either the SOPs were not there or they were not being followed. This prompted him, in his letter of September 22, 1992,²⁵⁶ to direct that SOPs be developed and practised.²⁵⁷

Initial planning documents had contemplated an early reconnaissance. In fact, the Commanding Officer's reconnaissance did not occur until after most of the training for Operation Cordon had been conducted — at the same time as Exercise Stalwart Providence. The lateness of the reconnaissance had an unduly negative impact on training because there were a number of SOPs that could not be completed until the Commanding Officer returned from reconnaissance.²⁵⁸

FINDINGS

- *Standing operating procedures are crucial to ensure efficiency, standardization and cohesion in the training and operations of a unit. Particularly in the early stages of pre-deployment preparations, the commandos were not training with a uniform set of SOPs. The lateness of the reconnaissance unduly delayed the completion and finalization of the mission-specific SOPs, and adversely affected mission-specific training.*
- *CAR staff received insufficient support, guidance, information, and materials to assist them in developing, in a timely manner, the mission-specific SOPs necessary for the conduct of standardized and sufficient training in relation to the tasks governed by those SOPs.*

Attitudinal and Psychological Preparation

To assist in preparations for Operation Cordon, MWO Mack from The Royal Canadian Regiment put together some observations based on experience with Operation Scalpel (Persian Gulf), which were forwarded to the CAR on September 9, 1992. On the subject of personnel and training, he noted:

Individual soldiers were well trained for the task they were required to do. On occasion, at the MCpl/Sgt level there was a tendency to over-react to stressful situations. Superiors have to be aware of and anticipate this and have the junior leaders THINK before reacting. Certain situations can easily 'get out of hand' with serious consequences...which the superiors would be responsible for.²⁵⁹

This points to the need for proper discipline, and also to the need for training that develops appropriate attitudes and self-control.

A very clear and principled statement regarding the appropriate tone and attitudes that should guide both pre-deployment preparations and the mission itself is contained in the training direction issued by BGen Beno on September 22, 1992.²⁶⁰ BGen Beno began by defining three basic rules that should govern the conduct of any peacekeeping operation and underlie all of the battalion group's preparatory training: minimum use of force; maximum use of deterrence; and conflict resolution at the lowest possible level.²⁶¹

After acknowledging that every soldier must be capable of employing weapons and must understand battle drills and tactics, BGen Beno wrote:

Nonetheless, I wish it stressed and clearly understood at every level that training to specified weapon and battle task standards is only a vehicle by which soldiers gain confidence in themselves, their subordinates, peers and superiors, and their equipment. Training in this manner must not be viewed as an end in itself; it is simply one means of producing a confident, cohesive unit that is capable of conducting any type of operation and

reacting quickly and professionally to any unforeseen situation. For example, I would not want your soldiers believing company attacks would be a common occurrence in Somalia. They should be thinking quite the opposite. Indeed, as Commanding Officer of the battle group you should aim, through the imaginative use of deterrence and the timely employment of reserves, to deploy and return from Somalia without having discharged a single weapon in anger.²⁶²

In a training report of October 13, 1992, LCol Morneau indicated that the spirit of BGen Beno's direction and the three basic rules provided in his letter of September 22, 1992, had been stressed throughout the training.²⁶³ Capt Walsh verified that the three rules — minimum use of force, maximum use of deterrence, conflict resolution at the lowest possible level — were articulated by both LCol Morneau and LCol Mathieu during the pre-deployment preparations.²⁶⁴ During Exercise Stalwart Providence, LCol MacDonald also emphasized the importance of tone and attitude.²⁶⁵

While it would appear that BGen Beno and LCol Morneau were both cognizant of the need to convey appropriate principles relating to tone and attitude for a peacekeeping mission, we saw little evidence that much was done to ensure that these attitudes were instilled at all levels within the unit. On the contrary, we heard testimony that all the commandos appeared to be adopting too aggressive a bearing during UN operations training.²⁶⁶ Serious concerns were raised about aggressiveness in the training of 2 Commando, both before and during Exercise Stalwart Providence.²⁶⁷ Even though LCol Morneau briefed his staff and officers on the importance of establishing an appropriate tone for the mission, these instructions were not backed up with effective measures to ensure that the appropriate attitudes were being conveyed to, and adopted by, the troops.

In any event, it is doubtful that an 11th-hour orientation could have served to adequately balance years of socialization in attitudes appropriate for combat. We have expressed our views on the need to integrate peace support training into the regular training cycle, both to develop appropriate skills and foster appropriate attitudes. The difficulty with merely tacking on peace support training to general purpose combat training during the pre-deployment phase is highlighted in an excerpt from Maj Seward's *Lessons Learned from Exercise Stalwart Providence*:

Exercising in a UN peacekeeping role had a certain 'strangeness.' The open fire policy, the rules of escalation of force and the requirement to constantly and continuously negotiate had some of the junior leaders and soldiers confused despite a concerted effort to explain and ensure a corporate understanding. As the exercise evolved, I think that 2 Cdo's understanding of use of the above continually increased.²⁶⁸

FINDINGS

- *Despite the apparent sensitivity to the need to establish an appropriate tone and attitude for the training preparations and mission, the CAR did not succeed in ensuring that the appropriate tone and attitude were in fact conveyed to, and adopted by, personnel at all levels within the unit. At least some components within the CAR remained overly aggressive in their conduct and bearing during training exercises.*
- *Eleventh-hour attempts to instil an orientation appropriate for peace support missions cannot counterbalance years of combat-oriented socialization.*

Another aspect of psychological training apart from tone or attitude training deals with preparation for stress encountered during operations. Although the training plan included a one-hour briefing by the padre that was to include a discussion of combat-induced stress disorder, there is no evidence that any other briefings were conducted to help soldiers prepare for the multitude of stress-inducing circumstances likely to be encountered in a protracted peacekeeping mission. In the words of one officer:

I would be the first to admit that we were not really well prepared for the stress reaction that we encountered in operations as a result of vehicles blowing up on mines and as a result of people getting shot at. We were really not very well prepared to deal with personal crises and respond to personal crises.²⁶⁹

We eventually developed some of those skills, but I found myself lacking, and I think also within the chain of command we were lacking in our ability to deal with that kind of traumatic stress that we were experiencing.²⁷⁰

FINDING

- *There was insufficient training provided for dealing with stress likely to be encountered in theatre.*

Standardization of Training

The three commandos were all supposed to be training to accomplish the same general goals and complete the same list of regimental-level and commando-level training activities. They were not, however, training in exactly the same manner.²⁷¹ The commando training schedules prepared by the CAR Headquarters,²⁷² together with the individual commando training plans,²⁷³ detail the activities conducted by each commando on a day-to-day basis.

The major differences between the commandos' approach to training was highlighted in the testimony of their respective OCs. Both 2 Commando and 3 Commando at the outset placed considerable emphasis on general purpose combat training, conducting such activities as live and dry fire section and platoon attacks and battle drill training.²⁷⁴ However, while 2 Commando focused almost exclusively on combat-oriented training during the early phase of training, 3 Commando also incorporated mission-specific, task-oriented training (for example, roadblocks, checkpoints, cordon and search) into its schedule during the first two weeks of pre-deployment preparation.²⁷⁵ 1 Commando's training was somewhat different: they did no live fire platoon attacks, and placed more emphasis on negotiation and communication skills, training soldiers how to diffuse situations in various scenarios.²⁷⁶ Maj Pommet, whose strong leadership was praised by many of the soldiers we interviewed, indicated that he believed in a need for mission-specific training at an early stage and built it into the timetable accordingly.²⁷⁷

Each officer commanding had to assess the training needs of his own commando, and adapt those needs to the mission at hand.²⁷⁸ Maj Pommet (1 Commando), for example, was very confident in his soldiers' abilities at the outset of training preparations. He had trained with his troops the previous spring and 1 Commando had acted as an enemy force during the summer training of reserves. As well, 1 Commando had a minimal rotation of personnel in the summer of 1992.²⁷⁹

Differences in training were no doubt also influenced by the attitudes of the commandos' OCs, particularly in relation to their perception of the threat level in theatre. Maj Seward appeared to perceive a greater threat than the other sub-unit commanders: "He was much more intense about bearing and about possibly the need to use force."²⁸⁰ This intensity of approach had been evident in a session where standing operating procedures were being developed: Maj Seward was described as being the most intense, Maj Pommet as being at the other end, and Maj Magee (3 Commando) in the middle somewhere.²⁸¹

Some of the differences in approach to training may also be attributed to each of the commandos being a product of their parent regiments. All would train toward the same goal, but each commando had its own personality and training philosophy.²⁸² We heard evidence that the commandos in the CAR remained strongly affiliated with their parent regiments, and the separation along regimental lines made the attainment of a cohesive unit very difficult.²⁸³ In addition, 1 Commando had very little contact with the other commandos, in part because of language barriers.²⁸⁴

The three commandos conducted their training separately and in somewhat divergent manners. Both before and after Exercise Stalwart Providence, they had no opportunity to train together as a unit. Late development of standing operating procedures also contributed to their performing tasks in different ways.

FINDINGS

- *There was a lack of standardization in training among the commandos. In part, this was attributable to differences in training needs, expected in-theatre tasks, regimental affiliations and the late development of standing operating procedures. Nevertheless, the commandos were conducting their training activities in a very independent manner, and were largely left on their own to assess the sufficiency of their training.*
- *Both prior to and after Exercise Stalwart Providence, the CAR did not train together as a unit and did not develop cohesiveness as a unit.*

Training of 2 Commando

When Maj Seward assumed command of 2 Commando in July 1992, cohesiveness within the sub-unit was low. This was due in part to the previous officer commanding having been away on training, and in part to the down-sizing and reorganization of the CAR, which left the Regiment focused on administrative matters.²⁸⁵ In addition, both 1 Commando and 3 Commando had acted as an enemy force at the Central Area Concentration for the Militia held in August. 2 Commando had not had the same opportunity and had not done any general purpose combat training. After receiving the warning for Somalia, Maj Seward's training priorities were therefore to integrate the soldiers into rifle and weapons sections and to provide a training opportunity to the section commanders to learn the capabilities of individual soldiers.²⁸⁶ Early in the pre-deployment phase, then, Maj Seward asked LCol Morneault if he could place more emphasis on general purpose combat training. LCol Morneault gave him permission to do so.²⁸⁷

Maj Seward spent approximately four days during the early part of training doing section battle drills.²⁸⁸ He believed that conducting such drills would help to integrate the soldiers, instil section control, and provide a basis for future platoon or commando operations training.²⁸⁹ Maj Seward also conducted field firing exercises, which he saw as a good way to ensure that the section would be able to move and protect itself under "real conditions."²⁹⁰ During the field firing exercises, Maj Seward set up scenarios where the soldiers were expected to discern between friendly and hostile forces. In

one role-playing scenario, a soldier was held hostage in a shelter that had both friendly and hostile forces in it, and the section commander was to deploy his section in a tactical fashion to rescue the hostage.²⁹¹

Several witnesses had grave concerns about the focus and nature of 2 Commando's training. Offensive operations at the platoon level, simulated hostage-relief situations, and grenade assaults were seen as falling outside the scope of training appropriate for a peacekeeping mission.²⁹² The offensive mode of training, using aggressive attack situations, was viewed as inappropriate, and even the training conducted for roadblocks and checkpoints appeared to be carried out in an overly aggressive manner.²⁹³ With respect to the section battle drills, LCol Morneault called Maj Seward in to discuss the matter, and allowed him to complete the training, but instructed him not to take it beyond the section level.²⁹⁴ LCol Morneault cautioned him twice not to overemphasize the combat part of this training, and also cautioned him about the tone of the training — not to extend it into training for offensive operations.²⁹⁵

Maj Seward also reviewed the proposed field firing training with LCol Morneault, who agreed with the exercise but again cautioned him to be careful that the tone was not too aggressive.²⁹⁶ To LCol Morneault's knowledge, Maj Seward did tone down the training after he was told to do so.²⁹⁷ With respect to the house-clearing exercise, however, LCol Morneault instructed him that such training was not to be done at that time, because it was not clear that force could be used on the mission in a hostage-taking or kidnapping situation.²⁹⁸

Having devoted considerable time to combat-related exercises, 2 Commando was left with limited time to focus on other aspects of its training. Maj Seward testified that prior to Exercise Stalwart Providence, 2 Commando did complete all categories of training that were to be covered.²⁹⁹ However, the focus of their training was at the individual and section levels.³⁰⁰ LCol Morneault acknowledged that, in retrospect, Maj Seward misapprehended the time available, believing that he could accomplish all the mission-specific training which he had been directed to do as well as supplementary general purpose combat training. This did not prove to be the case and 2 Commando was not as prepared as it should have been for Exercise Stalwart Providence.³⁰¹

Disciplinary problems in the CAR caused significant training difficulties during the week of October 4th. Because members of 2 Commando were suspected of having been involved in serious disciplinary infractions on the weekend of October 2nd to 3rd, they were removed to the field for the week to be isolated from the rest of the Regiment. While there, they continued to train according to their training plan.³⁰² This undoubtedly divided

2 Commando's focus between training and trying to get to the bottom of the incidents. It was also the week that the vehicles came in, and 2 Commando only used one of its allocated days for training with the vehicles. In sum, this week's events were a major distraction and adversely affected 2 Commando's training.³⁰³

2 Commando's performance at Exercise Stalwart Providence in mid-October is discussed in the next section. However, after the exercise, BGen Beno concluded that 2 Commando was acceptable but had been trained too intensely and aggressively.³⁰⁴

Following Exercise Stalwart Providence, Maj Seward designed an additional training exercise for 2 Commando, Exercise Bravo Cordon, to address platoon- and commando-level operations. It was a two-and-a-half-day exercise held from November 19th to 21st, with scenarios involving negotiations with locals and bivouac security — a 'mini Stalwart Providence' to deal with lessons learned from that exercise.³⁰⁵ Maj Seward was not present for the exercise as he was attending a merit board.³⁰⁶ In taking the initiative to design Exercise Bravo Cordon, however, he demonstrated a willingness and a desire to attempt to remedy the shortcomings identified in Exercise Stalwart Providence by providing additional scenario-based training for his commando.

FINDING

- Overall, 2 Commando's training was too aggressive and combat-oriented for a peacekeeping mission such as Operation Cordon. We recognize that 2 Commando appeared to require additional time for refresher general purpose combat training, and that Maj Seward wanted to ensure that his troops were capable of dealing with any threats that might be encountered in theatre. Nevertheless, the degree of aggressiveness in the training scenarios, together with the length of time devoted to combat-type training, was to the detriment of the acquisition and development of mission-specific skills, as evidenced by 2 Commando's difficulties in the initial stages of Exercise Stalwart Providence.

EXERCISE STALWART PROVIDENCE

Exercise Stalwart Providence was the field training exercise undertaken by the Canadian Airborne Regiment to prepare for deployment to Somalia. It took place from October 14 to 18, 1992, in the CFB Petawawa training area. It was conducted to ensure that the CAR was operationally ready to deploy on Operation Cordon.

Execution

The five-day exercise, which involved the entire unit, consisted of a series of scenarios in the field for various sub-units of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. It was in effect an elaborate simulation game on the ground, based on a speculative model of the upcoming UN mission to Somalia. The Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) organized and evaluated the exercise. In order to assess the performance of the CAR soldiers, the RCD devised a series of scenarios and incidents, set out in an 'activity matrix'. The initial tasks involved securing and establishing a base camp. The subsequent scenarios included events such as a convoy encountering mines and coming under fire; a small group of refugees requiring medical aid arriving at base camp; a request from a local official for assistance in disposing of corpses; and a riot at a food distribution site.³⁰⁷

Some Key Problems

Exercise Stalwart Providence was, on the whole, effective training: it allowed each commando to practise tasks anticipated for Somalia; it featured scenarios which required contact with non-combatants; it attempted, not always successfully, to make the scenarios realistic by having people role-play various elements of Somali society; and it had effective, built-in mechanisms for learning and evaluation throughout. The diligent efforts of the Special Service Force Headquarters, and the Royal Canadian Dragoons under LCol MacDonald, are to be commended. However, as we will outline below, the effectiveness of the exercise was limited by several problems from the outset: confusion as to the purpose of the exercise, the absence of the Commanding Officer of the CAR, difficulties in obtaining intelligence, and the lack of an effective system to address the remedial training needs identified in the course of the exercise.

Confusion as to Purpose

It is evident that in the planning and execution stages, there was confusion concerning the purpose of the exercise. While brigade staff and those conducting the exercise were clear that the exercise was intended to confirm the unit's operational readiness, some senior CAR officers approached it as simply a training opportunity. Once they realized that they were being evaluated, they began to view the exercise as a test.

This confusion may be explained by the fact that the holding of an exercise to confirm preparedness for a UN mission was not required by any standing policy or guidelines, nor was it usual practice in the Canadian Forces in 1992 to hold such an exercise. A unit exercise prior to deployment was common, and would be expected in this case since the newly reconstituted CAR had yet to complete any unit-level training. But according to the CAR's Deputy

Commanding Officer, who was acting as Commanding Officer during the exercise, it was "quite unusual" to have the exercise conducted and evaluated by another unit in the manner that occurred.³⁰⁸

The purpose of Exercise Stalwart Providence, as set forth in the September 14, 1992, letter from brigade headquarters, was "to confirm the operational readiness of the Airborne Battle Group³⁰⁹ for UNOSOM (Operation Cordon.)"³¹⁰ Its objectives were to enable the battalion group to confirm standing operating procedures for such anticipated in-theatre tasks as convoy escort and protection of the base camp, as well as rules of engagement, crowd and refugee control, arrest and detainment procedures, and burial details (mass graves). A further objective was the practice of incident resolution, including escalation of the use of force, negotiation and reporting procedures.

The letter of September 14th also tasked the Royal Canadian Dragoons with conducting the exercise.³¹¹ Both LCol MacDonald and Maj Kampman of the RCD concluded, based on this letter, that the purpose of Exercise Stalwart Providence was to confirm the CAR's readiness for the Operation Cordon mission to Somalia. They also understood that given the short time frame, the CAR would be doing a fair amount of training throughout the exercise.³¹²

It appears that in the early stages, both the Commanding Officer, LCol Morneault, and the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, agreed on the purpose of Exercise Stalwart Providence, but, as events unfolded, the exercise took on different purposes for each. LCol Morneault saw Exercise Stalwart Providence as a regimental exercise in which, as Commanding Officer, he would have the opportunity to assess his commandos and to define additional training needs.³¹³ He saw the role of the brigade in the exercise as providing support to a commanding officer-run exercise for the battalion. When he expressed concerns to his superior that the exercise was becoming a "regimental test", he received assurances that BGen Beno was looking only for three cohesive commandos.³¹⁴ Indeed, BGen Beno testified that, "It was never a test exercise",³¹⁵ but that it was too late to be doing commando-level training.

The differing views of BGen Beno and LCol Morneault may explain why several senior officers within the CAR gained the impression that the exercise was in fact a test of the unit's operational readiness.³¹⁶ The CAR's Deputy Commanding Officer, Maj MacKay, along with the OCs of 1 Commando and 2 Commando, testified that as Exercise Stalwart Providence unfolded it became clear to them that it was a test. At the outset, they were all approaching it as an opportunity to conduct commando-level training and to practise different approaches to peacekeeping tasks.³¹⁷ MWO Mills of 2 Commando testified that he had received verbal orders that Stalwart Providence was a "confirmatory test", not a "training exercise".³¹⁸ Similarly, Maj Magee, the Officer Commanding of 3 Commando, understood that it was to be a test of operational readiness.³¹⁹

FINDING

- *There was confusion between the brigade and regimental levels as to the purpose of Exercise Stalwart Providence. We are disturbed that there could have been any misunderstanding about an exercise which occupied so much of the SSF's human and materiel resources. Various perceptions as to its purpose existed during the planning stages: some saw it as simply a training exercise; others believed it was an exercise to test the cohesiveness of the sub-units; and still others saw it as an exercise to confirm the operational readiness of the CAR as a whole. It is our view that given the compressed time frame, the CO should have been left to run a regimental exercise, rather than having been rushed into a brigade-level test of operational readiness.*

Timing of Exercise Stalwart Providence

A further perplexing question lies in the timing of the exercise, which coincided with the Commanding Officer's reconnaissance to Somalia. The question was debated before us as to whether the exercise should or could have been delayed, in order to allow LCol Morneault to be present. This option, had it been possible, would also have allowed for the completion of the requisite sub-unit training that some witnesses said was not in fact satisfactorily completed by October 14th.

According to BGen Beno, the dates for the reconnaissance mission were set by the United Nations. BGen Beno also said that it would have been "exceedingly difficult" to change the dates of Exercise Stalwart Providence in order that the Commanding Officer, LCol Morneault, could do both the exercise and the reconnaissance. We are satisfied by the legitimate factors substantiating the decision that the CAR's Commanding Officer would be away during the conduct of the exercise.³²⁰ We are, however, in agreement with the testimony of several witnesses who stated that the absence of the Commanding Officer had a negative impact on the exercise.³²¹

FINDING

- *We find that it was unfair to both LCol Morneault and the troops to have the Commanding Officer absent during what was essentially a test of the unit's operational readiness. Ideally, LCol Morneault should have been given the opportunity to be present at the exercise as well as to go on the reconnaissance mission.*

Lack of Intelligence

There was a lack of intelligence and current information on Somalia made available from NDHQ to the CAR, which impeded the planning of Exercise Stalwart Providence and limited its relevance to the real situation. When LCol MacDonald was planning the exercise, his primary source of information on Somalia was the Cable News Network (CNN) and the news media.³²²

We feel that this lack of up-to-date information limited the scope of the exercise. For example, the master activity list included only one reference to what could be called thievery. LCol MacDonald could not recall any scenario which addressed stealing from Canadian troops, and said he was not aware, in October 1992 when he was designing and delivering Exercise Stalwart Providence, of the extent of the thievery that was then going on in Somalia.³²³ This is a curious comment in that his subordinate, Maj Kampman, indicated that he had been well aware of the degree of theft in Somalia, and had specifically tried to include situations which involved this in the scenarios for Exercise Stalwart Providence.³²⁴ Another witness testified that there was not much emphasis placed on dealing with detainees, civilians, or thieves in the exercise since the CAR was not expecting to detain anyone and was told simply to hand the detainees over to local elders.³²⁵

FINDING

- *The training benefits afforded by Exercise Stalwart Providence were limited by a lack of intelligence and current information on conditions in Somalia. The exercise required a focus which more accurately reflected the threat, political, and cultural factors the CAR was liable to face in Somalia, and the opportunity for CAR members to practise the skills they would require to meet these challenges. In our view, the exercise should have included information, scenarios, and tasks which more closely represented the challenges expected in Somalia. This would have required significantly more support from NDHQ, in terms of intelligence and sourcing of expertise and advisers.*

Identification of Remedial Training Needs

As the exercise evaluators, the Royal Canadian Dragoons developed a detailed and effective system to identify problem areas in the CAR's performance during Exercise Stalwart Providence. In particular, they expressed concerns over the CAR's ability to take on a mounted role and safely operate vehicles. They also found problems in the flow of information down through the ranks. There was no intensive period of remedial training after Exercise Stalwart Providence which, in light of the concerns raised as a result of the exercise, was most definitely required.

Vehicle Training

At the end of Exercise Stalwart Providence, mounted operations was identified as an area where the CAR would need additional training. Both Maj Kampman and LCol MacDonald testified about the difficulties faced by the CAR, a light infantry battalion, in adjusting to its new role as a mounted unit.³²⁶

Maj Kampman testified that: "...at the end of the week...we continued to be concerned about the ability of the Airborne soldiers to operate the vehicle[s] in a safe fashion."³²⁷ LCol MacDonald testified that he thought, at the end of the exercise, the CAR could have used an additional week of vehicle training.³²⁸ He clearly expressed this concern in a letter to BGen Beno dated October 20, 1992. This letter highlighted the critical need for practice in mounted operations, and specifically the "complexities of convoy operations".³²⁹ As some of the CAR drivers were new to the equipment, the RCD offered to give them vehicles for additional post-exercise mounted operations training. LCol MacDonald said that this offer was never accepted.³³⁰ We find this surprising and disappointing as it is clear from the documentation and the testimony that key officers and leaders within the CAR would have been aware of the need for remedial training.³³¹

Passage of Information

An additional concern expressed by the RCD during Stalwart Providence was that information was not getting passed down to the soldiers. LCol MacDonald stated that this was a critical requirement in this type of mission, as every soldier must have every bit of information made available to them.³³² They tested the flow of information by waiting a few days after a certain message had been issued, and then having an RCD observer walk up to the perimeter and ask a soldier what he had heard about that particular issue. If the soldier had not heard of it, they would track the message back until they found the place where the passage of information had been disrupted.³³³

Use of Force

Over-aggressiveness and escalation in the use of force by 2 Commando during the exercise was a source of concern for many witnesses.³³⁴ One particular problem involved the passage of information on the use of force down the ranks in 2 Commando. One witness cited this as the main reason that 2 Commando did not improve as quickly as the other sub-units.³³⁵ The view was expressed before us that the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers were not getting the information they deserved.³³⁶ This is reflected

in the RCD debrief points of October 20th, which stated that the “open fire/use of force policy is not clearly understood by all soldiers asked.”³³⁷ It is interesting to note that in his testimony, Maj Seward agreed with this statement, and felt that the soldiers’ understanding would improve if the issues were re-emphasized and reinforced.³³⁸ However, the very fact that there seems to have been such a problem with the passage of information within 2 Commando would indicate that the necessary reinforcement of the principles of the escalation of force was not taking place.

LCol MacDonald was sufficiently concerned about the issue of the passage of information that he mentioned it in his post-exercise letter to BGen Beno, along with his concerns about vehicle training. His overall assessment of the CAR following the exercise was that they had come a long way in the short period of time available to them, and would perform well in Somalia, given that they had three to four weeks left to train before leaving.³³⁹ However, these additional training needs were not seriously or systematically addressed in the weeks prior to deployment.

FINDINGS

- *Exercise Stalwart Providence was, on the whole, a good training exercise: it allowed each commando to practise tasks expected in Somalia; it featured scenarios which required contact with non-combatants; it attempted to make the scenarios realistic by having people role-play various elements of Somali society; and it had effective built-in mechanisms for learning and evaluation throughout. The diligent efforts of the SSF HQ, and the RCD under LCol MacDonald, are to be commended. However, Exercise Stalwart Providence lacked several important elements in order to be fully effective, whether as a training or a confirmatory exercise: the presence of the CO; more complete and accurate information respecting conditions likely to be encountered in theatre; and an effective system in place to ensure that identified remedial training needs were adequately addressed.*
- *The results of Exercise Stalwart Providence should have led to a concentrated and structured period of remedial or additional training, closely supervised by the chain of command. It should have included:*
 - *emphasis on proper passage of information*
 - *additional mounted vehicle training*
 - *training to ensure appropriate restraint in the use of force and ROE*
 - *training on the capture and holding of detainees.*

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING FOR OPERATION DELIVERANCE

The change from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance had a significant impact on the training requirements for the deployment to Somalia. After weeks of training for a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission in a relatively stable area of Somalia, the CAR was suddenly faced with the enormous challenge of preparing to deploy on a new and uncertain Chapter VII peace enforcement mission in a different and much less stable region of Somalia, with new use-of-force policies, and under new command arrangements. Most significantly, the new mission called for a new force structure: the CAR battalion group as constituted for Operation Cordon was to be augmented by the Mortar Platoon from 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, and A Squadron from the Royal Canadian Dragoons, neither of which had been warned or trained for Operation Cordon. Not only did these additional elements require training, but it would be essential that the newly formed battle group be brought together and trained as a cohesive whole.

However, there was almost no time for preparatory training for Operation Deliverance, and we are alarmed by the fact that no significant consideration was given to training requirements, including time to train, by those responsible for committing troops to the new mission.³⁴⁰ Little training was conducted by any of the elements of the new Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group following the warning for Operation Deliverance. There was no training on mission-specific rules of engagement, despite the fact that a Chapter VII mission would involve use-of-force policies that differed substantially from those appropriate for a Chapter VI mission. Most significantly, perhaps, the elements of CARBG were ultimately sent off on a potentially dangerous mission overseas without ever having had the opportunity to train together as a full battle group.

The Training of the CARBG

On December 4, 1992, Special Service Force Headquarters issued a preliminary warning order indicating that the CARBG would be augmented for the new mission.³⁴¹ The warning order tasked the CAR to submit a consolidated training plan for the entire battle group by noon on December 5th.³⁴²

On December 5th, LCol Mathieu issued a warning order instructing CARBG sub-units to conduct training and preparations in accordance with the regimental training conference held the previous day.³⁴³ A Squadron was

instructed to train in compliance with the SSF warning order, as co-ordinated with the CAR's training officer. The warning order also stated that Operation Cordon rules of engagement were not applicable to the mission, and that new rules of engagement were to be issued.³⁴⁴

The CAR's training plan for Operation Deliverance, covering the period from December 7 to 16, 1992, was submitted to SSF on December 5th.³⁴⁵ Sub-units recently attached under the CAR's command were to complete fitness training, weapons training, individual preparations training, and specialty vehicle/equipment training prior to commencing collective CARBG training for the mission.³⁴⁶ Catch-up briefings (intelligence, medical, mine awareness, etc.) were also scheduled for those personnel who had not previously received them.

LCol Turner explained that the change in mission introduced the new task of disarming factions who attempted to interfere with relief efforts, in addition to the previous tasks related to peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. This placed a new emphasis on a fighting function, which in turn required that a greater emphasis be placed on live fire training.³⁴⁷ As well, the area to which they were being deployed was less stable than that planned for Operation Cordon, increasing the prospect of belligerency.³⁴⁸

The following training was therefore planned for the CAR in preparation for Operation Deliverance: Invertron training (artillery indirect fire simulation); direct fire control (refresher training in requesting and spotting direct fire); live fire range training (to be conducted at section, platoon, commando, and battle group levels); combat first aid refresher training; officers' training on CARBG SOPs and airmobile operations; and briefings to leaders on the use of equipment to be used in theatre. A Bison armoured vehicle driver conversion course was also to be conducted. In all, the CAR's training schedule provided for no more than 10 days of training, with even less time available for the members of the advance party.

The degree to which the Operation Deliverance training plan for the CAR was followed is not clear from the evidence before us. Maj Seward testified that there was a continuation of individual and refresher training, and that additional training such as Invertron training and a march and shoot competition were conducted. He described the training as being "low level...filler training," and noted that there were no vehicles available.³⁴⁹ There is clearly one respect in which the training plan was not followed: the contemplated battle group live fire range training did not occur, as CARBG did not train together as a group. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

It was suggested before us that the CAR itself required little additional training to prepare for Operation Deliverance based on the following propositions: the Regiment had carried out concentrated training for Operation

Python and Operation Cordon during the past year and the skills learned were transferrable to Operation Deliverance; the new Chapter VII mission was more in line with the CAR's operational role as a general purpose light infantry unit; and the CAR had been training continuously for short-notice deployments.³⁵⁰

We find these arguments unconvincing, both in and of themselves and also in view of the numerous training problems and deficiencies discussed below. Here we note only that the CAR was trained as an air-deployable light infantry unit, and had only recently undertaken rudimentary mechanized training for routine tasks associated with peacekeeping missions. Normally, before entering a potentially mid-intensity theatre of operations, a mechanized unit would conduct intensive training in tasks involving the collective use of force. Therefore, despite its previous training experience, the CAR could not have been considered combat capable, as a mechanized unit, for a Chapter VII mission at the time it was warned for Operation Deliverance. Furthermore, the requisite training could not have been provided after it was warned, as there were no vehicles available with which to do such training.

We heard little evidence concerning the training received by the mortar platoon from the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment. Their training plan, however, suggests that what little time they did have to train would have been devoted almost exclusively to the conduct of mortar drills, together with dry and live fire training.³⁵¹

We were, however, presented with unsettling testimony regarding the daunting training challenges faced by the A Squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons during the very limited time available to prepare for the mission — a period described by Maj Kampman, the Officer Commanding A Squadron, as “controlled chaos”.³⁵² Equipment was in a low state of repair, with only 30 to 40 per cent of the vehicles operational in terms of both driving and gunnery systems.³⁵³ The whole Regiment (the RCD) focused on getting the Squadron ready, working 20 hours a day. Their primary concern, however, was preparing the vehicles and equipment. Everything else, including training, had to be of secondary importance; they tried to fit in whatever little training they could.³⁵⁴

The A Squadron's limited training was fitted into six and a half days and included a two-day refresher course on small arms, two days on the indoor miniature range to allow Cougar (armoured vehicle) crews to practise gunnery drills, one day on first aid, and half a day for tactical training on armoured personnel carriers. There was also one day reserved for various briefings.³⁵⁵

A Squadron had recently completed some comprehensive training which no doubt helped them through this operation. They had carried out intensive training in the early part of 1992, and had performed very well in an armoured corps competition in the summer of 1992.³⁵⁶ As well, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, and A Squadron in particular, had played an important

role in preparing the CAR for Operation Cordon during Exercise Stalwart Providence. The preparations A Squadron had to undertake in order to conduct and evaluate that exercise provided them, albeit fortuitously, with valuable experience they could later draw upon when they were warned for Operation Deliverance.³⁵⁷

Maj Kampman expressed to us the serious concerns he had prior to being deployed on the mission to Somalia. He had received little direction on training; personnel were under a tremendous amount of stress; the mission was unclear; and there was little accurate intelligence on the theatre of operations.³⁵⁸ Maj Kampman's primary concern, however, was that the various elements of CARBG had completed no collective training as a battle group prior to deployment.³⁵⁹

[I]t is practically a principle, in fact it is a principle, I would say, within the Army that when we go into combat we operate as a combined arms team; that is armour, infantry, artillery, signals, engineers work as a single team, even down to the company or what we call combat team level.

And I was concerned that, because we had not had a chance to train as a battle group in Canada that we were now going into operations — and what we thought at the time probably combat operations — not having had an opportunity to train in that way.³⁶⁰

We most emphatically share this concern, and consider it one of the most egregious shortcomings in training preparations for Operation Deliverance. The absence of collective training for the CARBG meant that there was no opportunity to develop positive relationships between the various elements and to build the requisite knowledge and trust between the commanders.³⁶¹ We are aware that the CF regularly practises detaching and attaching various elements.³⁶² However, it was imperative for the CARBG to practise as a group, especially with the CAR assigned to conduct mounted operations — not its usual role. Cohesion and uniformity in execution of standing operating procedures, two important elements emphasized repeatedly in evidence relating to training for Operation Cordon, would have been difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without collective training.

The lack of collective training as a battle group may have constituted one of the most serious deficiencies in the pre-deployment preparations for Operation Deliverance, but it certainly does not stand alone.

There is no evidence to suggest that adequate analysis was done by NDHQ or Land Force Command regarding the training requirements for the new mission. We are not aware of any training guidance or direction having been provided by higher levels of command to the CARBG in relation to Operation Deliverance. Furthermore, while the CARBG was preparing for deployment, little information was available on the nature of the new mission.

The CARBG received no intelligence specific to the area where they were headed.³⁶³ Indeed, when the battle group was deployed, they knew only that they would provide security for the Baledogle airfield, to be followed by future security operations in a location that was as yet unknown. They did not know they would be deployed at Belet Huen until after their arrival in theatre; obviously, no planning for Belet Huen was done before deployment.³⁶⁴ In the circumstances, requisite intelligence briefings on the cultural, political, and environmental situation they were about to enter could not be realistically provided.

Rules of engagement (ROE) for the mission were not issued until the 11th hour; thus, no pre-deployment training on theatre-specific ROE could be undertaken.

There is little evidence on the supervision provided by LCol Mathieu in terms of training for Operation Deliverance. It is evident that he was in the United States from December 5th to 8th for purposes of liaison with U.S. commanders. He then was deployed with the advance party to Somalia on December 13th.³⁶⁵ It appears safe to infer that under the circumstances his involvement in pre-deployment training for the new mission would have been minimal. Additionally, there is no evidence that his superiors in the chain of command provided any supervision of the CARBG's attempts to train.

At the root of many of the deficiencies we have identified in the Operation Deliverance training lies the haste with which troops were committed to this mission, with virtually no time to conduct the requisite training; training requirements were subordinated to the time frames dictated by the political commitment to rapid deployment. The best efforts of the dedicated officers and soldiers directly involved in preparing for the mission could not serve to overcome the major obstacle standing in the way of the provision of appropriate and sufficient training: the lack of a simple but essential resource — time.

FINDINGS

- *With such a short period between warning and deployment, there was virtually no time to conduct preparatory training for Operation Deliverance. There is no evidence to suggest that adequate consideration was given to training requirements for the new mission by the officers and officials responsible for the decision to commit Canadian troops for the new mission, nor is there any evidence of training guidance or direction being provided to the CARBG by higher levels of command. This represents a significant failure by senior leadership.*

- *No significant training was conducted by the CARBG after the mission changed from Operation Cordon (Chapter VI) to Operation Deliverance (Chapter VII). Various prerequisites for the proper planning and conduct of training, such as a clear mission, theatre-specific intelligence, mission-specific ROE, training equipment and vehicles, and sufficient time to train, were not available. There was no opportunity for the newly constituted battle group to train together as a group. The CARBG was deployed to Somalia, on a potentially dangerous mission, without adequate training and without the battle group functioning as a cohesive whole. It was a matter of good fortune that they were not challenged by a serious show of force upon their arrival in theatre: the results could have been tragic.*
- *The CARBG was not operationally ready, from a training point of view, for deployment to Somalia for Operation Deliverance.*

ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF TRAINING

In our examination of the training received by Canadian Forces deployed to Somalia, in addition to the serious deficiencies already enumerated, we encountered several glaring deficiencies relating to specific aspects of training that one would consider essential for a mission such as the one the CAR was undertaking. These training components are sufficiently important to merit separate comment in this report under the general headings of Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), rules of engagement, cultural training, and training in negotiation.

Law of Armed Conflict

The CF is obliged under international law to provide training in the LOAC. We have determined that the insufficient knowledge of the Law of Armed Conflict on the part of the CAR members was in the first instance the result of weaknesses in training in the LOAC that existed in the CF more generally. Documents that we have reviewed indicate that in the mid-1980s, individual non-commissioned members within the CF were expected to have a “basic knowledge” of the Geneva Conventions, including treatment of prisoners of war and civilian detainees. Field officers attending the Command and Staff College would have received three hours of training in the LOAC in the mid-1980s,³⁶⁶ and some majors and most lieutenant-colonels would receive a full day session on the LOAC and ROE.³⁶⁷

According to the CF, there is considerable LOAC training taking place within the CF but it is not well co-ordinated.³⁶⁸ We heard testimony to the effect that there was little focus on LOAC training as part of the pre-deployment training for Somalia because soldiers received such training throughout their careers.³⁶⁹ While we agree that there was some training on the LOAC provided within the CF, we do not think that it was significant enough to justify its exclusion from pre-deployment training for the Somalia mission.

We have determined that there were similar weaknesses in training on the LOAC during the preparation for Somalia. During the Operation Cordon preparations for the Chapter VI mission, there was some understanding among the CAR officers that detention of civilians might be necessary in theatre.³⁷⁰ At that time, they anticipated that there would be some sort of local authority to hand the detainees over to, and it was not expected that they would be in the hands of Airborne soldiers for very long.³⁷¹ The scenarios in Exercise Stalwart Providence were based on this assumption, and it became apparent to those running the exercise that some of the members of the CAR were not familiar with the procedures for handling detainees.³⁷² It is clear from the testimony before the various courts-martial that there was no uniform understanding of how detainees should be treated. Several witnesses stated that they believed detainees were to be made uncomfortable in order to deter them from coming back.³⁷³ This was interpreted differently by various soldiers: some thought it meant keeping detainees awake all night and not giving them food or water,³⁷⁴ while others had the incredible notion that they were to keep detainees awake and uncomfortable by pouring cold water over their heads and not feeding them.³⁷⁵ The obvious confusion over the procedures for handling detainees was identified as early as Exercise Stalwart Providence. The fact that nothing was done to remedy this confusion created a pressing need for training on handling civilian detentions in theatre.³⁷⁶ However, this was not done.

Once the mission changed to Operation Deliverance under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the expectation of the type of detainees changed: now it was thought that they would be armed and aggressive looters.³⁷⁷ While we would have expected additional training on the handling of detainees — particularly given the shortcomings recognized during the regimental exercise, this did not occur. There was, however, a lecture given on the Law of War to CARBG officers and a few senior non-commissioned members on December 10, 1992, by LCol Watkin of the Judge Advocate General staff. This general briefing addressed the Geneva Conventions and the care to be taken with prisoners and detainees.³⁷⁸

FINDINGS

- In 1992 there was insufficient training in the CF generally on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This in turn resulted from a lack of institutional commitment within the CF regarding a systematic and thorough dissemination of the LOAC to all its members. As a result, the responsibility by default fell exclusively to those in charge of preparation of the CAR for Somalia to ensure that all ranks received adequate LOAC training.
- There was a very serious lack of training on the LOAC during the pre-deployment training for Somalia, as evidenced by the soldiers' confusion in theatre over how to treat detainees once they were captured.
- The lack of attention to the LOAC and its dissemination demonstrates a profound failure of the CF leadership, both in the adequate preparation of Canadian troops sent to Somalia, and in Canada's obligation to respect the elementary principles of international law in the field of armed conflict.
- There was no significant training on the capture and handling of detainees, either during Exercise Stalwart Providence or at any other stage of the pre-deployment training. This resulted from a failure of the chain of command to establish a policy for detainees and to ensure that standing operating procedures (SOPs) were developed for the capture and holding of detainees.

Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement are a fundamental tool of any military in accomplishing its mission effectively. They are, quite literally, the rules and principles that guide soldiers in operational situations, and form a necessary complement to the chain of command. ROE are commonly developed and disseminated before any military operation, such as the mission to Somalia. They form an essential part of pre-deployment training for specific missions, and are usually provided to all soldiers in written form (on a card) for ease of reference. A thorough understanding of the ROE is crucial in any military operation, for they establish the principles governing how a soldier is to respond to a given situation, and when and if that soldier is or is not to shoot.

An inherent understanding of the ROE was particularly important for the soldiers taking part in the mission to Somalia, where they would be faced with a complex array of peacekeeping and security duties in a volatile environment. However, the evidence before us is overwhelming that in spite of

the acknowledgement by senior Canadian Forces personnel that an effective understanding of the ROE was crucial to the Somalia mission, members of the CAR simply did not receive sufficient training in them.³⁷⁹

It was stated time and again before us that when it comes to training on the ROE, briefings and lectures are insufficient. The training has to be ingrained and instinctive, so that the soldier is able to react instantly under stress with the appropriate amount of force.³⁸⁰ Several witnesses testified that the best way to achieve this implicit understanding of the ROE is through scenario-based training, where soldiers learn to make quick decisions in practical situations.³⁸¹

The ROE for the Somalia mission should have changed in tandem with the change from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mission. But, for the original Operation Cordon training, there were amazingly no ROE available and, in their absence, the CAR trained on the Yugoslavian ROE.³⁸² Although they did not have the actual mission ROE, there was some training conducted on the use of force. For example, during Exercise Stalwart Providence, the soldiers were evaluated on their escalation of force in various scenarios. One exercise evaluator testified that they were concerned about the "ability of the Airborne to apply the [ROE]" and whether the Airborne members "were able to apply a controlled escalation of force according to the situation that was going to be presented to them."³⁸³ Although this concern was clearly expressed to senior CAR officers, there were no efforts to provide scenario-based remedial training after they received the mission-specific ROE.

The previously mentioned briefing provided by LCol Watkin on December 10th, included information on the ROE. He did not speak specifically about the Somalia ROE as none had yet been issued. The officers were then supposed to pass the information on to their subordinates.³⁸⁴ However, there were no efforts made to ensure that this information was properly understood before being passed down through the chain of command to the troops, nor even that it was in fact passed down.³⁸⁵

It is evident that when the senior commanders declared the CAR operationally ready on November 13, 1992, there had been insufficient training on the ROE. There were no mission-specific ROE available for training purposes for either Operation Cordon or Operation Deliverance. The failure to provide sufficient training in this area and on the use of force can be attributed in part to a delay in the development and distribution of the ROE. Nevertheless, greater attention could and should have been paid to the ROE and the use of force throughout the pre-deployment training period.

Once the Operation Deliverance Chapter VII ROE were finalized, clarification concerning the final, approved ROE should have been provided immediately before deployment or on arrival in theatre. We heard testimony

suggesting that a change from Chapter VI to Chapter VII ROE, under which the use of lethal force would not be restricted to situations of self-defence, would call for additional training time.³⁸⁶ However, it is clear that virtually no training was provided on the Chapter VII ROE once they were released on December 11, 1992.³⁸⁷

At the beginning of December, the view was expressed publicly on television by the Minister of External Affairs and International Trade that Chapter VII ROE allowed soldiers to shoot first and ask questions later.³⁸⁸ LCol Mathieu testified before us that this comment on the part of the Honourable Barbara MacDougall gave him the indication that they would be, in a sense, "backed" by the ROE for just about any kind of operation they would do.³⁸⁹

What little exposure to the ROE there was came in the form of lectures or discussions, but, due to the rush, there was a whole series of activities, such as hypothetical situations, that constitute training on the ROE that could not be conducted.³⁹⁰ Though the ROE were received very late, there was a commonly held belief that they could be reviewed and trained upon "in transit" on the plane to Somalia.³⁹¹ This shows that the level of importance attached to training on the ROE by the chain of command was both cursory and superficial.

While the need to systematically reinforce the ROE training once in theatre was recognized by senior commanders who testified before us,³⁹² this did not translate into effective ROE training throughout the deployment period.³⁹³ Maj Pommet showed great concern for the understanding of the ROE by his commando and took steps to train his soldiers, but he did so on his own initiative. On several occasions he verified his troops' knowledge of the ROE by presenting them with scenarios and asking them to respond.³⁹⁴ Although there may have been some discussion and briefings on the ROE, there was no organized and structured scenario-based training done in theatre. In our view, and notwithstanding the obvious need for it, the leaders failed to ensure that all of the soldiers had a comprehensive understanding of the use of force in Somalia through accessible and systematic training.

One guideline for the inadequacy of the CF in-theatre ROE training is what the U.S. forces were doing concurrently in Somalia. Rather than using the CF top-down distillation of information, the U.S. forces used the position of command judge advocate (CJA), in part, to educate its personnel on the proper interpretation of ROE. The CJA created a series of vignettes portraying anticipated situations that provided examples of the proper response. The Americans recognized that the ROE, as developed pre-deployment, might not have dealt with all possible situations that might occur. Therefore, they reassessed the appropriateness of the ROE once in-theatre realities were learned.³⁹⁵

Finally, as with training generally, protecting the time for the troops to be trained on the ROE is fundamental. There is no evidence that the senior leadership or the NDHQ staff considered this requirement. In our view, the need to allow time between the issuance of ROE and the deployment was so critical that it warranted delaying deployment to accommodate this need. Indeed, the CARBG should not have been declared fully operationally ready without it.

FINDINGS

- *There was a failure by the chain of command to provide adequate and appropriate training on the ROE and restraint in the use of force for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. Appropriate training must include briefings, scenario-based exercises, and means of assessing in order that personnel have a complete and instinctive understanding regarding the use of force. The inadequacy of training on the ROE constitutes one of the most serious deficiencies in pre-deployment training.*
- *The failure to provide adequate training on the ROE, and generally on restraint in use of force, can be attributed, in part, to the lateness in the development and distribution of the ROE. However, the unit should not have been declared operationally ready until adequate training on the ROE was conducted.*
- *Given the difficulties in providing training on the mission-specific ROE for Operation Deliverance prior to deployment, there was a clear and pressing need to ensure that systematic ROE training was provided on a priority basis once in Somalia. The necessary training was not conducted, nor were adequate measures taken to ensure that the ROE were sufficiently disseminated and understood.*

Political, Cultural, Historical, and Geographical Training

A further important aspect of mission-specific preparations is training on the politics, culture, history, and geography of the mission area. We find that there was little emphasis placed on this contextual training for the mission to Somalia. The training directive prepared by BGen Beno shows that it was anticipated that soldiers at the lowest ranks would be dealing with civilians on a daily basis through such tasks as the setting up of distribution sites, traffic control, and incident resolution with the minimum use of force.³⁹⁶ While a certain knowledge and understanding of the culture and politics of the local population is not in itself a task, it is an essential element underlying most of the tasks outlined in the training plans and directives.

Those in charge of pre-deployment training lacked a specific set of guidelines that outlined what the training requirement was in this area. While some officers at the lower staff level are to be commended for their efforts to provide some contextual training, the lack of recognition up the chain of command of the importance of this requirement resulted in inadequate theoretical and practical training on the political and sociological environment in Somalia. The evidence before us suggests further that there was a failure in the intelligence system, in that those in charge of training did not have the necessary information available to them.

A review of the testimony of senior officers before us reveals that training in this area was not considered an important pre-deployment requirement. From the CAR Operations Officer, all the way to the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time, Gen de Chastelain, it is clear that there was little or no concern regarding this area of training. It was described by some as a "routine thing" and, indeed, one officer considered it to be better than average for the Somalia deployment.³⁹⁷

While the CAR Intelligence Officer, Capt Hope, did his utmost to provide some training, he had no organizational framework to guide him.³⁹⁸ What he managed to provide was a series of intelligence briefings to the CAR soldiers, based on information collected from an NDHQ analyst, and on film clips culled from CNN.³⁹⁹ Also produced was the Somalia Handbook, though a large part of it consisted of tips on how to operate in a desert environment, and a relatively insignificant portion dealt with issues of politics, culture, and the history of Somalia.⁴⁰⁰

Further training on Somalia was provided in the form of briefings to the CAR officers: one by a reserve officer who had spent some time in Somalia, and another by a Somali national living in Ottawa.⁴⁰¹ Several officers found these briefings to be very useful, and the report of one briefing assessed the information as being "highly reliable".⁴⁰² Yet, despite their usefulness and apparent accuracy, even the most basic and general information from these lectures was not passed down to the soldiers. LCol Morneault thought that it would be better to wait in order to "exercise some caution to prevent the wrong information going out."⁴⁰³ The result of this decision was that the soldiers were unprepared for the culture shock they were to face in Somalia. Cpl Purnelle of 1 Commando testified that the reality of what they faced in Somalia was a shock to them all.⁴⁰⁴

Cpl Purnelle's testimony provides a clear example of the consequences of not passing on known, reliable information to the troops. He stated that he was shocked by the high rate of homosexuality in Somalia, evidenced by men holding each other's hands.⁴⁰⁵ However, Lt Bryden's debriefing report, prepared on September 26, 1992, a full three months before deployment,

expressly stated that while homosexuality is taboo, conversation is an art form in Somalia, and that "...touching to emphasize points is common. When in private conversation, two men may hold hands as they walk."⁴⁰⁶

It appears that CNN was the primary pre-deployment source of intelligence on Somalia.⁴⁰⁷ The intelligence information provided to those in charge of pre-deployment training was grossly inadequate and points to a failure of the intelligence system at the national level. It was clear from the testimony before us that the volatile and complex situation in Somalia called for accurate and up-to-date information which was extremely difficult to obtain.⁴⁰⁸ It is for precisely this reason that the intelligence system should have been working to its maximum capacity, in order to provide an accurate and measured understanding of the situation to those responsible for training and, ultimately, to the soldiers, who would be dealing face to face with the civilian population on a daily basis.

FINDINGS

- *Training on the politics, culture, history, and geography of Somalia, as well as training on intercultural relations — essential underpinnings for the performance of most operational tasks in peace support operations — was totally inadequate. This failure resulted from: a lack of peacekeeping doctrine outlining the importance of such training; lack of sufficient support from NDHQ in terms of providing specialist resources; and the inadequacy of intelligence on Somalia available to those responsible for preparing the CAR for deployment. What information was available was not properly conveyed to soldiers at the lowest ranks.*
- *CAR staff officers are to be commended for their efforts, in spite of the absence of adequate support and information, to include some cultural training in the CAR's pre-deployment training.*

Negotiation Training

A further aspect of training for the Somalia mission was in negotiation skills. Again, there was no standing doctrine within the Canadian Forces that outlined the requirements for negotiation training for peace support operations in 1992. The UN peacekeeping training guidelines, which discuss the important role that negotiations play in UN missions, were available in 1992.⁴⁰⁹ The guidelines state that mediation and negotiation are basic tools to be used by peacekeepers at all levels of the chain of command. Effective negotiation allows for dispute resolution without resorting to the use of force.⁴¹⁰ The UN guidelines suggest that negotiation training for soldiers adopt a lecture

format covering such areas as tact, diplomacy, and the three Fs of peacekeeping — firm, fair, and friendly. It also recommends that negotiation exercises be incorporated into low-level training exercises.⁴¹¹

Furthermore, BGen Beno's training directive recognized that the basic rules governing peacekeeping operations call for negotiation at the lowest possible level to encourage the minimum use of force. Yet, negotiation training for the CAR was conducted only as part of collective rather than individual training for the Somalia mission.⁴¹²

Testimony before us makes it clear that the only formal training for Operation Cordon on negotiation was a Royal Canadian Mounted Police presentation to the officers,⁴¹³ focusing on the psychology of a hostage taker. The briefing was called "theoretical" by one officer who attended, and successful completion was measured solely on attendance.⁴¹⁴

The briefing was attended by officers only, and it is not clear from the evidence whether the information provided to the officers would be relevant to peacekeeping soldiers or if, in fact, they passed it down to their soldiers. If the briefing did indeed focus on the psychology of a hostage taker, we question its relevance to the requirements for negotiation training recognized in both BGen Beno's directive and the UN training guidelines.

Some scenario-based negotiations were practised during Exercise Stalwart Providence. It is clear from the planning documents prepared by the Royal Canadian Dragoons that negotiation techniques would be practised during roadblock scenarios, distribution sites, and base security operations.⁴¹⁵ Maj Kampman testified that the Royal Canadian Dragoons were becoming frustrated with the CAR soldiers, who consistently failed to identify the hostile elements in the scenarios, a practical prerequisite to initiating negotiations with them.⁴¹⁶ While the type of negotiation training presented in Exercise Stalwart Providence was in line with the suggestions set out in the UN training guidelines, we question whether the CAR soldiers were informed about the techniques of negotiating in a peacekeeping role so that they would be able to practise them in the scenarios that they faced.

FINDING

- *There was some recognition by the Special Service Force and the CAR regarding the importance of negotiation training, as evidenced by BGen Beno's training directive and the inclusion of some scenario-based negotiations during Exercise Stalwart Providence. However, the training on crisis negotiation appears to have been theoretical and not entirely relevant to the extensive negotiation skills required during peace support operations.*

LACK OF STANDARDS TO EVALUATE TRAINING AT TIME OF DEPLOYMENT

At the time of the CAR's deployment to Somalia, many essential elements of training for peace support operations, such as training on culture, rules of engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict had no evaluation standards attached to them. This made it difficult for those in charge of training to determine, in an objective way, whether the level of the CAR's pre-deployment training was adequate. Generally speaking, we have seen the consequences of this lack of standards throughout our treatment of the issue of training.

This lack of objective standards was recognized at the time, and since the Somalia mission, by those who had the responsibility for determining the adequacy of the training and readiness of Canadian Forces personnel for a complex overseas operation.⁴¹⁷ It appears that with the lack of an objective framework, much of the burden of evaluating the appropriateness of the training fell on the Commanding Officer, LCol Morneau, who decried the lack of a generic peacekeeping package to provide guidance during the process of planning and assessing their preparedness for a complex mission such as the one the CAR faced in Somalia.⁴¹⁸

We are aware of the Battle Task Standards, which set out, in general terms, the level of training required for combat tasks. The de Faye board of inquiry stated that the degree to which these applied to the Somalia mission was clearly set out in the Land Force Command contingency plan directive on training. We note that while this document is quite specific as to what types of training are to be performed, it fails to outline the standard, or level, that the training must reach.⁴¹⁹ In addition, the Battle Task Standards that we have seen are for combat-type training, and do not, or did not, exist for mission-specific topics such as Law of War, cultural training or training on the rules of engagement.⁴²⁰

Perhaps the most obvious lack in training standards is evidenced in the training plans. A training plan without minimum standards built into it, along with a prioritized list of activities is, in effect, a training schedule or a list of times and dates and activities. When standards and priorities are built into the training plan, any slippage in deployment dates can be used effectively to bring the training to a higher standard in a methodical manner. These same standards, had they existed, would have been instrumental in assessing whether the CAR training for Operation Cordon was adequate once the mission had changed to Operation Deliverance.

In the case of the Operation Cordon training, the general standards and activities were set by CAR Headquarters, but it was basically left up to the individual commandos as to how they would carry out training.⁴²¹ As

the commandos were training, much of the evaluation was conducted by the platoon commanders and the OCs of the commandos.⁴²² This allowed for a variety of divergent opinions on the state of training among those responsible for, and those observing, the training.

A clear example of this can be seen in the events surrounding the replacement of the Commanding Officer, LCol Morneault. While the details of this issue have been discussed elsewhere,⁴²³ it might be useful to note here that one of the main factors cited in contributing to LCol Morneault's replacement was a perceived failure in the area of training. A few short weeks after LCol Morneault was relieved of command, LCol Mathieu declared the unit operationally ready. Maj Seward testified that the type of training on which LCol Mathieu based his declaration was not "significant" and was of a "filler nature": "I don't think it was the type of training on which you should base such assessments."⁴²⁴ Had there been a system in place to measure the standard of the training, it would have been unlikely to have two such divergent opinions on the status of training in the Regiment within such a short period of time.

The lack of training standards also meant that there was no systematic means to identify and correct training shortcomings. We have seen that both during and after Exercise Stalwart Providence, the Royal Canadian Dragoons expressed a number of concerns about the state of the CAR's readiness. As mentioned earlier, there was concern over the aggressiveness of the CAR and its ability to apply the ROE and control the escalation of force, and how the soldiers would deal with camp security and unarmed civilians. In particular, concern was expressed about the CAR's ability to work in a mounted role.⁴²⁵

We would have expected the training shortcomings to have been reflected in the training plan for the months of November and December, and we consider that adequate standards against which to identify those shortcomings would have made the remedial training more probable.⁴²⁶

FINDINGS

- *Land Force Command (LFC) had clear standards for training related to collective battle tasks, as well as to physical fitness and marksmanship. However, neither NDHQ nor LFC had established clear standards for training for non-combat skills relevant to peace support operations (e.g., familiarity with UN operations, negotiation training, cultural training, the Law of Armed Conflict, use of force). This left the CAR with insufficient direction respecting the level to which training was to be conducted in relation to specific skills. As a consequence, the training plans for the CAR lacked specific standards and evaluation criteria for many of the training activities.*

- *The lack of specific evaluation criteria meant that there was no overall framework for the evaluation of training and, therefore, no objective criteria against which to measure the adequacy of training and identify remedial training needs.*

IN-THEATRE TRAINING

Had there been a systematic approach for assessment in place, additional training needs could have been determined for refresher training, remedial training, and training for the change in missions and tasks, and an in-theatre training plan could have been developed based on these judgements.

We were surprised by the apparent lack of an in-theatre training plan. While there were several pre-deployment documents that gave us the impression that the general possibility of training in theatre was being considered, we heard no evidence which indicated that a systematic or comprehensive in-theatre training plan was developed or implemented.⁴²⁷ BGen Beno had had the impression during Operation Cordon preparations that there would be a one-month acclimatization period in theatre.⁴²⁸ It appears that, in actual fact, operations began within 24 hours of the CAR's arrival in Belet Huen without any training on location. We believe that the existence of an in-theatre training plan, including aims, objectives, scope, tasks and standards, would have made effective training during slack periods of operations more likely. We are also of the view that on-the-job training, while practical and appropriate in some areas, is not a valid substitute for training on essential peace-keeping skills such as understanding the rules of engagement, familiarization with standing operating procedures, and negotiation techniques.

There was a crucial need for training on the ROE in theatre. Considering the change in mission and late receipt of the ROE, there should have been a plan in place to ensure full comprehension of the ROE by all members of the deployed unit.

Training on the SOPs is another area that should have made up part of the in-theatre training plan. We have seen that for a variety of reasons, various SOPs were not developed before the CARBG's arrival in theatre. In the case of the SOPs on the handling of detainees, it was decided to wait and see what the situation in their particular area was and develop the SOPs then.

We heard testimony stating that the SOP on the treatment of detainees was changed at the very beginning of the mission.⁴²⁹ We are not aware of any training, outside of the instructions provided in orders groups, that incorporated this new SOP. We would have liked there to have been scenario-based training that ensured that everyone was aware of the new procedure, and which could have served as an opportunity to refresh the soldiers' knowledge of their obligations toward detainees under the Geneva Conventions.

Several witnesses testified that the training done in theatre was mostly hands-on, or on-the-job training.⁴³⁰ The primary area where training was carried out in theatre was weapons and range training. Several witnesses recalled a range being set up and some in-theatre target practices being conducted. There was also training on the use of cayenne pepper spray, refresher training in combat drills, driver training, and desert survival skills.⁴³¹ MCpl Favasoli does not recall any training on the ROE, treatment of detainees, crowd control, picket duty or patrolling, although he does remember doing weapons refresher training in theatre.⁴³²

Considering the clear identification of remedial training needs in the pre-deployment phase, we are dismayed by the lack of a comprehensive in-theatre training plan to address these needs systematically. In particular, training, as opposed to instructions or orders, was needed on the ROE, on the new SOPs implemented in theatre, and on local customs, traditions, politics, and security.

FINDING

- *There was no plan developed for in-theatre training, notwithstanding the numerous shortcomings during pre-deployment preparations — most notably on the ROE — which had been, or should have been, identified. There was a failure to provide training — as opposed to instructions or orders — in theatre on the ROE, on new SOPs, and on local customs, traditions, politics, and security. Insufficient measures were taken to ensure an understanding on the part of soldiers of the meaning and importance of issues related to the Law of Armed Conflict, cultural differences, and use of force. This amounts to an inexcusable failure of leadership.*

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CF PEACEKEEPING TRAINING

In making recommendations on training, we are mindful of the developments that have occurred in the Canadian Forces since the incidents in Somalia in March 1993,⁴³³ some of which have no doubt been a direct result of the attention that these have received from this Commission of Inquiry. For example, we are pleased that NDHQ has published formal guidelines on training and doctrine responsibilities, authorities and procedures for peace support operation deployments. The publication of documents on selection

and training issues for formed and composite units and individuals is a positive development, especially since the more systematic approach has resulted in the publication of preliminary training standards.

We are also encouraged by the establishment of the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario, and the Lessons Learned Centres and we consider that they should help to satisfy the need for co-ordination of training, the production of training material, and the updating of training content and standards in a more systematic manner than has been true in the past. The utilization of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre for officer educational purposes is also an improvement. However, we would like to see a similar approach taken for senior non-commissioned members, who play a crucial role in peace support operations, have a great deal of influence on junior members, and therefore require a broadening of perspective through education and discussion on peace support operations issues. Here we envision training in the peacekeeping partnership, humanitarian law, human resources support, and understanding the role of the peacekeeper as important.

We hope the reviews of the various individual training agencies will lead to concrete steps to better integrate individual and collective training efforts for peace support operations training, and we certainly endorse the specific attention being given to the Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement, and the increased emphasis on humanitarian and legal aspects of operations.

While we endorse all the improvements noted, it is not clear how they are going to be monitored. For example, a DCDS directive issued in December 1996, which sets out pre-deployment training requirements for peace support operations and is accompanied by preliminary training standards, does not provide any formal mechanisms for evaluating standards of training to prevent expediency rather than scrutiny becoming the norm — particularly when there is a requirement for rapid deployment. Since training of peacekeepers is still decentralized for units, we would like to see a much more stringent monitoring and evaluation approach developed and implemented under the aegis of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Despite recognition of the above directions, we still offer the following recommendations which emerged from our detailed examination of training issues, in the hope that they will contribute to a more effective training system for peace support operations in the Canadian Forces.

CONCLUSION

Our overall conclusion is that professional soldiers wearing the flag of Canada on their uniforms were sent to Somalia not properly prepared for the mission. They were not prepared, in good part, because of key deficiencies in their training. The mission called for troops who were well led, highly disciplined, and able to respond flexibly to a range of tasks which demanded patience, understanding and sensitivity to the plight of the Somali people. Instead they arrived in the desert trained and mentally conditioned to fight. The sad events which came to characterize the mission must not be allowed to happen again.

Canadians have every right to expect that despite challenging and difficult circumstances, the men and women of our armed forces, at all times, conduct themselves professionally, humanely and honourably. In fairness, however, we must not place this duty upon them without first ensuring that every effort has been made to prepare our service personnel — physically, psychologically and operationally — for the multitude of roles we ask them to assume.

We must equip our armed forces personnel not only with requisite technical skills and equipment, but also with the attitudes, character, psychological strengths, and ethical grounding to help them maintain their professionalism, humanity, and honour under the pressures of fear, discomfort, anger, boredom, horror, and uncertainty. That thousands of Canadian peacekeepers have served us well under these conditions is proof that it is possible to provide individuals with such diverse strengths. That there were some who did not withstand the pressures and committed improprieties ranging from public displays of poor taste to unspeakable atrocities is proof that greater efforts must yet be made.

In seeking remedy for the future, we urge the Canadian Forces to acknowledge the central role which training must play in mounting peace support operations.

Recommendations

We recommend that:

- 21.1 The Canadian Forces training philosophy be recast to recognize that a core of non-traditional military training designed specifically for peace support operations (and referred to as generic peace-keeping training) must be provided along with general purpose combat training to prepare Canadian Forces personnel adequately for all operational missions and tasks.**

- 21.2 Generic peacekeeping training become an integral part of all Canadian Forces training at both the individual (basic, occupational and leadership) and collective levels, with appropriate allocations of resources in terms of funding, people, and time.
- 21.3 The Chief of the Defence Staff order a study to determine how best to integrate the full range of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values required for peace support operations at all stages of individual and collective training for both officers and non-commissioned members.
- 21.4 The Canadian Forces recognize, in doctrine and practice, that peace support operations require mental preparation and conditioning that differ from what is required for conventional warfare, and that the training of Canadian Forces members must provide for the early and continuous development of the values, attitudes and orientation necessary to perform all operational missions, including peace support operations.
- 21.5 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the development of comprehensive training policies and programs for peace support operations makes greater use of a broad range of sources, including peacekeeping training guidelines and policies developed by the UN and member states, and the training provided by police forces and international aid organizations.
- 21.6 The Chief of the Defence Staff order that the mandates of all Canadian Forces institutions and programs involved in education and training be reviewed with a view to enhancing and formalizing peace support operations training objectives.
- 21.7 Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions:
 - (a) continuing development of doctrine respecting the planning, organization, conduct and evaluation of peace support operations training;

- (b) development of comprehensive and detailed training standards and standardized training packages for all components of peace support operations training;
- (c) timely distribution of current doctrine and training materials to all personnel tasked with planning and implementing peace support operations training, and to all units warned for peace support operations duty;
- (d) timely development and distribution of mission-specific information and materials for use in pre-deployment training;
- (e) systematic compilation and analysis of lessons learned, and updating of doctrine and training materials in that light;
- (f) systematic monitoring and evaluation of training to ensure that it is conducted in accordance with established doctrine and standards; and
- (g) provision of specialist assistance as required by units in their pre-deployment preparations.

21.8 The Chief of the Defence Staff oversee the development of specialist expertise within the Canadian Forces in training in the Law of Armed Conflict and the rules of engagement, and in intercultural and intergroup relations, negotiation and conflict resolution; and ensure continuing training in these skills for all members of the Canadian Forces.

21.9 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the time and resources necessary for training a unit to a state of operational readiness be assessed before committing that unit's participation in a peace support operation.

21.10 The Chief of the Defence Staff integrate a minimum standard period of time for pre-deployment training into the planning process. In exceptional cases, where it may be necessary to deploy with a training period shorter than the standard minimum, the senior officers responsible should prepare a risk analysis for approval by the Chief of the Defence Staff. In addition, a plan should be developed to compensate for the foreshortened training period, such as making provision for the enhanced supervision of pre-deployment training activities, a lengthened acclimatization period, and supplementary in-theatre training.

- 21.11 The Chief of the Defence Staff confirm in doctrine and policy the recognition of sufficient and appropriate training as a key aspect of operational readiness.
- 21.12 Contrary to experience with the Somalia deployment, where general purpose combat training was emphasized, the Chief of the Defence Staff confirm in doctrine and policy that the pre-deployment period, from warning order to deployment, should be devoted primarily to mission-specific training.
- 21.13 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that to facilitate pre-deployment training focused on mission-specific requirements, units preparing for peace support operations be provided, on a timely basis, with:
 - (a) a clearly defined mission and statement of tasks;
 - (b) up-to-date and accurate intelligence as a basis for forecasting the conditions likely to be encountered in theatre;
 - (c) mission-specific rules of engagement and standing operating procedures; and
 - (d) a sufficient quantity of vehicles and equipment, in operational condition, to meet training needs.
- 21.14 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish mechanisms to ensure that all members of units preparing for deployment on peace support operations receive sufficient and appropriate training on the local culture, history, and politics of the theatre of operations, together with refresher training on negotiation and conflict resolution and the Law of Armed Conflict, as well as basic language training if necessary.
- 21.15 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that no unit be declared operationally ready unless all its members have received sufficient and appropriate training on mission-specific rules of engagement and steps have been taken to establish that the rules of engagement are fully understood.

- 21.16** The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that training standards and programs provide that training in the Law of Armed Conflict, rules of engagement, cross-cultural relations, and negotiation and conflict resolution be scenario-based and integrated into training exercises, in addition to classroom instruction or briefings, to permit the practice of skills and to provide a mechanism for confirming that instructions have been fully understood.
- 21.17** The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine and policy that an in-theatre training plan be developed for any unit deploying on a peace support operation. The plan should provide for ongoing refresher training and remedial training in areas where deficiencies were noted before deployment and be modified as required to meet changing or unexpected conditions in theatre.
- 21.18** Canadian Forces doctrine recognize the personal supervision of training by all commanders, including the most senior, as an irreducible responsibility and an essential expression of good leadership. Canadian Forces doctrine should also recognize that training provides the best opportunity, short of operations, for commanders to assess the attitude of troops and gauge the readiness of a unit and affords a unique occasion for commanders to impress upon their troops, through their presence, the standards expected of them, as well as their own commitment to the mission on which the troops are about to be sent.
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NOTES

1. Terms of Reference, P.C. 1995-442, March 20, 1995.
2. This point is generally conceded, but see Franklin Pinch, "Lessons from Canadian Peacekeeping Experience: A Human Resources Perspective" (Gloucester, Ontario: FCP Human Resources Consulting, 1994), pp. 22-27; and Kenneth Eyre, "The Need for Standardized Peacekeeping Education and Training", in Alex Morrison, ed., *The Changing Face of Peacekeeping* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 157-159.
3. Gen A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, "Wing-Walking Revisited: Canadian Defence Policy After the Cold War", *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 6 (June 1992), p. 7.
4. FMC 3450-1 (COS Ops) 16 May 1989, "Peacekeeping" (hereafter, the Lalonde study).

5. See, for example, *FMC Commander's Training Guidance for the Period 1993-1998*, written in 1991: "the fundamental direction and basis of training in the Army remains unchanged, that is, the Army must train for operations in war." (4980-0057 (Comd), 15 July 1991), p. 1/18.
6. *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (June 1987).
7. See also *Statement on Defence Policy* (September 1991) and the 1994 *White Paper on Defence*, both of which endorse general purpose military and combat training as the foundation for multilateral operations.
8. See Pinch, "Lessons from Canadian Peacekeeping Experience", pp. 25-27, for distinctions between classical (or stable) and high-intensity (or unstable) peacekeeping operations.
9. For examples of the peacekeeping tasks undertaken on UN missions, see, for example, P. LaRose-Edwards, J. Dangerfield and R. Weekes, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers*, study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), pp. 3-4; and Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, *Security in a Changing World* (1994), Appendix G.
10. David Rudd, "Editorial Forum", *The Ottawa Citizen*, February 12, 1995, p. A9.
11. See, for example, "UN Training Guidelines for National or Regional Training Programmes" (91-02208); Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, "Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations", December 29, 1993 (4500-1), Document book 56F, tab 7, Appendix 2 to Annex A; Common Security Consultants, "A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre At CFB Cornwallis" (January 1994), Annexes F to J; DND, *Operations, Land and Tactical Air*, vol. 3, Peacekeeping Operations (September 15, 1995, B-GL-301-003/FP-001), pp. 11-3-1 to 11-6-3, which is concerned with peacekeeping operations conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter; and Headquarters, Department of the [U.S.] Army, "Peace Operations" (December 1994, FM100-23), p. 87, which has separate lists for peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
12. Even the subjects listed under GPCT or generic peacekeeping training may have a component that must be tailored to a specific mission. For example, although mine awareness is taught generally as part of GPCT, additional training respecting theatre-specific mines and booby traps must be part of mission-specific training for a particular operation.
13. Peter Langille ("Consolidating Canadian Forces' Peacekeeping Training Efforts", submission to the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, August 2, 1994) reports that troops were deployed to Rwanda on little more than a week's notice.
14. Similar themes were expressed in studies external to the Canadian Forces. See, for example, Langille, "Consolidating Canadian Forces' Peacekeeping Training Efforts", pp. 6-13. The author criticizes the CF's peacekeeping training system as ad hoc and poorly managed; based on outdated attitudes that permit training to remain a low priority and place undue reliance on general purpose combat capabilities; and decentralized and mission-specific.
15. FMC 3450-1 (COS Ops) 16 May 1989, "Peacekeeping".
16. "DCDS Appreciation of the Situation: CF Peacekeeping Resources and Commitments", September 19, 1989 (the Rowbottom study).

17. Peacekeeping Operations — Review, Interim Report — SPA/DCDS, 1850-1/90 (SPA/DCDS), December 21, 1990 (the Douglas report). Although some of the concerns raised in the report related to UN Military Observers, the findings have broader implications (pp. 12, 14–15).
18. The J Staff was established on a temporary basis in 1990 to overcome matrix management co-ordination problems and is still in effect.
19. The major outcome of the Douglas report was the development of a training plan and a recommendation to hold a seven-day pilot course for officers who would be serving as UN military observers/staff officers and multi-national force observers in May 1991. Part of the rationale for the course was to develop the proper attitudes among those carrying out UN peacekeeping duties and to develop loyalty and cohesion among CF officers (see Memorandum 4500-1 (DPKO), February 1991).
20. Preliminary Report, Military Review of Canadian Forces Peacekeeping Operations (MR1/90), February 13, 1991, pp. 33, 39, 193. The same findings are presented in Military Review 1/90 Peacekeeping Operations Interim Final Report, August 27, 1991, and Military Review 1/90 Peacekeeping Operations Final Report, April 15, 1992 (pp. 32, 39 and 202).
21. Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90: *Peacekeeping* (June 1992), pp. xvi, xvii, 192, 199, 252, 253, 255.
22. Training Guidelines for National or Regional Training Programmes (91-02208).
23. "Peacekeeping Training", staff paper, July 8, 1991 (4500-1 [DPKO 4], Document book 118, tab 2), pp. 2–8; and Document book 118, tabs 2A to 2E.
24. See P. Langille and E. Simpson, *CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre, Annapolis Royal, N.S.* (Common Security Consultants, 1991); and P. Langille and E. Simpson, *A Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence, Annapolis Royal, N.S.* (Common Security Consultants and Stratmon Consulting, Inc.).
25. *Training for Peacekeeping*, December 15, 1991 (3451-9 [DI Pol]), Document book 118, tab 3.
26. See memorandum, DI Pol to DM and CDS, "CFB Cornwallis Peacekeeping Centre, over Comments on the Report prepared in March 1992 for the Province of Nova Scotia by Common Security Consultants and Stratman Consulting Inc., September, 1992", January 13, 1993 (3450-1 [DI Pol]), pp. 4/11–7/11.
27. With criticism mounting, however, in December 1992, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff wrote, in a memorandum entitled "Training for Peacekeepers", "There have been...recorded examples of deficiencies in our preparations to suggest that, at the very least, peacekeeping training should be formalized and the responsibilities be carefully delineated. The requirement to formalize our peacekeeping force preparations may extend to our NDHQ procedures."
28. One source of external pressure was the Senate. See, for example, Report of the [Senate] Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping* (1993).
29. "Training for Peacekeeping", March 25, 1993, unclassified NDHQ J3PK 155, DND 312245.
30. See LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield and Weekes, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers*, pp. 18–19.
31. "Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations", December 29, 1993 (4500-1 [DCDS]), Document book 56F, tabs 7 and 7F, p. A-4. This ambitious document dealt with the preparation of individuals and of formed and composite units and laid out specific training requirements for each of these categories.

32. LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield and Weekes, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers*, pp. 19–21.
33. See Volume 1, Chapter 8, on the Canadian Forces personnel system for a description of the systematic model (CFITS) for developing a training program.
34. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3412–3413, and vol. 20, p. 3592.
35. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 622; and CWO Cooke, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4873–4877.
36. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6952–6953; and MGen C.W. Hewson, “Report on Disciplinary Infractions and Anti-Social Behaviour within Force Mobile Command with Particular Reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Ottawa: September 1985), Document book 1, tab 1, p. 20/55 (hereafter, the Hewson report). One witness before us described the Airborne Indoctrination Course as having consisted of getting up at 4:30 a.m. and going to bed at 10:30 p.m., being driven until the soldiers couldn’t move anymore (testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6953). Another CAR member familiar with the AIC stated that “it was probably worse than being in prison the way the soldiers were treated” (evidence of CWO Raymond to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. IV, p. 1001).
37. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 620–622.
38. Hewson report, p. 20/55.
39. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6952–6953.
40. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2287–2288.
41. Board of Inquiry, Change of Command, Canadian Airborne Regiment, June 12, 1992, Document book 123, tab 6, Annex C (hereafter, Board of Inquiry (Change of Command)).
42. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 39, p. 7624.
43. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2287–2288.
44. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 653.
45. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 39, p. 7625.
46. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 589. Col Houghton testified that as a result of the cancellation of the exercises, the Regiment “fell down a little” in the area of regimental training, but he did not believe that regimental cohesion had been seriously affected (Transcripts vol. 12, p. 2269).
47. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 603, 759. Col Holmes testified that it was also frustrating for the CAR’s members to sit by their television sets and watch the Gulf War unfold, wondering if they might be called to deploy (Transcripts vol. 4, p. 604).
48. Board of Inquiry (Change of Command), Annex C.
49. The precise nature of the CAR’s roles and tasks was under review in the early 1990s and is discussed more fully in Chapter 19 in this volume. See also “Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment”, November 4, 1992, Document book 29, tab 19.
50. NDHQ Instruction DCDS 3/85, Operational Responsibilities, Peacekeeping (PK) Standby Units, 3451-4 (DCDS), February 15, 1985, Document book 123, tab 1; Testimony of Gen de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9899–9900; and Col (ret) Joly, Transcripts vol. 16, p. 2999.

51. NDHQ Instruction DCDS 3/85, Operational Responsibilities, Peacekeeping (PK) Standby Units, p. 3. In response to our request to SILT for these directives, we were advised that "[a]fter substantive research, SILT cannot locate this document(s) nor verify that it ever existed" (letter, March 10, 1997).
52. "Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment", p. 6/12.
53. "Concept of Employment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment", p. 11/12; and Chief of the Defence Staff Force Development Guidance, Document book 86, tab 2. There was an apparent lack of precision about the nature of the standby tasking. For example, we were advised that a high state of readiness for rapid deployment did not apply to regular peacekeeping missions, such as Cyprus or Cambodia. For such missions, weeks or months of preparation are necessary: it is "not a 48- to 96-hour kind of business" (testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, p. 486). See also testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 28, p. 5308.
54. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3592.
55. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 39, p. 7622.
56. Regimental Training Guidance to Commanders, September 25, 1990, Document book 123, tab 2.
57. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 688; and MGen (ret) Hewson, Transcripts vol. 2, p. 341.
58. Evidence of Maj Magee to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. IV, p. 1070. Most NCMs, however, had served for at least one year in a mechanized infantry battalion before joining the CAR (evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 243).
59. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 248.
60. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6899.
61. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3412; and evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 243.
62. Evidence of Maj Magee to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, p. 1069. Maj Magee went on to clarify that by "aggressive", he meant such things as being highly motivated and outgoing, looking for a challenge, and wanting to take on leadership roles (p. 1087). Many others have described members of the CAR as "aggressive" in a positive sense. See, for example, MGen (ret) Hewson (Transcripts vol. 2, p. 342) discussing his 1985 report on disciplinary problems: "We found that the Canadian Airborne Regiment succeeded marvellously in producing an enthusiastic, fit and aggressive young soldier, *but these same characteristics needed to be tempered and, perhaps, channelled in the right direction by responsible junior leaders*" (emphasis added). See also testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 664.
63. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5746.
64. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 249.
65. BGen Beno, "The Way Ahead — Canadian Airborne Regiment Command, Control, Manning and Internal Operations", service paper, May 4, 1993, Document book 32, tab 5), p. 7/14, DND 000582; and testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9901. 1 Commando specialized in jungle terrain, 2 Commando specialized in operating in the desert, and 3 Commando specialized in mountain operations (testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 723).
66. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7072. See also testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9901.

67. SILT was unable to provide the CAR's annual training plans for several of the years preceding the deployment to Somalia. Partial records for exercises conducted by the CAR in the course of its annual training during the late 1980s and early 1990s revealed no UN-oriented exercises. As noted in Volume 3, the CAR did not even have standing operating procedures for UN operations, despite its status as Canada's UN standby unit.
68. "FMC OP O 01 — Op Python CCMINURSO", July 29, 1991, 3250-9 (Comd), Document book 123, tab 4.
69. Document book MOR2, tab 8.
70. Document book 123, tab 3. It would appear that BGen Crabbe was referring to the "Minimum Trg Reqr" (DND 119751), which specified vehicle training, signals training, weapons refresher, mine awareness, first aid refresher, environmental training and intelligence briefing. The FMC Planning Directive was "to be used by the planning staff of LFCA HQ and the tasked unit for Op Python" (DND 119587).
71. Document book MOR2, tab 9.
72. Document book MOR2, tab 10.
73. Document book MOR2, tab 10, Annex B, pp. 2/2 (DND 293218-293219).
74. Document book MOR2, tab 11. LCol Morneault testified that, in the context of preparing for Operation Cordon, BGen Beno told him that the Operation Python training plan would be a good model to follow (Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7066).
75. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 745-746.
76. Evidence of LCol Morneault to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, p. 1405.
77. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 825.
78. "After Action Report for Op Python", March 24, 1992, Document book 123, tab 5 (DND 386920).
79. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 651. CAR's tasking for Operation Python was cancelled in February 1992 (Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibit 104, p. 3).
80. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 604.
81. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6833. See also Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2384.
82. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6833 (translation). Cpl Purnelle also testified that this attitude changed quickly when the Regiment was warned for Operation Cordon — morale rebounded, at least during the initial training period.
83. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9607; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4104-4106.
84. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2316.
85. Estimates vary, but it would appear that about one third of the Regiment's members were new. See, for example, testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3780; Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2288; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5688; and MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4338.
86. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 667.
87. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 651.
88. Memorandum from SSF, February 7, 1992, Document book 7, tab 19.
89. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, p. 655.
90. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 241. Col Holmes testified that the CAR performed extremely well in the training exercise at Camp Lejeune and also performed well at the regimental exercise run by brigade headquarters (Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 746-747).

91. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 742–743. See also testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6896. Normally, these trade qualification courses within a unit are run on a yearly basis.
 92. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 748, 789.
 93. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 788–789.
 94. Testimony of Col Holmes, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 738–739.
 95. See Warning Order, Document book 28, tab 12.
 96. See Warning Order to LFCA HQ, Document book 28, tab 13.
 97. See Warning Order to SSF HQ, Document book 10, tab 24 (DND 000138), in which SSF was tasked to “assemble, prep, train and declare op ready the 750 pers. contingent.”
 98. See Warning Order to the CAR from SSF, Document book 10, tab 23 (DND 000142), tasking the CAR to “assemble, prep and train the 750 pers. Inf Bn Gp for Op Cordon.”
 99. LFCA WNG O 1, Document book 10, tab 24,
 100. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7053. BGen Beno was appointed Brigade Commander on August 7, 1992. On August 13th, he spoke with his COs and emphasized that he considered training to be their highest priority (testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7711–7712, 7724).
 101. Testimony of MGen MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8573–8574.
 102. Testimony of MGen MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8574; and Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2395.
 103. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7017.
 104. Exhibit P-87.1, Document book MOR2, tab 14; and testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7040. His notes in the estimate contemplated three to four weeks of commando-level collective training that might include a Regimental Command Post Exercise and Field Training Exercise (with refugees, hungry persons, belligerents, etc.) and one week of individual training. His notes also make reference to “little intelligence available”.
 105. Document book MOR2, tab 17; and testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7116. The notes outlined a training concept allowing for administrative preparations and briefings, three weeks of commando training to be followed by a commando field training exercise, regimental individual refresher training, and specialist equipment training. At the time, LCol Morneault was under the impression that he would have six to nine weeks to prepare his troops for deployment (Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7058, vol. 37, pp. 7286–7294, and vol. 37, pp. 7547–7548; and Document book MOR 2, tab 15).
- After receiving the warning order on September 5th requiring that the unit be prepared to deploy in 30 days, LCol Morneault revised this training concept to accommodate the new time frames. This included dropping the plan for a commando-level exercise. Within a day or two, however, it became clear that more time would be available, so LCol Morneault and BGen Beno planned a regimental exercise — Stalwart Providence — to follow the initial four weeks of training (testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7549–7554).
106. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7060–7061.
 107. Document book 28, tab 3.
 108. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7040–7045. See Document book 9, tab 15, regarding Operation Python.

109. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7043–7044. He also stated that “we did not have a generic package for the Army that we could say when we tasked the unit to do something, here’s a generic package as a guide and now get on with the specifics” (Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7120).
110. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2290.
111. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2291.
112. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2294.
113. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2292.
114. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2292–2293.
115. We note the absence of a reference by the witnesses to the 1991 UN Training Guidelines that were distributed to NDHQ/DPKO in February 1991. In its policy briefings to the Inquiry in June 1995, the CF indicated that “This reference document has been widely distributed to all prospective troop contributing nations, including Canada, and is employed as a basic document to assist in the preparation and training of potential peacekeepers” (“Brief for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia: Identification of National Contingents for United Nations Peace Support Operations”, p. 5). It would appear that the CAR obtained a copy of a version of the UN Guidelines only when LCol Morneau visited UN Headquarters in late September 1992. See evidence of LCol Turner to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 225.
116. Document book 13, tab 5; and testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2397.
117. During Capt Walsh’s testimony, this calendar was referenced as p. 2A in Document book 13A. It appears also as the final page in Document book 13, tab 5.
118. Document book 10, tab 24.
119. Document book 10, tab 23.
120. BGen Beno testified that in his professional opinion, those time lines were quite adequate for the CAR to prepare for deployment, particularly in light of the CAR’s status as Canada’s UN standby unit (Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7762–7763).
121. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3672.
122. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8214.
123. Letter, SSF to CAR, with enclosures, Document book 10, tab 28; LFC Draft Contingency Plan, Document book 12, tab 16, with covering letter, Document book 12, tab 15.
124. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3404.
125. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3617. See also testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3694.
126. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3427, and vol. 20, pp. 3617–3618, 3711–3714. LCol Morneau may have received a copy of Annex D unofficially before September 8th; he received parts of the draft LFC contingency plan “in dribs and drabs” (Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7554, 7560).
127. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3431–32, and vol. 20, pp. 3673, 3713–3714.
128. It was noted in the time chart for the training concept that the entire training period was dependent upon the existing level of training and could be adjusted.
129. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2302.

130. There is a notable absence of reference to the standards that are to be achieved, with the exception of company-level collective training (which was to conform to FMC Battle Task Standards) and personal weapons training (Stage 3 Shoot to Live). Also missing are topics such as training in the Law of Armed Conflict and negotiation, essential elements of pre-deployment preparation. These omissions, however, reflect the systemic failure to provide doctrine, directives, and standards in relation to training for peacekeeping missions.
131. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2297; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3784, 3801.
132. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3736–3738.
133. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3782.
134. See, for example, testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2305. Problems related to the availability of vehicles are reviewed in more detail later in this chapter.
135. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7282; and LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3447.
136. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, pp. 7288–2792; and LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3556, and vol. 18, p. 3428. The link between the possible deployment dates and the UN ship that would be carrying equipment and vehicles is significant because it was known 30 days were required from the time the ship was ordered by the UN until it was loaded and departed from Montreal. The original LFC Contingency Plan called for the ship to depart at W+31. For every day that passed without the ship being ordered, it was clear that the deployment date for the troops had slipped by a day, as the main body of troops was to arrive in Somalia at the same time as the ship (testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7557–7560; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8207).
137. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3621; and Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2423–2424.
138. Evidence of Maj Turner to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 222; testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8208, concurs.
139. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7559–7560. LCol Morneault testified that he believed that at a briefing given by personnel from LFCA on September 7th, it was made clear orally that a minimum of 60 days from the order was the time line the CAR could consider, although he did not recall whether he was ever told officially by SSF that this time line was firm (Transcripts vol. 39, p. 7561).
140. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7737.
141. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2465; Document book 12, tab 2.
142. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3791; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7065–7066. LCol Morneault does recall that he was told the initial handwritten plan wasn't good enough to forward to higher headquarters, but Capt Walsh then produced the complete training plan on computer, believing it conformed with what SSF HQ wanted (testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7065). This corresponds with LCol Turner's testimony that concerns about the training calendar were relayed to either Maj Kyle or Capt Walsh, and that in the second week of September, a more formalized and detailed plan was submitted (Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3722–3723).
143. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3619–3620.
144. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3726.
145. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, pp. 3435–3438, and vol. 20, pp. 3619–3620.

146. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7065, and vol. 38, p. 7345. This evidence was contradicted by BGen Beno, who testified (and supplemented his testimony with a written summary of events) that in a telephone conversation with LCol Morneau on September 15th, he gave LCol Morneau very explicit direction on what he wanted included in the Regimental Training Plan, including details regarding training objectives, assumptions, principles, and standards. He did so because he was concerned that LCol Morneau had not focused on what kind of training was required and how he was going to do it (testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7752–7753; and Document book 25, tab 12, serial 7, p. 2/9).
147. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7062–7066, and vol. 37, pp. 7311–7312.
148. Document book MOR2, tab 11.
149. Document book MOR2, tab 9. LCol Morneau did convey the concepts from this directive orally at an orders group for Operation Cordon (testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7063).
150. Document book MOR2, tab 10.
151. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37530; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5759, and vol. 32, p. 6165; and Maj Magee, Transcripts vol. 183, p. 37590. Testifying before the Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Maj Pommet indicated that the direction he received from LCol Morneau was broad, but he viewed this in a positive sense: he was given the task and necessary resources and permitted to get on with the job (evidence to the Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. III, pp. 757–758). See also the testimony of Maj MacKay, who told us that LCol Morneau did provide training guidance to his OCs during orders groups, although he could not recall whether the aim, scope, and objectives of training had been formally articulated “using those terminologies” (Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6484–6485). Although Maj Seward was satisfied with the direction he received, he was not entirely satisfied with the written training plan: it did not explain the level to which general purpose combat training had to be conducted; it did not re-emphasize the individual commando priorities in terms of probable in-theatre tasks; and it did not provide sufficient details about Exercise Stalwart Providence (Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5760–5762).
152. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6923; Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4073; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, p. 6165.
153. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2344. Capt Walsh also testified that he personally received clear direction from LCol Morneau on the development of the training plan (Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2299, 2454).
154. Testimony of Maj Magee, Transcripts vol. 183, pp. 37595–37598; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3804–3807. We note that in the absence of a prioritized list of activities in the training plan produced by regimental headquarters, the detailed sub-unit training plans, approved by the CO, would, in effect, reflect the priorities assigned to various tasks.
155. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7062. Contrast this with opinions expressed by other witnesses: testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3855–3857; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, pp. 8167–8169; Document book 25, tab 12, serials 3 and 6 (compare with testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7343–7344).

156. See, for example, evidence of LCol Morneault to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1409, where he discusses in detail an orders group conducted on September 7, 1992, during which he provided direction on training to be conducted and directed that emphasis be placed on observation posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, searches, patrolling, security and control at distribution centres, and security at bivouacs. See also the plans prepared by LCol Morneault in mid-September for a regimental exercise focusing on mission-specific tasks and emphasizing strongly the need for members of the Regiment to be given an opportunity to practise the use of force procedures and negotiation techniques (Document book MOR2, tab 16; and testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7125).
157. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2449–2450.
158. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3725; see Document book 28, tab 31.
159. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7360–7363, 7502.
160. Document book 13, tab 20. The document was drafted by Maj Turner, then reviewed, revised and issued by BGen Beno (testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3738).
161. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7773.
162. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3439.
163. Capt Walsh testified that these principles were expressed by both LCol Morneault and LCol Mathieu (Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2353–2354).
164. Document book 13, tab 20, pp. 1–2. The goal of not discharging a weapon during the mission if possible was also articulated by LCol Morneault during the planning and mounting process for Operation Cordon (testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2354).
165. The date on the document is not clear, but testimony indicates it is October 13, 1992 (testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7778).
166. Document book 13, tab 20, p. 6.
167. See, for example, Document book 25, tab 12.
168. For example, they discussed training on September 7th, at which time BGen Beno indicated that what he wanted were well trained companies and that “how [LCol Morneault] got them well trained [was] entirely in the realm of the commanding officer” (Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7735). They discussed the progress of training on September 12th (testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7744) and had further discussions regarding training on September 15th and 16th (testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7752–7753; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7344–7346, 7360–7363, 7502).
169. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, p. 7364.
170. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7052. LCol Morneault showed this document to Capt Walsh during the last week of September or first week of October, by which time, of course, the September training plan had already been completed (testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2300).
171. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7337, 7365. Although he acknowledged that there was nothing in BGen Beno’s letter criticizing the training to date or suggesting remedial measures, LCol Turner stated that if he had been a commanding officer receiving such a letter at W+18, he would have interpreted it as a lack of confidence on the brigade commander’s part in his ability to prepare for the mission (Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3674, 3743–3744).

172. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 39, p. 7662, and vol. 36, p. 7052. Maj Kyle also saw the written guidance as unusual only in terms of its late timing and speculated that it might have been intended to formalize previous discussions (Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3827–3829). “If [BGen Beno] was that concerned this probably should have been kicked in in the first day or two of the operation” (Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3828).
173. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7368–7369.
174. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2399.
175. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2300–2301, 2353–2354. See also testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3817. If LCol Morneault did not tell his staff directly about the letter, it could be because it was marked “confidential” (testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7118).
176. Document book 14, tab 5.
177. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2452.
178. Document book MOR3, tab 9. The planning for training during November, however, had been completed under LCol Morneault’s direction before he was relieved of command (testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2492).
179. Document book 13A, pp. 5–6.
180. Document book 13A, p. 7.
181. Document book 10, tab 28. Annex D does list “[local] customs”, which does not appear explicitly in the description of the operations briefing in the training plan.
182. Document book 13, tab 20. With respect to rules of engagement, BGen Beno noted in his directive that mission-specific ROE were not yet available. With respect to arrest and detention procedures, he stated that they must be “resolved in theatre”; indeed, no appropriate arrest and detention policy was established before deployment.
183. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3821–3825. Maj Kyle did note, however, that arrest and detainment procedures did not appear to have been addressed explicitly in the training plan (Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3826).
184. Document book 13, tab 11.
185. We are referring here to the commando training calendars prepared by the CAR HQ; see Document book 13A. For detailed training calendars prepared by the commandos, see Document book MOR2, tab 20.
186. Document book MOR3, tab 9.
187. These include vehicle training, supervision, the development of SOPs, standardization among the three rifle commandos, the ‘tone’, and excessive aggressiveness of 2 Commando.
188. These include Law of Armed Conflict (including arrest and detention), rules of engagement and use of force, training on Somalia, and negotiation training.
189. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2303–2304, 2471; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3791–93, 3956. Among other reasons were practical limitations that dictated this initial focus: equipment and training vehicles were not yet available for other forms of training; SOPs had to be developed for mission-specific tasks; administrative preparations were required; and intelligence was being gathered.
190. For example, a large quantity of specialty equipment was late in arriving (Document book 15, tab 5).
191. See Regimental Training Calendar for October, Document book 13A.

192. Document book 13A; testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2296; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, p. 7390, and vol. 36, p. 7107. Note that the additional training plans prepared for November and December do not appear to reflect the training conducted for Operation Cordon during that period. This is discussed below.
193. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, pp. 7139, 7147.
194. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6296, 6385–6386.
195. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4115–4116.
196. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2347–2348, 2452–54; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3968.
197. Document book 15, tab 5. Another training report, dated October 23, 1992, appears on p. 8 of Document book 13A.
198. See Memorandum, October 19, 1992, Document book 35.1, tab 3, p. 1.
199. The training plans provide only a list of the categories of training required. Although it provided some detail on the nature of the individual training requirements, BGen Beno's letter of September 22, 1992 (Document book 13, tab 20) does not elaborate on the standards to which collective training is to be achieved. Only Annex D of the LFC draft contingency plan (Document book 10, tab 28) makes general reference to a requirement for section, platoon, company, and battalion group training, again with no elaboration of standards to be achieved other than by way of reference to battle task standards.
200. See, for example, testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7774–7785; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7378–7385.
201. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7393–7396.
202. Document book MOR3, tab 6.
203. Document book 15, tab 20.
204. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7159; Document book 16, tab 12 (DND 005874-5).
205. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, p. 7482.
206. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7211; letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, Document book 15, tab 18.
207. Document book MOR3, tab 9.
208. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3926.
209. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7851–7852; LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, p. 34586; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4059.
210. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6349.
211. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7851–7852. BGen Beno pointed out that administration and logistics would have prevented the holding of a full-fledged exercise in November. Furthermore, LCol Mathieu did not see such an exercise as essential because he believed that the training had been adequate.
212. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, p. 34586.
213. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6512–6513.
214. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7850.
215. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2337.
216. As well, no mounted training was done in preparation for the CAR's assignment in the Western Sahara. See testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2316.
217. Interestingly, the training guidance contained in the Land Force Command draft contingency plan did not contemplate the need for driver training within the proposed training time lines (Document book 10, tab 28).

218. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3409.
219. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2318–2319. The CAR did have a few members who were qualified drivers, having served in armoured vehicle battalions. However, the trainees in the conversion course were beginning at “square one” (Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2306).
220. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2403.
221. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 5023–5024.
222. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5147.
223. Document book 29, tab 6.
224. Document book MOR3, tab 9.
225. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4989; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5217. But see testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2311.
226. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3622.

The problem of a shortage of vehicles to train on because of preparing and quarantining vehicles for shipment to the theatre of operations also appears to have existed during preparations for Operation Python (evidence of LCol Morneault to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1412).

Some of the operational vehicles had to be pulled from quarantine for use in Exercise Stalwart Providence and then had to be put back through the Departure Assistance Group (testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8212).
227. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6837; Capt Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3794; and Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6394. The training report of October 13, 1992 refers to delays caused by the late arrival of training vehicles and their condition (Document book 15, tab 5).
228. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8210.
229. Testimony of Capt Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3794.
230. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2315–2316.
231. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2321.
232. Such training concerned vehicle operation, assignment of responsibilities, dismounting procedures, etc. (testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2308–2310).
233. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2403.
234. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 244.
235. Letter, LCol MacDonald to BGen Beno, October 20, 1992, Document book 29, tab 6. See also testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6282–6283.
236. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5147.
237. Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3782. See also “SSF After Action Report”, February 2, 1993, Document book 24, tab 1, serial 1, which highlights the magnitude of the task involved in refitting the CAR for mechanized infantry operations.
238. See, for example, testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9436–9437; LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 9005–9014, 9021–9022; and MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8444–8449.
239. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8298.
240. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9482–9483; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7850.
241. Testimony of Gen de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9987.
242. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6832, 6850–6851 (translation).
243. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7067, and vol. 37, pp. 7306–7307.

244. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3528–3530.
245. See Volume 3, Chapters 24 and 25.
246. A standing operating procedure on the handling of detainees was finally developed in theatre (testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 3986).
247. Evidence of LCol Morneau to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1406.
248. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3898. See also Document book 13, tab 15, where the CAR's operations officer indicated that draft standing operating procedures would be confirmed on reconnaissance.
249. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4961–4962, and vol. 27, p. 5137.
250. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3905.
251. Document book 17, tab 1.
252. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4095.
253. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7108.
254. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3841–4382.
255. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3528. WO Murphy was also of the opinion that the commandos were working independently and that there was little uniformity in the training and development of SOPs (Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6641, 6646).
256. Document book 13, tab 20.
257. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3682–3683.
258. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5764. We recognize, however, that Canadian authorities appear to have had little control over the date of the reconnaissance.
259. Memorandum, "Equipment and Personnel Problems Encountered During Operation Scalpel", September 9, 1992, DND 386892. The covering letter accompanying the memorandum appears in Document book 118B, tab 5, DND 386889.
260. Document book 13, tab 20.
261. Document book 13, tab 20, p. 1. Capt Walsh testified that these principles were expressed by both LCol Morneau and LCol Mathieu (Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2353–2354).
262. Document book 13, tab 20, pp. 1–2. The goal of not discharging a weapon during the mission if possible was also articulated by LCol Morneau during the planning and mounting process for Operation Cordon (testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2354).
263. Document book 15, tab 5. See also LCol Morneau's briefing notes, in which he attempted to set the tone for the mission (Document book MOR2, tab 18).
264. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2354.
265. Evidence of Maj Seward to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1262.
266. Testimony of CWO Jardine, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4821.
267. Discussed later in this chapter.
268. Document book 35.1, tab 3, pp. 1, 2.
269. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5259.
270. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 28, p. 5288.
271. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7103.
272. Document book 13A.
273. Document book MOR2, tab 20.

274. Testimony of Maj Magee, Transcripts vol. 183, p. 37586; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5914–5915.
275. Testimony of Maj Magee, Transcripts vol. 183, pp. 37592–37594.
276. Evidence of Maj Pommet to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. III, pp. 756–758.
277. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37535.
278. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37523.
279. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, pp. 37521, 37529.
280. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7104.
281. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7104.
282. See evidence of LCol Mathieu to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, pp. 1189–1190; and evidence of Maj Pommet, vol. III, p. 765.
283. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5690.
284. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6844.
285. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5857–5858.
286. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5748.
287. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7103, and vol. 38, p. 7318. LCol Morneau acknowledged that he had been mistaken, in terms of the time available, in agreeing to Maj Seward's request (p. 7321).
288. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5915. Battle drills consist of moving across open ground and learning how to react under fire — a defensive manoeuvre. It was anticipated that patrols might come under fire from the local population (testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5918–5920).
289. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5754.
290. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5756.
291. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5757–5758.
292. Testimony of Major Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3807–3810, 3960–3962; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8115.
293. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, pp. 4803–4809. Although he expressed particular concern about 2 Commando, he suggested that all the commandos appeared to be adopting too aggressive a bearing during UN operations training, and he thought that more emphasis should have been placed on developing negotiating skills. He also acknowledged that he saw attack-type training in 2 Commando during only one of the four visits he made in September (Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4821–4822).
294. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5755.
295. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, pp. 5996–5997. The first caution was during the first or second week of September, the second during the last week of September (Transcripts vol. 31, p. 6046).
296. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5756–5757. LCol Morneau testified that he did not believe live fire range training was inappropriate: it had been conducted the year before for Operation Python, and in his view they had to be ready for a scenario "to help your buddy that's gone down" (Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7106).
297. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 39, p. 7660.
298. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7106.
299. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5909.
300. Document book 35.1, tab 3; testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 6000.
301. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7107, and vol. 38, p. 7321.

302. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6978, and vol. 38, pp. 7476–7477, 7385–7387.
303. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7012.
304. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 246.
305. Evidence of Capt Reinelt to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. III, p. 745; testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6512–6513; memorandum, Maj Seward, October 28, 1992, Document book 35.1, tab 3; and testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 6001.
306. Evidence of Maj Seward to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. V, p. 1264.
307. Document book 15, tab 8, DND 003667-003679. For further evidence on the types of scenarios, see testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5161–5163, 5156, 5167–5175. See also Maj Kampman's operations order for the exercise, Document book 13, tab 13, DND 005736-005739.
308. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6372–6373 and 6342. Normally, a unit would conduct its own preparatory training with the help of other brigade units, but exercises are not typically run by another unit in the manner that the RCD ran Stalwart Providence for the CAR. See also LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3615.
309. Note that it was the Airborne Battle Group, not only the Regiment, that was to take part in the exercise (testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4943–4944).
310. Document book 13, tab 11, DND 005353.
311. Document book 13, tab 11, DND 005354.
312. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5155; and Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4942–4943.
313. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, pp. 7412–7413; Document book 15, Tab 5, DND 000223. Commissioner Desbarats noted during the hearings that to judge from this document, LCol Morneault appeared to see the exercise as a final chapter of training. BGen Beno was of the view that the training should have been virtually completed before the exercise started (Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7800).
314. "If you turn it into a regimental test, then I need to run a battalion-level exercise, put my stamp on it, test my companies before they go to a brigade exercise... . So it was made very clear to me that we didn't have the resources at the time to do that, it is your exercise, I'm just helping you as much as I can, and I said thank you very much" (testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, p. 7411).
315. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7749. "In the [CF]...we do assess training...to ensure...that we achieve the objectives which we want to and that we confirm that those components of the unit have done that training. But we do not have a test where, for example, an outside agency would come in with checklists and test you."
316. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3567–3568 and 3744–3747; Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4990–4991; BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7748–7749; LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 38, p. 7505; Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 34, pp. 6498–6500 and 6505–6507; and Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3867–3869.
317. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6339–6340, 6342, 6409–6410, 6413, 6351–6352; of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5765; and Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37528.
318. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4343–4344.

319. Testimony of Maj Magee, Transcripts vol. 183, p. 37624.
320. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7839–7843.
321. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6264–6265; Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3892; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5764; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5185–5187.
322. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 5030.
323. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5137–5138.
324. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5171–5172.
325. Testimony of MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4345–4346, 4350.
326. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5145–5146; and Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4992–4993.
327. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5217.
328. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5064.
329. Document book 29, tab 6, DND 000676; testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2313.
330. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4988–4989.
331. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3881; he stated he was not surprised that they needed more work on mounted operations at the end of Exercise Stalwart Providence. Document Book 29, Tab 6, DND 000676. This letter informs BGen Beno of the need for additional driver training. Also, Capt Walsh's memo, Document Book MOR3, tab 6, DND 293047.
332. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4976–4977.
333. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5191–5192.
334. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3884; MWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4342; LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 39, pp. 7659–7660; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5926; Document book 15, tab 19, DND 005359; testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5198–5202.
335. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5049–5050.
336. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5051.
337. Document book 15, tab 19, DND 005366.
338. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5782.
339. Document book 29, tab 6, DND 000676.
340. See, for example, the testimony of Cmdre Cogdon before the Board of Inquiry (CARBG) regarding the lack of time to make the appropriate estimate and to “look at what [the change in mission] means” (Phase I, vol. IV, p. 948).
341. Operation Cordon contingency plan, preliminary warning order, Document book 19, tab 25.
342. Operation Cordon contingency plan, preliminary warning order. These instructions were confirmed on December 5, 1992, when SSF issued Operation Deliverance warning order 1, Document book 20, tab 2. The RCD was also ordered to conduct battle group Bison armoured vehicle driver training, and 1 RCR was ordered to assist with Mortar Platoon pre-deployment training as required.
343. Operation Deliverance warning order 01, Document book 19, tab 30.
344. This statement underlines the confusion surrounding the change in mission and the rules of engagement in particular; no rules of engagement had ever been issued for Operation Cordon.

345. Document book 20, tab 19. An additional training plan for the battle group covering the period December 14 to 25, 1992 was prepared on December 10th (Document book 20, tab 45). Most of the time during that period, however, was devoted to Christmas leave.
346. Memorandum, "Op Deliverance Training Plan", December 5, 1992, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibit 27, P-20.8. In his testimony, Capt Walsh clarified that this training was also to be completed by augmentees brought in for Operation Deliverance — those under specialty classifications like surgeons or special radio operators — in order to supplement their training (Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2458).
347. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 3591, 3648.
348. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3595. See also testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, pp. 34595–34598.
349. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5820. Capt Walsh also confirmed that Invertron training was conducted for all three commandos during the week of December 7th (Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2339).
350. See, for example, testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7853–7857; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, pp. 4631–4632; Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 32919–32924; and LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3596.
351. Document book 20, tab 19.
352. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5221.
353. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5221.
354. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 5000; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5232.
355. Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5235–5236. See also A Squadron Training Plan, Document book 20, tab 19.
356. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 28, pp. 5285–5287, and vol. 27, p. 5237; and Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 5000.
357. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5236–5237.
358. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5246–5247.
359. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5238. See also testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2338.
360. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5244.
361. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5238, 5242.
362. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8497.
363. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4169; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5153.
364. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4111, p. 4118.
365. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34808, 34758.
366. Maj Carol Mathieu, "New Horizons: Law of War Training for the Canadian Forces — A Luxury or A Necessity", paper prepared and presented to LCol R.G. Simard, Syndicate 7, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, Toronto, April 13, 1984, p. 9.
367. Document book 121, tab 10F, DND 163948.
368. Document book 121, tab 10F, DND 163946.
369. Testimony of CWO Mills, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4351–4352.
370. Testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7098–7099; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5804; and Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6301.

371. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4962; Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6860–6861; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5180.
372. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5170. Maj Kampman was referring specifically to the soldiers of 2 Commando.
373. General Court Martial, Pte E.K. Brown, vol. 5, pp. 1024–1025, evidence of MCpl Skipton.
374. General Court Martial, Pte Brocklebank, vol. 4, p. 650, evidence of Pte Brocklebank.
375. General Court Martial, Pte Bocklebank, vol. 2, p. 321, evidence of Cpl Glass.
376. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 28, pp. 5269–5270.
377. Testimony of Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6301–6303.
378. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2415, 2432.
379. The importance of training on the rules of engagement was recognized by several senior officers in their testimony before the Inquiry. See testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8303; Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1749–1750, and vol. 10, p. 1828; and LCol Nordick, Policy hearings transcripts vol. 2P, pp. 377–385.
380. See, for example, testimony of VAdm Murray, Transcripts vol. 155, p. 31540; and Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2359.
381. Testimony of MCpl Favasoli, Transcripts vol. 130, p. 26810; and LCol Nordick, Policy Hearings transcripts vol. 2P, p. 385. The Australian Army used scenario-based training on the ROE during their training for Somalia. See Brigadier Peter Abigail, “International Law and the Planning and Conduct of Brigade Operations”, in Hugh Smith, ed., *The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1994), pp. 90–91.
382. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10096–10099.
383. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5149. A similar concern was expressed by LCol MacDonald in his letter to LCol Morneault; see Document book 29, tab 6, DND 000676.
384. Testimony of LCol Labbé, Transcripts vol. 163, p. 33260.
385. Testimony of Maj (ret) Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21299–21300.
386. Testimony of Maj (ret) Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21334–21335.
387. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5809–5810; MCpl Klick, Transcripts vol. 124, pp. 24992–24993; and Cpl King, Transcripts vol. 127, p. 25587.
388. Special Broadcast, CBC Newsworld, December 4, 1992 (transcript: Commission of Inquiry document FA000495).
389. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 170, pp. 35032–35034.
390. Testimony of Capt (N) MacMillan, Transcripts vol. 11, p. 2009; Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6323; and MCpl Favasoli, Transcripts vol. 130, p. 26401, and vol. 131, pp. 26486–26487.
391. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34719; LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9662; Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 5005; and Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8792.
392. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 11, p. 2009; Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 163, pp. 33271–33272; and Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1750, 1760, and vol. 10, p. 1833.
393. Testimony of Maj (ret) Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21353, 21356–21357; and LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34719–34721; evidence of Capt Moreau to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 300.
394. Testimony of Maj (ret) Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21353.

395. Capt Parker, "JAG Integration into OOTW TOC Operations", *News from the Front!* (The Center for Army Lessons Learned: February 1994).
396. Document book 13, tab 20, DND 000179.
397. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7860–7861; Col O'Brien, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1929–1930, 1947; Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8863; Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9808–9810; LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 7109, 7087; Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4097; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5813, and vol. 32, pp. 6188, 6098.
398. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19928–19930.
399. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19931, 19935–19937, 19940.
400. Document book 25, tab 16, DND 004106; testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20120.
401. The Reserve officer was Lt Matt Bryden. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4001; and LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7056. See also Document book MOR2, tab 4, DND 293192, Briefing by Mr. Muhammad Hassan, and testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7077; and Maj MacKay, Transcripts vol. 33, p. 6302.
402. Document book MOR2, tab 4, DND 293192.
403. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, p. 6096.
404. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6839–6840.
405. Testimony of Cpl Purnelle, Transcripts vol. 35, p. 6842.
406. Document book MOR2, tab 4, DND 293194.
407. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37522; Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 31, p. 5902; Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5118, and vol. 26, p. 4952; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 28, p. 5302.
408. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1380–1381.
409. Document book 14, tab 19, DND 003033. It is not clear whether this document was available to or consulted by the CAR for the Somalia mission. For purposes of this discussion, the UN document is used as a guideline for what *should* or *could* have been done, but it is recognized that it did not constitute official CF policy at the time.
410. Document book 14, tab 19, DND 003036.
411. Document book 14, tab 19, DND 003036.
412. Document book 13, tab 20, DND 000179.
413. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3896.
414. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2349–2351.
415. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3890; Document book 14, tab 6, DND 0036643; Document book 14, tab 11, DND 003650-003654.
416. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5172–5179.
417. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8470; and evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. II, p. 249.
418. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7120.
419. Document book 10, tab 28, DND 003051; Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Annex E to the Narrative, Phase I, vol. XI, 19 July 1993, pp. E-6/7-7/7.
420. DND, *Field Training Regulations*, vol. 2, supplement 4, "Individual Battle Task Standards" (B-GI-304-002/PT-Z04, 1995), makes reference to "Battle Task Standards for Operations Other than War", including United Nations operations. This document was ordered from the Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team, but we were advised that it has not yet been produced.

421. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3866.
422. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3864–3865.
423. See Volume 2, Chapter 18, Discipline.
424. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5818.
425. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5216–5218. See also Document book 29, tab 6, DND 000676.
426. Document book MOR3, tab 6, DND 293047; testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, pp. 5787–5798; December Training Plans, Document book 20, tab 19, DND 000461-000477; Document book 20, tab 45, DND 006415-006416.
427. Document book MOR2, tab 14, DND 292831; Document book MOR2, tab 17, DND 292836.
428. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7856–7857.
429. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 119, pp. 23884–23885.
430. Evidence of Capt Nash to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 449; and Cpl Lewis, vol. II, p. 466.
431. Testimony of LCol Moffat, Transcripts vol. 99, pp. 19398–19399; evidence of LCol Moffat to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, pp. 388–389; and Cpl Lewis, vol. II, p. 466.
432. Testimony of MCpl Favasoli, Transcripts vol. 130, pp. 26406–26407.
433. See, for example, Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations, 4500-1 (DCDS) December 29, 1993, Document book 56F, tabs 7 and 7F. But see LaRose Edwards, Dangerfield and Weekes, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers*, p. 21, and Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations: Final Report (undated, but received by Inquiry research staff from NDHQ J3 Trg in January 1996), indicating the deferral of, or lack of implementation of, many of the specific tasks in the DCDS directive. See also Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Peacekeeping, Chapter 7, National Defence (May 1996), p. 7–28; DCDS Study Directive: Peacekeeping Training in the Canadian Forces, 4500-1 (DCDS) September 14, 1995; DND, *Operations Land and Tactical Air*, vol. 3, Peacekeeping Operations (B-GL-301-003/FP-001), September 15, 1995; and NDHQ Instruction DCDS 5/96: Training Requirements for Peace Support Operations, 3451-1 (DCDS), December 6, 1996; Document book 118C, tab 12.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: CONFUSION AND MISINTERPRETATION

Our terms of reference directed us to evaluate “the extent to which the Task Force Rules of Engagement were effectively interpreted, understood and applied at all levels of the Canadian Forces chain of command”. As we have affirmed elsewhere, the term rules of engagement (ROE) refers to the directions guiding the application of armed force by soldiers within a theatre of operations.

The ROE perform two fundamentally important tasks for Canadian Forces (CF) members undertaking an international mission: they define the degree and manner of the force to which soldiers may resort, and they delineate the circumstances and limitations surrounding the application of that force. They are tantamount to orders.

The record shows that Canadian Forces members serving in Somalia fired weapons and caused the loss of Somali lives in three separate incidents: on February 17, 1993, when Canadian soldiers fired into a crowd gathered at Belet Huen's Bailey bridge;¹ in the shooting death of Ahmed Afraraho Aruush on March 4, 1993; and on March 17, 1993, when Canadian soldiers shot a Somali national at the compound of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Belet Huen.² Shidane Arone's death on March 16, 1993 also shows CF members ready to resort to violence.³ Individually and collectively, these incidents raise critical questions surrounding the ROE governing CF members in Somalia. Did the ROE anticipate fully the range of situations where the application of force would be possible? Were the ROE clearly drafted? Was the information about the ROE passed adequately along the chain of command? Were the CF members properly trained on the ROE? This chapter explores these and related questions.

While we describe elsewhere in this report the Canadian Airborne Regiment's preparations to deploy to Somalia, it is necessary to repeat certain key points to understand fully the use and misuse of the ROE. We come back again to the failures which led to the confusion and misinterpretation

that came to characterize the role the ROE played in the Somali desert. Unfortunately, these failures strike entirely familiar notes, including lack of clarity surrounding the mission in Somalia; inadequate time to prepare, giving rise to hasty, ill-conceived measures; a chain of command that did not communicate the ROE clearly to the soldiers; deficient training on the ROE; and lack of discipline by CF members in observing the ROE.

THE DRAFTING OF THE ROE

On December 5, 1992, the warning order for Operation Deliverance was issued by National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).⁴ Following this, the Canadian Operations Staff Branch (J3) subordinate to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS), Intelligence, Security and Operations (ISO), MGen Addy, and staff members of his office drafted the ROE. A section in the office of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), VAdm J. Anderson, also played a part.⁵ Between December 6 and 8, 1992, the Deputy Minister met with the Judge Advocate General (JAG) and the VCDS about the ROE: in his view, the ROE had sufficient foreign policy implications to demand his attention.⁶ By December 11, 1992, the ROE were completed; the VCDS forwarded a copy by fax to Gen de Chastelain, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), who was visiting Brussels together with the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Marcel Masse.⁷ The CDS approved them, and they were sent to Col Labbé, who was to command the Canadian contingent, on December 11th. Col Labbé published them in his operation order for Operation Deliverance on December 12th. On December 24, 1992, Gen de Chastelain forwarded the approved ROE again to Col Labbé, along with Col Labbé's terms of reference as Commander Canadian Joint Force Somalia.⁸

THE CHANGE FROM OPERATION CORDON TO OPERATION DELIVERANCE

We note that the ROE were drafted as Canada's mandate in Somalia evolved. During early planning for Operation Cordon, the CF expected to use the port of Bossaso as the base. Once Operation Cordon gave way to Operation Deliverance, however, this assumption broke down. Mr. Fowler, deputy minister of DND at the time of the deployment, testified that Canada's sphere of operations was still uncertain as of December 7, 1992.⁹ The advance party of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) flew into Baledogle

over an 11-day period beginning December 15, 1992. By December 28, 1992, Canada had agreed to become responsible for the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector.¹⁰ Moreover, Operation Cordon obliged Canada to carry out peace-keeping under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, but Operation Deliverance required Canada to engage in peace enforcement under Chapter VII. Ideally, the drafters should have tailored the ROE to reflect the mission and tasks involved, as well as the dangers they would encounter there.

LACK OF DRAFTERS' TOOLS

DND officials acknowledged candidly to us that, in December 1992, they lacked important tools that would have been helpful to the drafters of the ROE. Apart from UN Security Council Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992,¹¹ the foundations in international law for the mission were ambiguous.¹² We also learned that there was no CF doctrine stipulating how to draft the ROE for joint forces.¹³ Nor did the drafters have a detailed definition of the mission's mandate, a written statement of Canada's political objectives, an evaluation of the risks, nor the concept of operations espoused by the force's command — to name some major omissions.¹⁴ On balance, we conclude that the CF and NDHQ were ill-prepared to draft ROE for Operation Deliverance.

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN ROE

Canadian drafters could conceivably compensate, at least partially, for the gaps in their information by examining the ROE issued by other countries joining the American-led Unified Task Force coalition. The Americans asked coalition members to create ROE compatible with theirs.¹⁵ They developed a classified but releasable version for coalition allies, entitled Proposed Coalition Military Operations Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE).¹⁶ Also the ROE of other nations were available and could have helped the drafters.¹⁷

DIRECTIONS ON USING THE ROE

CF members needed to be trained on the ROE before deploying to Somalia if the ROE were to be properly employed. LCol Mathieu, Commanding Officer of the CARBG, testified that the soldiers received training in Canada on the Law of Armed Conflict but no training on the ROE for Somalia.¹⁸ Various other former Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group members

agreed that there was no training on the ROE before deployment.¹⁹ Training was imperative to reflect not only the changed area of operations but also the elevated level of danger entailed in a peace enforcement mission. Although training could help give CF members clear and practical directions on the use of force, by not providing for detailed, mission-specific training on the ROE, our military leaders failed their soldiers.

Since the CARBG were not trained on the ROE before deploying, it was essential to make alternative attempts to ensure that the ROE were explicitly and consistently understood. CWO (ret) Jardine testified, however, that no instructions were ever given to the CAR as a whole. Instead, commanding officers disseminated instructions at their respective orders group.²⁰ This approach was clearly insufficient since it afforded too many opportunities for diverging instructions.

THE AIDE-MÉMOIRE OR SOLDIER'S CARD

To reinforce instructions from higher-ranking officers, soldiers on duty in an operational theatre normally carry a condensed version of the ROE known as an aide-mémoire or soldier's card, and the CF did attempt to provide members deploying to Somalia with such cards. LCol Mathieu and Maj Mackay, the CAR's Deputy Commanding Officer,²¹ collaborated to produce an initial version of the aide-mémoire that the advance party of over 200 troops received on December 13, 1992.²² After Col Labbé became commander of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS), however, he asked Capt (N) McMillan, J3 Plans on LGen Addy's staff, to draft an aide-mémoire. On December 16, 1992, Capt (N) McMillan forwarded this second version of the aide-mémoire to Col Labbé, who was in Somalia. The Colonel approved the new version the following day and asked that it be translated. The French version was ready five days later; and the aide-mémoire, in both official languages, was available in plasticized form on December 23, 1992.²³ Still another soldier's guide was sent by fax to NDHQ for reproduction in pocket size on February 16, 1993.²⁴

Had the aides-mémoire appeared sooner, the soldiers would have had time to become acquainted with them, but the ROE themselves surfaced so late that the advance party received its aides-mémoire only when boarding a bus at CFB Petawawa to depart for Somalia.²⁵ Capt (N) McMillan's version of the aide-mémoire became available only a few days before the CARBG's main body began to deploy to Somalia. Francophone members of the CARBG did not receive cards in French until December 23, 1992.²⁶ Some CARBG members did not receive the aide-mémoire until they had left Canada: Maj Mansfield testified that he received it in Belet Huen during the first week of January 1993.²⁷

Also troubling were the discrepancies among the various versions of the soldier's cards circulating in Somalia, some of them significant. Most important, the provisions concerning the resort to force were described differently and yielded significantly dissimilar logical interpretations depending on the phraseology in a given version. For example, one version affirmed that the application of force depended on necessity and proportionality,²⁸ while other versions did not mention these elements, stating less clearly the preconditions for using force.²⁹ We believe strongly that the discrepancies between the various versions of the aide-mémoire contributed significantly to the confusion and misinterpretation that surrounded the ROE in Somalia.

IN-THEATRE TRAINING ON THE ROE

The deficiencies imposed by hasty preparations for deployment could have been remedied by proper training on the ROE once the CF members reached Somalia. Shortly after arrival, the need for this training became glaringly apparent. This created grounds for questioning whether CARBG members would apply the ROE in a suitably disciplined manner and underscored the importance of training in this critical area. What we heard, however, indicates that there was no systematic, organized, structured training on the ROE in theatre. For example, MWO Amaral, formerly of 2 Commando, testified that he never engaged in simulated riots or other scenarios where the soldiers would have had to decide whether or not to shoot.³⁰

IN-THEATRE DIRECTIONS ON USING THE ROE

Clear and consistent directions from the CARBG's leaders to the troops in theatre would have helped offset ambiguities and imprecision surrounding the ROE. There were some officers, such as Maj Pommet, Officer Commanding (OC) 1 Commando, who tried to do this. Although he received no instructions from his superiors to train his soldiers in Somalia, he called them together several times to check on and improve their knowledge of the ROE.³¹ He tested his troops by presenting them with specific scenarios and asking them to respond.³² Although there might have been other such isolated efforts, it is certain that no co-ordinated instruction on the ROE occurred at the regimental level.³³

Maj Pommet's efforts were hampered and constrained by the abstract manner in which the ROE were framed. The ROE contained no examples of situations to assist soldiers in evaluating the degree of force to use. LCol Mathieu

testified that, in 1992, the CF had no manual containing examples of situations implicating the ROE.³⁴ The U.S. forces' ROE for Somalia, by contrast, included such examples.³⁵ Capt (N) McMillan, who drafted the ROE, later explained, to our bewilderment, that he deliberately refrained from including examples because, he claimed, problems could have arisen if he had omitted some relevant scenarios.³⁶

GAPS AND AMBIGUITIES IN THE ROE

Although the incident of March 4, 1993 made the level of force to be used against thieves an urgent issue, thievery had been a problem earlier in the mission. But Capt (N) McMillan testified that thievery had received little emphasis when the ROE were being prepared.³⁷ After the CF reached Somalia, Col Labbé did not ask Capt (N) McMillan to amend or to clarify the implications of the ROE for thieves since he held that "they were sufficiently clear to deal with the whole spectrum of would-be aggressors, petty thieves, looters and so on."³⁸ The events of March 4, 1993 and other occurrences clearly suggest otherwise.

Particularly critical was the ROE's treatment of the phrase 'hostile intent'. Any failure to grasp this phrase accurately could carry disastrous consequences: sub-paragraph 15(b) of the ROE authorized the CF to use "deadly force" in responding to a "hostile act" or when confronting "hostile intent".³⁹ Thus, there appeared to be no distinction between a hostile act and a hostile intent, and many soldiers accepted that this was the case.⁴⁰ Maj Kampman, OC of A Squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), asserted that when he received a draft of the ROE about December 12, 1992, the sense of hostile intent was unclear. He testified further that LCol Mathieu sought to make it clearer by advising the soldiers that a "hostile intent" existed if someone held a weapon "parallel to the ground". In the major's view, though, this attempted definition was unworkable, since his squadron operated in an area where many Somalis carried weapons.⁴¹

In a related vein, the ROE were deficient in failing to address adequately the question of the level of threat and the need for a graduated response depending on the severity of the threat encountered. The ROE left the impression that the response to unarmed harassment could be exactly the same as that envisaged for an armed threat (i.e., deadly force).⁴²

The ROE also failed to provide guidance to soldiers as to appropriate conduct when a threat dissipates. They were silent on the issue of disengagement. For example, soldiers were not aware of the appropriate response to a situation where an intruder breaks off an incursion and flees.⁴³ While armed

force might be appropriate when the threat is direct and immediate, it may be excessive and even unlawful where the threat has subsided and the individual takes flight.

The ROE implications for handling detainees were equally uncertain. Paragraph 19 stipulated: "Personnel who commit a hostile act, demonstrate hostile intent, interfere with the accomplishment of the mission, or otherwise use or threaten deadly force against the Canadian Forces...may be detained. Detained personnel will be evacuated to a designated location for turn-over to appropriate military authorities."⁴⁴ Capt (N) McMillan testified that the drafters expected detainees held by the Canadians to be turned over to the Americans. As they were finalizing the ROE, however, it became unclear whether detainees would be conveyed to the Americans or some other body, such as the Red Cross or a UN agency. Since no recognized government existed in Somalia, the issue was left to be addressed in Somalia.⁴⁵

These few examples provide some insight into the depth and complexity of shortcomings relative to the ROE. However, they are provided purely as illustration and are far from exhaustive.

LCol Mathieu's Orders Group of January 28, 1993

These and other ambiguities furnished the context for LCol Mathieu's orders group of January 28, 1993. LCol Mathieu cited the well-publicized comment of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and International Trade, the Honourable Barbara McDougall, who boasted that soldiers going to Somalia had been provided with ROE that permitted them to shoot first and ask questions later.⁴⁶ At the orders group of January 28, 1993, LCol Mathieu told his soldiers that deadly force could be used against Somalis found inside Canadian compounds or absconding with Canadian kit, whether or not they were armed.⁴⁷

Paragraph 7(C)a of the ROE affirmed: "An opposing force or terrorist unit commits a hostile act when it attacks or otherwise uses armed force against Canadian forces, Canadian citizens, their property, Coalition forces, relief personnel, relief materiel, distribution sites, convoys and noncombatant civilians, or employs the use of force to preclude or impede the mission of Canadian or Coalition forces."⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it was not clear that Somalis were conducting an 'attack' simply by penetrating the Canadian compound.⁴⁹ Also, according to much testimony, no definition of 'Canadian kit' was offered at the orders group of January 28, 1993, although it was apparently assumed that the phrase 'relief materiel' encompassed Canadian kit which, in turn, was taken to denote 'Canadian military equipment'.⁵⁰ Soldiers had differing

views as to what was understood by the term. Some believed it included water bottles or jerrycans of fuel — an interpretation that would have authorized a soldier to shoot at someone attempting to steal a bottle of water. Later, this was clarified to denote vital military supplies or equipment.⁵¹ In our view, the direction issued at the January 28th orders group clearly exceeded the authority to shoot envisaged by the drafters of the ROE.

Even if LCol Mathieu wanted to modify the ROE, he had several hurdles to overcome. The Department of National Defence (DND) informed us that, before Operation Deliverance, no doctrine or procedure was available for the ROE to be adjusted and adapted rapidly according to the circumstances in theatre.⁵² Paragraph 30 of the ROE required recommended changes or additions to pass via Col Labbé to the CDS,⁵³ and Gen de Chastelain confirmed that only he could approve amendments.⁵⁴

Reactions to LCol Mathieu's Direction on the ROE

LCol Mathieu's direction placed the CARBG members in a quandary. Maj Pommet testified that he and Maj McGee, the officer commanding 3 Commando, questioned whether the direction was legal. The direction to shoot at thieves remained in force, but all OCs agreed not to shoot at children who often tried to pilfer from the troops.⁵⁵ Capt Hope described the direction as "a major step" in escalating the use of force.⁵⁶ MWO O'Connor qualified it as "a deviation" from the ROE.⁵⁷ MWO Amaral found it sufficiently ambiguous so as to represent a relaxation of the ROE.⁵⁸ Maj Pommet testified that since the direction was issued at an orders group meeting, it presumably qualified as an order⁵⁹ and not merely as a broad policy statement. Soldiers were uncertain as to whether they were required to obey this new interpretation of the ROE, or whether they could resist it as an unlawful order. Far from clearing up confusion about the ROE, the interpretation given on January 28, 1993 increased it to a dangerous extent.

Attempted Clarifications of LCol Mathieu's Direction on the ROE

In the days immediately following January 28, 1993, attempts were made to clarify LCol Mathieu's direction. Understood literally, it authorized lethal force against all thieves; nonetheless, some CARBG members understood that deadly force would be employed only when stolen materiel was 'critical equipment'.⁶⁰ Yet even LCol Mathieu conceded that nothing made clear what materiel counted as critical equipment.⁶¹ Another source of confusion

was the target toward which soldiers were to aim once they had decided to fire on an intruder. LCol Mathieu instructed CF members to shoot "between the skirt and the flip-flops", that is, at the legs.⁶² Maj Mansfield thought that the instruction could represent a positive step: it placed a shot to kill another step away.⁶³ However, even he was uncertain about the effect of the instruction, since he acknowledged that soldiers are trained from the outset to shoot at the centre of visible mass.⁶⁴ It is equally probable that it had the opposite effect, making the conditions for resorting to violence easier. Without doubt, many found the instruction confusing.

THE SOLDIERS' MOUNTING RESENTMENT

As the soldiers spent weeks and months in Somalia, their mounting resentment of continuing thievery and their confusion about the proper application of the ROE became an increasingly dangerous mix. Maj Mansfield, as OC of the engineer squadron, found that Somalis who penetrated the Canadian compound frustrated his men greatly and he was worried about retaliation.⁶⁵ WO Ashman believed that Somali infiltrators caused CF members to feel violated.⁶⁶ MWO Amaral asserted that Somalis spat on various CF members and hurled rocks at them.⁶⁷ On March 3, 1993, an American soldier died when a U.S. vehicle struck a mine near the village of Matabaan, approximately 80 to 90 kilometres north-east of Belet Huen, and Cpl Chabot testified that the American's death engendered a thirst for revenge against the Somalis.⁶⁸ Perhaps it is not mere coincidence that Mr. Aruush perished on the following day.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR TRAINING ON THE ROE

As CF members gained greater experience in Somalia and grew progressively more dispirited, intensive training on the ROE became all the more important. When LCol Mathieu used his orders group of January 28, 1993 to communicate an important direction concerning the ROE, he employed a very loose approach. Scenario-based fact-driven training on the ROE would have been far superior, because it would have compelled individual CF members to confront in advance the painful choices that real events impose without the luxury of studied reflection. In particular, it could have reinforced the requirement for necessity, proportionality and restraint in the use of force. Moreover, by talking about how best to handle the frustrating circumstances and events

that they encountered routinely, the soldiers would have had a safe and useful opportunity to vent their true feelings. They could have considered, simultaneously, the implications of resorting to excessive responses to unjustified provocations. The message must have been inescapably clear after the incident of March 4, 1993, but subsequent experience would show that the commanders' response to these obvious problems with the ROE was insufficient.

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE LEADERS

The ROE clearly failed to give CF members in Somalia useful, concrete guidance about the use of force, but their leaders declined to recognize any deficiencies. LGen Addy characterized the ROE as "perfectly clear".⁶⁹ Col Labbé affirmed that the ROE contained all the directives necessary for soldiers to bring their mission to a successful conclusion; moreover, in his opinion, the descriptions of "hostile intent" and "hostile act" were precise enough to enable soldiers to make reasoned choices about force.⁷⁰ LCol Mathieu's attempts at correction may well have sown confusion. Some might contend that the soldiers themselves can invariably offset their leaders' deficiencies through their own common sense, but to endorse this assertion would be to hold the lower ranks to standards their superiors were incapable of attaining. In any event, the unaddressed problems surrounding the ROE would contribute to a bitter harvest of death and scandal.

THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 4, 1993: RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROE

The tragic events of March 4, 1993 starkly revealed the confusion experienced by reconnaissance platoon members. According to Capt Rainville's direction to them, any Somali who attempted to penetrate the barbed wire surrounding the Canadian compound was engaging in "hostile action".⁷¹ This authorized his soldiers to begin a graduated response, potentially leading to the use of deadly force. Sgt Plante understood that platoon members would be justified in shooting would-be infiltrators even if they did not feel themselves menaced.⁷² MCpl Leclerc understood that soldiers were not authorized to shoot thieves, but could use deadly force against saboteurs.⁷³ In our view, though, no proper understanding of the ROE could justify using food or non-vital materiel as a device for luring Somalis into the compound and entrapping them. Moreover, the ROE of civilized nations do not encompass shooting fleeing, unarmed civilians in the back.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE MARCH 4TH INCIDENT

The day after the incident of March 4, 1993, Col Labbé gave the DCDS, VAdm Murray, a verbal report. VAdm Murray testified that he understood how Canadian soldiers might have misinterpreted the ROE. He was also uncertain as to whether criminal action was involved in these events.⁷⁴ The event should have triggered a re-examination of the ROE. Clearly, it was appropriate and important to seek an immediate, efficient and exhaustive re-examination of the ROE, including an examination of how they were understood and applied. However, the ensuing flow of correspondence after March 4, 1993 about the ROE and the soldiers' understanding of them tended to conceal rather than to attack problems.

CF CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT THE ROE, MARCH TO MAY 1993

Capt (N) McMillan's review of the ROE was released on March 20, 1993. Because he had presided over drafting the ROE in December 1992, he was placed in the uncomfortable position of reviewing his own work. He concluded, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the ROE as approved did not need to be modified. Nevertheless, he made two recommendations: to obtain confirmation that all levels of command had received clear direction on the ROE, and to refer all future questions surrounding the application of the ROE in Operation Deliverance to NDHQ.⁷⁵

LCol Watkin of the JAG Office produced another, more thorough, review on April 14, 1993. He held that the reconnaissance platoon's members acted in good faith, applying the ROE as they understood them. At the same time, he voiced serious concerns about the adequacy of the ROE themselves. He advocated that they be amended to provide specifically "for a graduated response and a cessation of the use of force when hostile intent ceases, or it is clear a hostile act has not occurred". Additionally he urged that consideration be given to changing the ROE "to provide separately for the defence of property and to deal with the 'fleeing felon' issue". Furthermore, he called for further investigation of "[t]he failure to communicate all the requirements of the ROE to the unit level".⁷⁶

On April 24, 1993 — less than a week after LCol Watkin's review — VAdm Murray (the DCDS) wrote to Col Labbé about the ROE. He expressed himself satisfied that the ROE were suitable for Operation Deliverance. On the other hand, he asked Col Labbé to confirm that leaders had "read, understood, and appropriately interpreted" the ROE, that soldiers had been

instructed on the application of force for their assigned roles, and that commanders had been encouraged to seek clarification if the mission and the ROE seemed inconsistent.⁷⁷

Two days later Col Labbé responded to VAdm Murray. The Colonel attempted to reassure the DCDS that further problems with the ROE were unlikely. He believed there were no grounds for seeking clarification of the ROE on the premise that they were unsuitable to the mission. He reported that additional measures had been taken to ensure that all CARBG ranks were “fully conversant” with the ROE. Despite the overwhelming amount of evidence we received suggesting that there was no training on the ROE in Somalia, Col Labbé told VAdm Murray that soldiers had exercised on the ROE “hundreds of times”.⁷⁸

On April 27, 1993, VAdm Murray wrote about the ROE to the CDS, Adm Anderson, the DM, Mr. Fowler, the VCDS, LGen O'Donnell, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy and Communications, Dr. Calder, and the Commander of Land Force Command, LGen Reay. He repeated Col Labbé's two most important assertions: the ROE required no changes, and measures had been taken to ensure that all ranks were fully conversant with them.⁷⁹

However, on May 23, 1993, LCol Mathieu noted in his field note pad:

Seems to be some confusion on ROE ref looters. Review ROE with emphasis on escalation, graduated response, deescalation, proportionality and necessity and min force to do the job only shoot if...⁸⁰

The same day MGen de Faye, President of the board of inquiry, advised Adm Anderson and VAdm Murray that he had received a great deal of testimony giving him “grave concern over the understanding of the ROE in the Battle Group in general and 2 Commando in particular.”⁸¹ MGen de Faye's concern focused specifically on the resort to deadly force against thieves, particularly as they fled. Nearly three months after the incident of March 4, 1993 which evoked the same issue, MGen de Faye concluded unequivocally that the same confusion persisted. He urged Adm Anderson and VAdm Murray to establish clearly the circumstances where deadly force might be employed against fleeing thieves and to articulate them clearly to Col Labbé.⁸²

Col Labbé gave his response to MGen de Faye's concerns in a missive of May 23, 1993 to VAdm Murray. The Colonel affirmed that he had done everything necessary to ensure that LCol Mathieu and the CARBG fully understood the ROE. Nevertheless, LCol Mathieu had received instructions to emphasize yet again to his OCs that the ROE allowed deadly force to be used against thieves only when they were armed and displayed the intent to use life-threatening force.⁸³ Because the CARBG's redeployment to Canada was scheduled to take place shortly, there was little impetus for the Canadian Joint Force Somalia or NDHQ to subject the ROE to further scrutiny. There is no evidence that the ROE underwent critical re-examination in the closing days of Canadian operations in Somalia.

FINDINGS

Neither the drafting of the ROE for Operation Deliverance nor the attempts to impart them to soldiers showed the CF in a favourable light.

- *Canadian soldiers were deployed to Somalia under rapidly changing circumstances, and the ROE reached them in a piecemeal, slow and haphazard manner. Late production of the ROE was an avoidable occurrence and represents a leadership and systemic failure.*
- *Several inconsistent versions of the soldier's card co-existed in theatre.*
- *The interpretation of the ROE was changed substantively during operations in Somalia. In addition, the ROE were weak and incomplete. They failed, among other things, to address the crucial distinction between a "hostile act" and a "hostile intent".*
- *The interpretation and application of the ROE created substantial confusion among the troops. The interpretations offered by commanders added to the confusion, as did the failure to consider adequately the issue of the possible non-application of the ROE to simple thievery and to advise the soldiers appropriately.*
- *The training conducted on the ROE in pre-deployment and in-theatre phases alike was inadequate and substandard. Indeed, our soldiers were poorly trained on the ROE, having been confused, misled and largely abandoned on this crucial issue by their senior leaders. These realities contributed directly to serious practical difficulties in applying the ROE while Canadian operations in Somalia were continuing, notably with regard to the March 4th incident.*

These difficulties, important as they are, point to a larger issue of the adequacy of Canadian Forces policy concerning the institutional and systemic development and transmission of ROE.

In 1992 the CF clearly had no sufficient doctrine governing the development, promulgation and application of ROE. This gap is quite astonishing, since Canadian peacekeepers had enjoyed a lengthy and distinguished history in numerous operational theatres around the globe since Lester B. Pearson's era as Secretary of State for External Affairs. We acknowledge the noteworthy progress made by the CF since Operation Deliverance to fill the gap.

MGen Boyle received a briefing about the ROE on January 8, 1996, shortly after he replaced Gen de Chastelain as CDS. It suggested that Canada's experiences in Somalia gave particular impetus to developing ROE architecture that could be used equally efficiently in a single service, joint or combined operation. While the 1991 Gulf War provided the initial impulse, the lion's share of the work took place in 1993.⁸⁴ When Gen de Chastelain approved

the *Use of Force in CF, Joint and Combined Operations* in July 1995, the labours finally bore fruit.⁸⁵ The purpose of the first volume, which is unclassified, is to assemble principles, concepts and definitions pertinent to ROE in one location; they need not be repeated in every ROE document. A list of numbered ROE issuable to joint force or contingent commanders is found in the second volume, which remains classified.

The CF's attempts to standardize the understanding of principles, concepts and definitions relating to ROE and to assemble a library of ROE for commanders should help to prevent confusion about the ROE and their application for CF members being deployed abroad. As we have observed, the soldiers in Somalia, except for a few, were unclear or confused at all levels about the requirements of the ROE. We urge the CF not to become complacent regarding further work to clarify ROE for members. While we do not advocate that the CF adopt, without reflection, any other country's doctrine or practices regarding the ROE, there may be worthwhile lessons to learn from other countries which could help improve Canadian ROE. For example, in a statement of the Australian Defence Forces' policies and responsibilities for ROE, the operational aspects of ROE and the Australian ROE system impressed us as remarkably succinct and clear.⁸⁶

Recommendations

To clarify the development of, training for, and application of rules of engagement, and to lend greater certainty to them.

We recommend that:

- 22.1** The Chief of the Defence Staff create a general framework for the development of rules of engagement to establish the policies and protocols governing the production of such rules.
- 22.2** The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and promulgate generic rules of engagement based on international and domestic law, including the Law of Armed Conflict, domestic foreign policy, and operational considerations.
- 22.3** The Chief of the Defence Staff establish and implement policies for the timely development of mission-specific rules of engagement and ensure that a verification and testing process for the rules of engagement is incorporated in the process for declaring a unit operationally ready for deployment.

- 22.4 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the Canadian Forces maintain a data bank of rules of engagement from other countries, as well as rules of engagement and after-action reports from previous Canadian missions, as a basis for devising and evaluating future rules of engagement.
- 22.5 The Chief of the Defence Staff develop standards for scenario-based, context-informed training on rules of engagement, both before a mission and in theatre, with provision for additional training whenever there is confusion or misunderstanding.
- 22.6 The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and put in place a system for monitoring the transmission, interpretation and application of the rules of engagement, to ensure that all ranks understand them, and develop an adjustment mechanism to permit quick changes that are monitored to comply with the intent of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
- 22.7 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that any change in the rules of engagement, once disseminated, result in further training.

NOTES

1. Exhibit P-280, Document book 52; Exhibit P-280.1, Document book 52A.
2. Exhibit P-276, Document book 43; Exhibit P-276.1, Document book 43A.
3. Exhibits P-274 to P-274.30, Document books 38 to 38AC.
4. Exhibit P-69, Document book 20, tab 5.
5. Testimony of LGen P.G. Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9565.
6. Testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 51, pp. 10212, 10230.
7. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10089; Exhibit P-70, Document book 21, tab 8.
8. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10078.
9. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 51, p. 10256.
10. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. 11, Exhibit P-20.11, p. A-4/33.
11. Exhibit P-50, Document book 3, tab 8.
12. DND, "Brief for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia: The Use of Force and Rules of Engagement" (1995), pp. 14/15.
13. DND, "Brief for the Inquiry", pp. 13/15.
14. DND, "Brief for the Inquiry", pp. 14/15.
15. General Court Martial of LCol J.C.A. Mathieu, vol. 4, pp. 723-724.

16. Exhibit P-68, Document book 19, tab 29 (includes two documents: "Operation RESTORE HOPE Serial One ROE", December 4, 1992; and "Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE)" October 25, 1989).
17. See, for example, the detailed Australian planning process for the development of ROE: Australian Defence Force Publication, vol. 3, August 25, 1992, issued by the Chief of Defence Force.
18. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 173, p. 35709.
19. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20293; MCpl Klick, Transcripts vol. 124, pp. 24920–24921; MCpl M. Favasoli, Transcripts vol. 130, p. 26401. By contrast, see the testimony of Cpl King, Transcripts vol. 127, pp. 25586–25587. Specific ROE should have been available for the training in Operation Cordon, but none were. The soldiers were trained on the ROE promulgated for operations in the former Yugoslavia (testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21324).
20. Testimony of CWO (ret) C.L. Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, pp. 21032–21034.
21. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 11, pp. 2014–2017. According to Gen de Chastelain, a unit deploying customarily prepared its own aides-mémoire, although NDHQ vetted them subsequently to confirm that they accorded with the ROE he had approved (Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10128).
22. Exhibit P-70, Document book 21, tab 16. Better copies of this card are found in Exhibit P-34.7, General Court Martial of LCol J.C.A. Mathieu, vol. 7, pp. 1206–1207; Exhibit P-93 (card format); and Exhibit P-203.1, Document book 53A, tab 8.
23. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 11, pp. 2024, 2031; Exhibit P-71, Document book 22, tab 12; Exhibit P-72, Document book 23, tab 12. The English version of the card is Exhibit P-70.1 and Exhibit P-203, Document book 53, tab 4. The French version is Exhibit P-203, Document book 53, tab 4, and Exhibit P-267.
24. Exhibit P-203.2, Document book 53B, tab 3.
25. Testimony of CWO (ret) C.L. Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, pp. 21032–21034.
26. Exhibit P-72, Document book 23, tab 12; Exhibit P-73, Document book 24, tab 6. The advance party had no French version at their departure for Somalia from December 13, 1992 on; only English texts of the ROE and the first version of the aide-mémoire existed at that time.
27. Testimony of Maj J.G. Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20285.
28. Exhibit P-70, Document book 21, tab 16.
29. Exhibit P-203, Document book 53, tab 4; Exhibit P-203.2, Document book 53B, tab 3.
30. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20642.
31. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21359.
32. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21353. When the de Faye Board of Inquiry (CARBG) visited Somalia in the spring of 1993, Maj Pommet's familiarity with the ROE reportedly impressed the Board's members favourably (Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 1).
33. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21359.
34. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34728.
35. Headquarters, United States Department of the Army, *Peace Operations* (December 1994), Annex D, Sample Rules of Engagement: Rules of Engagement for Operation Restore Hope, pp. 90, 92.

36. Exhibit P-31.2, General Court Martial of Capt Rainville; testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 11, p. 2133.
37. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 11, pp. 2100, 2132–2133.
38. Testimony of LCol Labbé, Transcripts vol. 164, p. 33368.
39. Exhibit P-203.1, Document book 53A, tab 4.
40. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 114, pp. 22976–22977.
41. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 28, pp. 5299–5300.
42. See the testimony of Maj Pommet in this regard, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21326–21329.
43. Testimony of Sgt Groves, Transcripts vol. 112, pp. 22460–22462.
44. Exhibit P-203.1, Document book 53A, tab 4, DND 287752.
45. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 11, pp. 2039–2040.
46. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 170, pp. 35033–35034.
47. Exhibit P-242.4, Document book 48A, tab 6, DND 014618.
48. Exhibit P-203.1, Document book 53A, tab 4, DND 287749.
49. Indeed, throughout the month of February, Somalis who attempted to breach the wire were regularly shot at. This even resulted in a dangerous exchange of friendly fire when soldiers in Service Commando shot at a thief and the bullet passed through the lines of 1 Commando (testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21405–21407).
50. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20042–20043.
51. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20043; Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 115, pp. 23202, 23207; and MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20624–20626.
52. DND, “Brief for the Inquiry”, pp. 9/15–15/15.
53. Exhibit P-203.1, Document book 53A, tab 4, DND 287754.
54. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10093–10094.
55. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21424. See also letter, Maj Seward to his wife, expressing concern that soldiers were being asked to shoot at children, Document book 53A, tab 26, DND 015255.
56. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20059.
57. Testimony of MWO O’Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, p. 21802.
58. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20767.
59. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 108, p. 21643.
60. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 115, pp. 23207–23208.
61. Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 170, p. 34985.
62. General Court Martial of LCol J.C.A. Mathieu, Exhibit P-34.2, vol. 2, pp. 373, 390–392.
63. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 114, p. 22756.
64. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 114, p. 22756.
65. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, p. 103, p. 20401.
66. Testimony of WO Ashman, Transcripts vol. 122, pp. 24697–24698.
67. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20693–20695.
68. Testimony of Cpl Chabot, Transcripts vol. 120, p. 24185.
69. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9568.
70. Testimony of LCol Labbé, Transcripts vol. 164, p. 33368.
71. Testimony of Capt (ret) Rainville, Transcripts vol. 144, p. 29343.
72. Testimony of Sgt Plante, Transcripts vol. 134, pp. 27072–27076, and vol. 135, p. 27365.
73. Testimony of MCpl Leclerc, Transcripts vol. 140, pp. 28432–28434.

74. Testimony of VAdm Murray, Transcripts vol. 152, p. 31045.
75. Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 1.
76. Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 2.
77. Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 1.
78. Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 1.
79. Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 1.
80. Copy of LCol Mathieu's field notes, Document book 48X, tab 1, DND 298719, and Document book 48V, tab 3, DND 295998. The electronic transcription is inaccurate, and the wording has been verified from the original.
81. Letter, MGen de Faye to Chief of the Defence Staff and Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 1.
82. Letter, MGen de Faye to CDS and DCDS.
83. Exhibit P-242.29, Document book 48AB, tab 1.
84. DND 447282 (unfiled document).
85. DND, Use of Force in CF, Joint and Combined Operations (B-GG005-004/AF-005, 2 volumes, 1995, unfiled document).
86. Australian Defence Force Publication, vol. 3 (August 25, 1992).



OPERATIONAL READINESS

The true measure of the state of well-being of the Canadian Forces (CF) is the readiness of the units and elements for employment in their assigned roles, tasks, and missions. Operational readiness, therefore, is a defining military concept. It is as vital to understanding the health of the armed forces as taking a pulse is to assessing the well-being of the human body.

The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and subordinate commanders are responsible and accountable for the operational readiness of the CF. This responsibility is particularly significant whenever units or elements of the CF are about to be committed to operations that are potentially dangerous, unusual, or of special importance to the national interest. Therefore, it is incumbent on officers in the chain of command to maintain an accurate picture of the state of the armed forces at all times and to assess the operational readiness of CF units and elements for employment in assigned missions before they can be deployed on active service or international security missions.

READINESS: AN ASPECT OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Assessments and declarations of operational readiness are part of the military operational planning process and cannot be viewed separately from it. The statement of the mission issued in operational orders (or defence plans) begins the planning process. A declaration by a commander that a unit is operationally ready indicates that the planning process is complete and that the unit is prepared to undertake its assigned mission. At every level of the chain

of command, the declaration of operational readiness closes the loop of planning responsibility when the officer tasked to carry out a mission reports the readiness of units to the officer who ordered the mission.

Operational readiness is defined as "the state of preparedness of a unit...to perform the missions for which it is organized or designed."¹ In the army, readiness is closely associated with operational effectiveness, that is, with "the degree to which operational forces are capable of performing their assigned missions in relation to known enemy capabilities."² These definitions highlight two critical considerations implicit in the idea of operational readiness. First, readiness is relevant and measurable only in relation to the unit's assigned mission. Obviously, if a unit has no mission, then there is nothing against which to assess readiness. If a unit has a very general mission, measurements of its standard of readiness can only be general. However, as the mission becomes more specific, so too does the assessment of readiness.

Second, assessing and determining operational readiness is a function of command and was confirmed as such by the CDS in 1992.³ Because commanding officers at all levels are responsible and accountable for the accomplishment of missions assigned to them and for missions they assign to their subordinate units, they are also accountable for the operational readiness of units to accomplish those missions. As MGen Dallaire described to us, "the military leader has undivided responsibility for subordinates; for all that they do or fail to do and a personal responsibility that they accomplish the assigned mission."⁴

According to the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board,⁵ operational effectiveness is "essentially qualitative but must include the quantitative aspect as well. Strategic and tactical doctrine, leadership, and morale are all factors contributing to operational effectiveness and are part of the equation" as much as numbers of personnel and equipment.⁶ Senior officers, and especially commanding officers, are required to define operational readiness in terms that can be translated into training objectives and that can be used for subsequent assessments. Although the assignment of a mission is the *sine qua non* for assessing operational readiness, the mission statement alone is rarely a sufficient indication of the standard of readiness expected of units unless units are repeating the most basic of operations or well-understood and practised missions. In all other cases, senior commanders and commanding officers must clearly define for their subordinates the skills and functions that must be mastered and the standards by which those skills and functions will be measured in relation to specific missions.

MAIN ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

Although there do not appear to be standards or criteria for measuring operational readiness in CF units, certain elements of operations provide categories that reasonable commanders would check to ensure that units under their command were ready for operations. An operational-ready unit would have:

- a clearly defined mission;
- a well-defined concept of operations appropriate to the mission;
- well-trained and experienced officers and junior leaders;
- a unit organization appropriate to the mission;
- weapons and equipment appropriate to the mission;
- adequate training of all ranks in tactics, procedures, operations of weapons and equipment, and command and control appropriate to the mission;
- a well-organized and practised system for the command and control of the unit in operations;
- logistics and administrative support appropriate to the mission; and
- good morale, strict and fair discipline, and a strong sense of cohesion and internal loyalty.

ASSESSING OPERATIONAL READINESS

Operational missions are usually too complex for a commander to make a valid assessment without measuring detailed objective standards and without the aid of competent staff officers. The nature of the mission and the experience of the unit members will greatly influence the detail of the commander's operational evaluations. If, for example, the mission is routine and the unit has a proven ability to accomplish it, then readiness inspections might be cursory. On the other hand, if the mission is in any major respect unusual, or if the unit or the commander is inexperienced in the type of mission or in the circumstances in which it will be undertaken, then the assessment of readiness must be meticulous. Therefore, before commanders assign a mission to a unit, they must know the criteria for accomplishing the mission and the standards of readiness necessary to achieve it. They must then communicate these criteria and standards to their subordinates and establish means to ensure that they have been met before the mission is launched.

In army doctrine and custom, the criteria for defining classical military missions are well understood. Army officers easily comprehend typical tactical missions, for example, 'to capture Hill 220' or 'to defend the bridge at River X'. However, when missions arise that are outside doctrine and experience, it is necessary to define precisely what 'mission accomplished' means, and to specify the means and methods to achieve that goal. These important techniques are taught at CF command and staff colleges.

Officers are taught that a mission analysis is a function of command and a key part of the planning process. It is undertaken:

...to ensure a full understanding of the mission, the essential tasks to accomplish that mission, and the underlying purpose of those tasks.

To fully understand this mission, the commander must have a thorough appreciation of the purpose of his mission, the essential conditions or tasks which must be achieved to successfully accomplish the mission and the desired outcome or end state of the mission in the context of future operations. The commander must, therefore, know the intent (purpose, concept of operations, and end state) of his immediate superior commander and the commander two levels higher. This will provide the commander with the overarching framework to determine what must be accomplished and in what sequence to trigger the necessary chain of events to achieve the mission within the overall operational plan.

Mission analysis is a dynamic process, which allows the mission to be continuously evaluated in the context of the current situation. The superior commander's intent has primacy over the assigned mission. In the face of an unforeseen, fundamental change in the operational situation, the commander must determine [from his superior commander] if the original mission is still valid. If not, he must be prepared to act as he would expect his superior commander to direct were he aware of the situation.⁷

A commander, however, may not change the intent of his superior commander's orders without reference to that commander if it is possible to alert him to the new situation.

THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF OPERATIONAL READINESS FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Peace support operations have been difficult to define as a class of military missions. Operations within peace support missions have become increasingly untidy, and experience in one theatre and in one type of mission might not be relevant to another theatre or mission. According to MGen MacKenzie, the

types of UN traditional peacekeeping missions in which the CF had taken part over more than 32 years, in Cyprus for instance, "caused little concern in the senior headquarters that the unit going there was ready."⁸ There was always adequate training time and the mission was in most senses routine. However, in MGen MacKenzie's opinion, "the world changed at the end of the Cold War.... The Cambodian, the Rwandan, Croatian, Bosnian, Somalian [sic] missions were all very, very, different" from anything the CF had experienced on previous peacekeeping missions.⁹

Among other things, peace support operations are often complicated by political situations that make it hard for soldiers to determine one protagonist from another and combatants from non-combatants. How rules of engagements are to be applied in such circumstances may be uncertain. Whereas in open warfare soldiers may not need to know a great deal about the cultural situation they face, in peace support operations knowledge of the cultural situation might be the most critical factor. In peace support operations, discretion and the consequences of error at the most junior level of command may be of paramount importance, where normally they would be of little consequence. For these and other reasons, the readiness of soldiers and units about to be deployed on peace support operations must be assessed differently than in conventional operational terms.

The mission of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS) was in every aspect outside Canada's previous experience. The objective assumed by Col Labbé in his operation order, for example, was "to conduct enforcement operations in Somalia to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations." However, there was, at the time, no CF or army doctrine for "enforcement operations." Moreover, Col Labbé took his mission from orders issued to United States armed forces and, according to the Board of Inquiry, Col Labbé's initiative "in this area, in most cases, was well ahead of [Canadian] policy."¹⁰

Similarly, although many witnesses testified that Operation Deliverance was a Chapter VII UN mission and not a usual Chapter VI mission, there is no evidence that any officer or planner considered the effect of this change in emphasis on the CJFS or issued instructions to prepare the CF for it. A unit prepared for a Chapter VI mission is not automatically operationally ready for a Chapter VII mission, or vice versa. The situation the CJFS faced on arriving in Somalia was unlike the situation commanders in Canada had assumed in their plan. This possibility should have been anticipated before the deployment, and Col Labbé should have been given orders confirming what the CJFS was to accomplish in such circumstances.

THE CF OPERATIONAL READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS SYSTEM

The CF had an overall reporting system called the Operational Readiness and Effectiveness System (ORES) in place at the time that Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance were planned. The ORES required commanders of commands to report to the CDS on the level of readiness of commands to meet missions and tasks assigned by the CDS.

As early as 1984, the Auditor General of Canada criticized the fundamental unreliability of the ORES, and the same finding was essentially repeated in 1994.¹¹ His 1994 observations are important not only because of the source, but also because they were "agreed" to by the CDS and Deputy Minister of DND.¹² However, we were amazed to find that even in 1992, the CF had no objective method to determine the operational readiness of units or formations.

The Auditor General of Canada reported that each command in the CF had its own method of reporting within the ORES process and that entire command reports could be adjusted by senior officers in NDHQ if they had a different perspective from that of the subordinate reporting commander. The result, according to the Auditor General, was that "instead of being primarily an objective and quantitative assessment of current readiness, ORES [was] mainly subjective."¹³

The Auditor General found that he could not duplicate the results reported by commands nor assess the reliability of the data in the ORES.¹⁴ It is important to note that the ORES process provided no checks on the chain of command and, therefore, commanders essentially audited their own operational readiness. The ORES was largely a quantitative measuring system and problems were identified by the rule of exception where "commanders reported only negative exceptions that [appeared] *significant to them*."¹⁵ In fact, the system reports were of a global nature and required additional judgements by officers in the chain of command before the final reports were submitted to the CDS.

The Auditor General found the general problems of the ORES were replicated in Land Force Command (LFC). He reported that "until 1994, LFC did not have standards to use in assessing units. Collective training provides some information on readiness, but LFC staff did not regard existing field exercises as adequate assessments."¹⁶ In other words, even though this serious problem had been brought to the attention of commanders years earlier, in 1992 the CF still did not have valid army exercises designed to assess the operational readiness of army units, elements, or commanders.

Internal Criticism of the ORES

External reports of deficiencies in the operational assessment process were supported by internal criticisms of operational evaluations by successive commanders of LFC. In a July 1991 letter to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS), VAdm George, LGen Gervais wrote that "my predecessors had serious misgivings which I share concerning the ORES system. In my view, the ORES does not meet its stated purposes, its methodology oversimplifies a very complex situation, and it is not a true statement of the operational readiness of my command." He continued, "in its present guise, ORES is not acceptable as it fails to achieve many useful purposes, its mechanics are flawed, and it does not take into account future uncertainties."¹⁷

Officers in NDHQ at about the same time had apparently already come to much the same conclusion. At a meeting chaired by Col R.S. Elrick, officers "suggested that there is no single central policy covering operational readiness, and readiness and sustainment [in the CF]. There is also no common focus for readiness matters in NDHQ.... Finally, there is no commonly recognized single source of direction for readiness matters."¹⁸

In August 1991, the DCDS acknowledged LGen Gervais' "frank and useful comments" and promised to raise the issue at the Defence Management Committee (DMC).¹⁹ Yet in March 1992, the CDS and the Deputy Minister reported "that further improvements [in the ORES] are essential."²⁰ They, subsequently issued direction on August 26, 1992 to refine the ORES process. The CDS and Deputy Minister acknowledged the criticisms of both the Auditor General and CF commanders, and stressed that the ORES was intended to close "the loop of responsibility for operational readiness by reporting back to the CDS on directed tasks." They confirmed also that the "ORES is a chain of command responsibility and...must continue to be managed at a senior level."²¹

Therefore, in 1991 and late 1992, the operational readiness reporting system in the CF, and especially in LFC, was regarded to be unsatisfactory and unreliable, even as a global information system. Certainly, the Commander LFC had no confidence in the system. Adm Anderson, who was Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) in 1992 and then CDS afterwards, wrote in his affidavit supporting LGen Addy that the development of the ORES system had "a long tortuous history in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence", and required further development, implying that the system was unreliable.²² Unfortunately, the ORES was the only central operational readiness reporting system available to the CDS and NDHQ staff officers before and during the planning for the deployment to Somalia.

Commanders and staff officers did form their own opinions regarding the readiness of units. However, these personal assessments, regardless of the technical competence of the observer, could not be relied upon as sound objective bases for measuring readiness over time because they were not tested against agreed criteria or controlled in any systematic way even within commands. The CDS does not have the time to inspect every unit in the CF personally and he, therefore, depended almost exclusively on the ORES or reports from his subordinate commanders. But there is no evidence of any meetings among the commanders to assess the state of operational readiness of LFC generally or the CAR and CARBG specifically at any time during the planning phase or before the deployment to Somalia.

ISSUES RELATED TO OPERATIONAL READINESS FOR SOMALIA

The CAR received the warning order for Operation Cordon in September 1992 and trained throughout the autumn of 1992 for that mission. The Regiment was declared operationally ready by the Commander Special Service Force on November 13, 1992. Subsequently, the CAR, regrouped into the CARBG, was warned for Operation Deliverance on December 5, 1992. It was declared operationally ready on December 16, 1992, after the deployment of the CARBG advance party.

Until the CARBG was tasked for Operation Deliverance, every activity, training event, decision, and operational and logistical plan at every level of command was aimed at preparing the CAR for operations near Bossasso where it would secure the local area for humanitarian relief operations.²³ The Commanding Officer and a large party of other officers completed a detailed reconnaissance of the region in mid-October 1992. Preparations for the operation were progressing according to the directions of BGen Beno during the autumn of 1992, but the lack of a firm deployment date tended to perplex the planning process. However, several serious problems in the CAR undermined the entire training and preparatory phase and hence, in our view, the state of unit readiness.

The Problems of Reorganization

The CAR was attempting to adjust to a LFC-imposed reorganization and reduction in strength throughout the summer of 1992. Besides reducing the CAR strength, these changes affected other aspects of the unit's system for

command and control, its rank structure, and methods of operation. Moreover, during this period the Commanding Officer, Col Holmes, was replaced by LCol Morneault, and in a matter of months LCol Morneault was replaced by LCol Mathieu. Also, many experienced soldiers left the CAR on annual rotation to home units. Between the warning and the declaration of readiness for Operation Cordon, several new personnel, including commanders at many levels, joined the now reduced Regiment.²⁴

During the preparatory period, several reserve force personnel who had no experience with the CAR were attached to the unit, presumably for duty in Somalia. They were not specifically requested by the Commanding Officer and their position in the unit remained unsettled as a result. As late as October 6, 1992, BGen Beno complained to LCol Morneault that he was very concerned with the placement of the reserve soldiers in the CAR and with the relationship of those soldiers with regular members of the CF.²⁵

Adaptation to Motorized Operations

As the mission and concept of operations for the CF in Somalia evolved during 1992, it became evident that the bare-bones CAR would have to be reinforced for the operation. Two commandos, therefore, were issued the Grizzly version of the CF Armoured Vehicle General Purpose (AVGP) to allow them to conduct motorized operations. This decision required a change in the concept of operations for the selected commandos. The addition of these vehicles added to the pre-deployment training burden, and introduced a new and unfamiliar factor to the unit's operations and logistical planning procedures.

First, the decision to add AVGPs to the unit was taken so late that little time was available for training drivers and commanders. Second, there were never enough vehicles to allow the Regiment to train in motorized operations as tactical sub-units, and very little tactical training of any type was conducted before Exercise Stalwart Providence. Maj Kyle, the CAR operations officer, testified that

for the subunit training, [the 16 available AVGPs were] not sufficient because there was only enough for one subunit to train at a time and then [they] had to be handed over, those groups of vehicles had to be handed over from commando to commando to the support platoons which added a huge time factor, an administrative factor, to our training and reduced the amount of hours the commandos could spend with the vehicles.

He testified also that the vehicles were almost impossible to use for training or operations. "We received some that weren't even operational at the time. We had to do maintenance to actually get them working."²⁶

Third, following the evaluation exercise, most members of the CAR were sent on embarkation leave and, therefore, were not available for AVGP training. Finally, the hasty assembly of AVGPs from across Canada and the demands of the loading and transportation plan for the deployment meant that few members of the unit worked with the actual vehicles they would use in Somalia until they arrived in theatre.²⁷

Following Stalwart Providence, the exercise director, LCol MacDonald, reported to BGen Beno that

it is critical that time be dedicated to mounted operations and specifically convoy operations. Drivers and crew commanders are not yet proficient with the AVGP and indeed in some cases there is still a hazard to themselves and others. The battalion was only briefly exposed to the complexities of convoy operations during the exercise and now they require practice and more practice.²⁸

The adaptation of the CAR to a motorized role was, therefore, neither complete nor adequate in the circumstances.

The Readiness of Leaders

The readiness for operations of unit leaders, both officers and non-commissioned officers, is a critical measure of a unit's state of readiness. Unit leaders, and especially officers, are expected to understand the unit's mission and to plan training and operations based on a clear concept of operations. They must set and enforce mission-specific operational standards for their troops and efficiently direct training towards these ends. Leaders, and especially non-commissioned officers, must set standards for discipline and enforce them rigorously. Finally, unit leaders must develop and maintain a high level of unit morale and work together to build unit cohesion. The readiness of leaders at all levels, therefore, is the key to unit cohesion, operational effectiveness, internal administration, and discipline.²⁹

Many officers and non-commissioned officers in the CAR were conscientious and effective leaders. However the CAR had serious problems before it went to Somalia that can only be attributed to the failures of a significant number of key leaders in the chain of command. At CFB Petawawa, and in Somalia later, officers and non-commissioned officers in the Regiment failed to ensure proper training of their troops and to control aggression; failed to ensure proper passage of information to soldiers; failed to enforce discipline; failed to maintain effective relationships with subordinate leaders; and failed to take remedial action to correct lapses in discipline in the regiment and the commandos.

Several witnesses testified that members of the CAR were undisciplined and, among other things, misused pyrotechnics, ammunition, and weapons; engaged in antisocial activities, such as the so-called Lepine party; and abused Red Cross workers in CFB Petawawa. However, the most serious and alarming event was the burning of the unit orderly sergeant's car by members of the CAR, an act that was plainly an attack on the authority of their superiors.

Commanders and leaders were not only unable to maintain good order and discipline in the CAR, but they were also unable to resolve these problems satisfactorily before the CAR departed for Somalia. Even as late as October 19, 1992, BGen Beno complained to MGen MacKenzie that "the battalion has significant unresolved leadership and discipline problems which I believe challenge the leadership of the unit."³⁰ However, no effective action was taken by any officer in the chain of command to root out this disruptive informal leadership in the ranks.

Problems were evident at all levels. LCol Morneault appeared distant from his troops and preparation for the mission. CWO Jardine, the Regimental Sergeant-Major, testified that LCol Morneault was overly concerned with administrative details and visited training only occasionally.³¹ He and LCol Morneault argued about the readiness of the unit and the Regimental Sergeant-Major openly contradicted the Commanding Officer in front of the warrant officers and sergeants.³²

LCol Morneault was not the only officer whose ability as a leader was questioned by senior officers and others. Senior officers and some senior non-commissioned officers did not trust Maj Seward nor consider him fit for duty in Somalia.³³ BGen Beno remarked that he "would fire Seward based on [his] observations and what [he] heard from [LCol] MacDonald", the director of Exercise Stalwart Providence, but nothing was done.³⁴

Other officers who held important positions in the Regiment were of concern also. Capt Rainville, commanding the CAR Reconnaissance Platoon, was another problem officer. Capt Rainville had a record of poor judgement and misconduct before his posting to the CAR, a situation known by both LCol Morneault and LCol Mathieu prior to the deployment of the CAR to Somalia. As well, Maj Mackay was perceived as a weak Deputy Commanding Officer by BGen Beno and CWO Jardine.³⁵

Officers were not the only ones described as poor leaders in the CAR. In 2 Commando, in particular, many non-commissioned officers were young and inexperienced: two were found unsuitable and were returned to their parent units six months after they were posted to the CAR. A third non-commissioned officer failed to report a soldier he knew was involved in an unlawful activity. Two privates were invited by NCOs not to co-operate with

a military police investigation of the October incidents. The Regimental Sergeant-Major, according to the evidence, was not trusted by some soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers.

Indeed, leadership problems were so great that in late 1992 BGen Beno identified as risks the Deputy Commanding Officer, the Officer Commanding 2 Commando and the Officer Commanding the Reconnaissance Platoon.³⁶ Further, he suggested that as many as 12 non-commissioned officers among 25 soldiers be moved internally before the Regiment went to Somalia.³⁷ Thus during the pre-deployment period, the CAR was known to have significant leadership problems in the Commanding Officer, in 2 Commando, and in the regimental Reconnaissance Platoon. Therefore, by the army's own criteria for assessing the leadership aspects of operational readiness, the CAR and two of its main elements, 2 Commando and the Reconnaissance Platoon, were not operationally ready.³⁸

In his letter of October 19, 1992 recommending LCol Morneault's replacement, BGen Beno wrote that LCol Morneault must be replaced "forthwith" because "for many reasons the CAR is not a steady unit at this time" mainly because of leadership problems. Furthermore, BGen Beno declared that he was "not prepared to declare the CAR operationally ready as long as LCol Morneault remains its commanding officer".³⁹ On October 21, 1992, LCol Morneault was relieved of command of the CAR. This action was taken by superior officers, including BGen Beno, MGen MacKenzie, and LGen Gervais. It is clear to us, however, that the problems of leadership in the CAR in the autumn of 1992 were common throughout the Regiment and were not centred exclusively on LCol Morneault.

Training Readiness

Once the warning order for Operation Cordon was issued, the CAR dedicated itself to mission-specific training. In the weeks that followed, however, it became increasingly obvious to commanders and other officers that training was not progressing well or according to a clear plan. These problems arose in part from the failures of leaders and also from the confusion surrounding the mission and the deployment date.⁴⁰

The Commander LFC, LGen Gervais, was informed in mid-September 1992 that training in the CAR was slipping.⁴¹ By the end of September, according to BGen Beno, the general level of training was low and several specific tactics and skills had not yet been reviewed within the commandos.⁴² Officers noted that battle group training was incomplete, had not been conducted under the direction of the commanding officer, and had not been successful in ensuring that "individual commandos were conducting tasks and operations in similar fashions and to similar standards".⁴³

Training standards and plans in the CAR were often incoherent and not always productive. The CAR training plans and the activities of the soldiers in the field were often disorganized and conducted without reference to a specific mission or operating procedures. The Commanding Officer was criticized by BGen Beno who wrote that LCol Morneau did not understand the "drills that might be necessary in the performance of task specific operations...nor did he fully understand...how he might best prepare his battalion for these [UN] missions".⁴⁴ LCol Morneau was also worried about the state of training and twice cautioned Maj Seward about the activities of 2 Commando.

These concerns were partly substantiated in mid-October during the CAR test exercise, Stalwart Providence. The exercise was intended to confirm the readiness of the CAR for Operation Cordon by subjecting the unit and its members to realistic situations drawn from the mission-specific tasks. During the exercise, the CAR experienced several difficulties related to its proposed mission. The exercise after-action report prepared by LCol MacDonald highlighted serious problems in the CAR. For example, LCol MacDonald raised "key concerns" about the unit's inability to pass information along the chain of command, lack of cohesion, insufficient vehicle training, and weak tactical skills. He also mentioned certain leadership problems in the chain of command, especially regarding Maj Seward.⁴⁵

At the end of the exercise, according to his testimony, BGen Beno stated "that the battalion was not trained prior to exercise Stalwart Providence to the manner in which LCol Morneau and [he] had agreed it would be trained."⁴⁶ Yet we found that no effective action was taken to correct these training failures and to retest the CAR or the newly formed battle group. BGen Beno testified that it was too late in October 1992 to start retraining the commandos and the unit because the deployment date was fast approaching.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, he concluded on October 18, 1992 that the "unit is marginally prepared for its operational task but internal problems of leadership, command and control, and cohesiveness continue",⁴⁸ and he declared the unit operationally ready despite these serious misgivings.

The rules of engagement (ROE) were a critical part of the concept of operations for the CAR in Somalia, and we discuss them in detail in Chapter 22. Unfortunately, the ROE for the operation remained unsettled until after the majority of the unit and the CARBG for Operation Deliverance had arrived in theatre. As a result, there was no actual training on the ROE before the unit's departure for Somalia. Indeed, the advance party only received its copy of the ROE aide-mémoire on boarding a bus at CFB Petawawa.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, LGen Gervais testified that he declared the unit operationally ready, although "the issue of rules of engagement did not come to my attention at Land Force Command Headquarters".⁵⁰

Unit Discipline and Cohesion

Unit cohesion is the product of leadership, training, and high morale and gives members of a unit the feeling that they can depend implicitly on their comrades. A strongly cohesive unit tends to act together and respond predictably to the direction of its formal leaders. That sense of predictability gives a unit its strength, especially in times of stress. On the other hand, a unit lacking in cohesion tends to act unpredictably, often at the direction of informal leaders, again, most notably when the unit is under stress. Therefore, fostering unit cohesion is a cardinal responsibility of leaders, and the degree of unit cohesion is a key measure of operational readiness.

Leaders encourage and build unit cohesion continuously, especially during training exercises. Cohesion is built and maintained by emphasizing group loyalty and identification through ceremonies, common traditions, unique uniforms, and distinct practices. When a unit is warned for an operation, a commanding officer must make an extra effort to bring the unit together by providing a clear purpose for the unit's mission and by reinforcing, in training, unified and unifying procedures, orders, tactics, and other operating methods. It is critical during this period to demonstrate and exercise the formal leadership system or chain of command to establish confidence in the leaders and to eliminate questions about who is directing the unit in the field.⁵¹

Any experienced officer asked to measure the cohesion of a unit would, therefore, look for evidence that members of the unit at all levels understand the unit's mission and perform their tasks according to agreed standing operating procedures; and that orders and directions are flowing through the unit from top to bottom in an efficient and effective manner. In a phrase, one would expect to see the unit acting predictably as a unit. According to BGen Beno, "the criteria which [he] used to declare the Canadian Airborne operationally ready were essentially training...leadership, morale, and administrative preparations...were they operating as a regiment? [I am] talking cohesion, training, leadership and morale".⁵²

But by these criteria, unit cohesion was obviously weak in the CAR. The CAR, and especially 2 Commando, had, in the words of the Commander Special Service Force (SSF), "significant unresolved...discipline problems which I believe challenge the leadership of the unit".⁵³ There is no more telling symptom of lack of discipline in any military unit than challenges to its leaders from the rank and file. In such units there can be no confidence in the likely response of soldiers to orders issued by their officers and non-commissioned officers, especially when the unit is under stress.

The instances of indiscipline in the CAR were numerous and widespread. Prior to the deployment of the Regiment to Somalia, Canadian Airborne soldiers were implicated in an unusually high rate of service offences ranging

from simple assault and drunkenness to arson. There is evidence that members of the unit had committed weapons-related offences, ranging from the possession of restricted weapons to the discharging of pyrotechnics stolen from the CF. Members of the unit also showed a lack of self-discipline and aggressiveness towards officers and individuals from outside the CAR. For example, the unit embarrassed itself and the SSF when several soldiers refused to provide blood samples and acted rudely toward Red Cross workers.⁵⁴

Since its inception, the CAR was organized around concepts that detracted from its cohesion as a regiment. It was established in three distinct commandos based on the three parent infantry units of the regular force. This idea emphasized the commandos at the expense of the regiment and weakened somewhat the authority and prestige of the commanding officer and his staff in the eyes of the soldiers in the commandos. The notion that the Regiment would be used primarily in independent commando operations further weakened the regimental concept in the CAR and discouraged the development of regimental operating procedures and unity of command. When the CAR was reorganized in 1991–92, these problems were carried essentially unchanged into the new Airborne unit.

During the preparatory phase of Operation Cordon, the unit continued to act and train as separate commandos and not according to a strongly directed unit plan or as part of a cohesive regiment. Indeed, this was a major criticism of the CAR and it was a situation that continued in Somalia. The continuation of the separation of the commandos from each other — and in some respects from the regimental headquarters — while the unit was preparing for a common mission, had a strongly detrimental effect on the state of leadership, discipline and morale in the Regiment.⁵⁵

By mid-October, following Exercise Stalwart Providence, the exercise director, LCol MacDonald, reported that the CAR was still not functioning as a unit.⁵⁶ His remarks were supported by BGen Beno who complained that the commandos were operating “independently”; that there were few standardized drills for operational situations; that the chain of command was “extremely poor”; and that serious “internal problems of leadership, command and control, and cohesiveness continue”.⁵⁷ By BGen Beno’s own standards, therefore, the elements needed to build unit cohesion in the CAR were very frail and the state of cohesion, not surprisingly, was low. Yet BGen Beno declared the Regiment operationally ready for deployment less than a month later.

Evidence of low unit cohesion in the CAR immediately before its deployment to Somalia was presented to our Inquiry by other witnesses as well. Besides other indicators of poor relations and cohesion within the CAR, they described a significant degree of tension and distrust between some officers and non-commissioned members. For example, the company sergeant-majors

lacked respect for the Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO Jardine. Maj Seward, almost from the day he arrived to command 2 Commando, was in conflict with CWO Jardine, MWO Mills, and Capt Kyle. It was reported that many senior non-commissioned officers in 2 Commando argued repeatedly with MWO Mills and would not follow his directions.

Generally, the officers and NCOs were divided between loyalty to the CAR and their own commandos, but even in some commandos rivalries and personal conflicts worked against cohesion at that level. For example, WO Murphy testified that distrust in the leadership in the Regiment was "causing dissension amongst the NCOs."⁵⁸

Administrative Readiness

Operation Cordon in itself would have been a complex operation, requiring considerable adjustment to the CAR and the marshalling of CF resources from across Canada to support the unit in the field. While the CAR was completing its training for the mission, other headquarters and units were responding to the needs of the operation. Commanders in the SSF and the CAR were not particularly concerned with the personal readiness of the soldiers who were going to Somalia because the members of the CAR were checked through an established personnel readiness system and, for the most part, this activity had been completed successfully by early November 1992.

The CF, however, experienced certain difficulties in providing quickly some resources requested by the CAR. On October 20, 1992, MGen MacKenzie was informed that, except for individual training for some soldiers augmenting the force from outside the CAR, training for Operation Cordon was complete. He accepted, without assessing for himself, that the CAR could now be employed as part of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). But, as the evidence before us shows, the CAR was not prepared administratively because of shortfalls related to personnel, equipment, and vehicles.⁵⁹ On November 10, 1992, BGen Beno confirmed this fact when he told MGen MacKenzie that he was "not yet prepared to declare the CAR ready for deployment as part of UNOSOM" because of administrative deficiencies in the unit or plan. Among other things, the unit had not loaded transportation sea containers, did not have certain engineer vehicles, and some units were still short of personnel.⁶⁰ Despite the seriousness of these shortfalls — and they would become clearly evident in theatre — no action was taken to delay the deployment until these matters could be rectified.

DECLARATION OF OPERATIONAL READINESS: OPERATION CORDON

According to the LFC Contingency Plan for Operation Cordon⁶¹ and as confirmed by LFC operations order of November 26, 1992,⁶² the Commander LFCA, MGen MacKenzie, was ordered by the Commander LFC, LGen Gervais, to declare "in writing" the CAR operationally ready for Operation Cordon at his discretion. MGen MacKenzie delegated this responsibility to the commander SSF, BGen Beno, on November 5, 1992.⁶³ In his orders, LGen Gervais defined operational readiness as "the capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. [The term] may be used in a general sense or to express a level or degree of readiness."⁶⁴ BGen Beno repeated this definition in his orders of November 26, 1992.⁶⁵

The determination of the operational readiness of the CAR rested mainly on BGen Beno's personal assessment of the unit. In his testimony, BGen Beno stated that, in his experience, there was no CF checklist or criteria by which to assess a unit's operational readiness. He testified, however, that "cohesion, training, leadership and morale" were the key measures he used to decide the operational readiness of the CAR.⁶⁶

The Commander SSF evaluated the CAR throughout the pre-deployment period and seemed eager to make a declaration of readiness. On October 20th he informed MGen MacKenzie that "[training] for Op Cordon is complete less [individual training] for some external augmentees...[and therefore] the Cdn AB Regt battle group could now be [employed] as part of UNOSOM" even though "the battle [group] is not [administratively] ready to deploy".⁶⁷ On November 10th in response to a query from LFCA asking for a declaration of operational readiness for Operation Cordon, BGen Beno replied that he was "not yet prepared to declare the CDN AB Regt op ready for [deployment]".⁶⁸ He was still concerned about certain administrative shortages but again he declared that he was prepared to send the CAR to Somalia even though the unit "may have to deploy without all the [equipment] it has [requested]".⁶⁹

Three days later, on November 13, 1992, again without resolution of the outstanding administrative problems, BGen Beno declared the CAR Battle Group "[operationally] ready to conduct [assigned] tasks as part of UNOSOM". MGen MacKenzie at LFCA and LGen Gervais at LFC concurred in this assessment without comment on November 16th and November 19th respectively.⁷⁰

From the evidence before us, BGen Beno's assessments of operational readiness, especially in later October 1992, are surprisingly inconsistent. His declaration of October 20th that the CAR could be employed as part of

UNOSOM is clearly inconsistent with the fact that on October 19th he wrote to MGen MacKenzie requesting in very strong tones the replacement of LCol Morneault "forthwith" because the CAR was not ready. BGen Beno supported his request for LCol Morneault's dismissal by noting that

the battalion has not been adequately trained as a general purpose infantry battalion;

the companies have not been trained and assessed by the commanding officer prior to beginning a battalion exercise;

operational matters directly applicable to the task at hand (Op Cordon — UNOSOM Somalia) have not been developed to the standard possible, expected and required;

the battalion has significant unresolved leadership and discipline problems which I believe challenge the leadership of the unit; and

the unit has major internal problems in regards to command and control; cohesion, standardization, administration and efficiency.⁷¹

The CAR, according to BGen Beno, "is clearly not 'operational' and will not be so until the aforementioned problems are resolved". BGen Beno concluded, nevertheless, that "there is potential to turn things around quickly in the Canadian Airborne Regiment if there is good leadership at the top".

Furthermore, after making this declaration on October 20th, BGen Beno wrote, in an aide-mémoire dated October 21, 1992, "Assessment: The Cdn AB Regt is not ready for OP Cordon."⁷² Then, on October 22, 1992, BGen Beno wrote to MGen MacKenzie emphasizing that "the [CAR] was not trained sufficiently to deal with task specific missions. The unit is marginally prepared for its operational task but internal problems of leadership, command and control, and cohesiveness continue."⁷³

Even if faith in "good leadership" were affirmed as the cure for the ills of the CAR, it does not justify a declaration of operational readiness before the cure has been demonstrated. Without such a demonstration, commanders along the chain of command had to base their assessments and decisions concerning the CAR on the double assumption that LCol Morneault's replacement, LCol Mathieu, was a good leader in the situation and that his arrival in CFB Petawawa would spontaneously rectify the problems that BGen Beno had observed. We do not believe that these were reasonable assumptions in the circumstances.

To what degree was LCol Mathieu a better leader than LCol Morneault? This question was never answered in testimony and might be unanswerable in fact. Although LCol Mathieu was an experienced Airborne officer, he had no experience as a battalion commander, and no officer who recommended him for command vouched for his ability to turn an unsteady unit around within days. When LGen Gervais was asked whether LCol Mathieu

"was chosen as the best candidate to specifically deal with the situation at the Canadian Airborne at the time in October of 1992" he implied that the requirement was not the main criterion for LCol Mathieu's selection as commanding officer. LGen Gervais testified that LCol Mathieu "was the best candidate because of his experience, having been a deputy commander of the Airborne...[and] because, in my estimation, I didn't want to have somebody who was brand new to the unit's method of operation...LCol Mathieu on recommendation to me appeared to fit those requirements."⁷⁴

In effect, the decision to place LCol Mathieu in command of the CAR was based on the assumption that his good record as a subordinate officer in the CAR was sufficient indication that he could handle the new and challenging position of commanding officer.⁷⁵ In fact, LCol Mathieu was selected to command the CAR by some of the same officers who had only months before selected LCol Morneault to command the CAR using essentially the same criteria. Moreover, LCol Mathieu's selection was influenced greatly by the appeal of MGen Roy from the Royal 22^e Régiment to allow a regimental officer to redress the apparent embarrassment caused to the Royal 22^e Régiment by LCol Morneault's dismissal.⁷⁶

In addition, political considerations, as perceived by senior commanders, pertaining to the referendum in Quebec and the need to have a Francophone as commanding officer of the CAR had a significant influence on the selection process.⁷⁷ Finally, the availability of an officer and the anticipated effect of this unexpected posting on that officer's career were critical criteria for selecting a new commanding officer.⁷⁸ Thus, rather than the needs of the unit and the mission, it was extraneous issues and the careerist attitude of senior commanders and staff officers that were the paramount considerations in the appointment of an officer to replace LCol Morneault.⁷⁹

There is little evidence that commanders and staff officers made a special effort to confirm that LCol Mathieu was the good leader BGen Beno needed to "turn things around quickly in the Canadian Airborne Regiment."⁸⁰ Indeed, LGen Gervais' testimony suggests that he was only vaguely aware of the serious disciplinary problems that BGen Beno listed as one of the main reasons for relieving LCol Morneault of command.⁸¹ MGen MacKenzie confirmed that the underlying training and disciplinary problems in the CAR were not given any special consideration when he and other senior officers accepted LCol Mathieu over other contenders to command the CAR in the autumn of 1992.⁸² When MGen MacKenzie was asked if any of his superiors directed him to find out specifically whether existing discipline problems had been resolved, he answered "no." He added that he put "a fair amount of faith" in BGen Beno's assurances that the problems were being addressed by moving people to different positions in the CAR.⁸³

MGen MacKenzie, according to his testimony, seemed at the time more preoccupied with the optics of regimental infighting and suspicions than with making a clear, objective analysis of the abilities of the contenders to solve the actual problems that existed in the CAR at the time.⁸⁴

Senior officers assumed that LCol Mathieu would be briefed by BGen Beno about the problems in the CAR after LCol Mathieu had taken command of the CAR. Consideration of the problems in the unit and the relative abilities of the commanding officer candidates to solve those problems were not part of the selection criteria.⁸⁵ In other words, commanders assumed that LCol Mathieu was a strong leader and that this characteristic alone would enable him to overcome serious, embedded problems in the Regiment. BGen Beno reinforced this assumption after LCol Mathieu took command by reporting that he "saw tremendous leadership in LCol Mathieu during the time that I was there. The unit ran extremely well. There were no problems that weren't dealt with in the traditional manner, swiftly, clearly, professionally and the unit pulled itself together quickly under Colonel Mathieu."⁸⁶

Thus, one must conclude, from BGen Beno's testimony, that in the 18 days between LCol Mathieu's assumption of command on October 26, 1992 and the declaration of operational readiness by BGen Beno on November 13, 1992, every outstanding training, leadership, unit cohesion, and discipline problem that BGen Beno cited as reasons not to declare the CAR operationally ready on October 19, 1992 had been resolved. One must keep in mind that LCol Mathieu did not even see the Regiment as a whole until November 9, 1992 and that the transformation of the CAR from an unfit unit to a fit unit, therefore, would have occurred in only four days.⁸⁷ According to Maj Seward, LCol Mathieu had no opportunity to conduct any meaningful training because most equipment had already been packed for shipment. Maj Seward considered the training that took place under LCol Mathieu's direction as simply "of a filler nature", training to fill time until the deployment began.⁸⁸

What decisions and actions, other than LCol Mathieu's talent as a leader, might account for this remarkable transformation? BGen Beno could cite only three isolated facts that demonstrated LCol Mathieu's effect in solving the unit's many problems. According to BGen Beno, staff work in the CAR improved, LCol Mathieu organized platoon level competitions to build unit cohesion, and demonstrations for visitors were well conducted. However, because most of the unit was on embarkation leave until mid-November, no unit level training was conducted under the new Commanding Officer.⁸⁹

Was BGen Beno under pressure from NDHQ or officers in the chain of command to declare the CAR ready before it was in fact ready? Certainly, someone in NDHQ was especially concerned about the readiness of the unit on November 13, 1992. On that day, Col O'Brien and Cmdre Cogdon, senior

operations staff officers at NDHQ, bypassed the chain of command and specifically asked BGen Beno about the state of readiness of the CAR for that mission. According to BGen Beno they stated that "they needed to know right away: Is the regiment operationally ready or not?" BGen Beno testified that "based on my judgment that [the CAR] would be [ready] within a few days, I declared them operationally ready on that day".⁹⁰ Nevertheless, BGen Beno testified that he did not see anything unusual in this procedure nor did he admit to being under pressure to make a positive declaration.⁹¹ However, he did admit in testimony that if he had not been able to declare the unit ready at the time, "it most definitely would" have reflected adversely on his leadership and command.⁹²

OPERATION DELIVERANCE

Operation Cordon was cancelled by NDHQ and a warning order for Operation Deliverance was issued to LFC on December 5, 1992. The commanders of LFCA and SSF were immediately warned by LFC of the impending new operation.⁹³ In effect, the warning order for Operation Deliverance negated a large portion of the planning, decisions, and actions that had been taken in preparation for Operation Cordon. According to Cmdre Cogdon, Canadian Operations Staff Branch (J3) Plans at NDHQ, when the change was announced, it occurred "so quickly that we...were not given the appropriate time to do the appropriate estimate, recce, [and to take a] real look at the forces required...".⁹⁴ While the staff could and did struggle to make do and to adjust their plans for the new operation, commanders appeared unconcerned about the effect of the changes and the abbreviated planning time on the actual state of readiness of the newly formed CARBG.

Although there were similarities between Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance, there were enough critical differences between them to raise the question of whether the operational readiness declaration made for Operation Cordon was valid for Operation Deliverance. As explained elsewhere in our report, Operation Deliverance involved a deployment of the CF on an uncertain mission, in a different region of Somalia, under new command arrangements, and with a completely changed force structure. Moreover, the CAR had just completed a stressful change of command and was still plagued with problems of leadership, unit cohesion, and discipline.

Perhaps the most significant change in plans, next to the replacement of LCol Morneault, was the regrouping of SSF units to form the CARBG under LCol Mathieu. LFC ordered the commander SSF to build the CARBG by adding a Cougar squadron, A Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons

(A Sqn, RCD), a mortar platoon from 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR), an engineer field squadron from 2 Canadian Engineer Regiment, and by making other minor changes to the CAR order of battle.

This reorganization alone should have provided ample reason and motive for commanders to reassess the readiness of the newly formed CARBG. First, the new sub-units had not been warned, trained, or tested for a mission outside Canada. According to Maj Kampman, OC A Squadron, RCD, his unit had considerable difficulty in preparing men and equipment for the deployment. Maj Kampman testified that when he received the order to go to Somalia out of the 18 Cougars in A Squadron, only about six or seven were operationally ready for deployment.⁹⁵ Second, the CAR had not trained with an armoured unit as part of its pre-deployment training and thus the CAR and A Squadron, RCD were not well known to each other.

The CARBG lacked cohesion at the moment of deployment because it had been in existence for less than a month and had never trained as a group. Maj Kampman testified that he was only warned for Operation Deliverance on December 3, 1992 and placed under command of the CAR on or about December 7th.⁹⁶ He had never worked with LCol Mathieu in the field; in fact he did not know him at all. He met his new Battle Group Commander on December 7th and it was only from that time that they began to make joint plans. A Squadron, RCD, however, never completed any "collective training with the rest of the Battle Group prior to deployment".⁹⁷ Therefore, there was no opportunity to build positive relationships between A Squadron, RCD and the CAR, nor was there any opportunity for soldiers in either unit to practise operational procedures as a battle group.⁹⁸

Maj Kampman was particularly concerned about his command relationship with the CAR because, as he testified, "I had never had an opportunity to work with the Airborne Regiment and I had not had an opportunity to build up that knowledge and trust that you would like to have between commanders within a battle group."⁹⁹ Indeed, Maj Kampman felt he was under considerable stress, not only because he had only had 10 or 12 days to prepare for deployment, but also because he did not understand the mission, had no clear explanation of the command arrangements in Somalia, and was provided with the barest of intelligence reports of the likely area of operations.¹⁰⁰

A Squadron, RCD also faced considerable administrative problems prior to deployment which Maj Kampman described as "controlled chaos".¹⁰¹ Maj Kampman testified that his vehicles were in a bad state of repair because before the warning order was issued "there was no plan [in the SSF] to take the Cougar into operations".¹⁰² The Squadron had to be reorganized just before deployment to meet the manning limitations imposed on the CARBG by NDHQ. Incredibly, the personnel selection in the Squadron "became very

much driven by the fact that we had to downsize the squadron to go on operations. The number of positions that I was allowed within the order of battle of the Battle Group was about 20 fewer positions than what I [Maj Kampman] actually had in peacetime."¹⁰³ Maj Kampman reported, as well, that "I had to cut a lot of my support logistics personnel that I would normally have taken as an integral part of the squadron."¹⁰⁴ This decision caused further disruption in the squadron and may have hampered operations in Somalia.

None of the problems Maj Kampman reported were caused by his own decisions or actions but were imposed on him as he tried to prepare his squadron for what he thought would be a combat mission in a distant land. Moreover, none of the problems Maj Kampman described were unique to his squadron. His CO, LCol MacDonald, knew the state of the armoured vehicles general purpose (AVGPs) in the squadron. Maj Kampman informed LCol Mathieu of the state of his squadron and they discussed problems associated with the hasty organization and lack of training in the Battle Group and especially the "problem" they were going to have with the rules of engagement because Maj Kampman's soldiers had not been trained on any rules whatsoever.¹⁰⁵

DECLARATION OF OPERATIONAL READINESS: OPERATION DELIVERANCE

The NDHQ operation order for Operation Cordon asked for a specific declaration of readiness from commanders. Officers at NDHQ, as already noted, were particularly concerned with the state of readiness of the CAR in November 1992. This attention was in sharp contrast to their attitude towards a readiness declaration for Operation Deliverance. The operation order from NDHQ did not ask for a declaration of operational readiness for Operation Deliverance, and no officer inquired of anyone to check the state of the unit until just before the advance party was deployed.¹⁰⁶

Despite the absence of a request for a declaration of operational readiness from the CDS, the Commander LFC confirmed in his operation order of December 9, 1992 his previous order to MGen MacKenzie to declare the CARBG "op ready for deployment".¹⁰⁷ His order was unmistakeable: MGen MacKenzie was to make a personal assessment of operational readiness of the CARBG before he made any declaration to LGen Gervais. It is unclear whether MGen MacKenzie gave a similar written or verbal order to BGen Beno. In any case, responsible and experienced commanders would realize that this order and the declaration itself were matters requiring their personal attention.

MGen MacKenzie stated before us that he was not aware of any order to declare units ready for Operation Deliverance — “the penny didn’t drop at the time”.¹⁰⁸ BGen Beno, in his testimony, stated that he “was never asked” to make a declaration of operational readiness for Operation Deliverance CARBG.¹⁰⁹ However, BGen Beno, in his own warning order to the commanding Officer of the CARBG, ordered LCol Mathieu to “inform the Comd SSF when the main body [is operationally] ready”.¹¹⁰ Moreover, BGen Beno must have been aware of LGen Gervais’ order to MGen MacKenzie to declare the CARBG operationally ready because he was an “info” addressee. He also referred to the LFC order in his own confirmatory orders to LCol Mathieu on December 10, 1992, but he did not repeat there his earlier order to LCol Mathieu that the Commanding Officer must inform him when the main body was ready.

Even though MGen MacKenzie had been specifically ordered by the Commander LFC to “prepare the Operation Deliverance Battle Group and declare them operationally ready to deploy”, we have no evidence that any direct action to comply with this order was ever taken. During his testimony, MGen MacKenzie admitted “in hindsight” that the November 13, 1992 declaration of operational readiness for Operation Cordon “might have been premature”.¹¹¹ Even though he admitted in testimony that the change in unit structure was significant, he left to BGen Beno all responsibility to assess and report on the operational readiness of the CARBG. In his opinion, if there were any problems in the SSF or the CARBG, then “by exception General Beno would certainly be on to me on that. I mean, the CDS and I were up there a week or two before they deployed, and if they weren’t operationally ready we’d certainly know about it.”¹¹²

Thus, despite significant changes to the orders, area of deployment, organization, and other plans for the mission, while in the midst of obviously truncated planning procedures, and without personally making a comprehensive review of the measures taken to redress the disciplinary, training, and administrative problems that plagued the CAR throughout the preparatory phase, there is no evidence that MGen MacKenzie asked BGen Beno before the deployment began if his units were ready for the mission to Somalia. Notwithstanding direct orders from his commander to make a declaration of readiness, MGen MacKenzie did not make a detailed assessment of the readiness of the CARBG, depending instead on the assumption that if something was amiss, then someone would tell him of that fact.

MGen MacKenzie testified that he issued no written declaration after November 13th and that he could not recall ever receiving a declaration from BGen Beno.¹¹³ However, notwithstanding the testimony of MGen MacKenzie and BGen Beno, the facts of the declaration of readiness for Operation Deliverance remain confused. NDHQ did ask for a confirmation of operational readiness by message to LFC Headquarters and SSF Headquarters on

December 10, 1992.¹¹⁴ BGen Beno's headquarters did issue a declaration on December 16, 1992.¹¹⁵ LFCA Headquarters, in turn, issued a declaration to the same effect within 24 hours¹¹⁶ and the Commander LFC forwarded a declaration to NDHQ on December 18, 1992.¹¹⁷ Therefore, either MGen MacKenzie and BGen Beno were confused in their recollection of this cardinal act of command or the declarations were composed and sent by subordinate staff officers in their absence or without their knowledge. In either case, the evidence strongly suggests that no useful assessments of the operational readiness of the units were made.

LGen Gervais realized when Operation Deliverance was announced that a new declaration of readiness would be necessary and issued orders to that effect. However, he accepted the declaration from MGen MacKenzie without confirming precisely that the serious problems leading to LCol Morneault's dismissal had been corrected. LGen Gervais stated in his testimony that he relied on the declarations of BGen Beno and MGen MacKenzie and issued his own declaration of readiness for the Battle Group in mid-December 1992 after the CARBG advance party had departed.¹¹⁸ He stated that, although he believed that the declaration "came up a little late, but never too late...and it gave an indication that this battle group was ready to be committed for deployment".¹¹⁹

The question of who declares units or elements of the CF destined for deployment overseas operationally ready and by what criteria is best summarized in an exchange between BGen Beno and MGen de Faye, President of the board of inquiry on the deployment to Somalia. MGen de Faye asked BGen Beno, "I'd just like to get on the record because we've asked a number of witnesses who have been unable to give us the specific information. And what I'd particularly like to know is, what the required readiness states are in operational terms as specified by LFC, to LFCA, to yourself in terms of the response for the Canadian Airborne Regiment." BGen Beno replied that he could not relate any "specific information" concerning readiness states or standards for the CAR.¹²⁰

FINDINGS

Criticisms of the process for operational readiness and effective assessments in the CF are directly relevant to two major issues before us — adequacy of operational planning within DND and the CF, and the suitability of the CAR and the CARBG for operations in Somalia.

- It is reasonable to conclude that because the Operational Readiness and Effectiveness System was known to be unreliable in 1991 and still under fundamental review in August 1992, all assessments of operational readiness of Land Force Command (LFC) or units in LFC based on the ORES in late 1992 were also unreliable. The only credible measure of operational readiness could have come from the direct inspection of units by officers in the chain of command. The most important criterion for judging the adequacy of the actions and decisions of commanders regarding assessments of the operational readiness of Somalia-bound units, therefore, is the effort commanders took to inspect units and commanders nominated for the Somalia operation. Did they adequately define an objective measure of readiness for the Somalia mission, clarify the mission statement, assign criteria for readiness testing, inspect the units, and oversee corrective actions?
- Clearly it was impossible for the Chief of the Defence Staff and his commanders at LFC and LFCFA to know the state of any unit without some reliable method for checking operational readiness. But the extant system was unreliable, and little effort was made to install a dependable process before the assessments for deployment commenced. Therefore, because they could not and did not know the 'start-state' of any unit in 1992, they could not reliably determine what training or other activities, including resupply of defective equipment, would be necessary to bring any unit to an operationally ready 'end-state' without a detailed inspection at unit level.

Moreover, because the specific mission for Operation Deliverance was not known in detail until after the Canadian Joint Force Somalia arrived in theatre, no specific assessment of mission-operational readiness and no assessment of operational effectiveness could be made before the force was deployed.

- These critical flaws in the planning process imply that the staff assessments and 'estimations' that were completed at all levels of command, and especially those prepared for the CDS at NDHQ which he used to advise the government on whether to commit the CF to Somalia, were essentially subjective and unreliable. Furthermore, these flaws and the lack of command and staff effort to verify the exact situation of units suggest strongly that subsequent planning and the decisions and actions of senior officers and officials were likewise arbitrary and unreliable.
- There is a fundamental confusion in NDHQ and the CF officer corps about the important distinction between a unit that is ready to be deployed and one that is ready to be employed on a military mission. The question that seems not to have been asked by any commander assessing unit readiness was "ready for what?" The failure to make specific findings of mission readiness and the confusion between readiness to deploy and readiness for operations are major problems in the CF.

- Obviously, during the pre-deployment period there was a serious breakdown of command in the CF and the LFC with respect to the assessment and declaration of the operational readiness of CF destined for operational duty in Somalia. The roots of this failure of command lie in the neglect of operational readiness generally by every officer in the chain of command.

First, the commanders did not establish clear standards of operational readiness for the CF, for LFC, for the UN peacekeeping standby unit, and for units tasked for Operation Deliverance in particular. This omission became most evident when the CF and, eventually, the CARBG were placed under the stress of a complex and, in some respects, unusual mission. There was no agreement or common understanding on the part of officers as to the meaning of the term "operational readiness". Therefore, because the term had no precise meaning in doctrine or policy, it came to mean whatever officers and commanders wanted it to mean at the time. In other words, any officer could declare a unit to be operationally ready without fear of contradiction because there were no standards against which to measure the declaration.

A second contributing factor to this failure of command stems from the notion held by officers in the chain of command that operational readiness is simply a subjective measurement and solely the responsibility of the commander on the spot. Commanders at all levels seemed content to accept on faith the declarations of their subordinates that the CAR and the CARBG were ready without seeking any concrete evidence that their readiness had been tested in a realistic scenario. MGen MacKenzie testified before us that "funny enough [readiness is] not a term we use...within the Army; historically, it is a commander's responsibility to evaluate [readiness]" according to his own standards.¹²¹ LGen Gervais concurred with this view when he described his own experience with declarations of readiness. He stated to us that "commanders are obviously responsible for these particular [declarations] pieces of paper...you don't necessarily always have to have a piece of paper, it can be done verbally, but it can also be done later on by the commander on the ground."¹²²

- Although Exercise Stalwart Providence, which was a type of tactical evaluation for Operation Cordon, revealed significant problems, no substantive effort was made to organize comprehensive training to correct these problems during the exercise or to test the results of remedial training after the exercise. Furthermore, no tactical evaluation was made for Operation Deliverance even though most important aspects of the mission, concept of operations and unit organization were different from those of Operation Cordon.

- Commanders were satisfied to attribute all failures of readiness to LCol Morneau's "poor leadership", even though other serious problems in the unit and in its preparations were evident. It is conceivable that a unit might not be ready in one instance but made ready in the next simply by changing the commanding officer. This, of course, is what was assumed to have happened in the CAR. While such a sequence might be possible when, for example, a commanding officer is found to be unfit and no other readiness problems exist, this was not the case in the CAR. Clearly, leaders failed to carry out a rigorous assessment in the field of all aspects of mission readiness of the CAR, and then the CARBG, after they issued orders to the unit. Leaders failed, therefore, in their primary duty as commanders.
- The lack of objective standards and evaluations, an unquestioning and unprofessional 'can-do attitude' among senior officers, combined with other pressures — such as a perception that superiors want to hurry the deployment — can bring significant pressure on commanders to make a readiness declaration that might not be made otherwise. There is enough evidence to suggest that this occurred during the preparation for Operation Deliverance. For instance, Cmdre Cogdon testified before the de Faye board of inquiry that in his opinion "we were reacting to a political imperative to make [Operation Deliverance] happen as quickly as we can, to jump on the bandwagon and to get in there... to get in there almost at the same time as the Americans could."¹²³ The only obstacle to such pressures and the dangers they carry is command integrity and, in this case, command integrity, especially at SSF, LFCA, and NDHQ was, in our view, fatally weak.
- In terms of organization, the CAR had two major defects that impaired its operational readiness. First, the unit was in the midst of a fundamental reorganization and change in concept of operation. This factor was aggravated by a higher than normal turnover of personnel during the annual CF "active posting season" of 1992 and the late decision to add militia soldiers to the CAR. Second, in late 1992 the CAR was directed to re-equip itself with a fleet of armoured vehicles general purpose and to adapt to motorized tactics with inadequate resources and a bare minimum of training time. The CAR was assumed to be suitable for immediate operations in a hostile environment before it had completed the LFC-directed changes and before the Commanding Officer had an opportunity to test the new structure in the field under his command.

The AVGP's were brought into the unit seemingly without careful consideration of the effect that action would have on the readiness of the unit. Even if the CAR had been operationally ready before it received the AVGP's, it could not have been so afterwards until these vehicles had been incorporated in all respects into the unit's plans and standing operating procedures. For these reasons

alone, officers in the chain of command ought to have been especially alert to signs that the CAR was under stresses that might undermine its operational readiness.

Clearly, the commanders of the SSF, LFCA, and LFC ought to have been aware of the state of the Cougar fleet, the fact that the AVGP (in any variant) was not a "combat vehicle"¹²⁴ and that logistical support for the Squadron would need to be carefully monitored. In other words, there was no reason for them to believe that a CF armoured squadron at a peacetime garrison status could be made operationally ready for a combat mission in a few days.

- If unit leaders do not understand their unit's mission or are unable or unwilling to plan and execute operationally relevant training programs, then the unit cannot become operationally ready for any mission. If unit leaders are unable or unwilling to set appropriate standards for operations and discipline, then the unit would be aimless and probably uncontrollable. Finally, if unit leaders do not lead their units, then the state of unit cohesion and morale will depend on the haphazard influences of circumstances and informal leaders. We are convinced that the measure of a unit's leaders provides a strong indication of the unit itself.

It is difficult to conclude, therefore, that a unit with serious internal problems of leadership and discipline and which had not been trained effectively as a battle group nor had time to train on a central element of its concept of operations — namely the rules of engagement — was operationally ready prior to deployment. Rather, the significant changes in the mission and the force to be deployed to Somalia should have alerted commanders to the need to reassess the readiness of the CAR and the more complex CARBG for service in Somalia.

- There were enough significant differences between the deployment plan for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance to alert prudent commanders to the need for a specific assessment and declaration of operational readiness of the CARBG to meet the demands of the new plan. BGen Beno admitted as much in his testimony. When asked "If you have a very tight time line; that is, in early December these two units, The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) and the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), are being told they are now going to be part of the battle group and they have literally days in which to prepare, is that not a situation where a superior officer like yourself should be deciding about operational readiness of the whole configuration, whether the whole unit can work together?" He answered "yes, it is."¹²⁵ Officers at LFC also understood the need to check the operational readiness of the CARBG, and in his orders, LGen Gervais ordered MGen MacKenzie to "identify, assemble and prepare the Operation Deliverance battle group and declare them ready for deployment".¹²⁶

Thus, immediately before deployment, commanders at all levels of the SSF, LFCA, LFC, and NDHQ had ample reason to check the operational readiness of the CARBG and few reasons to assume that it was operationally ready for the mission in Somalia. However, no effective actions were taken by any commander in the chain of command to make such an assessment or to respond to orders to do so.

- There are few more fundamental acts and responsibilities of command than preparing troops for operational missions in dangerous places. The declaration of operational readiness is the final hurdle troops must overcome before they confront their mission. That hurdle must be built and guarded by commanders. In preparing troops and units for Operation Deliverance, CF commanders in the chain of command failed in their responsibility to their superiors and to their troops. Leaders failed their superiors (including the people and Government of Canada) by not diligently checking the state of units as was their irreducible responsibility. They failed their soldiers and subordinate officers because they did not allow them the time to prepare properly for their mission and because they allowed them to venture onto a battlefield for which they were unfit. Whenever troops and units fail in the field because they are not fit and ready, then it is because leaders fail, and these leaders must be held accountable for the result.

The problems evident in CARBG during its tour in Somalia occurred in conditions far more peaceful than were anticipated prior to departure. If our soldiers had encountered heavy armed resistance in Somalia, CARBG's lack of operational readiness might well have resulted in large-scale tragedy rather than a series of isolated disasters and mishaps, damaging as these were.

Recommendations

We recommend that:

- 23.1 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that standards for evaluating individuals, units and elements of the Canadian Forces for operational tasks call for the assessment of two necessary elements, operational effectiveness and operational preparedness, and that both criteria be satisfied before a unit is declared operationally ready for any mission.

- 23.2 To avoid confusion between readiness for employment and readiness for deployment on a particular mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff adopt and ensure adherence to the following definitions throughout the Canadian Forces: *Operational effectiveness* is a measure of the capability of a force to carry out its assigned mission. *Operational preparedness* is a measure of the degree to which a unit is ready to begin that mission. Operational readiness of any unit or element, therefore, should be defined as the sum of its operational effectiveness and preparedness.
- 23.3 Contrary to the experience of the Somalia mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure, before any Canadian Forces unit or element of any significant size is deployed on active service or international operations, that a formal declaration is made to the government regarding the readiness of that unit to undertake the mission effectively.
- 23.4 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish a staff, under CDS authority, to conduct no-notice tests and evaluations of the operational effectiveness and preparedness of selected commands, units and sub-units of the Canadian Forces.
- 23.5 The Chief of the Defence Staff order that national and command operational orders issued to Canadian Forces units tasked for active service or international operations state precisely the standards and degrees of operational effectiveness and operational preparedness demanded of individuals, sub-units, units, and commanders.
- 23.6 The Chief of the Defence Staff standardize format, information, and directions concerning declarations of operational readiness and require such declarations to be signed by commanders.
- 23.7 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish clear, workable and standard measurements of operational effectiveness and preparedness for individuals, sub-units, units, and commanders in units and formations of the Canadian Forces.

- 23.8 The Chief of the Defence Staff replace the Operational Readiness Evaluation System with a more reliable and efficient process aimed at collecting information about the effectiveness and preparedness of major units of the Canadian Forces for assigned operational missions.**
- 23.9 The new readiness reporting system be capable of giving the Chief of the Defence Staff, senior commanders and staff officers a real-time picture of the effectiveness and preparedness of major operational units of the Canadian Forces for their assigned tasks.**
- 23.10 The new operational readiness reporting system identify operational units as being in certain degrees of effectiveness and preparedness, such as high, medium, and low and in certain states of readiness, such as standby-ready and deployment-ready.**

NOTES

1. Land Force Command, Operational Staff Procedures LFC, *Staff Duties in the Field*, Supplement 3, Army Glossary, p. 0-9.
2. Army Glossary, p. 0-8.
3. NDHQ, "DM and CDS Direction on Operational Readiness and Effectiveness System (ORES) (26 August 1992)", p. 2/3 DND 311739.
4. Policy hearings transcripts vol. 3P, pp. 490P-491P.
5. The Army Doctrine and Tactics Board was established to study, propose, and monitor doctrine and tactics taught and practised in the army (Standing Operating Procedure, September 1992, p. 1-1).
6. Army Glossary, p. 0-8.
7. Canadian Land Force Command Staff College (CLFCSC), *Course Brief*, November 8, 1995, p. 4-3/11.
8. Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8438.
9. Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8439.
10. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, Annex G, paragraph 4, p. G-2/5.
11. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons (1994), vol. 15, Chapter 24, p. 24.
12. Report of the Auditor General, vol. 15, pp. 24-26.
13. Report of the Auditor General, vol. 15, p. 24.
14. Report of the Auditor General, vol. 15, p. 24.
15. Report of the Auditor General, vol. 15, p. 24 (emphasis added).
16. Report of the Auditor General, vol. 15, p. 25.
17. Letter, LGen Gervais to VAdm George, "Mobile Command — ORES", July 12, 1991, DND 311760.

18. NDHQ, "Record of Decision — Readiness discussion 7 Feb 91", 3000-15 (D Force S), February 11, 1991, DND 311754.
19. NDHQ, "Operational Readiness and Effectiveness System (ORES)", August 29, 1991, DND 311758.
20. As quoted in NDHQ, "Operational Readiness And Effectiveness System".
21. NDHQ, "DM and CDS Direction on Operational Readiness and Effectiveness System (ORES) (26 August 1992)".
22. Affidavit of Ambassador Anderson, Brussels, Belgium, March 10, 1997.
23. Document book 28, tab 12.
24. For testimony on the policy decision and problems associated with the change in the structure of the CAR, see testimony of LGen (ret) Foster, Transcripts vol. 3, pp. 431–433; LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8950–8955; LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9387–9391; and Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9897–9902.
25. Letters between BGen Beno and LCol Morneau, October 6, 1992 and October 9, 1992 "Integration of Reserve Personnel — OP Cordon", DND 032194 and 032191.
26. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3794.
27. Testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, pp. 2304–2322.
28. Document book 29, tab 6.
29. In testimony before this Inquiry, the critical importance of such qualities in officers was emphasized by many witnesses, including MGen Dallaire, Policy hearings transcripts vol. 3P, pp. 478P–481P; LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9029; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8256.
30. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8063.
31. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4575.
32. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1474–1475, and vol. IV, p. 856.
33. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4579.
34. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7998.
35. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7805, 7996; CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4797; and Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5672.
36. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7996.
37. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7940.
38. See testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947, 8059–8062.
39. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, October 19, 1992, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VIII, tab 37.
40. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3621.
41. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9719.
42. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7764, 8022–8027.
43. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3623.
44. BGen Beno, "Commander SSF Comments: CAR Preparations and Activities Related To Op Cordon", Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. X, tab 93.
45. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5052; and evidence to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 974–976.
46. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8151.
47. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7801.
48. BGen Beno, "Commander SSF Comments: CAR Preparations and Activities Related To Op Cordon".

49. For a description of the problems created by the lack of specific ROE for Operation Cordon, see testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7817-7977.
50. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9657.
51. Testimony of MGen Dallaire, Policy hearings transcripts, June 9, 1995, DND NS 194345.
52. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7963.
53. Document book 15, tab 18.
54. See testimony of LCol Morneau, Transcripts vol. 37, p. 7195; letter, LCol Rodgman, Brigade Surgeon, to LCol Morneau, October 18, 1992, DND 201753; and notes, Capt Power, October 21, 1992, DND 2017554.
55. BGen Beno, "Commander SSF Comments: CAR Preparations and Activities Related To Op Cordon".
56. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5015-5052.
57. BGen Beno, "Commander SSF Comments: CAR Preparations and Activities Related To Op Cordon".
58. Testimony of WO Murphy, Transcripts vol. 34, p. 6586.
59. Message, HQ SSF to HQ LFCA, 1903 Ops, October 20, 1992.
60. Message, HQ SSF, message 2021, November 10, 1992, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VIII.
61. "FMC Contingency Plan — Op Cordon — Plan Summary", 3450-2-6 (DCOS Ops) 3 September 1992, DND 000042, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, Exhibit 6, p. 6/8.
62. "LFC Op O 01, Op Cordon CCUNOSOM", 3450-2-5 (DCOS Ops), November 19, 1992, p. 8/11.
63. "LFCA G3 Ops 381", 051900z November 1992, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. 8, Exhibit 19.
64. "FMC Contingency Plan", Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, tab 6, p. B1/2.
65. "SSF OP O 01, 3350-OC (G3)", November 26, 1992, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Exhibit 23.
66. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7963.
67. "OP Cordon — Op Readiness", HQ SSF, Ops 1903 of 201400Z October 1992, Document book 15, tab 20.
68. Document book 16, tab 23.
69. Document book 16, tab 23.
70. In testimony, when LGen (ret) Gervais was asked specifically whether he was "satisfied" that the CAR "was in fact ready to deploy" for Operation Cordon, he replied, "Yes" (Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9657).
71. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, October 1992, Document book 15, tab 18, pp. 1/2-2/2.
72. Document book 15, tab 22.
73. Document book 15, tab 27.
74. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9736.
75. See testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9462-9483.
76. Testimony of LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9061, and vol. 47, p. 9467; and MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8393.
77. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. IV, pp. 1014-1043. The Chairman of the Board of Inquiry appeared to concur in this assessment.

78. Testimony of Major Priestman, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2725.
79. Evidence of BGen Beno to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), Phase I, vol. IV, pp. 1014–1043.
80. Letter, BGen Beno to MGen MacKenzie, October 19, 1992.
81. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9738.
82. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8404.
83. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8418.
84. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8392.
85. Testimony of LGen Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9151–9153; and MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8404.
86. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8258.
87. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 8118–8119.
88. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5818.
89. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5820.
90. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7970.
91. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7970–7971.
92. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8244.
93. See “Op Cordon cancellation”, Document book 20, tab 3; Document book 20, tab 5; and Document book 20, tab 2.
94. Evidence of Cmdre Cogdon to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 947–948.
95. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5229.
96. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5215–5216.
97. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5238.
98. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5238.
99. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5242.
100. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5243–5247.
101. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5221.
102. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5222.
103. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5223.
104. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5223–5239.
105. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5300.
106. Document book 20, tab 29.
107. Document book 20, tab 32.
108. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8416.
109. See BGen Beno’s repeated assertions that he was not asked to make a declaration of operational readiness for Operation Deliverance: Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7969, 7973, 8117.
110. SSF, 3350-OP (G3), “Warning Order — #02”, December 9, 1992.
111. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8420.
112. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8419.
113. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8418.
114. NDHQ, 3350-1 (Op Deliverance), of 102312Z December 1992, DND 026433.
115. HQ SSF Petawawa, Ops 2137, of 161159Z December 1992, DND 094982.
116. HQ LFCA, G3 Ops, of 171655Z December 1992, DND 072066.
117. HQ LFCA, Comd 207, of 181500Z December 1992, DND 072036.

118. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, pp. 9655–9657. See declarations of readiness: SSF Ops 2137 of 161159Z December 1992; LFCA G3 Ops 436 of 171655Z December 1992; and LFC Comd 207 of 181500Z December 1992. The declaration for CJFS headquarters was issued under 1 Cdn Div HQ G3 3407 of 171611Z December 1992.
119. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9656.
120. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, Annex G.
121. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8419.
122. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9656; and BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8015.
123. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 947–948.
124. See the 1996 report of the Auditor General of Canada for remarks about the inappropriateness of using the AVGP family of vehicles in a combat environment.
125. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7973.
126. LFC “Op Deliverance — Wng O #02” of 090440Z December 1992, paragraph 3C(1)(H).

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into the Deployment of
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CANADA

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sur le déploiement des
Forces canadiennes en Somalie