2017 Edition
The United Nations and Canada:
What Canada has done and should be doing for UN peace operations
John E. Trent, editor

Dedication: This 2017 volume is dedicated to the memory of Warren Allmand. Mr Allmand, who passed away December 7 2016, was one of Canada's longest-serving and successful parliamentarians. He represented the riding of Notre-Dame-de-Grâce from 1965 to 1997 and held several Cabinet positions in governments led by Pierre Elliott Trudeau. He also led many internationally-minded organizations such as Parliamentarians for Global Action, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, and most recently, the World Federalist Movement – Canada.

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Preface

Peacekeeping: The Canadian Context

John E. Trent

Canadians were at the beginning of peacekeeping. You might say that peacekeeping is in the Canadian DNA. It is similar to diplomacy, mediation, conciliation and understanding other people’s points of view in an international context: we just happen to be good at it – or we used to be. Let us look at the historical record, the current complex situation and finally at Canada’s present embarrassing position.

At the height of the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, with our allies invading Egypt, Canada’s foreign minister, Lester B. Pearson, proposed a resolution at the UN to set up a peacekeeping force to separate the belligerents and help ease Britain and France out of the war. As the former President of the UN General Assembly, Pearson was listened to. It took only a week to create the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and, in effect, to save a critical situation at the time. Today it can take up to a year to put an emergency force in the field. Pearson and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld together set up the parameters for the new type of force which was not even contemplated by the UN Charter. It would be based on the principles and practices of consent of the belligerents, monitoring, impartiality, non-use of force, and lightly-armed peacekeepers.

Such peacekeeping operations would have the multiple benefits of being impartial, being confidence-builders in conflict zones, providing transparency, and establishing and policing a buffer zone. They were designed to combine war-like enforcement with peace-like negotiation. They became a signature activity of the United Nations.

In the 1990s the Security Council went beyond the narrow task of ‘keeping the peace’ to actually using force for ‘peace-making’ or ‘peace enforcement’. More recently, a third generation of multidimensional ‘peace-building’ has evolved which includes in its operations not only peace-enforcement but also long-term international support for the redevelopment of institutions and finances in failed states and the monitoring of elections.

This multidimensional approach aims to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, promote human rights, support elections, restore the rule of law, and assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. In most instances peace operations are to overcome civil wars.

Peacekeeping has become an essential element of international security in a globalized world. That is why an October 2016 CTV survey indicated that
almost 70 per cent of Canadians supported deploying Canadian forces in UN peacekeeping missions.

By August 2017, there were 16 UN-led missions in the field at an annual cost of $8.2 billion U.S. They include 112,000 military, civilian administrators and police. Thus, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN Secretariat now supervises more personnel in the field than any single country. For years Canada contributed the largest contingent. But since the 1990s, Canada’s numbers have dwindled to 30 military personnel and 58 police. We now rank 71st among contributors. It was no doubt to rectify this embarrassing situation that more than a year ago the Trudeau government promised to create a contingent of 600 military and 150 police with a three year budget of CAD $450 million. Apparently there have been several requests from the UN but at the time of writing (October 2017) Canada has still not sent a contingent to fulfill its promise. This is despite the fact that in November 2017 Canada will be hosting the 3rd UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Forum in Vancouver, with the participation of hundreds of delegates from around the world.

So there we have the context for the Canadian experience in peacekeeping – past, present and future. There is a compelling case for Canada doing more to fulfill its responsibilities. We are needed by the UN and by the world. We have special capabilities. Canada has never been a colonizer. Our forces speak two languages and are trained for both peace and war. We can handle modern communications. We have the planes, helicopters, land transport and specialized personnel. Around the world, people are not averse to welcoming Canadians – especially when they are in need. Doing more will make Canadians proud.

In an interview published on Sept. 28, 2017, the Globe and Mail asked the former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, why Canada had failed to win a seat on the Security Council in 2014. He replied that members of the UN did not much appreciate the foreign policy of our former Prime Minister, Stephen Harper. Then he added, “I am hopeful Canada can be elected next time (for a two-year seat in 2021-22). That’s the general expectation. Prime Minister Trudeau has been seen as a leading voice in the international community on humanitarian and peace and security issues, and even refugee issues.” We should note that the former Secretary-General specified peace and security issues. Justin Trudeau and the Liberals should note it also. How can we hold up our heads, how can we fulfill international expectations, if we do not soon carry out our promises to provide peacekeepers, policy, money, equipment and up-graded training. Only then, as Trudeau promised, will we be able to claim that “Canada is back.”

In this short publication, our authors tell us the why and how of peacekeeping. Canada’s former Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy links peacekeeping with the problems of refugees and migration. Prof. Jocelyn Coulon, former advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, tells us why Canada should send its peacekeeping mission to Mali. Monique Cuillerier of the World Federalists discusses Canada’s National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security. WFM – Canada President, Prof. Walter Dorn writes about Canada’s peacekeeping past and the need to fulfill current commitments. Peter Langille, a leading thinker on the challenges faced by the UN, discusses standing forces and rapid deployment. Former Disarmament Ambassador, Peggy Mason, writes about the UN organization’s comparative advantages as a peacekeeper. And two of Canada’s best-known former “uniformed” peacekeeping personnel, RCMP Chief Superintendent (Ret.) Dave Beer and Brigadier-General (Ret.) Greg Mitchell, discuss Canadian contributions to UN police peacekeeping and to peacekeeping training, respectively. And Beth Woroniuk discusses how the UN can do more to address sexual abuse on peace operations. But all these specialized topics should not impede us from raising our voices to remind the government about Canada’s responsibility for peacekeeping.
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As we await the government of Canada’s renewed engagement with United Nations peace operations, we would do well to consider the changing global security challenges that confront modern peacekeeping – including those posed by record numbers of migrants and refugees.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of forcibly displaced persons – over 65 million in 2016 – is higher now than at any time since the end of the Second World War. Of this total, the number seeking safety across international borders as refugees topped 22.5 million.

As more and more of the world’s citizens seek refuge from armed conflict, UN peacekeepers are increasingly tasked to serve in operations where the cessation of armed conflict is still a work in progress, and Security Council “protection of civilians” mandates face enormous difficulties. Recent funding cuts by peacekeeping’s largest financial contributor, the United States, constitute yet another challenge.

Countries hosting some of the largest concentrations of refugees are also heavily reliant for their internal security on UN peace operations. Examples include South Sudan, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The UN system demonstrates an awareness of the cross-cutting nature of many of these challenges (but not always the will to make the changes necessary). Some examples:

- The June 2015 UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) called for an essential shift in the way peace operations are conceived and carried out. The HIPPO highlighted the “primacy of politics,” the idea that lasting peace is achieved through political solutions and not through military and technical engagements alone.

- The current Secretary-General’s embrace of “sustaining peace” as an overarching framework for much of the UN’s programming encompasses the spectrum of peace and security operations: conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and long-term sustainable development.

- And last September’s Summit, “Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants” led to a declaration that includes a plan of action, “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” setting out yet another framework for positive responses when governments meet again to address these problems in the Fall of 2018.
As Canada’s foreign Minister, I was involved in efforts like the Landmines Treaty and the International Criminal Court, which made me realize that there are limitations within UN structures to the degree of freedom to think and act outside the box. A lot of interests are at stake. Ultimately the UN needs to be the place where change happens, but it’s not the place where the best thinking is going to be done on the kinds of normative and institutional changes that are necessary.

With climate change, famine, armed conflict all on the rise, the way the world comes to grips with the rising number of refugees need a major re-set. The World Refugee Council that I am chairing -- supported by Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and the government of Canada -- hopes to come up with recommendations for significant reforms, as well as mobilizing the political will needed to implement them.

For example, the whole system of funding refugees, based primarily on donor government pledging, is really kind of archaic. Many of the legal instruments, like the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the 1951 Refugee Convention and, in a peacekeeping context, the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians, are weak and/or out of date. We need a new, much more coherent multilateralism.

Canada not only supports our work on the World Refugee Council, but also provides an example to others of how best to re-settle refugees and manage diversity.

Our contributions to peace operations and to refugee system reform can provide important reasons for other UN member states to view positively Canada’s candidacy for election for a two-year term on the UN Security Council in 2021-22.
The Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping: A role for Canada

David Beer

If Canada intends to reinvigorate its long coveted image as peacekeeper, any strategic response could include support to the UN Police (UNPOL) “Strategic Guidance Framework” for International Police Peacekeeping (SGF) as a logical, affordable and high-profile marketing of “Brand Canada.”

Today about 13,000 police are deployed to 18 UN missions. Once monitors and reporters, police are now problem-solvers, mentors and trainers; protecting civilians, securing elections, investigating crime and fighting extremism. However, Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) represent widely diverse standards of justice and operational policing capacity that are weaknesses of police peacekeeping.

Since 2009 UNPOL has worked to develop a new policy foundation. UN PCCs were consulted to find, not “best” practices, but “good” practices they all could embrace as a collective policy for police peacekeeping. The product, the SGF, is a coherent framework ready to roll out as a foundation of the UN strategy for sustainable peace through justice and security. It includes guidelines for: capacity building, command and control, police operations and administration, and assures pre-deployment readiness and wider operational capabilities.

Narrowing diversity among PCCs, it details skills and standards, and gives operational guidance for civilian-led “integrated” missions.

The SGF stresses transparency and accountability, principles of consent and impartiality, and only justified use of force. It is a global policing model, a model not influenced by biases, racism or corruption -- common maladies that creep into even well-founded systems. Underpinned by human rights, gender equality, protecting the vulnerable, combating violence and exploitation, and overarching community service, the SGF is a benchmark of fundamental “good practice” for any policing system.

By the 1990’s the changing nature of conflict, with intra-state conflict more common than inter-state, traditional peacekeeping grew to include alternative and inclusive strategies. The importance of fundamental justice as a foundation of sustainable security and state development was recognized.

Today civilian police missions are often complex and dangerous, sometimes including executive to establish and sustain security, as well as mentoring, advising, training and building capacity toward sustainable local capacity development.

While the fundamental role of civilian police -
internal security through enforcement of law and prevention of crime - is a universal idea, to “serve and protect” is interpreted differently around the world. Police resources and practice among UN member states represent widely diverse policing experience, expertise, techniques, training and skills. They come from different judicial systems, reflect different cultures, societies, religions, and languages. Today it is not uncommon for police missions to include officers from as many as 40 or more countries. Add to that reality persistent logistical challenges, dynamic and dangerous conflict environments, rotating contingent deployments, and national caveats where member states stipulate and even restrict the deployment assignments of their national police representatives, and the complex formula of police missions is better understood.

In a painstaking process to standardize and improve UN police performance, the UN has made concrete steps to identify roles, responsibilities, skills and competencies, and created a framework of strategic guidance for police contributions to peacekeeping missions. The result is the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping, a cohesive and coherent plan for United Nations Police to meet the challenges of the complex mandates of modern post-conflict.

**A path for Canada**

This all presents a clear path for Canada to take a leadership role supporting UNDPKO. Canada is an experienced police peacekeeper, current in the “integrated mission model”, universally recognized for police professionalism, and a contributor to the development of the SGF. Moreover the SGF mirrors Canadian foreign policy priorities; human rights, gender equity; reducing sexual violence; protecting the vulnerable and refugees.

As the UN prepares to roll out the SGF globally, it would welcome financial or administrative assistance, or direct human resources support like trainers, senior mentors, or subject matter experts.

**Reference:**

UN Police, Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping:

Jocelyn Coulon

In the 2015 election campaign, Justin Trudeau promised Canadians and the world that, under his government, Canada would re-engage in UN peace operations, long neglected by the Conservatives. In power, he repeated his determination to keep his promise at his first meeting with the UN Secretary General in March 2016. A few months later, in August, he unveiled an ambitious plan to deploy up to 600 military personnel and 150 police in UN operations and to provide specialized equipment. The Department of Foreign Affairs also had an annual budget of $150 million for the next three years to finance peace and security initiatives for fragile states, to protect women and girls, and to strengthen regional peace and security organizations.

Although the Canadian plan was well received by the UN on paper, the government has been slow to implement it. However, in December 2016, Justin Trudeau received a full briefing on the various deployment options. The four options presented concerned missions in Africa: in Mali, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since then, the Prime Minister has been unable to choose, and this attitude is unforgivable.

In my opinion, Canada should participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA, for at least three reasons.

First, in Mali, Canada is on familiar ground and has deep roots. The two countries have had diplomatic relations since 1970, and Mali is one of the top beneficiaries of Canadian development assistance. Canadian diplomacy, supported by cooperants and NGOs, has spared no effort to support development and democracy and to promote the protection of human rights at all stages of this country’s sometimes violent history. Canadian industrialists, especially in the mining sector, have also invested heavily there.

Second, Mali is in the heart of an area, the Sahel, where many crises and issues, such as weak government, proliferation of Islamist terrorist groups, trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, competition for natural resources, and migratory flows, threaten the security of all of West Africa, as well as Europe and consequently North America. Furthermore, since 2012, Mali has been going through a delicate political transition following a coup, a rebellion in the north of the country and repeated attacks by Islamist terrorist groups. This situation has led to the deployment of three military operations to stabilize not only the
country but also the region: the Barkhane operation led by France, with the mandate of fighting terrorism in the Sahel; the UN mission, MINUSMA, whose priority tasks are to protect civilians, to accompany the peace and reconciliation process between Malians, and to restore the government’s authority throughout the country; and finally the European Union’s mission, EUTM–Mali, with the mandate of training a national army.

The job of reconstruction and stabilization is immense. As UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said on September 20, 2017, Mali is still fragile and in a sensitive period one year before the next presidential election. If the country is to take this step and implement the peace agreement, it needs all the resources at its disposal. In his latest report on the situation in Mali to the Security Council, the Secretary General called on member states to contribute to the mission. In particular, he requested some specialized equipment to fill some of MINUSMA’s gaps, such as armored personnel carriers, helicopter units, an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance company, and a company to neutralize explosives and munitions. Canada has this equipment and could make it available to the mission.

Third and last, Canada, as a founding member of the UN, has the responsibility to ensure that peacekeeping operations run smoothly. Several European countries have returned to peacekeeping missions, especially in Mali, in order to strengthen them. Canada must share the burden of peace and security in Africa. It must help Mali and the UN.

Jocelyn Coulon is a researcher at CERIUM, University of Montreal. He served as Senior Policy Adviser to Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016-2017.
Monique Cuillerier

In the more than fifteen years since the first United Nations Security Council resolution (1325) to specifically address the women, peace and security agenda, sixty-three countries have developed National Action Plans (NAPs) — and sixteen new ones are in progress. National Action Plans act as implementation frameworks for a government’s work in women, peace, and security. There is no specific template for countries to follow in developing a national action plan and their details reflect national interests and priorities.

Canada’s first national action plan (C-NAP) covered the period from 2010 to 2016, expiring at the end of March of that year. A new C-NAP has been in process since then and is scheduled to be released shortly. The C-NAP includes participation by numerous government departments and other bodies who are involved in work related to the women, peace and security agenda. This, of course, includes those government bodies involved in peacekeeping: Global Affairs Canada, the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The first C-NAP was based on the four pillars of the women, peace and security agenda: prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery. Amongst others, Canada made peacekeeping-related commitments such as increasing the meaningful participation of women in peace operations; increasing the effectiveness of peace operations including the protection and promotion of the rights and safety of women and girls; and improving the Canadian capacity to address violence and protect human rights of women and girls within the context of peace operations.

These broad goals were backed up by 28 actions and 24 indicators, divided amongst the four pillars and with reporting commitments assigned to the relevant government bodies.

There are various ways of considering issues related to women and peacekeeping. One approach, that was prevalent, if not dominant, in the first C-NAP was the use of quantitative indicators. Examples of relevant peacekeeping indicators that DND/CAF and the RCMP were responsible for include the percentage of pre-deployment courses that address the differential impact of armed conflict on women and girls; the number and percentage of personnel deployed to peace operations that have received such training; and the number and percentage of female Canadian
Forces personnel, police officers, and civilians deployed to peace operations.

While such indicators are not a problem, there were identified issues in the first C-NAP with a lack of baselines and targets attached to them. In the final progress report of the first C-NAP for 2015-2016, released in June 2017, Global Affairs Canada says that their intention is that “the renewed C-NAP have a strong baseline and realistic targets with a limited number of actions which are clearly focused on moving from one to the other and for which performance can be measured through appropriate indicators.”

Reporting commitments that realistically acknowledge the current situation and move Canada towards feminist foreign, defence, and international assistance policies, as the federal government has indicated they want to do, will ensure a Canadian peacekeeping contribution that incorporates a gender perspective. But they alone are insufficient. So long as the C-NAP acts primarily as a reporting framework and not as a call to further action, there is a danger it will merely be a bureaucratic tool.

There are also issues related to the women, peace and security agenda and peacekeeping that are not so easy to measure quantitatively. Conflict-related sexual violence, for example, is an acknowledged problem. And although details can be counted — the number of complaints, for example — the problem itself requires a change in the fundamental attitudes and behaviour of peacekeepers. This change will take time and patience, along with a supportive C-NAP that encourages the federal government to take the challenges of the women, peace and security agenda seriously.

The new C-NAP is also intended to be bi-structural, having both an overarching framework and individual departmental reporting, according to their own goals and plans. The overarching aspect will, ideally, bring together an overall strategic objective for implementing the women, peace and security agenda across the relevant parts of the federal government.

Clearly, if the new C-NAP is going to contribute positively to Canada’s peacekeeping efforts moving forward, it needs to address the challenges of fully integrating the women, peace and security agenda into the workings of DND/CAF and the RCMP, while also meaningfully measuring the integration of a gender perspective in peace operations and related areas.
On the night of his election victory, Justin Trudeau declared that Canada is “back” on the international stage and said that, “if there’s any country in the world that can live up to our collective expectations, it’s this one.” He continued to set high expectations in his Mandate Letters to the Ministers of National Defence and Foreign Affairs, tasking them to re-engage Canada in UN peacekeeping. This re-engagement – being “back” – would be a major undertaking since Canada has had an illustrious history in peacekeeping.

During the Cold War, Canada was the leading contributor to peacekeeping, providing the most peacekeepers of any country (about 10% of the total) and being the only country to have participated in every UN peacekeeping operation. For a period after the Cold War, Canada remained the top contributor, providing at its peak 3,300 uniformed personnel in July 1993. However, when the number of UN peacekeepers in the field surged in the twenty-first century from 20,000 uniformed personnel in the year 2000 to 100,000 by 2015, Canada did not contribute to the surge (except briefly in 2000-01 for the mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea, the last time Canada rotated military units in UN operations). Instead it kept constant the number of peacekeepers at 200–250. In 2006, the newly elected Harper government withdrew Canadian peacekeepers from the Golan Heights, where Canadian logisticians had been stationed since 1974. That brought the numbers of Canadian peacekeepers down to about 50, which were further reduced to around 30 for most of the Harper government. Thus the Canadian contribution was a mere shadow of what it had once been. And when US President Barak Obama co-chaired a leaders’ summit on peacekeeping at UN Headquarters on 28 September 2015, Canada offered nothing. That same evening, Liberal leader Justin Trudeau complained about this in an election debate with Prime Minister Harper, saying: “The fact that Canada has nothing to contribute to that conversation today [in New York] is disappointing because this is something that a Canadian Prime Minister [Lester B. Pearson] started, and right now there is a need to revitalize and refocus and support peacekeeping operations.”

But for the past two years, following the 2015 election, Canada has not increased its peacekeeping contribution. The numbers of uniformed personnel in the field actually decreased.

Canada found that it would be excluded from the defence ministerial on UN peacekeeping in September 2016 in London unless it made a concrete pledge beforehand. So in late August 2016 in Saguenay at the time of a Liberal caucus meeting, Canada pledged “up to” 600 troops and 150 police. It also offered to host the next ministerial, scheduled for
14-15 November 2017. The Vancouver pledging conference aims to obtain new pledges and to take stock of the old ones made in New York and London. Much to Canada’s embarrassment, in the year since the London ministerial, Canada has not even made good on its own pledge. As of August 2017, Canada was contributing only 29 military personnel and 41 police, a historical low for the once prolific peacekeeping nation!

Prime Minister Trudeau and his Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan insist that they want to get the peacekeeping deployment “right” but the dithering has diminished Canada’s status and contribution. It has also reduced Canada’s chances of being elected to a UN Security Council seat, which it seeks for 2021-22. From the 1950s to the 1990s, Canada could use its consistent peacekeeping contribution as a strong reason to be elected to a two-year seat every decade on the UN’s most prestigious and important body. But by 2010, this rationale no longer held and Canada lost the election. Now, as an attempt is again made, the government dithering weakens its chances to win the election in 2020, over 20 years since it last won such an election.

Even if Canada were to provide the entirety of its pledge of 600 troops and 150 police it would still be a comparatively small contribution to the 100,000 uniformed personnel the United Nations has in the field. But even with relatively low troop numbers, Canada can make a significant difference on the ground by providing key enablers (e.g. heavy-lift aircraft, expert medical units, and advanced technologies for monitoring). The United Nations needs experienced and well-trained troops, which Canada has, although not yet experienced in UN missions or trained on them. Most importantly, it needs nations eager to deploy.

Two years after Trudeau claimed on election night that Canada was back (a claim he reiterated in his 2016 UN General Assembly address), we have yet to see the peacekeeping promises fulfilled. So emphatic advice is needed:

Action, not simply words.
Accountability, not simply pledges.
Impact, not simply contributions.
Example, not simply hosting.
Rapid response, not simply political analysis.
Humanity’s collective interest, not simply national and sectarian interest.
Put humanity first! Make the UN better!
Canada: rapid deployment or routine delays?

H. Peter Langille

We made at least a beginning then. If on that foundation we do not build something more permanent and stronger, we will once again have ignored realities, rejected opportunities and betrayed our trust. Will we never learn?


As we mark the 60th anniversary of Lester Pearson’s Nobel Prize lecture, Canadians have heard that we’re “back” within the UN club, including a commitment of 600 Canadian Forces troops, 150 police personnel, along with $450 million in support of United Nations peace operations. Within the UN, hopes were high. Canada, once a leader in UN peacekeeping, is urgently needed, whether to avert a wider war in South Sudan, to fill gaps in the Central African Republic, to support in stabilizing Mali or for help in other UN operations.

It wasn’t so much that the promise of 600 CF troops was all that impressive. By UN standards, that’s modest. The enthusiasm for Canada was based, firstly on the likelihood that we might also bring much-needed assets (what the UN calls critical enablers) in strategic and tactical airlift, military engineering, a mobile field hospital, even helicopter fleets. And secondly, Canada was once highly regarded for innovative reforms in UN peacekeeping, for its ideas and expertise, particularly in the related areas of operational planning, training, peacebuilding and rapid deployment.

Rapid deployment matters, especially if the UN is to improve on conflict prevention and protection of civilians. In the absence of a prompt response, conflicts tend to escalate and spread, then result in the current phenomena of later, larger, longer operations at far higher costs, setting back the prospects for disarmament and development.

If the Government of Canada plans to be “back” in UN peace operations, with a credible focus on rapid deployment and conflict prevention, two key questions are ‘how now’ and, ‘what would be needed’?

The following steps merit consideration:

1. UN peacekeeping has to be elevated to a national defence priority, as a number of Canadian civil society organizations have recommended.

2. An independent team is needed to supervise and direct a whole of government approach to UN peace operations.

3. DND’s Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy should be elevated to a CF Command, headed by a supportive Major-General.

4. An independent research capacity is needed, to develop serious analysis, ideas and, policy-relevant plans and proposals. The former Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, initiated by former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, remains a model worth emulating.
5. A ‘Peace Operations Forum’ could also be restored as it proved to be a cost-effective means of coordinating and informing both civil society and government officials of recent developments in this field.

6. Canada could begin to address the UN’s 2005 call for the transformation of advanced military’s Cold War capacity to UN peace operations with the following:
   - Assign two CF combat engineer regiments, an engineer support regiment and a construction regiment to stand at high readiness for UN peace operations;
   - Designate three of the five CF CC-177 Globemaster III planes to support UN strategic lift and eight of the sixteen CF CC 130J planes to support tactical lift;
   - Prepare a mobile field hospital to specialize in providing rapid humanitarian relief in operations abroad, and;
   - On a rotational basis, one of the CF’s three brigade groups could be designated and prepared as a high-readiness stand-by formation for UN peace operations.

7. Canada must develop a dedicated peace operations training centre.

Finally, it is widely apparent that the official preference for pragmatic, incremental reforms does not deliver a reliable capacity for UN rapid deployment.

Governments remain reluctant to deploy personnel and resources to operations that entail risks. Thus, prevention and protection are laudable “Responsibility to Protect” priorities, but unmanageable objectives in the absence of appropriate UN capacity.

8. The current Trudeau government could lead in support of the Canadian proposal for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS). This idea stemmed from the former Liberal Government study for the UN General Assembly, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations. With this one development – effectively a standing ‘UN 911 first responder’ for complex emergencies – the UN would finally have a rapid, reliable capacity to help fulfill four of its tougher assigned tasks – i.e. to help prevent armed conflict and mass atrocity crimes, to protect civilians at extreme risk, to ensure prompt start-up of demanding peace operations, and to address human needs where others either can’t or won’t.

9. A fundamental review of security approaches and priorities is overdue. The umbrella concept of “sustainable common security” merits consideration. It encourages the deeper international cooperation required to address current and future global challenges.

“Will we never learn?”

Dr. H. Peter Langille specializes in conflict resolution, independent defence and security analysis, peace initiatives and UN operations. He wrote the initial plans for a Canadian multinational peacekeeping training centre, served on the 1995 Government study, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations and developed the proposal for a UNEPS. His latest book is “Developing a United Nations Emergency Peace Service: Meeting our responsibilities to prevent and protect,” (New York, Palgrave Pivot, 2015).
The “Value Added” of UN Peacekeeping

Peggy Mason

UN peacekeeping is no miracle cure and there are no guarantees of success. But when properly mandated, resourced and managed, UN peacekeeping offers the best chance for a society emerging from violent conflict. Peacekeeping is the front end of a complex, long-term process of helping conflicting parties create the necessary conditions — political, socio-economic, security — for sustainable peace.

At the centre of this effort is the peace process. Complex political problems always lie at the heart of violent conflict and require political solutions that are negotiated and agreed to by the parties. A capable security force will be essential in both the peace negotiation and implementation phases, but it is a supporting element of the overall mission nonetheless.

As the Afghanistan debacle has so dramatically and tragically illustrated, no amount of military “robustness” and professionalism on the part of international military forces can make up for the lack of a credible peace process. Recall the “whole of government” mantra repeated throughout Canada’s long Afghanistan military engagement: “There is no security without development and no development without security”. But the hard truth of the matter was there could be neither security nor development without ending the war and that, in turn, could not be achieved by military means but only through a comprehensive peace process.

The statistical evidence is clear: looking at all past wars of the last quarter-century, only 15 per cent have ended decisively on the battlefield, and in these cases the rebels prevailed at least as often as the governments they fought. All the rest ultimately had to be settled at the negotiating table. Precisely because of the primacy of the peace process, today’s multi-dimensional UN peace operations — which involve military, police and civilian components — are much more than military operations charged with providing a safe and secure environment. The core of the effort comprises civilians mandated to facilitate the peace process, promote the rule of law, and support the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.

Increasingly mandates, like that for MINUSMA in Mali, also include security assistance to the elected government so it can reassert its authority nationwide. This military assistance is in concert with diplomatic and technical support for national political dialogue and reconciliation efforts.
For a collective enterprise of this magnitude to succeed — as UN peacekeeping does more often than not — the international effort must be perceived as legitimate and impartial. And it must have the broadest possible international support within a coherent legal and operational framework.

Only the UN Security Council (UNSC) can mandate such an operation and only the UN Organization can lead the mission if it is to be internationally acceptable. Headed by a civilian in the role of Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), with all the other components, including the military and police, reporting to him or her, the very structure of the UN peacekeeping mission reflects the centrality of the peace process. This stands in sharp contrast to NATO-led military missions, even where authorized by the UNSC to assist in stabilizing a conflict.

NATO-led stability operations lack the perceived legitimacy and impartiality of UN-led operations precisely because their political and military leaders are seen to represent a very specific set of powerful countries and interests. Not only does the separate military command structure undermine coherence in the international effort, NATO leadership constitutes a gift to spoilers on the ground decrying alleged “foreign occupation” - the presence of additional non-NATO forces notwithstanding.

An integrated mission under the overall authority of the SRSG also allows UN command and control to be decentralized to the operational level. This contrasts with the centralized, top-heavy and opaque command structure operating in NATO.

Many current UN missions may have comprehensive mandates to build sustainable peace but they manifestly lack the professional forces and equipment to provide the secure environment necessary for peace to take hold. The full potential of UN peacekeeping will not be realized until countries like Canada meaningfully re-engage.

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Gregory B. Mitchell

Modern UN Peace Support Operations (PSO) have a high degree of operational complexity, and most are conducted in austere, post-conflict, and often hostile environments. Mission integration amongst various UN organizations and contributing nations is an essential element of success, because different PSO actors have different roles, deployment time-lines, procedures, budgetary pressures and supervising authorities. Therefore, it is only by pursuing an integrated approach that short-term, political or security gains can be balanced against the longer term developmental, humanitarian, and social objectives needed to create sustainable peace.

As many like-minded nations have done, Canada has formally adopted a whole-of-government approach to its foreign policy PSO activities. Coherence amongst defence, diplomacy, aid, and trade, should be a priority to help achieve Canada's strategic objectives. When the Government of Canada (GoC) deploys Canadians to participate in a UN Peace Support Operation, the primary objective should be to contribute to the achievement of mission success. The best way to do that is the provision of appropriate education and training for the military, police and civilian personnel it intends to deploy.

Modern complex, multidimensional PSOs require a comprehensive approach to education and training. If the whole-of-government approach to operations is to gain traction, an integrated approach to training and education must first be adopted, and should be targeted at all levels - strategic, operational and tactical. When Canadian involvement in a new PSO is being considered, departmental staffs conducting the strategic level policy analysis require levels of expertise, knowledge and skills that are quite different from those of the staffs that go on to develop the operational level campaign plan. In turn, their levels of expertise, knowledge and skills are different from those tacticians tasked with implementing the plans on the ground.

Training in some of the more complex, cross-cutting issues should be provided in a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach. The three major components – diplomacy, defence and development - should be trained to work together in an integrated fashion to foster understanding of the others’ roles and responsibilities, to facilitate communication and synergy, to achieve unity of effort, to develop mutually supporting plans and activities, and to bridge cultural differences and achieve levels of cooperation seldom found even at UN headquarters or in most national capitals.

Organizational strategic objectives and policies should be taught, including introductions to the range of UN mission objectives. Also, the necessary psychological preparation for difficult, morally ambiguous, and potentially dangerous situations should be included (confronting armed child soldiers is one clear example). Training on these and other evolving issues requires personnel with considerable international expertise and experience, informed by a high degree of theoretical and practical research, coordinated within a clear, centrally directed and seamless program of training.
Such a comprehensive approach was previously provided by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) that, for over a decade, provided the capacity and network of experts to offer a full range of PSO research, education, training and international capacity building.

PPC was the world's first, civilian-managed, peacekeeping training centre, and was one of only a handful conducting training, capacity development, public education and research that reflected the multidisciplinary realities of contemporary peace operations. By actively pursuing the development of capacity with civilian, military and police institutions engaged in and/or supporting international peace operations, PPC contributed directly to Canada achieving some of its international objectives: exporting Canadian values; enhancing Canadian leadership on peace and security issues; and increasing the quantity, quality and effectiveness of Canadian military, police and civilians in peace operations.

It is therefore proposed that a new institution be established – the Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIPTC) – with capabilities similar in nature to the former PPC.

The following specific recommendations are proposed:

1. The Government of Canada should establish the Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, an institution to replace the capabilities provided by the former Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

2. The institution should be fully funded and supported by the Government of Canada.

3. The institution should partner with other Canadian organizations involved in research, development, education and training of PSO-related subjects.

4. Canada should consider offering its enhanced education and training capabilities, along with other areas of peacekeeping expertise, to assist in international capacity-building ventures.

Given its leadership role on the international stage and its intent to reclaim a prominent position with the UN, Canada should seek to develop state-of-the-art education and training, both for its own use and for its efforts towards international capacity building. It should embrace a system that can meet the diverse education and training requirements of all three components - military, police and civilian. To ensure Canadian personnel are effective in achieving PSO success, the Government of Canada should address the issue of training and education as a matter of priority.

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Gregory B. Mitchell was a career Canadian military officer who completed five United Nations peacekeeping missions. His final military posting was to Denmark where he was the only Canadian ever to command the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). He later worked on behalf of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Romeo Dallaire’s Child Soldiers Initiative and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Ottawa. He is currently Executive Director of Peace Operations Consulting, a global network of independent peace operations professionals, Executive Director of the Royal Military Colleges Club of Canada and peacekeeping advisor to the Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans’ Association.
Gender Perspectives in Peacekeeping: 
More than Deploying More Women

Beth Woroniuk

The historic United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security (WPS) notes the Security Council’s “willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component.” Seventeen years later there is still confusion regarding what this means, what it involves, and how to achieve it.

Given that the “integration of gender perspective remains at the heart” of the Vancouver UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial hosted by Canada in November 2017, it is important to clarify the issues involved.

What should Canada do to ensure robust integration of gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations?

First, deploying more women is a priority and should be supported; however it must be done responsibly.

There have been global calls for more women peacekeepers. Yet progress has been glacial. As of August 2017, 3.7% of military peacekeepers and 9.5% of police peacekeepers were women.

Initiatives to increase the number of women peacekeepers include financial incentives to encourage and reward troop contributing countries (TCCs) who deploy more women, more and improved training for women peacekeepers, mentorship programs, women’s professional networks and pipeline mechanisms to identify senior women candidates.

However, it is essential not to take a narrow view of increasing women’s participation. The focus cannot be on numbers alone. One must also consider institutional culture, structural, attitudinal and logistical issues that must be addressed in order to ensure that these deployments are successful and not harmful to the women deployed. Research shows that women peacekeepers are also subject to harassment and abuse. Understanding and addressing issues related to sexism and homophobia in the security sector are critical. Canada’s efforts to tackle these issues through an initiative such as Operation Honour must yield results if we are to be a credible advocate on the global stage. Learnings from these initiatives can also be shared with other TCCs. Additionally it is crucial to ensure that women peacekeepers have proper training, medical support, equipment, and facilities.

Second, support and funding for the full range of gender mainstreaming initiatives in peace operations is required. This includes - inter alia - gender analysis across all issues including rule of law, protection of civilians, security sector reform (supported by gender advisors); consultations with women’s organizations (from mission design to withdrawal); including gender issues (including conflict-related sexual violence) in mission mandates; improved gender data; improved capacity building/training on gender analysis and gender perspectives – that includes participation from women’s organizations (including for mission leadership); specific programmes to increase women’s participation in post-conflict reconstruction (electoral, judicial, disarmament, etc.); the deployment of women protection advisors; and improved reporting on all of these issues.

Deploying more women will not address the need for gender analysis across mission agendas. Gender advisors (senior, experienced, with the relevant expertise) are essential to support the head of mission in each context.
While there have been promising gender mainstreaming innovations in peace operations in recent years, the Global Study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 notes that these remain pilot projects and special initiatives rather than the ‘core business’ of operations. Furthermore, recent developments threaten even this fragile progress. Analysts have sounded alarm bells that recent budget cuts have hit gender functions in peacekeeping missions particularly hard.

Canada should ensure that, in addition to deploying more women, these issues are given equivalent space and priority attention. Recent Canadian progress on implementing the Chief of Defence Staff’s Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and using Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) provide excellent starting points. DPKO should be encouraged to ensure that gender advisor positions are sufficiently resourced and have strong political support.

**Third, meaningful progress on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers, including military, police and civilians, is essential.** One of the major stains on UN peacekeeping has been the longstanding issue of peacekeepers abusing and committing violence against the very people who they are there to protect. Despite universal outrage, this issue has proved remarkably difficult to address.

Numerous recommendations are on the table. AIDs Free World’s Code Blue Campaign advocates for a special court mechanism, arguing that investigation and prosecution must be distanced from internal UN processes. They also recommend the establishment of a Victims’ Bill of Rights. The 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (HIPPO) recommendations included clarification of immunity definitions, improved disclosure of disciplinary actions taken by TCCs, and an adequately resourced victim assistance program. Other recommendations include clarifying and strengthening the secretary-general’s discretionary authority (as outlined in UNSCR 2272), establishing credible deterrents and strengthening accountability for civil perpetrators. What is clear is that progress is desperately needed.

**Finally, Canada can push for non-military solutions.** As was noted in the Global Study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325: “the value of the women, peace and security agenda is its potential for transformation, rather than greater representation of women in existing paradigms of military response.” Canada’s newly launched National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security provides useful insights to inform and guide Canada’s approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Beth Woroniuk is the coordinator and co-founder of the Women, Peace and Security Network-Canada. She has been involved in Canadian women, peace and security coalitions since 2000. Beth is currently on the Steering Committee of NATO’s Civil Society Advisory Panel on WPS. With over 25 years of experience on women’s rights and gender equality issues as both an analyst and activist, Beth has worked with bilateral aid agencies, UN entities, development banks and NGOs. She has particular expertise in gender dimensions of humanitarian assistance and post-conflict recovery. Beth recently joined The MATCH International Women’s Fund as Policy Lead.