



## Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

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### Executive Summary

The aim of this paper is to communicate a clear understanding of UN peacekeeping's uniformed capability requirements as they relate to the current and evolving peacekeeping environment. The first section describes the peacekeeping landscape across the various types of operations. The second section outlines the type of capabilities that have become, and will continue to be, critical for the operational effectiveness of our uniformed personnel. These areas include: experienced leadership; agile and flexible units; situational awareness capabilities for information-led operations; enabling units; force protection capabilities; logistics; modern technology; language facility in English and French as appropriate; women staff officers, military observers and troops; sustainable capacity-building and training; and the capability to rapidly deploy (see pages 4-7).

The third section summarizes the pledges by Member States that are registered in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) at the various levels and those pledges that were registered in the system but have now been deployed. At present 131 units are at Level 1, 42 units are at Level 2, and 7 units have moved from Level 3 to the Rapid Deployment Level. This does not include the 23 units that have been deployed or are currently in the process of deploying to a mission (see page 8).

The final two sections outline the gaps that remain, both in terms of current, mission-specific gaps, as well as in relation to the UN's goals for generating particular enabling capabilities. To help reach the goal of a rapidly-deployable brigade in 2017, four countries have followed through with pledges to the PCRS Rapid Deployment Level. As such, there are remaining requirements for a quick reaction force, a FHQ support company, a Level 2 hospital, medium utility helicopters, attack helicopters, and a transport aircraft. Based on the AAVs conducted to date, shortages are expected at Level 3 of the PCRS for francophone units, quick reaction force companies, helicopters, and ISR units (see page 9).

The list of current, critical gaps is limited to two missions – MINUSMA and UNMISS – and is related in part to recent changes in the mandates. MINUSMA is lacking an attack helicopter unit, a special forces company, two airfield support units, and EOD company, a riverine police unit, and an ISR unit in Sector North. Further to this, there are still equipment shortfalls, mainly APCs and other protected vehicles, for some TCCs that, if remedied, would aid in protection from IEDs and mines. In UNMISS, the full deployment of a Regional Protection Force to Juba still requires an additional infantry battalion, a transport company, a special forces company, and an armed reconnaissance companies (see page 10).

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<sup>1</sup> This paper has been updated since the last version was issued in September 2016. It will be revised and issued on a quarterly basis to reflect changes in current and emerging requirements and new commitments made by Member States.

## **I. The evolving peacekeeping environment**

The global demand for UN peacekeeping remains near an all-time high with over 100,000 uniformed personnel currently deployed. Despite troop drawdowns in Haiti, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire, increases in South Sudan and Mali will ensure that the total number remains at its historical peak. Given the continuing challenges in several missions, as well as an uptick in conflict globally, a significant near-term decrease in deployments is unlikely.

The global operating environment for UN peacekeeping is evolving. Alongside long-running traditional peacekeeping operations, other missions have been deployed in contexts where there is little or no peace to keep, and in which peacekeepers are targeted and confronted with ongoing violence, significant threats to civilian populations, and a variety of armed groups. In some missions, the host government has imposed severe restrictions on the freedom of movement and action of the mission, greatly diminishing its ability to operate effectively and testing the resourcefulness of mission leadership. The nature of conflict itself is also evolving. Security threats are increasingly transnational and criminalized in nature, and the lines between different kinds of violence and armed actors are increasingly blurred. In some cases, in particular in Mali, armed actors employ asymmetric tactics against both military and civilian targets, including the UN mission. The possibility of terrorist and extremist activity adds new threat types to the peacekeeping environment, creating challenges for detection, warning, and reaction.

While each mission is unique, it is useful to distinguish among several broad categories of United Nations peacekeeping operations and some generic requirements they share:

i) Supporting a ceasefire agreement: Long-standing monitoring and observation missions in Cyprus, the Golan, Jammu and Kashmir, and Western Sahara continue to help deter violence. These missions are limited in size and mandate. However, the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) illustrates how resource-intensive and challenging the maintenance of a deterrent presence in a volatile environment can be. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has also been confronted with a fundamentally different security environment since the start of the conflict in Syria, requiring a constant reassessment of the capabilities and resources required there.

ii) Supporting a peace process and national authorities after conflict: In several countries, large multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping missions face distinct challenges in helping to lay the foundations for sustainable peace. Still tenuous transitions in Central African Republic and Mali, as well as longstanding political and institutional challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo require agile military and police responses that are fully aligned with the political goals of the missions. The nuanced, but often necessary, application of force in this context regularly tests the military and police peacekeepers in these countries. Deterring and containing violence and protecting civilians are critical and demanding tasks that are complicated by gaps in capabilities, and, in the case of Mali, by terrorist attacks that directly target the mission itself. The large and remote territories in which many of these missions operate increase their difficulty as well as cost.

iii) Extending political and security gains into longer-term peacebuilding: UN peacekeeping missions also serve as early peacebuilders. In Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia, UN peacekeepers have succeeded in establishing basic security and supporting political processes. The conditions for sustainable peacebuilding are largely in place. National governments, supported by the UN, international financial

institutions and other partners must lead in setting strategies to deliver tangible peace dividends and economic development. Transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping missions depend on countries providing for their own security, and the UN will need to find effective ways to support this goal, including through the provision of expert capacities to strengthen the rule of law and the security sector.

iv) Providing security and protection during ongoing conflict: In South Sudan and in Darfur, Sudan, UN peacekeepers are trying to minimize the effects on civilians of ongoing conflict. Their activities are focused on protecting civilians, reducing the level of violence, providing security for humanitarian efforts and supporting efforts to implement a political settlement. The willingness of major parties to these conflicts – including the host authorities – to accept and cooperate with peacekeepers is critical. The scale and remoteness of the territory make these missions among the most expensive and difficult UN operations. These missions will likely continue to require major investments of capacity and resources for years to come.

In the short term, the demands of today's missions give some insight on future UN peacekeeping requirements as certain trends have emerged. UN peacekeeping operations must increasingly be dynamic. They are expected to perform multiple, interdependent and, sometimes, new tasks in harsh and remote operating environments that require good mobility, strong and secure supply chains, durable equipment and greater self-sustainability. More complex and sometimes more dangerous operations require strengthened communications, situational awareness, greater interoperability between units, and better force protection. In urban areas, specialized police capacities are needed to assist in confronting community violence, transnational organized crime or public disorder. Qualified corrections officers are also in demand to support national prison services in managing and operating secure and humane prisons. Critical, yet scarce, skill sets are required to rebuild police services.

The gap between expectations and delivery is likely to increase as the operating environment becomes more complex. Missions need to communicate effectively to host populations to explain their mandates and activities, and to manage expectations of what the mission can and cannot deliver. Such communication requires troops and police that are more proficient in the local language.

Against this context, current and future UN peace operations must be resourced with the right capabilities, delivered at the right time to meet the challenges they confront today and those that lie ahead. As such, the generation of capabilities for UN peacekeeping cannot focus solely on the type of equipment or number of personnel being sought. Rather it will increasingly focus on all the aspects that make a capability effective, including logistics, training, equipment, technology, doctrine, leadership, discipline, interoperability, and mind set, as well as the absence of operational caveats. What is needed are the right capabilities, not only the available ones. Finally, to adapt to the evolving operational realities and address the versatility of threats, missions require different capabilities at different periods in their lifecycle. Mission concepts of operations will be continually reassessed and force compositions and operational plans will need to be adjusted. In this context, TCC/PCCs must remain flexible and adaptive in the capabilities they provide.

## **II. General Capability Requirements**

The capability requirements for peacekeeping will vary from mission to mission depending on such factors as the mandate, security environment, geography, population distribution, and even the climate. Although the spectrum of UN deployments do employ some common capabilities, the force, police and corrections requirements of each mission are planned with specific capabilities to achieve the desired

effect based on the mandate. Protection of civilians, for instance, will remain a central task of many peacekeeping missions; hence, the primary focus, mind-set, and posture of the uniformed personnel are expected to be people-focused, pro-active, robust, and capable of protracted deployments. Missions need capabilities to undertake information-led operations to enhance situational awareness, in-theatre high mobility units capable of undertaking pre-emptive and assertive operations, and effective and reliable enablers including greater force protection assets, as described in more detail below.

### Leadership

The men and women nominated by Member States to serve as Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander and Police Commissioner face momentous challenges in implementing ambitious mandates. As such, they must be of the highest quality in terms of relevant operational experience, training, and ethics. In addition, such leaders must have the proper mind set to successfully navigate the challenging operational and political terrain of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. This becomes increasingly important in situations in which parties to a conflict or the host government itself do not provide full consent to the mission's presence or freedom of action. Such qualities are no less important in the men and women chosen by Member States to serve as contingent commanders of their deployed units. Success or failure can often depend on the experience, commitment, attitude and decision-making of the contingent commanders.

### Agile Units

Units which are agile and offer greater flexibility to the Mission (Infantry Battalions, Force Reserve Companies, Special Forces, Formed Police Units, Quick Reaction Forces and Attack Helicopters) are required for larger area domination and for contributing to the provision of a secure environment for the protection of civilians, to facilitate humanitarian access and to protect themselves and mission personnel. The infantry troops need to be organised and equipped as self-reliant and agile troops capable of conducting a broad spectrum of operations as enumerated in the UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM). Likewise, Special Forces capability requirements and tasks are now described in a dedicated UN Military Unit Manual.

### Situational Awareness

Information-led operations have become more critical as UN missions expand into complex environments facing multiple threats. Military and police activity must be shaped by focused and accurate intelligence to ensure effective operations. In the context of peacekeeping, such intelligence should be first built on human intelligence, which will require improved capabilities in this area. This will also require technologies and language capabilities that facilitate the acquisition, management, analysis and dissemination of intelligence to support timely decision-making within a mission-wide intelligence architecture. The following capabilities allow missions to provide this function:

- Surveillance and reconnaissance units, along with specialized personnel, equipment and tools;
- Command and Control structure (C3) capable of independent mandate implementation and force protection operations at unit, sector and mission levels
- Secure and interoperable information management and communications systems, including microwave, fibre-link and beyond line-of-sight communications;
- Unarmed, unmanned aerial systems, including smaller, tactical UAVs; and

- Aerial data and geospatial information including the near real-time sourcing and dissemination of satellite imagery. Aerial visualization, including monitoring platforms with mounted radar surveillance technology with day- and night-time capability.

### Enabling Units

The importance of effective enabling units (e.g., multi-role engineers, transport, signals, aviation and medical) to the mission cannot be overstated. The areas of operation are frequently underdeveloped with limited transportation infrastructure and scarce local resources. Improved medical care, especially night-flight capable aviation assets for CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, is an obligation when peacekeepers are asked to operate in high risk environments. Capable and effective engineering, transport and aviation have always been the backbone of a functioning mission, and will continue to be so in the future. Complex environments require modern and capable signals elements that facilitate secure, interoperable communications throughout the mission area. In addition, enabling units must increasingly be capable of protecting themselves autonomously. With the increasing number of demanding tasks, missions cannot anymore spare infantry or FPU's just to protect military enabling units.

### Force Protection

Force protection has emerged as a key element which needs to be addressed from multiple angles. Along with defensive measures and assets to safeguard camps, measures to counter improvised explosive devices and indirect fire attacks are increasingly important. In Mali we have seen violent extremist and terrorist groups adjust and enhance their use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against peacekeepers (including suicide and vehicle-borne), requiring the mission to introduce more sophisticated methods and technologies to keep its personnel safe. The following gaps must be filled to counter the increased threats in Mali and in future missions:

- EOD/IEDD/Weapons Intelligence Teams, combat engineering and combat convoy companies (force protection / escort) with relevant observation and identification capabilities (mobile, fixed, tethered, aircraft and UAVs) for route surveillance;
- Advanced IED detection systems, including ground penetrating radar and hand-held explosive meters, electronic countermeasures and other alert systems linked to area or mission wide intelligence resources;
- Mine-resistant vehicles;
- Indirect fire detection and warning systems integrated with bases' C3-systems (operations centers) and increased accommodation protection measures;
- Accurate and effective information, analysis and communication of situations to ensure that appropriate actions are taken. This requires intelligence from the whole range of available sources (see Situational Awareness section).

### Logistics

Peacekeeping missions are being deployed in environments with scarce infrastructure as well as limited and extended lines of communication that are vulnerable to frequent disruptions. In order to achieve expeditious initial and subsequently full operational capability, it is imperative for Member States to pledge military and civilian capabilities that would enhance the start-up and sustainment and complement the commercially contracted capabilities of the UN. The projects/activities could be turn-

key in terms of mission infrastructure, including the rapid construction of camps and bases, and the provision of medical, aviation and telecommunications.

### Technology

To ensure that peacekeeping operations are capable to work safely and effectively in their evolving operating environments, the UN and Member States are seeking to modernize UN- and contingent-owned force protection, survivability and duty of care systems, equipment and supporting structures. Modernisation in communications, CASEVAC/ MEDEVAC, and force protection measures are some of the notable areas where use of technology is essential. Technology such as UAVs, counter-mortar radars-alert systems, satellite imagery, visual surveillance equipment and remote sensors have become necessities for uniformed personnel to perform their tasks effectively in peacekeeping missions.

### Language Facility

With more than 50 per cent of UN peacekeepers deployed in Francophone environments, the UN lacks the ability to deploy sufficient uniformed contingents that can adequately communicate with the local population, a critical element to the protection of civilians and early peacebuilding. Proficiency in English is imperative for all personnel working in medical and aviation units. Future missions may require more troops and police conversant in Arabic.

### Women's Participation

Women uniformed personnel are critical in the intelligence, planning, civil-military affairs and community outreach activities conducted by a UN peacekeeping mission. Women personnel are often the most appropriate peacekeepers to interact with vulnerable members the population, who often will only speak with other women. Better engagement with local women will also increase the missions' ability to contribute to early warning mechanisms and enhance the missions' ability to protect civilians. The UN has set a target to have women comprise at least 15 per cent of all deployed staff officers and military observers by the end of 2017. Each Member State will need to prepare, train and nominate more women officers for this goal to be met.

The participation of women police and corrections officers in peacekeeping can provide role models to the female population in post-conflict societies, encouraging them to join their police and prison services as well as to report sexual and gender-based crimes. Women officers help restore trust and confidence in the police and prison services, especially from the perspective of women and children, as the institutions are reformed, restructured and rebuilt. Overall, an increase in women police and corrections officers in peacekeeping can have an immediate impact on operational efficiency and effectiveness.

### Staff Officers

The ongoing selection of high calibre individual officers with the appropriate skill sets is a persistent challenge for UN peacekeeping. The UN currently deploys approximately 5,000 individual military officers in various DPKO and DPA missions as staff officers and military experts on mission (UNMEMs). There is a continuous requirement in peacekeeping for experienced and qualified officers in the fields of, *inter alia*, military planning, UAS, CIED, logistics, defence sector reform and civil-military liaison. Work is ongoing to better test and train the staff officers before they are deployed.

### Capacity-building and Training

Sustainable capacity-building and effective training that meets UN standards for all TCC/PCCs are major efforts that must be given a high priority moving forward. Member States must refer to the UN's standard pre-deployment training materials and the suite of UN military unit manuals as guiding documents for the preparation and training of the pledges. In-depth Assessment and Advisory Visits, the SOP on Assessment of Operational Capability of FPU, and the Operational Readiness Assurance Framework for military units, including the SOP on evaluation of sub-units, and the identification of lessons will help complete the cycle of doctrine, training, evaluation, and learning to help ensure all units meet the required standards of capability and performance.

Among the capacity-building pledges made at the 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, nearly all were related to training, with offers to provide space in various courses or training facilities to interested Member States. As more Assessment and Advisory Visits are conducted, the Secretariat will work to play a constructive role in identifying needs and matching them with the pledging countries. More training and capacity-building offers that respond to identified needs are always required. In general, offers to provide equipment have not often included associated training, the provision of spare parts or maintenance, and are therefore limited in their sustainability and effectiveness. For maximum effect, it will be important for capacity-building providers to adopt a more sustained relationship with one or a few TCC/PCCs, bilaterally or through a triangular partnership with the Secretariat.

### Rapid Deployment Capability

The ability to deploy rapidly, during the most critical window of opportunity in a country, continues to be one of the most vexing operational challenges for UN peacekeeping. The PCRS is intended to help identify and prepare units to be ready for more rapid deployment. This tool can also be used by Member States or multilateral organisations to pledge strategic airlift capability or rapidly deployable government-provided civilian enablers. As one incentive, the General Assembly has authorized the possible payment of a premium to TCC/PCCs for the rapid deployment of enabling military and police capabilities. Furthermore, the Secretariat has presented an issue paper in the 2017 COE working group to propose some financial reimbursement for TCC/PCCs to maintain major equipment of units pledged at the PCRS Rapid Deployment Level (i.e. willing and able to be deployed in under 60 days).

Member States, DPKO and DFS need to continue working together to enhance the operational preparedness of pledged units through the PCRS. All units at Level 3 should be able to deploy in fewer than 90 days from receipt of the UN request and be prepared to self-sustain for an initial period of time. Preparing capabilities to meet the requirements of Level 3 and pledging units to the RDL will be a key factor in improving the UN's rapid deployment capability. As a part of this capability, deploying units must be self-sufficient in life-support upon initial deployment, and self-sustaining, with capabilities to deploy and operate independently in austere and high-risk environments. Vertical engineering capabilities (military or government-provided civilian capabilities) should also be pledged to be deployed rapidly to facilitate the construction of camps and the absorption of new units in theatre. A summary of capabilities currently registered in the PCRS is below, along with a description of capabilities that need to be committed to the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL).

### **III. Currently Pledged Capabilities**

The total pledges and their current status as fully registered in the PCRS (Level 1 and Level 2) are in the table below. Level 1 indicates that a Member State has input all necessary information (list of major equipment, table of organization, etc.) about a pledged unit into the PCRS. Level 2 indicates that a unit

has received an Assessment and Advisory Visit and the unit was assessed to be on track to meet UN requirements and can begin discussions on a draft MOU/LOA. Level 3 indicates that a draft MOU/LOA has been discussed and a cargo load list has been provided. Discussions on draft MOUs have begun with the first Member States to have reached Level 2 of the PCRS. Note that a number of units have already deployed to field missions, reducing the overall numbers of units still registered in the PCRS.

Type of units	Number of units pledged	# of units in PCRS Level 1	# of units in PCRS Level 2	Deployed/ Deploying units
Infantry Battalions	39	17	6	1
Infantry Companies	13	9	-	2
Special Force Units/ groups	11	5	1	2
Force Protection/ Units	14	2	3	-
Engineer Companies/ Platoons	27	9	5	2
EOD Companies/ Teams	3	1	1	-
Hospitals/ Medical Teams	22	6	5	2
Utility Helicopter Units	16	7	3	1
Attack Helicopter Units	6	2	2	1
Transport Aircrafts	18	11	2	4
Unmanned Aerial Systems	4	1	2	1
MP Companies/ teams	5	3	1	-
Signal Companies	5	2	2	-
Log/ Transport Companies/ Units	11	2	3	1
Formed Police Units	26	15	3	3
Police Guard Units	3	2	-	1
SWAT	3	2	-	1
Miscellaneous Capabilities	39	29	3	1
Naval Units	6	6	0	-
Strategic Air Lift	6	0	0	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>23</b>

Of the pledges, 67 per cent have been fully registered in the PCRS, 84 units from 28 countries have received AAVs, and over twenty units/subunits of more than 3,000 troops have already been deployed or are in the process of deploying to current missions.

The large number of credible pledges will improve the uniformed capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations, as well as increase the speed of future deployments. There are, however, challenges in operationalizing the pledges and reaping the benefits of an adequately prepared, equipped and committed reserve force. First, there is a need for more Member States to register their pledges with sufficient details in the PCRS as well as to receive AAVs by teams from UN Headquarters. Fifteen Member States have yet to fully register their pledges, leaving the pool of registered troops and police at approximately 40,000. Some pledges come with caveats limiting the possible location, or effectiveness of any deployment, and some niche units that have been pledged are not the types of capabilities in demand in current missions. A number of pledged units are still in the process of being created and will not be deployable until 2018 or later. Finally, of the 84 units that have been assessed through AAVs since March 2016, shortfalls and gaps have been observed in different categories of equipment and

training in 36 pledged units. It therefore would be reasonable to estimate that approximately 20,000 troops and police on offer can currently be considered as viable pledges in the near term.

#### **IV. 2016 Capability Goals**

The Secretariat has conducted 28 AAVs in 2016, with the goal of having sufficient capabilities at a desired state of readiness for the potential deployment of a new medium sized peacekeeping mission (approx. 15,000 troops and police). Of these 15,000, the capabilities of one integrated brigade (approx. 4,000 troops) would need to be pledged to the Rapid Deployment Level to fulfil the requirements for a brigade size force. The table below lists the specific capabilities required at Level 3 and RDL of the PCRS as well as the current status. *Note that some pledges meant for the RDL have already been deployed and some units pledged to the RDL have not yet been registered.*

##### Requirements for Level 3 and Rapid Deployment Level and Current Status

<b>Type of Unit</b>	<b>Required at Level 3</b>	<b>Registered in Level 3</b>	<b>Required at RDL</b>	<b>Registered in RDL</b>
Infantry Battalion	9	0	3	2 (1 additional TBC)
QRF	3	0	1	0
SOF	3	0	1	1
FP/FHQ Support Coy	2	0	2	0
Level 2 Hospitals	3	0	1	0 (1 TBC)
Engineer Coy	3	0	1	1 (1 additional TBC)
MUH	3	0	1	0
Attack Helicopter	1	0	1	0
Tpt Aircraft	3	0	1	0
Log Bn	1	0	1	1
Signals Coy	1	0	1	1 (1 additional TBC)
FPU	4	0	3	1 (3 additional TBC)
SWAT	2	0	2	0
Staff Officers	30	0	30	(20 TBC)
Military Observers	125	0	125	0

#### **V. Current and Anticipated Critical Gaps**

##### Gaps in the PCRS for future deployments

For the PCRS to function effectively, more pledged units will be needed at Level 3 or RDL. Based on pledged capacities and the AAVs conducted to date, shortages are anticipated at Level 3 for:

- quick reaction force companies;
- medium utility helicopters;
- attack helicopters; and
- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance units.

In general, the Secretariat also anticipates continued gaps in Francophone capabilities (both military and police) and women staff officers and military observers.

With regard to rapid deployment requirements, six Member States (Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) pledged at the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in September 2016 to maintain specific units at a high-state of readiness (able to deploy within 60 days) for 2017. We encourage further pledges at the RDL for 2017, especially for utility and attack helicopters. Similar commitments of all types of units will be needed by Member States annually to retain the required capabilities.

### Mission-specific critical gaps

The below list of mission-specific critical gaps remains dynamic and will change frequently. Member States are recommended to contact Force Generation Service or Police Division/Selection and Recruitment Section, as relevant, for real-time updates or for more details. Some of the gaps listed below are part of the current force/police requirements and are actively being generated; others (in italics) are anticipated for the future. Changes can occur because of a unit's planned withdrawal from a mission or because of the demand for new capabilities emanating from a military/police capability study and /or strategic review of a mission.

In Mali, the UN mission continues to operate with significant capability gaps, both current and anticipated. The gap of MUH and AH units in MINUSMA starting in mid-2018 would constitute a critical capability gap that would significantly reduce the Force's ability to perform mandated tasks, including CASEVAC/MEDEVAC. The current lack of ISR capability – especially in Sector North – is limiting MINUSMA's ability to fulfil its mandate. In terms of equipment shortfalls, the increased threat from IEDs and mines in Mali highlight the importance of adequate APCs and other protected vehicles. MINUSMA TCCs and PCCs lacking such equipment require bilateral support in order to enable deployment of the required number of APCs.

In South Sudan, a new Security Council mandate expanding the mission's military component has brought about a number of new capability requirements. Those that have yet to be filled are detailed below.

	<b>Situational awareness</b>	<b>Manoeuvre</b>	<b>Enablers</b>	<b>Aviation</b>	<b>Police</b>	<b>Corrections</b>
<b>UNMISS</b>		1 x High Readiness Coy (SOF); 1 x Armed Recce Coy; 1 x Infantry Battalion	1 x Transport Coy			30 operational prison security officers
<b>MINUSMA</b>	1 x ISR Unit for Kidal	1 x SOF Coy	1 x EOD Coy; 2 x Airfield Support Units	1 x AH unit; <i>1 x AH unit; 1 x MUH unit [starting mid-2018]</i>	1 x Riverine Police Unit	
<b>MINUSCA</b>						20 operational prison security officers