The chapters in this volume explore how the world’s leading religious traditions have dealt with the normative problems associated with war and armed conflict. Although non-violent strategies of conflict resolution have been considered in several of the chapters, the book’s main focus has been on what Stephen Neff names “the just-war outlook in the generic sense of the term”. This is the idea that the use of armed force may be justifiable within determinable limits in order to uphold fundamental human values, such as protection of one’s homeland from attack, defence of the innocent, preservation of the rule of law, or accountability for grave crimes such as genocide.

The reader may find this focus on “just war” unexpected in a volume that purports to study how religious traditions have assessed the normative dimensions of war. For many, the term “just war” has come to signify a secular Western discourse that is ill suited for describing religious attitudes towards the phenomenon in question. Moreover, on the theme of religion and war the reading public has grown accustomed to apparently contradictory attitudes. On the one hand, it is often assumed that “true” religion requires a renunciation of violence; on the other hand, it seems equally incontrovertible that, when individuals enter war with religious motivations, their use of force will know no limits. Hence the freighted term “holy war”, long associated with historical excesses such as the medieval Crusades or the Reformation era wars of religion, has newly found application to a wide range of violent struggles in which religious identifications are taken to be a key factor. The discourse about

religion and war thus gyrates from principled pacifism to the most extreme realism (where it is thought that in war for religious reasons “anything goes”). The ground traditionally occupied by the world’s great religious traditions – wherein over the centuries a network of overlapping distinctions has been drawn on the difference between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of force – has been neglected in favour of the more dramatic discourse that alternates between the opposing poles of non-violence and militant extremism.

If “just war” designates the search for a middle ground between “no violence whatsoever” and “anything goes”, then it can be a useful term for designating the abundant literature that arose first in Hindu culture, then among the ancient Israelites, to a certain extent among followers of the Buddha, and finally with much explicit articulation by Christians and Muslims. The present book has been edited with the hope that careful study of this literature will yield insight into the influence – good and bad – that religious motivations can exercise in the tragic domain of war.

There can be much value in secular approaches to the norms of war, as found in philosophical treatises, policy statements and, not least, the growing body of legal statutes (“international law”) that formulate when, how and by whom force may be used in the public interest. This literature is largely about rules of restraint, with respect to both _jus ad bellum_ (as may be found, for instance, in the UN Charter) and _jus in bello_ (as, for example, in the Hague or the Geneva Conventions). Yet this literature also contains rules of empowerment, which urge military action (a “responsibility to protect”) when many human lives are at grave risk from violence. The legal statutes in particular are framed in a language that prescinds from any explicit mention of religious concerns. The aim by and large is not so much to exclude religion but rather to employ a language that will be understood across the boundaries of the world’s many religious communities, and by non-believers as well.

Admirable as this secular universalism may be, it has a notable downside. In seeking a common denominator (a shared consensus on the rules of war), the religious springs of human motivation, which _in concreto_ are founded upon the particularity of different religious traditions, go untapped. The result is a set of rules that may be compelling in their abstract clarity but that may fail to motivate in the concrete circumstances of action because they have but little resonance within the cultural matrix of ordinary moral agents. Since the cultural matrix for millions of people in the world today is infused with ideas, images and expectations that originate from their respective religious traditions, if rules of war are to have real traction, if they are to have a hold on the minds and hearts of believers, it is important that they be associated with longstanding norms of peace and war that can be found within each of these traditions.
People will continue to listen to preachers and follow the ethics of their religions, no less than they will continue to read the books of international law. One can find good use in secularizing the norms of war from the religious traditions and codifying them into inter-state agreements. This book is intended not only as a reminder of the religious origins of norms of war, but also to help us remember that religious convictions continue to shape our conduct today (both in a positive and in a negative direction) with respect to the onset and methods of war.

Gaining a better understanding of the norms articulated by the world’s religious traditions provides an internal (in this sense privileged) standpoint from which to judge manipulations of religion by those political leaders and others who have not failed to appreciate how powerfully religious beliefs can motivate human beings to action. The instrumentalization of religion has been much in evidence in several recent conflicts, and it has not gone undocumented within the present volume.

The reasons that can justify behaviour leading to the elimination of human life are as religious and ethical as they are political or legal. All religious traditions have on at least some occasions been demonized and accused of provoking aggressions, wars and human suffering. The complexity goes even further, as not only individuals but entire societies have sometimes been blamed in this way. This book considers what religions say about going to war and methods of fighting, but it does not take up Samuel Huntington’s contested claims about a “clash of civilizations” as an explanation for the persistence of war in the twenty-first century. Although historically it seems beyond doubt that religious teachings have been instrumental in motivating or justifying some wars, we see little evidence for an inherent animosity between religions. True enough, kings and politicians have made use of religious texts to justify warfare. Soldiers have been told to fight infidels and, if necessary, to die defending a faith, a holy place or a community. But throughout history, war, an inherently political activity, has needed religion much more than religion has needed war.

The newly revived discourse on “holy war” has tended to obscure the complexity of traditional religious teachings about war and violence. The origins of this term merit close historical examination. One can speculate that it was first employed metaphorically in the Christian West to designate the arduous spiritual struggle in the face of sin, evil and temptation to remain faithfully on the path to God, much as Muslims speak of the “greater jihad” of the soul. However, after the sixteenth-century wars of religion in Western Europe, the term came to signify, often in writings by Enlightenment detractors of religion, narrow sectarian rationales for resorting to armed force. Used as a catch-phrase, “holy war” suggests that, applied within settings of violent conflict, the religious impulse is at
its most intense and authentic when it serves to motivate action on behalf
of one set of narrow “sectarian” religious interests, against a competing
set of equally narrow interests.

Left out of the equation are what one might term “universalist” reli-
gious rationales for engaging in war. Such rationales (which express
norms of both empowerment and restraint) are formulated within partic-
ular religious traditions and couched in a terminology proper to each tra-
dition, but are not founded on reasons exclusively proper to any one
religion. Thus we find a number of core ideas affirmed across a range of
different traditions: for instance, that force may be used to protect inno-
cent third parties from attack, that grievances should be openly aired be-
fore redress is sought through armed force, that non-combatants should
not be directly targeted in war, that promises even to enemies should be
kept, that prisoners should be treated humanely, or that especially cruel
means of warfare should be banned. When these core ideas find expres-
sion in holy books, or are articulated by recognized religious authorities,
they benefit from a kind of divine warrant that strengthens their credibil-
ity in the eyes of religious believers. Let us now summarize some aspects
of what can be identified as common (or “universalist”) causes and
methods of war, based on the preceding chapters.

Jus ad bellum

The preceding chapters have shown that there is much overlap between
the different religious traditions regarding what counts as a legitimate
rationale for resorting to armed force. While revenge or purely acquisi-
tive reasons for war are almost universally condemned, self-defence from
attack is the rationale most often put forward for going to war. In Hindu-
ism, Christianity and Islam, for instance, defence is not merely framed
as an allowable course of action (a right or a justification); it is also pro-
moted as an obligation incumbent upon the political leadership and citi-
zenny alike.+

Despite this broad consensus, within the different religions there re-
main somewhat different assessments of what kinds of wrongdoing
warrant defensive action. For instance, Islamic authors often view the ex-
pulsion of helpless people from their homes or attacks on holy places as
among the greatest of harms; hence defence in this tradition will consist
first and foremost in using force to protect against attacks of this kind.
Likewise, within Islam there is a very strong condemnation of surprise at-
tack as an especially pernicious form of aggression. Within Christianity,
by contrast, although much is said about the protection of the innocent,
the protection of holy places has typically not figured very prominently
in discussions about legitimate defence. However, within this religion there may be found particularly rich discussions about whether or not the threat of future harm can legitimize defensive military action. Now referred to under the heading of “pre-emption”, the consensus among leading authors (Catholic and Protestant) is that only immediate threats, based on demonstrable signs of imminent aggression, can warrant resort to armed force in the absence of any ongoing attack. More dubious is the legitimacy of defensive action in the face of a long-term plan to carry out future aggression. What is more, these authors are nearly unanimous in their rejection of preventive war, the strategy whereby nation x attacks nation y so as to prevent y from acquiring a capacity to cause x future harm. In this vein, the Dutch Protestant Hugo Grotius wrote that “[q]uite untenable is the position, which has been maintained by some, that according to the law of nations it is right to take up arms in order to weaken a growing power which may do harm, should it become too great…. [T]hat the possibility of being attacked confers the right to attack is abhorrent to every principle of equity.”

In several traditions, there may likewise be found a strong imperative to contemplate all possible alternatives before resorting to the use of force – the principle of last resort. Hence we find Christian and Muslim authors articulating the view that God has provided humans with means other than force by which to solve disputes, and a wronged party must declare its grievances to the perpetrator, allowing an opportunity for non-violent resolution before resorting to force. Similarly, Buddhist teachings, while rarely engaging in explicit discussion of war and its justification, do make clear that leaders are allowed to use limited force only when prior attempts at peaceful negotiation have met with failure.

It must be observed that the teachings of the major religious traditions regarding war are also strongly influenced by their respective conceptions of peace. The ethics of the transition between peace and war, which is the domain of jus ad bellum, will be construed very differently depending on how peace is conceptualized in relation to war. Some religious traditions define peace positively in relation to justice and friendship, rather than negatively as the absence of war. This is particularly salient in both Judaism and Christianity. With respect to the latter, for instance, the Eastern Orthodox tradition, while maintaining that war is unconditionally an evil, also acknowledges that there are times when war is necessary in order to restore a peace that has been disrupted or lost. Judaism similarly shares the conviction that war is not a natural condition, and adds to it the messianic ideal that universal peace will become a reality for the whole of humanity. In Islam, great value is attached to building and maintaining peace, to the extent that it is considered a duty for all Muslims, and, accordingly, those who bring peace are promised “continuous praise from
the angels”. However, in contrast to the normative centrality of peace in most traditions (including Buddhism, which traces war to human failings such as hatred and ignorance), Hindu teaching emphasizes the inevitability of inter-state war; its efforts are accordingly directed chiefly at limiting the harmful effects of violent conflict.

Several of the religions studied in this volume have on occasion held out the promise that heavenly rewards will be granted to individuals who conduct war in a manner consistent with the teachings of their tradition. This idea of “reward” is clearly vulnerable to political misuse and, notwithstanding certain biased portrayals, Islam does not find itself alone in this regard. Hence, in the dharmayuddha doctrine of Hindu religious thought, warriors who kill in the line of duty are assured a place in Heaven after death; similarly, in Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christianity, soldiers who fight justly for a worthy cause have sometimes been canonized as saints.6

It is true, however, that there can be found teachings on war and violence that are proper to specific religious traditions. Some of these teachings provide reasons for restraint, while others encourage resort to force. As an example of the former, one could cite the Shiite teaching that offensive war may be waged only at the command of an Infallible Imam. Since it is believed that no such Imam is present today (in light of the doctrine of “occultation”), the result is a general prohibition of offensive war and thus a special religious reason that narrows the jus ad bellum to strict defence. A related conception may be found within Judaism, in its teaching that “discretionary war” has no current validity and has not had such for well over 2,000 years, in the absence of a High Priest with access to an authorizing oracle (the Urim and Thummim). Similarly in Islam, although defensive war may be waged without the special permission of legitimate authority – under conditions of great urgency all citizens, including women and children, are expected to fight – offensive war is regulated much more strictly. It is stipulated, for instance, that grievances must be announced beforehand so that the offending party has an opportunity to make amends, and hostilities may be initiated only with an open declaration being made beforehand (surprise attack being strictly condemned) solely under the command of the highest authority in the land. Other religions, including Christianity, also distinguish between “defensive” and “offensive” war; with the proviso that significantly stricter requirements obtain for the latter than for the former. This framework has been adopted into international law, as evidenced for instance in Articles 51 and 42 of the UN Charter: although individual states retain the right of self-defence, the UN Security Council is alone permitted to authorize offensive war (termed “enforcement action”).
The emerging contemporary norm of humanitarian intervention also has its roots in several religious traditions. In Islam, for instance, the faithful have been urged to fight in aid of those who are helpless to defend themselves, and in Christianity the ideal of fighting on behalf of the innocent has existed at least since St Ambrose in the fourth century, who famously wrote that “he who fails to ward off injury from an associate if he can do so, is quite as blamable as he who inflicts it.” The norm of humanitarian intervention has now achieved a strong basis in public consensus, in large respects owing to the duty of compassionate assistance that is affirmed in one way or another in all religious traditions. Applied historically in concrete circumstances, it goes without saying that religious justifications for the use of force have not always been altruistic. Acknowledgement of this fact should nevertheless not preclude us from recognizing that religious traditions have sometimes urged resort to force for humanitarian reasons, in ways that many of us would be willing to countenance today.

For examples of special religious reasons that encourage resort to armed force, one could point to the medieval Crusades in Western Christianity ( premised on the belief that the Holy Land, having been “consecrated” by the birth and death of Jesus, was by right the property of Christians), or to the conviction, upheld by Ibn Taymiyya (thirteenth century) and some later Sunni authors, that Muslims have a positive duty to “strive in the way of God” by spreading Islamic law to those who lack it, “through peaceful means if possible but with the use of force if necessary”. Other causes that have justified the resort to force include the Shinto belief in Japan as a “land of the Gods”, which in the sixteenth century served to warrant the invasion of the Korean peninsula, ostensibly to spread the “benefits of civilization” to neighbouring states. In Hinduism, the realist doctrine of *kutayuddha* preaches the use of force to maintain power and protect territory, as advocated in Kautilya’s *Arthasastra*. Closer to our own time, during the armed conflict in the Balkans, some Orthodox Serb theologians promoted a “Kosovo covenantal mythology” that helped create “an environment in which organized violence could be justifiable and even recommendable as the only possible self-defence strategy for a perpetually beleaguered Christian Orthodox nation and Church” (Chapter 7 in this volume).

There are many more examples of religious encouragement to violence. Although Islam has born the brunt of blame in recent years, it remains true that none of the world’s religious traditions can claim immunity from such a tendency. There is much need for a systematic comparative exploration of the doctrinal factors that condition religious motivations for engagement in acts of violence. Such an exploration...
largely falls outside the scope of the present volume, but it can be noted, based on findings contained herein, that in ideological settings where there exists a tight fusion between state and religion a wide opening is created for the justification of religious violence. It is well documented, for instance, how in the “sacral” political order of the Christian Middle Ages heresy and other forms of religious dissidence were considered crimes against the state, akin to sedition, and on this ground would warrant armed suppression. This mindset has also promoted various forms of inter-civilizational conflict (say between Christians and Muslims) and inter-denominational wars of religion. In Islam, similarly, there have been times when the state’s coercive power was viewed as “essential for the establishment and maintenance of discipline and order, without which mosques could not be opened and the practice of Islam carried out” (Chapter 10 in this volume). In either case (and here again examples could be multiplied with reference to other religions), when the very unity of the political community is constituted along religious lines and where, in addition, the political order is viewed as instrumental to religious ends, there will be increased pressure to use force in responding to religious threats. Inversely, doctrinal attempts at separating the cause of religion from that of the state have generally helped to bring about a de-legitimization of religiously inspired violence.\footnote{8}

\textit{Jus in bello}

If we consider what the previous chapters have written about \textit{jus in bello}, or proper conduct in war, it will become apparent that there is much overlap on this theme among the world’s different religious traditions. One important case in point is the key norm of non-combatant immunity, a principle that has found expression in nearly all religious traditions. Although framed diversely in different settings, the idea that civilians, wounded soldiers, prisoners and even combatants who have lost their weapons should not be targeted with direct harm has found widespread affirmation in religious texts. True enough, some religious actors have preached the contrary, but it is difficult to find much support for this extreme view within the classical texts that have been discussed in this volume. Non-combatant immunity and related principles have been codified in international humanitarian law through treaties such as the Geneva Conventions (1949). The violation of such humanitarian norms regularly prompts widespread condemnation from figures of authority in the major religions, demonstrating how there exists much inter-religious agreement regarding these norms.
Despite the widespread support for non-combatant immunity, the implementation of this norm is anything but easy, particularly in settings that include the use of terrorist tactics and asymmetric warfare. In such contexts, normative discourse oscillates between inclusive and exclusive definitions of combatant status, which results in correspondingly different prescriptions for the use of force. Advocates of terrorism often claim that civilians are responsible for the actions and policies of their governments, and on this basis they are deemed legitimate targets of force. Asymmetric warfare likewise often involves a blurring of the line between combatants and non-combatants. When actors views themselves as unable to confront an opponent in conventional ways, but consider their cause just, they often feel justified in using unconventional tactics such as human shielding and kidnapping. The employment of “human shields” is now deemed a violation of international humanitarian law – accountability for the fate of these involuntary shields rests with the individuals who placed them in their precarious position. In responding to tactics such as these, some religious texts have emphasized the responsibilities of the active party, as for instance in Islamic jurisprudence, which permits the targeting of combatants who have taken shelter among women and children. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) “purity of arms” code likewise maintains that minimizing the deaths of non-combatants is a priority, with however the qualification that, for a sovereign state, minimizing the deaths of one’s own non-combatants takes priority over protecting non-combatants on the opposing side.9

Proportionality in the use of force is another concept that has found widespread acceptance among the world’s leading religious traditions. Proportionality has proven to be especially hard to apply to unconventional weaponry, for instance nuclear arms. Within Christianity and Islam, strong condemnations regarding any possible battlefield use of such weapons have been enunciated, owing to the high number of casualties and the long-term harm that would inevitably result. On the other side of the spectrum, some Hindu authors allow for the use of these weapons in circumstances of last resort. In some religious traditions there has also been broad debate on the permissibility of designing and possessing nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence. Whereas Roman Catholic teaching has allowed for a limited strategy of deterrence, as long as all nuclear states actively work toward the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament, in the Shia tradition any possession of nuclear weapons, for whatever reason (including deterrence), is considered incompatible with the teachings of Islam.10 Indeed, consternation over the development of nuclear weapons prompted a reassessment in the Roman Catholic Church of the basic concept of just war, with Pope John XXIII...
maintaining (in 1963) that, “in this age which boasts of its atomic power, it no longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice”. It must be said nonetheless that the “limited” wars of the post–Cold War era have reintroduced the just war idea into public (and religious) debate, since experience has shown that even states that possess a nuclear arsenal are able to fight without bringing (inherently) disproportionate force into the fray.

Evolution and interpretation

Most religious traditions, by their inherent dependence on historical texts, rarely offer detailed answers to emerging contemporary issues, including modern methods of warfare. Religious teachings are often taken to be universal truths that apply across time, irrespective of social, political or technological developments. Whereas religious texts do not readily change, the historical circumstances of human life are subject to profound transformations. Religion is not, therefore, about blindly following a set of rules, but more about considering how the principles contained in sacred texts and practices should apply to the emerging issues of the present day. Religious texts call for reflection on their meaning, and so it is natural that a variety of interpretations will be offered, adding to the rich diversity of opinions within each tradition. This highlights both the opportunities as well as the inevitable risks that accompany the interpretation and application of religious teachings. In the process of bringing religious teachings into the broader stream of public discourse, theologians and other scholars strive to show how their respective religions can maintain their core identity while allowing for diversity in their adaptation to the changing conditions of human existence.

In this fashion, from their origins in different times and different contexts, the world’s great religious traditions have had to come to terms with the same changing world; they likewise have grappled with the same issues of war and violence. In doing so, they have reached many of the same conclusions. Although each tradition contains teachings that are unique to it alone – the role of the Urim and Thummim (the High Priest’s oracle) in Judaism, or the occulted Twelfth Imam in Shia Islam, would be two such examples – this should not prevent us from seeing the many significant parallels and points of agreement on the norms of war among the different religions. This notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that religious discourse on war can also give rise to extremist interpretations, particularly when religious teachings are made to serve narrow political interests. One need only think of the use to which the concept of “holy war” has been put, not only by Christians (as recently as the Spanish
Civil War) and Muslims (al-Qaeda), but also by Buddhists (witness the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka), Hindus (nationalist appeals vis-à-vis Kashmir) and Jews (the Settler movement), as justification for campaigns of violence. For political leaders engaged in war, there can be a strong temptation to deploy the rhetoric of religious justification, with all the increased support and protection from criticism this brings. Religious discourse can magnify and exacerbate pre-existing tensions; this effect is open to exploitation by leaders who use it to rally their troops, the public and other politicians. Religious calls to action can serve to reinforce the positive identity of “our” side, thereby demonizing the “other” side. For each potential soldier, if God is on his side he cannot easily refuse to fight, and his belief that the war will end in victory will be strengthened, thereby removing the fear of defeat and encouraging others to join the fight.

All religious texts contain internal tensions; passages calling for action often contradict those advocating restraint, and vice versa. Each exponent of a religion claims the validity of his or her interpretation, and herein resides the greatest problem: moderation is frequently seen as, at best, no more than one of many different interpretations. But this ignores the reinforcement that these moderate religious views receive from secular international law. In turn, it cannot be ignored that the core norms of international law originally took root in the religious thought of humanity, Christianity especially, but to some extent in other traditions as well. The cross-cultural legitimacy of international norms in a range of areas, including the use of force, human rights and law, is based on, and continues to be enhanced by, the existence of shared religious principles. International norms “return the favour” by conferring cross-cultural validity back upon the moderate voices within each tradition that contributed to the formulation of these norms in the first place. In this way, the views of moderates, and therefore their readings of the core texts, are vindicated by international consensus. Extreme factions can never gain this validity. Here we need to be reminded of what Aristotle said about the mean of virtue: this is a mean of excellence, not of mediocrity; true moderation indicates great skill, akin to hitting the bull’s eye on a target.

Inter-faith dialogue is an indispensable path toward building up a consensus on norms of war among people of different religions. This in turn contributes greatly to denying credibility to extremists who claim religious rationales for their violence. It is telling that, from the perspective of extremists, dialogue and mutual engagement are seen as unacceptable compromises, endangering the purity of their tradition’s teaching and practice. Recent efforts to encourage dialogue between Muslims and Christians, including Pope Benedict XVI’s meetings in 2007 with the Saudi king and with a group of Muslim scholars led by Jordanian Prince...
Ghazi bin Mohammad bin Talal, have been criticized by the leaders of al-Qaeda, for whom inter-religious dialogue is viewed as a threat to the interests of “true religion”. But Muslim hard-liners do not have a monopoly on this aversion to dialogue. Such aversion may be found, *inter alia*, among Christian advocates as well.\(^1\)

The preceding chapters have shown how religious thinking contributes vitally to our understanding of norms of war. This said, much further research is necessary. In particular, a deeper knowledge of the ongoing internal tensions and developments within the different traditions would provide valuable insights not only about each religion in particular, but more generally about the processes by which religious teachings on peace and war develop. These insights, in turn, could throw light on the ways in which these teachings are interpreted and misinterpreted, as well as the nature and dynamics of their influence on the political sphere.

### Notes

4. This was summed up by the Swiss Protestant author Vattel, when he wrote that “[i]f a Nation is bound to preserve its existence it is not less bound to preserve carefully the lives of its members. It owes this duty to itself” (cited in Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse and Endre Begby (eds), *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p. 507).
6. In Gratian’s *Decretum* (c. 1140), one of the most influential works of Western Christianity, we read this invocation (attributed to Pope Leo IV): “Having relinquished all fright and terror, do combat with all your strength the enemies of the holy faith and the adversaries of all religions. For if any of you dies, the Almighty knows that he died for the truth of the faith, for the salvation of the country and the defense of the Christians, and he will therefore obtain celestial reward” (quoted in Reichberg et al., *The Ethics of War*, p. 124). For a study of military sainthood in Christianity, see André Corvisier, *Les Saints Militaires*. Paris: Editions Honoré Champion, 2006.
7. Citation from Gratian’s *Decretum*, in Reichberg et al., *The Ethics of War*, p. 114.
9. For discussion of this topic, see *Journal of Military Ethics*, 4(1), 2005, special issue on “Israel and the Ethics of Fighting Terror”.
10. This condemnation is reflected in the statement issued on 12 August 2005 by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who declared that “the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam” (cited at ⟨http://www.mathaba.net/0_index.shtml?x=302258⟩, accessed 22 October 2008).