Norms of war in Eastern Orthodox Christianity

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The attitudes of the Eastern Orthodox churches to the use of armed force and the means and methods of warfare have not received such exhaustive treatment as the corresponding attitudes to the same phenomena in Western Christianity – Roman Catholicism and the various denominations of Protestant Christianity. Yet lately a thought-provoking debate has developed among Eastern Orthodox theologians and scholars centred on the historical development and transformations of the notions of “justifiable war” and “just war” or the categorization of war as a “lesser good” or a “lesser evil” in Eastern Orthodox Christianity. These debates, as well as the Eastern Orthodox Christian responses to modern developments in international humanitarian law and new weapons and tactics of mass destruction, need to be considered in the context of the historical development and transformations of the Eastern Orthodox perspectives on war and peace, their principal stages and figures, their scriptural and patristic basis and their reinterpretations in modern ideologized and reformist trends in Eastern Orthodox thought.

Eastern Orthodox attitudes to the problems of warfare, just war and the ethics of war offer important parallels to and differences from the respective Western Christian attitudes, which need a careful and balanced analysis. It is worth mentioning at this stage that it is still difficult to present a definitive reconstruction of the evolution of the notions of just and/or justifiable war in Eastern Orthodox thought and societies, because some of the main relevant works in its classical representative tradition, Byzantine Christianity, either have not been edited and published or,
when edited, have not been translated into modern West European languages and thus remain inaccessible to the larger scholarly audience. With the present state of evidence and research in this field of study, it will be possible to introduce what seem to be the most important Eastern Orthodox perspectives on the use of military force and right conduct during warfare, while remaining conscious of the above problems and the amount of unpublished source material in this particular field.

Scriptural and patristic basis

As in Western Christianity, the roots of the prevalent attitudes to war and peace in Eastern Orthodoxy can be easily traced back to the New Testament and its well-known passages concerning the use of force, violence, Christ’s moral teaching and its emphatic pacifistic perspective (for example, Matthew 5–7, 26:52, Luke 2:14, 3:14, 6:29). At the same time, Eastern Orthodoxy inherited the potential for a non-pacifistic and even militaristic exegesis of the New Testament passages containing military imagery (for example, 1 Thessalonians 5:8, Ephesians 6:10, 1 Corinthians 9:7, 2 Timothy 2:3–4), Jesus’ “sword” allusions (Matthew 10:34, Luke 22:35–38) and the heavenly war imagery in Revelation 20, which, as in Western Christianity, in particular circumstances and through suitably literalist interpretations could be used to sanction the use of force. Eastern Orthodoxy also inherited the evident tensions between the ideas of war and peace respectively in the Old and New Testaments, which, despite the continuity between the notions of the ultimate universal eternal peace in some trends of Jewish prophetic and messianic thought and early Christian messianism, diverged substantially in other areas.

These divergences had already caused divisions and schisms in early Christianity, as many of the Gnostic groups came to attribute the Yahweh-inspired war and violence episodes in the Old Testament to a lower, often wicked, demiurge of the physical world, and Marcion’s (c.85–c.160) dichotomy between the New Testament God of salvation and love and the Old Testament God of the law of vengeance and justice also proved influential until the early third century CE. Millenarian trends in early Christianity, Montanism, and other related apocalyptic currents, seeking to revive apostolic Christianity, characteristically professed passionate pacifism and a rejection of violence. These pacifistic preoccupations in early Christianity could be coupled both with apocalyptic expectations of forthcoming eschatological peace and with pronounced rejection and condemnation of Christian participation in (Roman) military service. Such anti-militarism and pacific views were shared and articulated with varying degrees of intensity and qualification.
by early Church Fathers such as St Justin Martyr (c.100–c.165), Clement of Alexandria (c.150–c.215), St Hippolytus (c.170–c.236), Tertullian (c.160–c.225), Origen (c.185–c.254), St Cyprian of Carthage (d.258), Arnobius (3rd–4th century) and Lactantius (c.250–c.325). At the same time, an increasing amount of evidence suggests that Christians served in the army in the pre-Constantinian era, particularly from the late second century onwards, and were beginning to form Christian milieus within the Roman military.

Constantine’s Edict of Milan in 313, his conversion to Christianity and the legitimization and institutionalization of the Church in the Roman empire inevitably led to various patterns of rapprochement between the state’s and the Church’s attitudes to war and war ethics. This rapprochement is exemplified by Eusebius of Caesarea (c.260–c.340) but occurred against the protests and opposition of anti-militarist Christian groups such as the Donatists. The newly evolving concord between secular and clerical authorities followed somewhat differing patterns in the West and East Roman empire, conditioned by the contrasting ways in which Church–state relations developed in the Latin West (which amid the “barbarian” invasions and the formation of the Germanic states were also able to provoke frequent secular–ecclesiastic rivalries) and the Greek East (in the framework of the crystallization of Byzantine political theology within a centralized imperial state).

In the specific political and religious conditions in the Latin West (where the very survival of the Christian empire, forced to wage defensive wars, was at stake), St Ambrose (c.339–397) and St Augustine (354–430) eventually laid the foundation of the medieval Western Christian just war tradition, which, through a process well explored in Western scholarship, was systematized in the commentaries/syntheses of, for example, Gratian (d. by c.1160) and Thomas Aquinas (c.1225–1274). Adhering to a different corpus of patristic writings and a different set of relationships with the East Roman (Byzantine) state and ideology, the Eastern Orthodox Church retained important elements from pre-Constantinian Christian attitudes to war and its morality, whereas the Byzantine state itself inherited and retained core elements of the secular just war tradition of the pre-Christian Roman empire and Greek antiquity. In the East Roman world, the pacific tendencies of pre-Constantinian Christianity were brought into the framework of the newly evolving Christian imperial ideology by figures such as Eusebius, St Cyril of Alexandria (376–444) and St John Chrysostom (345–407), who argued that the establishment of the Christian empire fulfilled a providential design to pacify the world and put an end to humanity’s violent conflicts and strife. Such notions drew to a certain degree on some earlier patristic views that, even in the pre-Constantinian Pax Romana, had in effect pro-
vided favourable conditions for the dissemination and internationalization of Christianity. Such views may show some general indebtedness to earlier Stoic thinking about the pacifying role of the pre-Christian Roman empire.

Not all of the Eastern Christian Fathers of the late East Roman/early Byzantine period, however, were prepared unequivocally to identify the earthly Roman empire with the “empire of Christ”. Coexistence between the pacific and pacifistic theological and social attitudes transmitted from early to Byzantine Christianity, on the one hand, and the political and military needs of an imperial state (which retained important features of pre-Christian Roman military structures, machinery and ethos), on the other, was not always easy and unproblematic. The most telling manifestations of this tension are to be found in Eastern Orthodox Christian canon law, as in the 13th Canon of St Basil the Great (c.330–379) from his first Canonical Epistle to Amphilocho, Bishop of Iconium (378), according to which the act of killing during war needs to be distinguished from voluntary murder, although it is advisable that the perpetrators should be refused communion for three years.\(^4\) The text of the canon also contains an allusion to an earlier pronouncement by St Athanasius of Alexandria (c.296–373) made in his Epistle to Ammoun the Monk, which (when extracted as a separate statement) asserts that it is “praiseworthy” to destroy adversaries in war.\(^5\) When, however, the pronouncement is seen in the overall context of the rhetoric and imagery of the epistle, this can allow for different readings,\(^6\) which cast doubt on its interpretation as a rare and important Eastern Christian patristic endorsement of the lawfulness of killing in war.\(^7\)

A succession of canons in the Apostolic Canons and those of the Eumënical and Local Councils that entered Eastern Orthodox canon law spell out explicitly the prohibitions on Christian clergy and monks on entering military service or receiving positions in the secular state administration and government.\(^8\) Stipulating further the prerogatives of clerical and monastic non-resistance to violence, these canonical regulations delineate the phenomenon that has been aptly defined as a “stratification of pacifism”\(^9\) in the early medieval Church, applicable in varying degrees to the different Church activities in both the Greek East and the Latin West. Consequently, both clergy and monks were expected to maintain the pacific and pacifistic standards of the early Church and were prohibited from any military activity, which was strictly reserved for the laity.

The subsequent developments of the inherited canon law of the patristic and early medieval periods followed differing trajectories during the High Middle Ages in Western and Eastern Christendom. Between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, Catholic canonists, theologians and
clerics introduced various innovations in Catholic canon law to accommodate and specify the role of the Church in the evolving Catholic just war and holy war doctrines (based generally on selective exegesis of the scriptural sources, the principal notions in Augustine’s Christian justification of warfare and definitions of just war as well as Roman law) and the juridical theory of the Crusade.

No comparable contemporary developments can be detected in Eastern Christian canon law, although there were attempts to soften the harshness of the 13th Canon of St Basil and to consider it as an advisory rather than a mandatory canonical requirement. The commentaries by the prominent twelfth-century Byzantine canonists John Zonaras and Theodore Balsamon on St Basil’s 13th Canon define it, respectively, as “burdensome” and “unendurable” – if it were to be implemented systematically, Christian soldiers involved in regular or successive warfare would never be able to partake of the “holy mysteries” of the Body and Blood of Christ. Both canonists argue that, because the excommunication of Christian soldiers from the mysteries for three years, as prescribed by the canon, was widely seen as an excessive punishment, they were not aware of any instance when the canon had actually been enforced by the Church. However, both canonists refer to the proceedings of a Church synod during the reign of ascetically minded warrior-Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963–969) during which Patriarch Polyeuktos (956–970) and the ecclesiastical hierarchy invoked the authority of St Basil’s 13th Canon to deny the emperor’s request that the Church should establish canonical regulations through which Byzantine soldiers who fell in warfare would begin to be honoured on a par with the holy martyrs and accordingly be celebrated with hymns and feast days. Significantly, Nikephoros Phokas’ request that fallen soldiers should be treated as martyrs occurred during the emperor’s offensives against the Arabs in Asia Minor and Syria, re-conquests that witnessed a more pronounced use of religious rhetoric. It is also significant that the refusal of the Byzantine Church to treat fallen Christian soldiers as martyrs occurred after Pope Leo IV (847–855) and Pope John VIII (872–882) had already stated that those who died defending the Church and Christendom would be granted absolution and receive heavenly rewards – notions that in the second half of the eleventh century would crucially contribute to the development and eventual formalization of the Crusade idea and the sanctification of holy war by the Catholic Church.

Within the Eastern Orthodox tradition, comparable notions appear in the ninth-century Vita of the celebrated missionary to the Slavs, St Constantine–Cyril the Philosopher (826/7–869), which records his ambassadorial visit to the court of the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–861) in 851 and his debates with Muslim theologians there. He was asked...
by the Muslim theologians why Christians do not apply in practice the
directives in the well-known verses in Matthew 5:38–44 teaching non-
violence, non-resistance to evil/evildoers and love and prayer for one’s
enemies. In his reported reply St Constantine in effect gave priority to
John 15:13 (“No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life
for one’s friends”), arguing that as private people Christians can bear
any offences, but when in company they defend each other and sacrifice
their lives in battle for their neighbours. Accordingly, the martial feats of
the “Christ-loving soldiers” in defence of their lands, the Holy Church
and Christianity are interpreted through the prism of this precept in
John as constituting paradigmatic Christian duties for which they should
“fight to the last”. After fulfilling these “precious pledges”, the Church
would qualify these Christian soldiers as martyrs and intercessors before
God. But, unlike contemporary Catholicism, between the tenth and
twelfth centuries this notion was not developed and affirmed systemati-
cally in Eastern Orthodoxy, and its rejection by Patriarch Polyeuktos
during the aforementioned synod was an important precedent for its con-
tinuing negation by the Byzantine Church.

Despite becoming increasingly acquainted with crusading ideology in
the era of the Crusades, Byzantine canonists who were critical of the se-
verity of St Basil’s 13th Canon still rejected the innovation attempted by
Nikephoros Phokas to secure martyrdom for soldiers slain in battle. The
one major exception, when an Ecumenical (Constantinople) patriarch al-
tered this generally negative stance of the Byzantine Church towards the
martyrdom of fallen soldiers, occurred during the patriarchate of Michael
IV Autoreinaos (1208–1214) in the wake of the Fourth Crusade, the Lat-
in conquest of Constantinople and the establishment of the Latin empire
of Constantinople. The Orthodox patriarchate was compelled to go into
exile in Nicaea as the Greek Nicaean empire was establishing its sway
in the Byzantine heartlands in western Asia Minor, and beginning the
struggle against the Latins in Constantinople aimed at reclaiming the an-
cient seat of the Byzantine empire. In these new and changing political
circumstances, Patriarch Michael IV Autoreinaos took the radical step
of promising remission of sins to Nicene soldiers who died in battle, a
move that may have been influenced by contemporary Western crusading
models and paradoxically may have been applied in the context of battles
against Latin crusaders.12

The practice of promising such a reward, however, was not continued
beyond his patriarchate. More than two centuries had to pass before his
initiative was revived on one occasion during the first half of the four-
teenth century when the last Byzantine strongholds and enclaves in
western Anatolia found themselves under increasing pressure from the
warlike Turkish emirates that emerged in the wake of the breakup of
the Anatolian Seljuk sultanate. A contemporary Church calendar of saints and feasts bestowed military martyrdom on several Christian soldiers of Philadelphia in western Anatolia who fell in battle, this time against the Muslim forces of the feared Turkish warrior Umur Paşa Aydinoğlu, who was trying to extend the conquests of his coastal emirate of Aydın (on the western Anatolian littoral) further inland. Umur Paşa’s political and military exploits included active and decisive involvement in the Byzantine civil war of 1341–1347, which provoked the formation of a Holy League (Sacra Liga) against him by the Latin powers in the Aegean, leading to the Crusade of Smyrna of 1344 when a joint Hospitalier, Venetian and Cypriot fleet re-conquered Smyrna from his forces. Contemporary and later Muslim sources extoll Umur Paşa as a model Islamic warrior for the faith who distinguished himself in the ghazwa warfare (originally “raid against the infidels”), which by that time had acquired increasingly religious overtones – the Turkoman ghāzī fighters in Anatolia could be praised as the “instruments” and “sword” of God, and their eventual martyrdom would bring them eternal life. It is intriguing, therefore, that this period of resumption of Latin crusading warfare in the Aegean (admittedly on a smaller scale) against the ghazwa campaigns of Umur Paşa witnessed a Byzantine Church attempt to honour as martyrs Byzantine Christians who fought Umur Paşa’s warriors for the faith. Like the previous Byzantine initiative in the sphere of military martyrdom, however, this attempt remained isolated and, more significantly, did not succeed in gaining any recognition from the Constantinople patriarchate. During the Byzantine Church synod in Nikephoros Phokas’ reign, moreover, certain priests and bishops were arraigned for having fought in battles in which they slew many adversaries and were accordingly defrocked by the synod that followed St Basil’s 13th Canon.

Finally, the prominent fourteenth-century Byzantine theologian and canonist Matthew Blastares confirms in his influential work on canon and civil law, Syntagma kata stoicheon (1355), the validity and relevance of the three-year penance of exclusion from communion “advised” in Basil’s 13th Canon, rejecting the arguments of Balsamon and Zonaras on the basis of his own scriptural and theological exegesis. At the same time, writing at a time when the Ottomans were establishing themselves in Gallipoli and Thrace and were to take Adrianople in 1365, Blastares states that, in essence, St Basil extolled the Christian soldiers who safeguarded Christianity and fought its enemies – a praiseworthy defence on behalf of chastity and piety.

Apart from these regulations and debates striving to define the limits and various dimensions of Christian involvement in warfare in the sphere of canon law, speculation about what should be the correct, adequate or
acceptable Christian response to the reality of war and affirmation of peace remained an important area in Eastern Orthodox theology, ethics and anthropology throughout the medieval period. In the context of the great theological disputes and schisms in the Church during the fourth century, which were especially divisive and dramatic in Eastern Christendom, the notion of religious peace was pre-eminent in the thought of most of the Greek Fathers of the period. It was clearly of primary importance for the Cappadocian Fathers, St Basil the Great, St Gregory of Nazianzus (330–389) and St Gregory of Nyssa (c.331–c.396), who vigorously fought the Arian movement. This accent on the quest for religious peace was closely related to aspirations for a unity of the Church, in the spheres of both doctrine and hierarchical organization.\textsuperscript{17}

In the works of John Chrysostom, which remained extremely influential and popular throughout the Byzantine period, the theme of warfare and its legitimacy reappears in various theological and social contexts. In his \textit{Fourteenth Homily to the Philippians}, he strongly condemns warfare, stating that “God is not a God of war and fighting”, which are thus against God; therefore, the Christian ideal and virtue entail the cessation of warfare and fighting, as well as being in peace with all man. In his \textit{First Homily on Corinthians I}, he explicitly declares that true peace can come only from God. He also clearly delineates the Eastern Orthodox “stratification of pacifism” in his work \textit{On the Priesthood}, in which the priesthood is required to adhere to the highest Christian standards and, whenever needed, to serve as a corrective to the actions of the government and laity in the secular world spheres where the state holds sway, including the pursuit and challenge of warfare. Indeed, one of Chrysostom’s well-known statements in his \textit{Second Homily on Eutropius 4} – “Never be afraid of the sword if your conscience does not accuse you; never be afraid in war if your conscience is clear”, which has been seen as affirming an Eastern Orthodox version of justifiable war – needs to be read in the context of his demarcation of the particular standards for the priesthood and the laity concerning their respective non-involvement/involvement in warfare.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, in his \textit{Seventh Homily on 1 Timothy 2:2–4}, Chrysostom provides a categorization of three types of warfare: those caused by attacking foreign armies, civil wars and the internal war of man against himself, the last being the most grievous because the first two cannot injure the soul, whereas the third disturbs the peace of the spirit, stirring up evil desires, anger and envy.

The peace of the spirit and its correlation to the divine peace, the mission of Christ and peace among humans remained important themes in Byzantine theology, mysticism and monastic spirituality throughout the history of the empire and found early expression in the thinking of Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite (c. 500) and Maximus the Confessor.
Paradigmatic New Testament notions alluding to God as “not a God of disorder but of peace” (1 Corinthians 14:33); to Christ as “our peace” (Ephesians 2:14); to “the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding” (Philippians 4:7); to the Kingdom of God as “righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit” (Romans 14:17); to the gentle and quiet nature of “the hidden person of the heart” (1 Peter 3:4), had already undergone substantial theological embellishment in the patristic period. These patristic embellishments defined Christians as “sons of peace”, a “peaceable race”, “soldiers of peace”, “workers for peace”, etc. During the Byzantine period, along with the New Testament notions of peace, they became a constant source for new theological, ethical and mystical elaborations and reinterpretations of the presence of, cultivation of and fight for peace in the individual human, social, natural and divine spheres. At the same time, the notion of spiritual warfare against supernatural forces of evil (following on the influential pronouncements of St Paul in, for example, Romans 7:23, Ephesians 6:16–20 and 1 Thessalonians 5:6–8) remained central to Byzantine monastic spirituality, mysticism and asceticism. Accounts of such warfare in Byzantine hagiography and demonology can contain some striking and detailed imagery and terminology; hence monks could be defined as the true “soldiers of Christ”, fighting on the front-line of this all-encompassing warfare.

In the influential system of Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, for example, primordial peace has an archetypal cosmological dimension – without striving towards its restoration in human societies and within the individual himself, man could not embark on the spiritual path to theosis (deification or divinization) and universal salvation, leading to establishment of the ultimate eschatological peace. A similar overwhelming emphasis on the notion of peace in all these various dimensions developed in the Byzantine liturgical, hymnographic, homiletic and hagiographic traditions. However, the numerous invocations of and appeals for peace in Byzantine liturgical and hymnographic literature occasionally coexist with prayers and prayer services for the safety and well-being of Orthodox soldiers/troops and their victory in battle, sometimes alluding to the imperial God-aided victories over the empire’s earlier adversaries and often accompanied with associated military imagery, symbolism and typologies. Such prayers can be found in the various versions of the Divine Liturgy of St Basil, the Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom and the hymnic cycle for the Feast of the Exaltation of the Cross on 14 September. These prayers, prayer services and blessings reflect the tension between the normative Christian pacific ideal of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the political and military realities that the Byzantine empire faced after the period of expansionism and military triumphs in late an-
tiquity. Forced to wage intermittently defensive warfare on nearly all fronts, the Byzantine imperial state felt compelled to cultivate inherited (and develop some new) religio-political mechanisms to legitimize and justify warfare against its numerous pagan, Muslim and Western (and, on occasions, Eastern) Christian adversaries.

Holy and just war in the Byzantine world (c.527 – c.1453)

Pacifistic and pacific currents in Eastern Orthodoxy may have maintained their currency in the medieval Byzantine world, but the existing rapprochement between state and Church in the late Roman and early Byzantine period meant that the Byzantine Church frequently found itself in situations in which its support for and justification of Byzantine military campaigns was seen as highly significant and necessary. With or without imperial pressure, the Byzantine Church could be involved in the mobilization of popular endorsement for Byzantine troops and inevitably was entrusted with ensuring that they observed their religious obligations properly and entered battle, to face danger and death, spiritually pure and in a pious frame of mind. As in Western Christendom, the involvement of Eastern Orthodoxy in the realm of medieval warfare found expression in military religious services, the early appearance in the field army of military chaplains (who could also serve in the fleet), the celebration of Eucharistic liturgies in the field, the use of Christian religious symbolism and relics for military purposes, the blessing of standards and weapons before battles, services for fallen soldiers after the cessation of fighting, and thanksgiving rituals to celebrate victory. Following in great detail on the different aspects of warfare tactics and strategy, the various Byzantine military manuals such as the Strategikon attributed to Emperor Maurice (582–602) and the tract ascribed to Emperor Leo VI the Wise (886–912) also stipulate at some length the religious services that need to be performed in military camps and the religious duties of soldiers and priests. Following on the paradigmatic use of the cross-shaped sign (the labarum) during Constantine the Great’s victory over his rival Maxentius in the battle at Milvian Bridge in 312, crosses – either depicted on flags or carried instead of or alongside standards – were widely used during Byzantine military campaigns. A number of reports recount the use of relics and well-known icons before and during battles between the imperial troops and their adversaries. The widespread popularity and evolution of the cult of military saints such as St George, St Demetrius of Thessaloniki, St Theodore Teron and St Theodore Stratelates, and their adoption as patrons by the Byzantine military
aristocracy, highlight another symptomatic dimension of the role of Eastern Orthodoxy in shaping the ethics and practice of warfare in the Byzantine empire.\textsuperscript{23}

An interesting and (as far as the subject of this chapter is concerned) crucial debate has developed lately among Byzantinists focused on the religio-historical problem of whether Byzantium ever conceptualized and put into practice its own brand of wars fought for ostensibly religious purposes comparable to the contemporaneous jihad in Islam and the crusading warfare of Western Europe. This debate has brought to the attention of a wider audience some important but less well-known and often neglected evidence of the interrelations between Byzantine Orthodox Christianity, on the one hand, and Byzantine political and military ideology and warfare, on the other. Deriving from diverse secular and ecclesiastical records, this composite evidence highlights the various intricate ways in which Byzantine Orthodox Christianity permeated and contributed to important aspects of Byzantine military religious traditions. The continuing debates on the provenance, nature and implications of this evidence have demonstrated the simplistic nature and untenability of historical reconstructions of unremittingly pacific policies of Byzantium (or the monarchies/polities belonging to its contemporary or post-Byzantine Orthodox Commonwealth) advanced by some Orthodox theologians and popular works on Byzantine history.

The debate on whether Byzantium developed its own version of religious war or a crusading ideology, and the role of the Byzantine Church in this development, can be traced to the early stages of modern Byzantine studies – for instance, in the works of Gustave Schlumberger on tenth-century Byzantine history.\textsuperscript{24} According to Schlumberger, the campaigns of Nikephoros Phokas and John I Tzimiskes (969–976) against the Arab Muslim powers in the Levant had a religious character and can be qualified as proto-crusades, especially as Tzimiskes aspired to re-conquer Jerusalem for Christendom. Schlumberger’s views were followed by medievalists such as René Grousset\textsuperscript{25} and George Ostrogorsky; the latter argued that Emperor Heraclius’ famous campaign against Sassanid Persia in 622–630 can be identified as the actual forerunner of the Western Crusades, and some of Tzimiskes’ anti-Arab campaigns betray a “veritable crusading spirit”.\textsuperscript{26} At the other extreme, in his influential publication on the idea of holy war and the Byzantine tradition, Vitalien Laurent argued that, in contrast to the medieval Islamic and West European versions of holy war, the Byzantines failed to develop a proper holy war tradition, owing to their inherent inertia and fatalistic attitudes, and thus, unlike Latin Europe, could not manage to find an active military response to Islamic expansionism.\textsuperscript{27} The view that the notion of a “holy war”, as developed in the Islamic and West European holy war ideolo-
gies, remained alien and incomprehensible to the Byzantines has since been upheld and supported with more arguments and evidence in a succession of important studies. However, the supporters of the position that when Byzantine ideology and practice of war are judged on their own terms and not just in the framework of Islamic and West European holy war models, they can exhibit on occasions the traits of a specifically Byzantine “holy war” tradition have also brought new valuable source material and methodological considerations into the debate.

The study of Byzantine and post-Byzantine versions of Christian warfare has been plagued for a long time by a number of influential inherited stereotypes (some of which derive from particular medieval West European perceptions of Byzantium), attributing to the Byzantines a distinct aversion to warfare and bloodshed, as well as passivity and compliance in the face of the Islamic menace from the East. Recent works on Byzantine military history, structures and strategy have demonstrated again the unsustainability of such stereotypes. Most of these stereotypes owe their authority and currency to their repeated exploitation in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European historiography of Byzantium and the Middle Ages and have survived the advance of modern Byzantine studies. This reassessment of Byzantine military religious traditions and ideology has also highlighted the need to re-visit the question of whether Byzantine policies, often seen as pacific and retreatist, derive from corresponding pacific traits in Eastern Orthodoxy (as frequently argued) or from the complex geopolitical situations in which the empire periodically found itself and the resultant strategic considerations.

A number of distinguished historians and theologians have endorsed with varying degrees of certainty and emphasis different aspects of the thesis that Byzantium did not develop a holy war tradition and abhorred (or in the case of the crusading movement, also did not comprehend) the holy war ideologies that arose and matured in the contemporary Islamic Near East and Western Europe (with all the implications for the ethics and theology of war in the Orthodox Churches/polities in the post-Byzantine period). In many cases, the absence of a real Crusade ideology (in West European terms) in medieval Byzantium is attributed to the specific nature of Byzantine Orthodoxy, its institutions and approach to violence and warfare. Proponents of this thesis, a summary of which follows below, habitually approach Byzantine military history through the prism of contemporaneous Islamic and West European theories and practice of holy war and their shared features. These features include: the proclamation (and leadership) of the holy war by a “legitimate” religious authority – warfare is thus seen as decreed by God; the ostensible religious aims of the war, which needs to be seen as being waged against adversaries identified in a religious context as “infidel” or “heretic” – these aims can
be thus virtually unlimited; and the promise of spiritual rewards to the warriors (remission of sins, martyrdom, eternal salvation, entrance into paradise). Since Byzantine military history only sporadically shows (at best only rudimentary) elements of these features, the inevitable conclusion is that Byzantium did not develop and put into practice an ideology of a Christian holy war. Even Byzantine wars that were characterized by a pronounced religious sentiment and rhetoric, such as those under Maurice and Heraclius against Sassanid Persia in the first three decades of the seventh century or the anti-Arab campaigns of Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes in the second half of the tenth century, do not possess, in this view, the core features of a Christian holy war. The Byzantines used the same religious services and the same Christian icons, relics and symbolism when confronting both non-Christian and Christian adversaries.

The different social and political conditions in the feudal world of Western Europe compared with the centralized imperial state of Byzantium conditioned the development of a very different military ethos among the corresponding aristocratic and military elites. The ethos cultivated among Latin knightly nobility was particularly conducive to enthusiastic support for and active participation in Christian holy wars. Unlike the medieval Catholic Church, the Byzantine Church did not promulgate war and did not indulge in the release of warlike and threatening declarations. The Byzantine Church entirely delegated the conceptualization and practice of warfare to the secular imperial government, trying on occasions to check what could be regarded as unwarranted imperial demands such as rewarding holy military martyrdom. Wars were declared, led and conducted by the emperor, a secular and public authority, entrusted to maintain the defence and unity of the imperial state. The conceptualization of Byzantine warfare overall was consequently in essence a continuation of the largely secular late Roman just war tradition; wars were, therefore, seen as intended to defend imperial territories or to regain lost territories and to protect imperial subjects. The late Roman just war tradition inevitably underwent Christianization in the Byzantine period and it was the divinely ordained mission of the Christian Romans (the new “chosen people”) to safeguard Constantinople, seen as both the “New Rome” and the “New Jerusalem”, and its single universal Christian empire the “New Israel”, against the encroachments of the new “barbarians” – pagans, Muslims and, on occasion, West European Christians. This Christianized “just war” tradition became a fundamental part of Byzantine imperial ideology, closely interwoven with the reinterpreted and actualized Romano-Byzantine paradigms of God-guidedness in battle and imperial victory (“Victoria Augustorum”).
Historians who argue that the study of the Byzantine version of Christian warfare needs to take into account to a much greater degree East Roman/Byzantine political and religious developments reach somewhat different conclusions, which are summarized below. In their view, some of the criteria used to define holy war ideology in Islamic and West European contexts are not applicable to Eastern Christendom and Byzantium. Thus, the fact that it was the Byzantine emperor who declared and conducted the various Byzantine wars and military expeditions should not automatically lead to the conclusion that these wars were entirely secular, because Byzantine political and religious ideology could not be separated so easily. In Byzantine political theology, the emperor was exalted as Christ’s vicar and God’s chosen ruler to preside over and defend the God-elected Christian Roman empire, itself an earthly replica of the divine heavenly monarchy. As a defender of the True Faith, Orthodoxy, his God-granted mission was to lead his armies against those who threatened the integrity of the universal Christian empire and its providential mission – whose enemies thus were also enemies of Orthodoxy. Regaining lost imperial lands, therefore, also meant restoring and expanding Orthodox Christianity, a notion that could be used to justify offensive warfare. In reality, Byzantine wars were always seen as being waged in defence of the unity of the sole legitimate Christian empire and Orthodoxy, which attached a certain quality of “holiness” to these war efforts, regarded consequently as divinely ordained and supported. On occasions Byzantine imperial and military propaganda (during Heraclius’ anti-Persian campaigns, for example) might define the adversary in religious terms as “infidel” and “impious”, but these remained isolated instances and were definitely not a routine practice. The Byzantine Church tenaciously opposed the notion of sanctified military martyrdom for fallen soldiers, although the situation may have been somewhat different in the military religious ideology developed by the Byzantine military classes.

There are indications that the idea of Christian warriors as martyrs for Orthodoxy, fighting for the salvation of their souls, became part of this evolving ideology and may have been encouraged more frequently by the imperial court than the only recorded case of such an imperial initiative during Nikephoros Phokas’ reign would suggest. Such developments in the ethics and martyrlogy of Byzantine Christian warfare can be tracked down especially in the Anatolian frontier zones of the empire, where Byzantine troops and military formations continuously confronted the ghazwa warfare of the advancing Turkoman groups from around the mid-eleventh century onwards. Finally, revisiting some of the evidence of Byzantine campaigns in the Near East suggests that Byzantine
aspirations regarding the re-conquest of Christian holy sites in Palestine were not that minimal, as usually accepted. Reassessed in this manner, some of the Byzantine military campaigns waged against non-Christian forces in Anatolia and the Near East may indeed be defined, in this view, as belonging to a certain degree to the category of holy war, to which the Islamic jihad and West European crusading warfare also belong as sub-categories.

The debate on the existence or non-existence of a Byzantine version of Christian holy war has undoubtedly opened new important venues for the exploration of Eastern Orthodox perspectives on the ethics and theology of warfare in the classical Byzantine and post-Byzantine periods. In some of the spheres of this debate and with the present state of published evidence and research, definitive conclusions cannot be reached yet. Debating Byzantine military history in greater depth, however, has brought about a deeper understanding of some of the specifically Eastern Christian and Byzantine approaches to the ethics and conduct of warfare. In an important contrast with the medieval West, for example, in Eastern Christendom and Byzantium, ecclesiastical involvement and participation in warfare with some religious goals was important but not absolutely vital for its promulgation and legitimization. However, given the blending of imperial and religious ideology in Byzantine political theology, most Byzantine wars, even those without ostensibly religious objectives and waged primarily for geopolitical reasons, possess an aspect of “holiness” – at least in the specifically Byzantine context. All these wars were waged to defend the integrity of God’s empire on earth and to recover formerly imperial and Christian lands – by extension they were fought for God and Orthodoxy. In this providential framework Byzantine military defeats and setbacks were interpreted as God’s punishment for Byzantine sins – or, in the later history of Byzantium, as crucial stages in the unfolding of the God-guided eschatological drama determining the fortunes of the universal empire. Pleading for divine help and protection before and in the course of war was absolutely imperative and then God could be indeed invoked as the “mighty Lord of battles” and the “God of Righteousness” leading the Orthodox to a complete victory. Apart from being called upon to repel demonic hordes, in a succession of Orthodox hymnic cycles the victory-giving powers of the Holy Cross could be sought by summoning its influence as an “invincible weapon” of Godliness and peace, granting the Orthodox people and their rulers victory over their enemies.

The debates on and discussions of religious rhetoric and elements in Byzantine campaigns show, moreover, that some of them could have openly stated religious goals as part of their politico-military agenda. Such religious goals could include the recovery of the True Cross and its
restoration to Jerusalem during Heraclius' anti-Persian campaigns\textsuperscript{34} or the re-conquest of lost Christian lands and Holy Places in Palestine, including naturally Jerusalem, which were reportedly publicly declared as military objectives (along with the vanquishing of Islam) during the anti-Arab offensives of Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes.\textsuperscript{35} Following the establishment of the Crusader states in the Levant, religious motives and sentiments arguably also played a prominent role in the successful Anatolian campaigns of Emperor John II Komnenos (1118–1143) against the Turkoman dynasty of the Danishmendids and Emperor Manuel I Komnenos’ (1143–1180) ill-fated war against the Seljuk Sultan Kılıç Arslan.\textsuperscript{36} These religious elements and the conducting of the campaigns are not sufficient to define the wars of Heraclius, Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes as “proto-Crusades” or those of John Komnenos and Manuel Komnenos as “Crusades” in the contemporaneous Western sense. But it would be difficult to deny that these campaigns possessed some elements of Christian holy war in the more general Christian medieval context. However, the heightened religious sentiments and elements in these Byzantine campaigns were not a result of a consistently and systematically developed theory of a Christian holy war, which was more or less the case in the Latin West between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. They were largely conditioned by the specific religio-political conditions related to the separate Byzantine military operations. In the case of the Komnenian emperors’ campaigns against the Danishmendids and Seljuks, exposure to the Islamic ghazwa of the Turkomans in Anatolia and West European crusading theory and practice during the eleventh century may also have played a role in enhancing their religious dimension.

Furthermore, what Western and Eastern Christian medieval military religious ideologies shared was their dependence on and exploitation of the Old Testament narratives and pronouncements of the God-commanded and -ordained wars of the Israelites against the “heathen” and “idolatrous” Canaanites. As the new “Chosen People”, the Byzantines (and their Western Christian counterparts) could draw on these models to depict their wars as God-guided campaigns against the new “infidel” or “God-fighting” enemies. Accordingly, successful warrior-emperors and commanders could be compared to the kings of Israel or to paradigmatic figures in the Old Testament Israelite “holy” wars such as Moses, Aaron, Joshua and David. Thus, in Byzantine military religious ideology and art, Moses’ crossing of the Red Sea could be interpreted as prefiguring Constantine the Great’s victory at Milvian Bridge, and Joshua’s military exploits and triumphs could be presented as alluding to Nikephoros Phokas’ and John Tzimiskes’ victories on the battlefield. The enemies of Byzantium could be “recognized” as new versions of the Old
Testament adversaries and oppressors of the Israelites such as the Assyrian king Sennacherib, acting again as instruments of God's punishment, provoked by the sins of the Byzantines.

The various Byzantine treatises on military strategy and tactics for combat shed further light on the distinct Byzantine attitudes towards the interrelationship of Christianity and warfare and its ethical implications. These tracts often draw heavily on earlier Hellenistic and Roman authorities, which highlights the continuity of the tradition of tactical and strategic manuals from Graeco-Roman antiquity to the Byzantine Middle Ages, but they inevitably contain much material and advice reflecting Byzantine Christian stances on warfare. The *Tactica* attributed to Emperor Leo VI states emphatically that fundamentally men are peaceful beings, but the devil incites them to indulge in violence and instigate warfare for his own insidious purposes. The origins of warfare are thus attributed to the devil and man should first and foremost prefer peace and avoid war. Accordingly, it was defensive warfare that was preferable and permissible in order to protect the imperial lands from invaders who have been essentially provoked by the devil to assail the territorial integrity of the empire. However, aggressive warfare and unnecessary bloodshed involving even potential enemies of the empire should be disallowed.37

In an anonymous sixth-century Byzantine treatise on strategy, war is condemned as a “great evil”, in fact the “worst of all evil”, but, since the enemy has made the shedding of Byzantine blood a matter of honour and virtue, a study of military strategy is necessary so that the aggressor can be resisted and defeated.38 This statement contains one of the core elements of the traditional just war theory (justifying war in self-defence) going back to antiquity and developed in detail in Western Christendom from the late fourth century onwards. The *Tactica* ascribed to Leo dwells on the need for a just cause for warfare in slightly more detail – again stating that, when enemies have initiated an unjust offensive war, a defensive war against them must be undertaken with courage and eagerness.

The provenance of these notions is clearly recognizable in the just war tradition that was crystallizing in the late Roman and early Byzantine period as a result of the merging of the inherited Roman political military ideology and post-Constantinian Christian political theology. But, apart from specifying in general the *jus ad bellum* regulations of this just war tradition, Byzantine military treatises do not develop in greater detail a theory or notions regarding more general questions raised by the need for a Christian justification of warfare. Their predominant focus remains the various practical and technical details concerning military strategy and tactics: campaign organization, siege warfare, skirmishing, guerrilla warfare, marching through mountainous terrain, setting up
camps, etc. On occasions some *jus in bello* regulations may be specified in some detail; avoiding unnecessary loss of life in open combat is frequently recommended – a predilection related to both the Byzantine notion of philanthropy and the actual and well-attested strategic concerns of Byzantium to prevent or solve conflicts (when possible) through diplomacy, bribery and other non-military channels.\(^3\) In the general ethics of war, touched on to a greater or lesser extent in the treatises, war largely appears a necessary or lesser evil – whether this is articulated explicitly or not. The need to plead for divine help and favour in warfare remains an important theme, and Christian rhetoric and polemic also occur on occasions; the *Tactica* ascribed to Leo, for instance, emphasizes that fighting the adversaries of Orthodoxy is spiritually meritorious for Christian warriors.

On the other hand, the study of the role of the Byzantine Church in the religious dimension of Byzantine warfare has as yet failed to uncover a systematic attempt at formulating a just (or indeed holy) war theory coming from within the Church. This applies also to the Orthodox churches that emerged in the Balkans and Russia following Byzantine missionary efforts in these areas from the late ninth century onwards. Thus the Orthodox churches in the Byzantine–Balkan world and Russia generally did not share the important transformation of Christian attitudes to warfare that occurred in medieval Western Christendom during the crusading period between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Apart from its continuing opposition to military martyrdom, Byzantine canon law remained static in this period and did not revise its traditional stance on regular, or what was perceived in the contemporary West as “holy”, warfare. The abhorrence and criticism by Byzantine churchmen, and indeed historians, of the phenomenon of combatant Latin bishops and priests taking part in the Crusades are well attested. At the same time, despite telling changes in the widespread Byzantine veneration of military saints in which the early anti-warfare perspectives were softened or disappeared, apparently to be integrated more easily into Byzantine lay military piety, the Church was certainly not an enthusiastic supporter of all aspects of this piety. However, further research is needed to explore in greater detail the socio-religious dynamism underlying the emergence of a distinct Christian warrior culture in the Byzantine Anatolian frontier zones, which may reveal that the local church and hierarchs played some role in this process.

Attempts to uncover a coherent and continuous tradition of legitimizing “justifiable war” in the Eastern Orthodox Church, from the patristic through the medieval period, may not have been persuasive,\(^4\) but individual medieval Orthodox churchmen did indeed on occasions articulate views that advanced or came close to such legitimization, or took some
part in the organization of defensive warfare. For instance, during the
great joint siege of Constantinople by the Persians and the Avars in 626,
the Constantinople Patriarch Sergios I acted as regent in the absence of
Emperor Heraclius and was in charge of defence. A contemporary hom-
ily reflects the patriarch’s public statements during the siege, which carry
the overtones of a religious war, proclaiming that God Himself will fight
for Constantinople’s citizens. In an atmosphere permeated with reli-
gious enthusiasm, sustained with military religious rites and ceremonies,
the patriarch used the image of the Virgin Mary to threaten the foreign
and “devilish” armies with her supernatural martial protection of the
city. Unsurprisingly, in her reported appearances during the siege she is
in the guise of a warrior-maiden, fighting for her city and chasing away
the Avar khagan, who concedes his inevitable defeat to the Mother of
God.

The already quoted impressive and significant legitimization of Chris-
tian just war and the potential martyr status of the Christian warrior as-
cribed to St Constantine-Cyril the Philosopher can perhaps be best
understood within the religio-political framework of his mission to the
court of al-Mutawakkil. As already indicated, this notion of sanctified
military martyrdom did not find acceptance in the mainstream of Byzan-
tine Church thought and practice. It is important, however, that it found
such an emphatic and explicit formulation in a proclamation attributed to
such an extraordinarily and endurin gly influential figure in the Byzantine
Commonwealth as St Constantine-Cyril the Philosopher. Owing to the
continuing authority of his pronouncements in the Slavonic Orthodox
world, this particular proclamation, as will be shown below, has been
used as a basis for a more systematic formulation of Orthodox just war
theory.

In the context of St Constantine’s pronouncement concerning the sanc-
tity embedded in the legitimate brand of Christian military endeavour, it
is worthwhile noting the interesting and symptomatic proliferation of the
canonization and widespread veneration of historical Orthodox warrior-
princes in some of the late medieval cultures of the Byzantine Common-
wealth, notably Russia, Ukraine and Serbia – for instance, St Alexander
Nevsky, Grand Prince of Novgorod and Vladimir (1236–1263), St Dmitri
Donskoi, Grand Prince of Moscow (1359–1389), St Stefan Lazar, Prince
of Serbia (1371–1389), and St Stefan Lazarević, Prince of Serbia (1389–
1427). These cults of saintly princes and rulers were evidently intended to
develop a religio-political loyalty to a national dynastic line and, in the
case of medieval Serbia, created a veritable genealogy of “holy kings”.
Some elements of the hagiographical biographies in the vitae of these
saintly princes and rulers suggest that in these cultures the Orthodox
churches were more prepared to foster and cultivate lay military piety
than was the Byzantine mother church. The precise religio-political dynamism that determined such developments still awaits a systematic study. Characteristically, Byzantine political ideology, as reflected in a succession of Byzantine Mirrors of Princes, in general continued to adhere to and promote an image of an ideal ruler that goes back to Hellenistic and late Roman models of an ideal emperor, and did not accept or absorb the concept of a warrior-king even in the period when Western chivalric attitudes and stereotypes were exercising some impact in late medieval Byzantium. At the same time, some of the hagiographic traditions surrounding Orthodox warrior-princes such as St Alexander Nevsky and St Stefan Lazar betray some remarkable continuity with Byzantine religio-political models. Furthermore, both South Slavonic and Russian Orthodox cultures offer some early paradigmatic examples of saintly princes who accepted martyrdom without resorting to violence or self-defence – for example, St John Vladimir, Prince of Dukija (d.1016), and Saints Boris and Gleb, Princes of Kievan Rus (d.1015).

The evidence of the presence and evolution of the notions of just and holy war in the medieval Byzantine world, notions that provided the underlying foundation of Eastern Orthodox attitudes to warfare in the early modern and modern periods, thus presents some important dissimilarities from the equivalent concepts and developments in the medieval Latin West. One may attempt a general explanation of these differences simply in the framework of the Christian tradition on the whole and the well-known trichotomy of Christian attitudes to war and peace proposed by Roland Bainton: pacifism, just war and Crusade. But, for a deeper understanding of the provenance and fortunes of these notions in Byzantium and the Byzantine Commonwealth, one needs to take into account the specifics of their trajectories in Eastern Orthodoxy. The continuity of pacific and pacifistic currents in Eastern Orthodoxy from the pre-Constantinian into the Byzantine period and their interrelationship with the continuity and Christianization of Roman imperial ideology in Byzantium seem fundamental for gaining a more insightful perception of these distinct trajectories. Thus, with regard to changing Christian attitudes to warfare in the Early and High Middle Ages, the notable endurance of these continuities and their amalgamation in medieval Byzantium need to be seen in the context of the various factors creating discontinuity with the late Roman past in the contemporary Latin West and the early Islamic world in the Near East and Levant. These continuities and discontinuities also contributed significantly to the divergences of views on war and peace among these three cultures.

The convergence of imperial and ecclesiastical ideology in Byzantium projected the formulas and images of Byzantine philanthropy in the spheres of political and military ideology, with the consequent use of
pacific rhetoric and symbolism in diplomatic and political discourse (depending on the circumstances and the priorities of Byzantine pragmatism, this discourse could be also aggressive and militaristic). References to and images of Byzantine emperors as “peace-loving”, “peace-protecting” and averting wars and violence acquired a ceremonial character and co-existed with forceful images of their military triumphs over the enemies of the empire. Ultimately, peace was supposed to be normative on both the religious and the imperial political level; the Tactica ascribed to Leo explicitly states that one should welcome peace not only for the Byzantine subject but also for the “barbarians”. The resultant Byzantine synthesis between the inherited religious and political pacific models, the late Roman just war tradition and some innovations in the theory and practice of warfare conditioned by the changing strategic and political circumstances created an ambivalent and flexible system of nuanced attitudes to war in which various compromises were achieved to neutralize the inherent frictions between the various elements. Apparently, the elaboration of more systematic theories for the religious and philosophical justification of war was not seen as necessary; similarly, the jus in bello regulations in the Byzantine military treatises largely reproduce earlier Hellenistic and Roman models. Beyond military religious services, the Byzantine Church participated extremely rarely in the justification and legitimization of war, although individual churchmen on occasions ventured to speculate and communicate their views on Christian just war and military endeavour, which could amount to such justification.

This Byzantine synthesis was well suited to the religious and secular needs of an imperial state that viewed itself as an heir to the East Roman imperium and as the sole “holy and Orthodox universal empire”; it seemed appropriate also to the Orthodox monarchies and principalities that emerged in the Byzantine Commonwealth in South-Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Russia. Following the Ottoman conquests in Anatolia and the Balkans and the integration of these regions into the new Ottoman version of the Islamic caliphate, the Orthodox churches in these regions, along with the Ecumenical patriarchate, found themselves in completely new circumstances. In the wake of the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans, an evolving Russian religio-political ideology came to claim the imperial leadership of the Orthodox Christian Commonwealth through the well-known doctrine of “Moscow the Third Rome”. This imperial leadership extended to aspirations for the political and religious protection of the Orthodox communities and churches within the Ottoman empire, which in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries went through dramatic periods of nationalistic anti-Ottoman uprisings and the formation of nation-states. Not long after these periods of painful and divisive nation-building, nearly all European Eastern Orthodox churches (apart
from the Ecumenical patriarchate in Istanbul and the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church) were forced to function and survive in the framework of the militantly secularist and repressive totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. During all these periods, including the current post-Communist phase, their adherence to and practice of the inherited New Testament, patristic and Byzantine attitudes to war and peace were every so often fiercely challenged and tested to their very limits.

Transformations of Eastern Orthodox attitudes to war and peace in the Ottoman and modern periods

The post-Byzantine/Ottoman period and the rise of nationalism

It is worth reiterating that, unlike the case of Western Christianity, the study of Eastern Orthodox approaches to the ethics and justification of warfare is still in its nascent stages. In the case of medieval Eastern Orthodoxy at least, the recent debates on and advances in the study of Byzantine military history and Byzantine political and religious attitudes to war and peace have made it possible to considerably update the state of the evidence and research summarized above. The same cannot be said about the study of the development of Eastern Orthodox stances on warfare and its legitimization in the post-Byzantine/Ottoman and modern periods. In this crucial area of the post-medieval and modern history of Eastern Orthodoxy, enormous quantities of wide-ranging and diverse material still need to be critically explored, first in the context of the various regional political and church historiographies, and then in the larger context of the respective developments in Catholic and Protestant just war traditions of thought during these periods. What can be offered in this chapter, therefore, will be a summary of the general tendencies and changes in the Eastern Orthodox discourses on the morality of war, as the various Eastern Orthodox churches struggled to adapt and respond in the post-Byzantine era to the changing religio-political circumstances in the regions previously belonging to the Byzantine Orthodox Commonwealth. Given the paucity of published archival material and research in this sphere of study, some of the conclusions in this summary will inevitably have a preliminary character. The summary will also aim to indicate important areas of research that could prove useful and rewarding in the pursuit of a better understanding of the occasionally puzzling changes in modern Eastern Orthodox perspectives on the ethics of armed conflict. Some better-researched cases of such changes or innovations will be highlighted that shed new light on the respective importance of tradition and innovation in modern Eastern Orthodox views regarding peace and
war that can be considered normative and representative. This will also make it possible to gain a clearer perspective on the continuities and discontinuities between these views and their scriptural, patristic and medieval Byzantine foundations.

As a prelude to the discussion of these changes of perspective in modern Eastern Orthodoxy, one needs first to outline the process of the emergence of autocephalous churches and patriarchates in the medieval Byzantine Orthodox Commonwealth. In the early Byzantine period, the Orthodox Church followed the so-called pentarchy system, where the principal church authority lay with the foremost sees – the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, with honorary primacy granted to Rome. The early Arab conquests in the Levant brought the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem under Islamic control, gradually decreasing their influence and significance. Byzantine missionary efforts in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe led not only to the Christianization of existing kingdoms, principalities and tribal unions in the region, but also to the eventual emergence of autocephalous churches and patriarchates in some of the newly Christianized Orthodox monarchies. The establishment of such patriarchates occurred as a rule in the framework of the political rivalries of these monarchies with Byzantium and their pursuit of aggressive policies towards Constantinople. Such was the case with the very early recognition of the Bulgarian patriarchate by Constantinople in 927 in the wake of the anti-Byzantine wars of the Bulgarian Tsar Symeon (893–926), during which he aggressively sought and received an imperial title, threatening to conquer and establish himself in Constantinople. The Bulgarian patriarchate was to remain the focus of intermittent Bulgarian–Byzantine political (not so much ecclesiastical) rivalries until the Ottoman conquest. The recognition of the autocephalous status of the Serbian Orthodox Church by Constantinople in 1219 proceeded in much more peaceful circumstances. But the establishment of an independent Serbian patriarchate in 1346 (with active Bulgarian ecclesiastical participation) again occurred in the context of the expansionist policy of the Serbian ruler Stefan Uroš IV Dušan (1331–1355) towards Constantinople, one year after he had proclaimed himself a basileus of the Serbs and Rhomaioi (Byzantine Greeks). Characteristically, the elevation of the metropolitan of Moscow in distant Russia to a patriarchal rank took place considerably later: it was acknowledged and presided over by a Constantinople patriarchate mission in 1589, 27 years after it had recognized the imperial title of the Russian ruler Ivan IV the Terrible (1530–1584). The formation of the Russian patriarchate was thus an event that again was conditioned by considerations of imperial ideology and status in the sixteenth-century Eastern Orthodox world.
In South-Eastern Europe, the establishment of the new patriarchates was intended to underscore the sovereignty of the new Orthodox monarch vis-à-vis Byzantine political ideology, with its central notion of Byzantine universal hegemony, specifically over Orthodox Christendom. Byzantine recognition of the new patriarchates can be seen also as a kind of concession to the political aspirations of the new Orthodox monarchs.\textsuperscript{46} Encountering and being exposed to the distinctive Byzantine concepts of supranational “patriotism”, the South Slavonic Orthodox cultures also developed traditions eulogizing their own people as being granted the status of the new “chosen people”, entrusted with an exceptional mission to spread Orthodox Christianity further and act as its faithful guardians. As in Byzantium, in the South Slavonic Orthodox world these religio-political concepts could confer a providential dimension to the comprehension and rationalization of Christian warfare, especially in the period of the Ottoman conquest. The decline and shrinking of Byzantium in the fourteenth century made one of the principal themes of the Byzantine apocalyptic tradition – the final eschatological battles of the last Byzantine emperor with the forces of Islam prior to the advent of the Antichrist – more actual and influential than ever. With the spread of such eschatological expectations concerning the fate of Constantinople and Orthodox Christendom itself, in some Byzantine circles Orthodoxy developed into “surrogate patriotism”, with strong anti-Latin/Catholic sentiments.\textsuperscript{47} Features of such a development can be discerned in contemporaneous and later versions of South Slavonic Orthodox cultures, but its dynamics as well as links to the rise of national consciousness in the region and its religio-political elements have remained regrettably underexplored.\textsuperscript{48}

Following the establishment of the Ottoman empire in the erstwhile Orthodox Anatolia and Balkan Europe, the Byzantine apocalyptic tradition enjoyed a continuation among nearly all strata of Orthodox cultures under Ottoman suzerainty, whether in the guise of post-Byzantine messianism or simple eschatological prophecies about the impending end of Ottoman rule.\textsuperscript{49} This post-Byzantine messianism prophesied the advent of a liberator-emperor who would rout the “infidel” Islamic occupiers in “holy battles” at Constantinople and banish them forever to initiate the final events of the eschatological drama. In non-eschatological versions, such prophecies could simply predict the recreation of the Byzantine empire, ruling Orthodox Christendom again from its old capital, the Holy City of Constantinople. Elements of this Byzantine messianism undoubtedly reappear in a modernized and secularized form in the Megali Idea (“Great Idea”) of Greek nationalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, aspiring to reinstate a Greek state for all the Greeks of the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Such concepts also find a parallel in the
abortive “Greek Project” of the Russian Empress Catherine the Great (1762–1796), which was designed to force the dismemberment of the Ottoman realm and the establishment of a reconstituted “Russo-Byzantine” Orthodox empire in Constantinople. It is worth noting, however, that Catherine the Great’s victorious campaigns and projects against the Ottoman empire were devoid of the rhetoric of religious war; by that time the Russian patriarchate had already been abolished and the Tsarist administration was managing the Church largely as a state department.

By the time Russian imperial expansionism was beginning to make real headway into the Ottoman Balkans, the Russian Church and the Eastern Orthodox churches that had earlier found themselves under Ottoman dominion had developed different sets of state–church relations, which were to have far-reaching implications in the modern era of nationalism and nation-state-building. Following earlier precedents of the integration of the “Oriental” patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem into the Islamic system of governance, in the wake of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople its patriarch was designated as the religious and administrative head of all Orthodox Christians under Ottoman sovereignty, regardless of their ethnicity. The implementation of these regulations, known as the millet system, assigned significant civil, educational and judicial roles to the Constantinople patriarchate, and the previously independent patriarchates now came under its authority (only the Serbian patriarchate was revived between 1557 and 1766). The millet system secured the survival and relative strength of Orthodox Christianity in the Ottoman empire, but it meant too that the ecclesiastical body of the Constantinople patriarchate, from its head to the diocesan metropolitans and the village priests, functioned as a secular administrative mechanism as well. Apart from his ecclesiastical role, the Constantinople patriarch was also the ethnarch, the civil “leader” of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman empire. This substantial secularization of the role of the Church opened it to frequent lay interference in its internal affairs, whether by the Ottoman authorities or by influential lay figures such as lawyers and merchants, whom the Constantinople patriarchate had to employ in order to fulfil its function.

The millet system also led to frequent friction and hostility between the mostly Greek upper hierarchy of the patriarchate and the Serbian, Bulgarian, etc., local churchmen under its jurisdiction. With the rise of nationalism, in the wide-ranging and influential Greek communities and diaspora within and outside the Ottoman empire, “Hellenism” and Orthodoxy began to blend in a forceful nationalist ideology. Focused on the aspirations for the formation of a new Hellenic Commonwealth, this nationalist ideology further alienated the Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian churches. Acting during the Ottoman era as a nationally and cultur-
ally unifying force, these churches inevitably played a crucial role in the formation of the respective national ideologies. Thus these national churches provided the religio-political source of the various eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Orthodox Christian identities, including the complicated process of the shaping of Romanian Orthodox culture in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which remained autonomous under Ottoman suzerainty until 1829.

The *millet* system, moreover, carried with it implicit dangers for the upper hierarchy of the Constantinople patriarchate. The outbreak of the Greek Revolution in 1821 (deemed to have been proclaimed by the metropolitan of Patras, Germanos) signified in the Ottoman reading of events that the patriarch and his senior prelates were guilty of high treason. Consequently the Christian *etnarch* was promptly executed, along with scores of other senior clerics in Istanbul, Edirne, Thessaloniki, Crete, Cyprus, etc. Similar, although less drastic, retributive measures are known to have been taken by the Ottomans in comparable circumstances against leading Bulgarian and Serbian churchmen. The event marked the beginning of the end for the old *millet* role of the Constantinople patriarchate, as its various functions and powers were eroded progressively. In the nineteenth century, the Orthodox churches in South-Eastern Europe, moreover, energetically sought and achieved autonomy from its jurisdiction, which was in some cases a divisive and arduous process. The consequent fragmentation of the ecclesiastical authority of the Ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople in South-Eastern Europe was accompanied by bitter debates and a succession of ecclesiastical crises provoked by the secular factors that were determining the formation of the new autocephalous and national churches. Orthodox internal strife in the second half of the nineteenth century was further exacerbated by the attempts of Russian diplomacy in the Ottoman empire to use for its own political purposes the struggle of Bulgarian churchmen for ecclesiastical emancipation or indeed the increasing Arab–Greek rivalry for control of the bishoprics or the patriarchal posts in the old patriarchates of Antioch and, later, Jerusalem.

In the Ottoman period, the tradition of Byzantine messianism (in its original Greek or derivative Slavonic versions) often lay dormant but was kept alive and re-actualized mainly in clerical and monastic circles. The tradition maintained its principal focus – the violent end of the Ottoman Caliphate and a restoration of the Orthodox Christian empire at Constantinople (or the relevant Orthodox Christian kingdoms) in the wake of huge conflicts between Christianity and Islam – while allowing some innovations. These momentous events might be attributed, for example, to Russian military intervention. In the South Slavonic Orthodox world, these themes became interwoven with the rich epical traditions
commemorating and mythicizing military resistance to the Ottoman invasion. Greek or South Slavonic churchmen who became actively involved in the actual armed struggle and uprisings against the Ottomans, especially from the late eighteenth century onwards, were as a rule aware of and often under the influence of one of the versions or elements of the tradition of this Orthodox *restoratio imperii*. Consequently, some of them sought to add a providential and religious dimension to the military conflicts with the Ottomans. Their pronouncements and agendas stood in sharp contrast with the official position of the Constantinople patriarchate, which endeavoured to promote peaceful resolution to such conflicts and reforms to improve the conditions of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman state. Such a stance was obviously affected by the precarious position of the Constantinople patriarchate in the late Ottoman empire, but also by its ostensible loyalty to the patristic, canonical and clerical Byzantine views on war, organized violence and peace.

An especially instructive case in this context is the eighteenth-century anti-Ottoman wars of the Orthodox Principality of Montenegro, which, profiting from its inhospitable mountainous terrain, was never fully conquered by the Ottomans, and its heartlands remained de facto independent throughout the Ottoman period. In 1516, the secular power in the principality was conferred on the bishop of the Montenegrin Cetinje diocese. This initiated the long era of the rule of the so-called prince-bishops (1516–1697), a kind of Orthodox theocracy that continued after 1697 under the reign of bishops belonging to the charismatic Petrović-Njegoš dynasty until one of them secularized Montenegrin rule in 1852. The Montenegrin prince-bishops conducted and led a number of campaigns against the Ottomans and maintained close links with the Russian imperial and ecclesiastic authorities; they were also able to gain an autocephalous status for their church. Perhaps it is not surprising that the characteristic pre-battle speeches attributed to the influential Montenegrin theocrat Petar I Petrović (1784–1830), one of the four saints of the Montenegrin Church, contain some of the notions of Christian religious war, invoking divine support to crush the “devilish” enemies of Christianity. Some of the pronouncements of his successor to Orthodox theocratic rule, Petar II Petrović Njegoš (1831–1850), betray unmistakable echoes of these Christian religious war notions, which are graphically articulated in his dramatic poem “The Mountain Wreath”.

*Imperial Russia and the Balkans*

In the post-Byzantine period, Russian ecclesiastical views on war and peace developed in markedly different religious and political circumstances from those in the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia. During most of the
period of Tatar suzerainty over the Russian lands (1236–1452), the Russian Church continued to function as a metropolitanate of the Constantinople patriarchate and played the role of the pre-eminent carrier of the cultural heritage and evolving ethno-religious consciousness in Russia. The Tatar overlords did not intervene in the internal affairs of the Church and it was actually able to conduct some impressive missionary work to the north and east of the Russian heartlands. This era of Tatar suzerainty witnessed the military feats of the Russian warrior-prince saints St Alexander Nevsky and St Dmitri Donskoi, but the Russian Church, especially in the early stages of the era, remained generally pacific, in line with the prevalent Byzantine clerical attitudes in this period. It did not develop either the rhetoric or the approach of religious or holy war. In actual fact, most of Alexander Nevsky’s major campaigns were directed against his Swedish, German and Lithuanian adversaries, while seeking peace and compromise with the Tatars. The Russian Church could on occasions promote non-resistance to the Tatars; however, before the great Russian–Tatar Battle of Kulikovo, Prince Dmitry Donskoi reportedly asked for the blessing of Russia’s paradigmatic national saint, St Sergius of Radonezh (c.1314–1392), who not only encouraged him to “fight with faith” against the “heathen” with God on his side, but allowed two monks to fight in the Russian army. Exalted as “the Builder of Russia” and as a close ally of the Grand Princes of Moscow, St Sergius of Radonezh was thus directly associated with the expansion of the principality and its reconquest designs and moves against the Mongols, not only in the actual political and military spheres but also in Russian national memory. As the Russian empire began to expand after the end of the Tatar dominion, certain later Russian campaigns, such as some of those conducted under Ivan the Terrible, were accompanied by heightened religious rhetoric, but they certainly cannot be qualified as religious wars – they were part of Russian imperial military expansionism.

Generally, in the Russian post-Byzantine Christian worldview, “holy wars” to recover Constantinople for Orthodox Christendom would have seemed largely unnecessary. The “Second Rome” had been punished for its sins, and since its fall to the infidel it was Moscow, the “Third Rome”, that, guided by the Holy Spirit, was entrusted to be the sole legitimate defender as well as the bastion of Orthodoxy. However, post-Byzantine Greek religious influence was reintroduced during the reign of Tsar Alexis I (1645–1676), himself known by the nickname “the most peaceful”, through the divisive reforms of Patriarch Nikon, which aimed to harmonize Russian service books with contemporary Greek ones and ultimately provoked a schism within Russian Orthodoxy. With Greek influence back in fashion, some religious rhetoric from this period conjures up visions of the future deliverance of all Orthodox Christians...
from Ottoman subjugation by Tsar Alexis, ceremonially proclaimed by him in the re-consecrated Hagia Sophia in Constantinople in the presence of all five Eastern Orthodox patriarchs. This visionary convergence of the contemporary Orthodox sacred autocracy and its highest spiritual authority culminated in the celebration of the Eucharist for the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

Russian secular and religious concepts of just war began to crystallize early in the history of Orthodox Russia. Defensive war was seen as rule justified, as were military conflicts aimed at regaining territories unjustly lost to an invader – they could be seen accordingly as wars of liberation. These notions of just war were intertwined with the belief in the inviolability of frontiers and war as the judgement of God. Thus the power of the Cross may be invoked to give victory to those whose war cause is just and to punish those who commit unjust military aggression. But, as elsewhere in the Orthodox world, these concepts were not systematically developed even in the period when Russian military thinking came under strong Western influence after the reforms of Peter the Great (1682–1725), which is clearly demonstrated by the first original Russian tract on international law written during his reign by the prominent diplomat Baron Petr Shafirov.

Increasing Russian military involvement in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not lead to any further major developments in Russian military thought of conceptual guidelines related to casus belli motives that could lead to military conflicts and to jus in bello means for conducting warfare. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 fortified Russian belief in the defence of the homeland as the highest form of just war and the ultimate patriotic duty. St Filaret, metropolitan of Moscow (1782–1867), made some interesting orations dwelling on the reasons for the Russian success, asserting that those who die for the faith and fatherland will be awarded with life and a crown in heaven and thus sanctifying patriotic armed defence.

The Russian Church’s involvement in the wide-ranging Russian military campaigns in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was predominantly focused on performing the standard Orthodox military religious services. State control of the Church after Peter the Great’s reign had obvious demoralizing effects on traditional Russian Orthodoxy. However, as the carrier of the established faith of the empire, the extensive missionary projects and operations of the Church, inspired by its self-entrusted mission to accomplish the Christianization of Asia, profited from Russian imperial expansionism. During these missionary campaigns and the establishment of its ecclesiastical structures in the newly conquered lands, the Russian Church inevitably became engaged in religious controversies and conflicts with local Muslim clerical and political elites,
especially in the Volga-Kama region (modern-day Tatarstan), related mainly to Russian policies of Christianization in these areas. But such predictable confrontations did not lead to warlike religious rhetoric or a call for religious wars coming from within the mainstream of the Church.

The forceful rhetoric of Emperor Alexander I (1801–1825) during the confrontations with Napoleon in 1807 and 1812, castigating him as an enemy of the Orthodox faith, needs to be seen in the context of the religio-political climate in Europe and Russia during and after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. In an atmosphere permeated with fears and trepidation about perceived increasing threats, not only to the European Old Order but to European Christianity (which led to the formation of the Holy Alliance in 1815), Alexander’s increasing use of dramatic Christian rhetoric derived from his own belief that he had a divine mission as a defender of Christendom in general, as well as from the startling impact on the emperor of prophecy-oriented figures from contemporary European mystical pietism. This evangelical pietist dimension of Alexander’s Christian worldview makes him an unlikely candidate for the role of a leader of an Orthodox “crusade” against the Ottoman empire sometimes ascribed to him, especially since Russian support for the Greek Revolution of 1821–1829 was initially non-existent and came only after Great Britain and France had already interfered on the side of the Greek rebels.

The treaty that followed the Ottoman defeat during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774 contained clauses that were seen in Russia as granting the Russian empire a mandate to protect the rights of Eastern Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman realm. These clauses were used constantly by Russia to intervene through diplomatic pressure or militarily in the turbulent processes that led to the formation of the post-Ottoman nation-states in South-Eastern Europe. The rise of European pan-Slavism and the Russian Slavophile movement in the nineteenth century made the aspirations for “liberation” of the various Slavonic peoples under foreign domination a popular and emotional topic in Russia. Debates and speculation on the ethics of war, justifiable rationales for resorting to violence and the Orthodox understanding of peace were rife in religiously oriented Russian cultural milieus in the nineteenth century, from the various doctrines and stances within the Slavophile movement to the influential pacifism of Lev Tolstoy or Vladimir Solovyov’s literary rationalization of the Christian just tradition. Whereas the Russian Slavophile movement had its liberal representatives, other trends considered the Russian version of “Byzantinism” as a religio-political antidote to what was seen as contemporary Western decadence and decline. More extreme Slavophile trends developed a Slavophile Orthodox messianism in which the Slavonic peoples were viewed as custodians of an authentic
unpolluted Christianity and thus entrusted with a messianic role among the progressively degenerating European nations. Militant versions of this messianic Slavophilism, such as those developed by the polymath Nikolay Danilevsky (1822–1885), aspired to the unification of all the Slavonic Orthodox world in a realm ruled benignly by an Orthodox emperor residing in the old, re-conquered capital of Orthodox Christendom, Constantinople. It is still debatable how influential militant Slavophile doctrines were in shaping elements of Russian imperial ideology during the reigns of Alexander III (1881–1894) and Nicholas II (1894–1917). Opinions also vary as to whether the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 represented the martial peak of militant Slavophilism or whether its primary motive derived from Russia’s old geopolitical goals of achieving access to the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean.

Orthodox churches in the East European nation-states and under Communism

Ultimately, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 led to the Ottoman recognition of the full independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and the autonomy of a Principality of Bulgaria. Inevitably, both in Russia and in the newly formed nation-states, this war was seen as a just war fought for the liberation and independence of the Orthodox Christian peoples, a *jus ad bellum* that was to be used by the new Balkan states in their forthcoming joint military aggression against the Ottoman empire in 1912. The Balkan allies of the first (anti-Ottoman) Balkan War of 1912 invariably viewed the war as a culmination of their struggle to achieve their respective “great” national ideas. Some of the subsequent disagreements and conflicts between them resulted from the fact that the ecclesiastical boundaries of the various churches’ dioceses in the Ottoman period were different from the newly established and changing state borders. The role of some of the local churchmen, for instance, in the occasionally violent Greco-Bulgarian conflicts over the jurisdiction of Orthodox sanctuaries in Macedonia in the early twentieth century is one such symptom of the adoption of secular and nationalist agendas by Orthodox churches, leading in this case to bitter infighting.

The ecclesiastical, political and national spheres in the Orthodox world in South-Eastern Europe continued to merge and interact profoundly and unpredictably in the tense period preceding World War I. Not only did the various Orthodox churches provide the key elements of the reinforced national identities of their people, but individual churchmen also took an active part in the political and even military struggles marking the protracted and frequently brutal dismemberment of the Ottoman empire. Inevitably they became and were to remain a crucial political force
in the new, predominantly Orthodox, states – a Bulgarian bishop, for example, served twice as prime minister during the first 10 years following the establishment of the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria. But the Orthodox churches in these new nation-states were also subjected to constant secular interference, as government after government sought to exploit their influence and use them as a political tool, whether in internal or external state affairs.

Given the Balkan anti-Ottoman allies’ just war rhetoric during the first Balkan War of 1912, a brief comparative analysis of the role of the various churches in the mobilization of public support for the war and the use of religious themes for its legitimization would have been extremely useful for the purpose of this chapter. Unfortunately, the religious dimension of this war is yet another unexplored chapter in the history of modern Orthodox churches’ attitudes to warfare with non-Christian adversaries. Fortunately, the views and pronouncements of one of the most vocal churchmen and theologians of twentieth-century Balkan Orthodoxy, Bishop Nikolai Velimirović (1881–1956), on this war and on Islam in general are well known, accessible in the West and thus difficult to ignore.

Canonized as a saint of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2003, Bishop Velimirović exercised substantial influence on twentieth-century Serbian Orthodox religious thought – he is often considered the greatest Serbian Orthodox theologian of the century and is praised by his adherents as Serbia’s “New Chrysostom”. His views (as well as those of his “school”) can be seen as representative of the attitudes of very influential currents in the Serbian Orthodox Church during the interwar period and they enjoyed a far-reaching revival from the 1980s onwards, thus providing a useful basis for a brief case-study analysis.

In the tense period between the Balkan Wars and World War I, Bishop Velimirović published a book in which he resorted to an uncompromising “crusading” rhetoric to depict the Balkan anti-Ottoman war as the last stage of the earlier Crusades against Islam. He solemnly proclaimed that this Balkan Orthodox military effort was backed by Christ and culminated in victory despite the pro-Ottoman stance of the European Christian “pharisaic” powers. In subsequent books published shortly afterwards in England (the first of them with a preface by the Archbishop of Canterbury), Bishop Velimirović kept his views and rhetoric similarly clear-cut and explicit: at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Serbian armies fought “for Cross and Freedom against Islam rushing over Europe”. He offered his own reading of the historical trajectory of the crusading movement. After passing through dramatic stages in Palestine, Spain and Russia, the Crusades of Christianity against Islam and its imperialism continue to this day and their most dramatic acts occurred
in the Balkans and especially in Serbia.\textsuperscript{60} Throughout this epic battle, Serbian political and military leaders served Christ as defenders of the Orthodox faith and “cross-bearing warriors against the infidels”.\textsuperscript{61}

Velimirović’s religio-national ideology certainly lays great emphasis on the covenantal mythology that has evolved in Serbian Orthodox readings of the religious and spiritual dimensions of the Battle of Kosovo, which have some obvious links to earlier Byzantine apocalypticism and messianism. His own elaborations of this covenantal mythology led to a sanctification of the nation and its army. He saw the ultimate Serbian Orthodox ideal as aspiring towards a holy nation, holy church, holy dynasty and holy army – the holy army envisaged as defending the sacrosanctity of Christendom surrounded by a halo of sacredness.\textsuperscript{62} One can also detect in this series of statements a new version of militant Slavophile ideology, which has now evolved into a national messianism,\textsuperscript{63} manifested on occasions in the guise of “crusading” Orthodoxy. This national messianic ideology is articulated not in the abstract context of the rise and fall of civilizations (popular with Russian Slavophiles) but in the framework of a vision of an ongoing Orthodox Christian religious war against its perceived hereditary enemy – Islam.

The convergence of this updated Orthodox Christian warrior ethos with a warlike national ideology led Bishop Velimirović to a reassessment of the phenomenon of war, which he saw as the basis of art, human virtue and ability.\textsuperscript{64} This represents a radical shift indeed from the fundamental Eastern Orthodox ecclesiastical approaches to war in the patristic and Byzantine period, when even a lay military strategist felt compelled to concede in his manual on the practice and tactics of warfare that it is the “worst of all evils”.\textsuperscript{65} It is worth mentioning in this context the declaration by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Gavrilo V Dožić-Medenica (1938–1950) in March 1941 in support of the military coup d’etat against the regent of the kingdom, which poignantly blends epic warlike imagery with “just war” notions that ultimately ascribe to the war effort a religio-historic salvific quality.\textsuperscript{66}

Apart from his crusading stance on Islam, Bishop Velimirović expounded strongly anti-Catholic and anti-ecumenical views that were also influential trends in the mainstream Serbian Orthodox Church in the interwar Yugoslav Kingdom. The Serbian Orthodox Church was thus ill equipped to develop a much needed inter-confessional dialogue in the multi-confessional kingdom with its competing identities when the Catholic Church in Croatia also began to undergo a process of ethnicization. The increasingly bitter conflict between the Orthodox and Catholic clerical elites in 1937–1939 was to lead to a virtual “mobilization” of the two churches in the prewar period and aggravated further the religious dimension of the Yugoslav civil war fought along religious/ethnic lines in
Axis-occupied Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1945. The severe blows that the Serbian Orthodox Church suffered in this period – a heavily depleted Church hierarchy and substantial destruction of Orthodox cult architecture in the western Balkans – contributed to the intensification and perpetuation of its general self-perception as a “suffering church” (a standard notion in Balkan Orthodoxy inherited from the Ottoman period), in dire need of securing its self-defence and survival in the region.

Paradoxically, World War II was to bring about a reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church after several cycles of massive Soviet repression of the Church, which began as early as the Russian civil war of 1918–1921 and progressively intensified in the 1920s and 1930s. In a successful attempt to boost national support and mobilization for the war effort against Nazi Germany as a just defensive war, Stalin revived the Russian Church and allowed a patriarchal election to be held in 1943. Earlier, during the Russian civil war, despite his various pronouncements and protests against the Bolsheviks, the Russian patriarch, Tikhon (1918–1925), did not officially “sanctify” the anti-Bolshevik war effort of the White Army, although a number of priests collaborated with it and were eventually executed by the Red Army and the Soviet authorities. Significantly, in one of his letters to the Bolshevik Council of People’s Commissars in 1918, the patriarch accused them of ordering soldiers to abandon the battlefields and the defence of the motherland, extinguishing in their conscience the precept in John 15:13, “No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends”.67 The letter was written in the aftermath of the already collapsing Treaty of Brest Litovsk, whose terms were seen in Russia as humiliating and unfair. Accusing the Bolsheviks of sacrificing Russia’s national interests for an unjust peace, the patriarch affirmed an Orthodox version of the just war tradition (national self-defence), using the same scriptural legitimization as St Constantine-Cyril the Philosopher in the ninth century. During the early cycles of Soviet anti-religious persecution the patriarch preached non-violent resistance to the suppression of Church institutions, hierarchy and religious life, repeatedly exhorting the faithful to abstain from vengeance and bloodshed, condemning anti-Jewish pogroms and pleading with the Bolshevik authorities to halt the cycle of bloodshed and destruction.68 The patriarch condemned civil war as the worst kind of fratricidal violence.

During the same period, interesting debates developed in the émigré Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia between some bishops who strove to preach a kind of “crusade” against Godless Communism in Russia and those who argued that the Russian Orthodox response to Communism should be non-violent resistance and work on spiritual renewal. In 1929, the émigré metropolitan Anthony Khраповитский issued
an epistle “To the Orthodox Population of the Far East”, in which he argued more or less for a war against the “enemies of the Church”. An essay entitled “The Sanctity of Military Endeavour”, which appeared in a Russian publication in Paris in 1929, is symptomatic of some of the attitudes to the Christian military ethos and war effort that enjoyed currency in some Russian émigré circles. The text eulogizes the historical and spiritual record of the Orthodox “Christ-loving army”, its “cross-bearing spirit” and the “Christ-bearing and Christ-loving military endeavours” through which it defended the Church and the “Christian Fatherland” by the sword. Proceeding with the theme of military martyrdom and sainthood, the text proclaims that it was on account of these military struggles for the Holy Church and the Kingdom of God on Earth that emperors, nobles, military leaders and soldiers have been accepted into the host of Orthodox saints. In 1925, the Russian émigré religious and political philosopher Ivan Il’in (1883–1954) – often seen as belonging largely to the tradition of Slavophile thought – published On Resistance of Evil by Force, in which he reaffirmed the necessity of war but questioned whether it can ever be defined as “just”. The book provoked intense reactions and disputes in Russian émigré lay and clerical circles, which have obvious relevance to the current debates on the historical constraints on the tradition of the justifiability of war in Eastern Orthodoxy.

The establishment of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe after World War II led to the institution of comparable patterns of initial oppression and persecution of the Orthodox churches in the various countries, followed by measures to secure their political subordination and subservience to the state. This new model of Church–state relations inevitably produced different variants of the immensely increased and usually hostile state control over Church institutions and differing patterns of passive and non-violent resistance to this aggressive and continuous secular interference at the various levels of the Church hierarchy.

After the first stages of anti-Church repression, Communist governments became aware of the potential of using the national Orthodox churches as a tool of their foreign policy through the existing ecclesiastical network of international Orthodoxy. The participation of these Orthodox churches in international ecclesiastical and lay peace initiatives during the Cold War period was largely supervised and controlled by the various governments. The Soviet efforts to use the Moscow patriarchate in this manner were particularly blatant and tensions and conflicts often arose between the patriarchates functioning within the sphere of the Eastern bloc, on the one hand, and the ancient “Eastern” patriarchates, as well as the Orthodox churches operating in non-Communist countries such as Greece and Cyprus, on the other.
Whereas Orthodox churches in the Communist countries were subjected to all these political and ideological pressures, the Orthodox Church in Cyprus continued to play a high-profile role in the political life of the state – a legacy of the ethnarch status of its archbishop in the Ottoman period, with its combination of civil and religious leadership duties. This inevitably brought the Church onto the centre stage of political and military developments on the island. In 1931, for instance, some of the Orthodox bishops took part in the organization of a riot against the heavy-handed British rule of the island. The election of Archbishop Makarios III in 1960 as president of the new Republic of Cyprus was another symptom of the interweaving of the ecclesiastical and political sphere in Cyprus, which in this case involved also dealing with the complex military political conditions provoked by the “Ecclesiastical Coup” of 1972 against Makarios, the military coup against him in 1974 (organized by the Greek military government) and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Such events showed that a modern Orthodox Church can embark politically on a direct collision course with state and military authorities when they encroach on the democratic process of state-building and its values.

The Yugoslav wars and Orthodoxy

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 seemed to mark the beginning of a new period for the revitalization of Eastern Orthodoxy and the restoration of its traditional place in the social and religious life of the region. The military conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s, however, again put to the sternest possible test the model of state–Church relations established in the post-Ottoman Balkan nation-states and its implications for modern Eastern Orthodox approaches to warfare as well as its means and limits in multi-confessional and multi-ethnic regions and/or countries.

Initially, the state–Church model in socialist Yugoslavia after World War II was similar to the model in the East European countries. The trials of clerics and religious leaders for their actual or alleged collaboration with the Axis occupiers, extreme nationalists, etc. actually exceeded those in neighbouring Communist countries, which also reflects the nature of the inter-religious/ethnic conflicts in wartime Yugoslavia.

This model was altered in the 1950s and the 1960s following Tito’s rift with Stalin and the Soviet Union in 1948. Religious organizations in Yugoslavia were able to take advantage of the various processes of liberalization in Yugoslavia, from the economic to the ideological spheres. In the 1960s, inter-faith dialogue between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic episcopate in Croatia made some, if uneven, progress;
both churches took part, again intermittently, in international ecumenical initiatives and meetings.

By the end of the 1980s, however, it was becoming increasingly apparent that relations between the Serbian Orthodox and Croat Catholic elites were deteriorating and approaching a crisis not dissimilar from the one in the late 1930s that preceded the inter-religious military conflicts in World War II Yugoslavia. It was also becoming increasingly clear that Orthodox and Catholic religious history, symbolism and practices were being subjected to a process of “nationalization” and politicization in the speedy formation of new national ideologies for the two communities. Elements of a similar process, but which began much later and was much less wide-ranging and influential as well as following a different socio-religious dynamic, could be observed in some circles of the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The impression that Orthodox and Catholic clerical circles were prepared to allow their religious institutions to be politically instrumentalized and used as an extension of the secular military sphere in an actual war situation was confirmed in the first political and military conflicts that triggered the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The obvious and multifaceted religious dimension of these conflicts has attracted much scholarly and general attention and many of its aspects are still under investigation.72

The accumulating evidence and critical analysis of the wartime post-Yugoslav national ideologies of the 1990s have led historians to apply terms such as “religious nationalism” or “ethno-clericalism” to define the processes that developed in some major spheres of Serbian Orthodox and Croat Catholic clerical and religiously oriented cultural circles in the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of Serbian Orthodox culture, the use of some of its traditional religious iconography and hagiography of principal national saints or religio-national pilgrimage rituals such as the Kosovo gatherings for the mobilization of what was viewed as a just national cause and the subsequent war effort is abundantly in evidence. What has become a focus of investigation and debate is whether the militarization of this Serbian Orthodox heritage was largely the outcome of its misappropriation by opportunist nationalist politicians and military leaders or did the Church or individual churchmen encourage this process?

The prominence of religious elements in the legitimization of Serbian war efforts and operations during the wars of the 1990s is clearly not sufficient to implicate the Church as an active conduit of this process. As in the case of other Balkan Orthodox nations, religious constructs played a central role in the formation of Serbian national identity and these could be invoked spontaneously in times of crises and conflicts. Furthermore, on one level the upper hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church took part in regional and international religious initiatives and meetings for
peace and reconciliation during and after the Yugoslav wars of succession. A number of observers, however, have questioned the sincerity of the Serbian Orthodox clerical elite’s participation in such initiatives, pointing to cases in which senior Serbian Orthodox clerics publicly called for campaigns of military vengeance for World War II crimes against Orthodox Serbdom, endeavoured to provide religio-political justification for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina or tried to use peace negotiations and agreements for narrow ecclesiastical or political reasons (including discussions of state and diocese borders). Questions have been asked, especially in Serbia, about whether senior Orthodox clerics who became public figures in the 1990s used the build-up to and advance of the military conflicts to reclaim the political and social role of the Church in Serbia, which was strongly curbed in Tito’s Yugoslavia.

Both Patriarch Pavle and some senior Christian clerics (Catholic and Orthodox) in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina tried to minimize the participation of religious institutions in the military conflict in the region, arguing that religious symbolism and discourse had been hijacked by all the warring parties to strengthen and legitimize their war propaganda. There is substantial evidence, however, that since the 1980s senior Serbian Orthodox clerics and institutions have played a major role in the reinvention of a religious national ideology grounded in intense Christian militaristic imagery and focused on the potent themes of heroic self-sacrifice as personal and national redemption (as developed in the Kosovo covenantal mythology). This ultimately created an environment in which organized violence could be justifiable and even recommendable as the only possible self-defence strategy for a perpetually beleaguered Christian Orthodox nation and Church. It was this intensely emotional and aggressive religious rhetoric and imagery that entered the spheres of mass media and mass politics (as well as, on occasions, Church media) rather than the warning statements and views of Serbian liberal clerical figures and religiously inclined cultural circles. During the armed conflicts this religious rhetoric and symbolism was thoroughly militarized on all levels, with the active participation of members of the higher and lower clergy, from the use of traditional Orthodox insignia to allusions to Old and New Testament passages to validate what was seen as a crucial martial stage of national messianism in a time of fateful inter-religious confrontation.

The notion of Orthodox Serbdom as the avant-garde defender of European Christendom from militant and expansive Islam, with its obvious “neo-crusading” overtones, enjoyed an understandable currency in lay military and clerical circles. The resultant development of traditional militarist Christian discourse, such as the “sacred” nature of the fight against an “infidel” enemy of the faith, led some senior ecclesiastics to heroicize (and even, on occasions, to sanctify) the war effort and some
of its protagonists to the extent that paramilitary leaders could perceive Patriarch Pavle as their supreme commander. Some of these processes were further deepened by analogous developments in Croat wartime religio-national ideology and to a degree and somewhat later in some Bosnian Muslim ideological currents that sought to religionize the war effort. The simultaneous revival of the influence of Bishop Velimirović and his adherents in the Church, which was to culminate in his eventual canonization, meant also a revival of his militant anti-ecumenical, anti-Catholic and neo-crusading anti-Islamic discourse at all levels of the Church hierarchy.

Finally, the legacy of the wartime years and the Church’s stance on the inter-religious conflicts has crucial implications for its current highly visible quest for a stronger political role in the new state–Church model that is evolving in the postwar years. In the unfolding debates on this process, Serbian liberal clerical and lay circles have expressed strong fears that senior churchmen continue to promote their vision of a politicized and exclusivist Orthodoxy, accompanied by reaffirmations of the tenets of the latest wartime religio-national ideology and elements of a rudimentary but growing “Orthodox fundamentalism”.

The role of senior Serbian Orthodox clerics in the politico-military instrumentalization of Orthodoxy during the Yugoslav military conflicts also explains the lack of a critical or any response by the higher echelons of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the methods of conducting war by Serbian regular army and paramilitary units throughout the conflicts, which repeatedly breached the codes of war established in the Geneva Conventions and which received wide-ranging international coverage and condemnation. But this ecclesiastical “indifference” to jus in bello norms during the Yugoslav wars of succession can be also related to the greater problem of the development of modern Eastern Orthodox stances on legitimate and illegitimate means of warfare, proportionality and discrimination, which lately have been the focus of growing international political, scholarly and inter-religious attention and debates.

As already indicated, even during the heyday of the Byzantine imperial era, on the whole the Eastern Orthodox tradition did not find it necessary to elaborate more systematic theories for the religious and philosophical justification of warfare and jus in bello regulations; the latter, as set out in Byzantine military treatises, largely reproduce inherited models from the Hellenistic and Roman antiquity. Jus in bello issues have received only occasional and cursory treatments in the later Russian just war tradition, a deficiency that certainly can be blamed to some extent for the absence of proportionality and discrimination that can frequently be observed in Russian combat practices. The lack of a more detailed and systematic consideration of the jus in bello norms in modern Eastern Orthodox
thought concerning the use of force and its limits, as well as its relevance to combat methods during military conflicts involving states or parties of the modern Eastern Orthodox world, deserves separate scrutiny. A major question to be addressed in this scrutiny should be how modern Eastern Orthodox thought can bridge the growing gap between its predominantly pacific legacy and the actual reality and conduct of modern warfare, especially when a warring party seeks an “Orthodox” legitimization of its war effort, as in the case of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

Contemporary challenges

The Yugoslav military conflicts posed some obvious challenges, not to say theological and ethical crises of conscience, to international Orthodoxy, with its different Orthodox churches and patriarchates, which were also affected by their existing and increasing contacts with institutions related to the implementation of the League of Nations Covenant, the United Nations Charter, and so on. The Ecumenical patriarchates responded with the organization of a series of conferences and meetings that condemned aggressive nationalism and its exploitation to stir up inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts. In effect, the Ecumenical patriarchate reiterated some of its earlier positions on religious nationalism and its dangers, referring also to more general issues in the ethics of war: the justification of humanitarian intervention, ethnic cleansing, nuclear weapons, etc. Both the Russian and the Greek Orthodox churches took part in regional and international peace-making initiatives and meetings during the armed conflicts, and in April 2004 the Russian patriarch, Alexei II, made a well-publicized visit to Belgrade during NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia and made a public peace appeal that also called for a peaceful reversal of the Serbian regime’s policies in Kosovo. At the same time, some Russian and Greek Orthodox clerics sought to heroicize the Serbian war effort and its military/paramilitary leaders, or indulged (in the Russian case, in clerical circles associated with neo-Slavophilism) in anti-ecumenical and occidentophobic statements and discourse. These Greek and Russian clerical attempts at pan-Orthodox “solidarity” did little to support (and actually further isolated) the liberal circles and voices in the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Yugoslav military conflicts provoked wide-ranging reactions in international Orthodox theological circles. As early as 1991, Paris-based Orthodox theologians accused Serbian Orthodox dignitaries of taking part (if unwittingly) in the regime’s intensifying campaign to stir up inter-ethnic hatred. In 1995, the pacific Orthodox Peace Fellowship sent a written protest to Patriarch
Pavle that a service for the blessing of weapons in a Serbian edition of the Book of Needs published in Kosovo in 1993 was being used in fratricidal war. During a meeting of the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches in Bucharest in September 1994, the patriarch of Alexandria, the pope/patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church and the patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church issued a peace appeal (in view of the military conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina) in which they called for an urgent inter-faith dialogue with Islam and condemned the political expropriation of religious traditions on the basis of militaristic nationalism.

Serbian Orthodox clerical approaches to the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s had implications beyond these military conflicts in the general context of contemporary Christian doctrines on the ethics of war. Accordingly the World Council of Churches and the ecumenical movements often adopted critical stances towards the Serbian Orthodox Church in this period. Consequently, the Syndesmos Declaration by the participants in a “War and Peace in Europe” seminar, hosted by the Archdiocese of Crete in 1994, appealed for inter-Orthodox solidarity in peace-making efforts but also strongly criticized what they saw as a prejudicial bias of the World Council of Churches against the Serbian Orthodox Church.

These meetings, initiatives, statements and appeals made the debate on contemporary challenges to Eastern Orthodox views on war and peace an important theme in current theological and church history studies. In 2003, the Ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, emphatically reiterated the traditional Eastern Orthodox patristic and Byzantine clerical precepts on warfare, declaring that in only a few specific instances could the Orthodox Church “forgive armed defense against oppression and violence”. After a decade of redefining its new models of relations with the state and indeed the military, in 2000 the Jubilee Council of Russian Bishops issued an extremely important statement of faith. This contains a section on “War and Peace” that advances a rare exposition of a more systematic Orthodox treatment of the Christian just war tradition. An earlier section of the statement, “Church and Nation”, alludes to cases in which national saints and churchmen have blessed defensive wars against invaders, including St Filaret of Moscow’s declaration that defenders of the faith and fatherland will gain heavenly life and crowns.

The section on the Orthodox teaching of “War and Peace” begins with an explicit restatement of the traditional Orthodox view of war as unconditionally evil, caused by fratricidal hatred and human abuse of God-given freedom. But then the statement identifies the cases in which war, although evil and undesirable, is necessary: national self-defence, defence of neighbours and “restoration of trampled justice” (a near-secular for-
mulation that could easily provide rather wide-ranging options for the justification of warfare). To justify the resort to war in these instances, the statement reproduces the whole episode from the *Vita* of St Constantine-Cyril the Philosopher (as quoted above) and thus, like the “Apostle of the Slavs” and Patriarch Tikhon in 1918, bases its just war doctrine on John 15:13. This is given as a reason for the high respect of the Church for the Christian virtues of soldiers who follow the precepts of such a just war and rewards them by canonizing them as saints. Matthew 26:52 (“They that take the sword shall perish by the sword”) is also used as a scriptural basis for this just war formulation, asserting that it should be impossible to serve one’s country “by immoral means”. Then the statement makes the important step of reproducing in detail the traditional *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* conditions of the Western Christian just war tradition, as based on St Augustine’s teachings. Significantly, the document tries to redefine some of these conditions, using scriptural references to Sirach 8:8, 1 John 2:16 and Romans 12:21–22 to characterize the Orthodox teachings concerning *jus in bello* norms – a topic that, as already indicated, largely does not receive detailed attention in Eastern Orthodox thinking on justifiable warfare. The document articulates further the Russian Church’s special concern for the Christian education of the military and the tasks of military chaplains. The “War and Peace” section concludes with a lengthy exposition of Eastern Orthodox conceptions of peace and ends by proclaiming the Russian Church’s commitment to peace-making at national and international levels and its dedication to opposing any propaganda of war and violence.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this statement of faith for identifying the currently increasing religious, social and even political roles of the Russian Church in post-Soviet Russia. It has even been proposed that the document could be adopted as a basis for the state’s religious policies. In the 1990s, the Russian Church had been involved in peace-making efforts such as Patriarch Alexei’s forceful Moscow peace appeal during the Russian constitutional crisis in early October 1993 when Russia was on the brink of civil war, or the Russian Church’s initiative to bring together the heads of the religious communities of Azerbaijan and Armenia for peace-rebuilding talks during their military confrontation in the same year. At the same time, the Russian Church’s clearly articulated doctrine of just war must be viewed in the framework of the visibly strengthening relations between the Church and the military and the various manifestations of this process (including some changes in the stances of Russian churchmen towards the war in Chechnya). Finally, given the impact of neo-Slavophilism and/or anti-ecumenical and anti-Catholic discourse and campaigns in certain Russian clerical circles (related to issues such as relations between Orthodox and Uniate
communities in Ukraine), it is certainly significant that the official statement of this doctrine has incorporated Western Christian just war notions in a non-polemical context.

These current reaffirmations and reformulations of Eastern Orthodox stances on warfare have interesting implications for the application of Bainton’s trichotomy of historical Christian attitudes to warfare (pacifism, just war and Crusade) to pre-modern and modern Eastern Orthodoxy. Whereas the third component in Bainton’s trichotomy (Crusade) is largely absent from pre-modern Eastern Orthodox approaches to warfare, the formation of religio-national ideologies in Orthodox Eastern Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has led to the emergence of what can be only defined as elements of “crusading” (or neo-crusading) discourse in some of their versions. Throughout this turbulent period the historically prevalent pacific Eastern Orthodox ecclesiastical stance has remained as influential as ever in higher-ranking Orthodox clerical circles and “normative” Orthodox theology. It has been recently categorically reiterated by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and a number of senior Orthodox ecclesiastics and in statements issued at official Orthodox meetings. At the same time, the Russian Church has attempted to systematize a new version of the Orthodox just war tradition (including scripture-based reformulations of jus in bello norms), which previously had been articulated in a fragmentary and inconsistent way.

There is little doubt that the successive military conflicts since the 1990s, both in the former Yugoslavia and in the Near East, have compelled Orthodox hierarchs and synods as well as Orthodox theologians and Church historians to address more systematically the theological and moral problems related to the justifiability and desirability of modern warfare – both within the Orthodox tradition and in Christianity in general. The religio-historical model proposed in 2003 by Alexander Webster symptomatically aims to revise the traditional thesis of a historical predominance of pacific and pacifistic attitudes in Eastern Orthodoxy. Webster’s alternative model instead reconstructs an unbroken and coherent Eastern Orthodox justifiable war tradition from the patristic period onwards, recognizing war as a “lesser good” rather than a necessary evil and adhering to a “teleology of justice”. Webster’s reconstruction also includes the presumption that the prevalence of pacific attitudes and the rejection of just war thinking in modern Eastern Orthodoxy represent misconceptions arising from ecumenical and theological contacts with some trends in Catholic and Protestant religious thought in modern times as well as the emergence of an Orthodox diaspora in the Western world. Webster’s model and claims have met strong opposition and counter-arguments that the proposed reconstructions impose on Orthodox history and thought a just war conceptual framework similar to that
of Thomas Aquinas and ignore some crucial *jus in bello* issues related to the modern means of warfare. The theory of the continuous existence of a justifiable war tradition in Eastern Orthodoxy, in which it is viewed as a moral good rather than a necessary evil, thus came to be seen by its critics as an attempt at a revision and modernization of Orthodox views on war and peace through the application of scholastic logic and a Thomistic conception of justice. The resultant symbiosis of Eastern and Western Christian concepts of war and justice can indeed be defined as a theological effort to initiate the conceptualization of an Orthodox just war theory adapted for modernity and its challenges. Perhaps it is significant that, after he more or less established the foundation for such a novel “Westernized” Orthodox just war theory, Alexander Webster co-authored a book intended to “reclaim” and harmonize the classic Eastern and Western traditions on war-making in view of the perceived need to justify an impending joint Eastern and Western Christian military response to militant Islam’s increasing threat to Western civilization.

At the same time, the traditional and widely held view that the quintessentially pacific teachings of Orthodoxy preclude the formulation of just war doctrines continues to be strongly reaffirmed not only by leading Orthodox ecclesiastics but also by Orthodox theologians, individually and as group statements. In a public statement in 1991 in relation to the first Gulf War, the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Orthodox Church in America declared that just war theory does not reflect the Orthodox theological tradition, which maintains that war can never be theologically justified. Accordingly, questions have again been asked about whether Western Christian-style just war systems can really be appropriate for Orthodoxy and whether Orthodox theological and ethical thought should try “to bridge pacifism and just war theory through a re-conception of justice and peace-making”.

Modern Orthodox thought can certainly draw on a rich heritage of theological and ethical thought to stimulate such reconceptions. Meanwhile, the evolving debates on the coexistence of pacific and justifiable war trajectories in Orthodoxy can be only of great help to ecumenical and inter-Orthodox contacts and dialogue. It has been suggested that studying classical Eastern Orthodox and Byzantine views on war and peace could make it possible to consider the increasingly vital issues of war and peace through a “Byzantine” perspective – which remains little known in the Western Christian tradition but still furnishes sufficient “points of common reference” and may offer promising new directions. Such studies and debates have become all the more needed given the current fundamentalization of mainstream Christian and Islamic traditions, with the resulting changes in their attitudes to the resort to violence and means of warfare. In this context, the study of the historical experience of
the four ancient Eastern patriarchates of Orthodoxy, with their enduring
tradition of inter-confessional dialogue and their search for a *modus
vivendi* with Islam, as well as their non-alignment with national causes,
may also provide some valuable new insights.

It is evident that further investigation and publication of the sources of
patristic, medieval and modern Eastern Orthodox traditions on the use of
force are certainly very much needed; some of these traditions have been
greatly neglected to the detriment of the better understanding of the di-
versity of Christian attitudes to war- and peace-making. Such studies not
only will enrich our knowledge of the historical transformation of stances
towards war and peace in the monotheistic traditions on the whole but
will have contemporary relevance in the quest for current religious an-
swers to some vital problems in the ethics of war, ranging from the rise
and misuse of aggressive religio-national ideologies to the legitimization
of humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive war, as well as the impact
of military conflicts and nuclear weapons on the environment.

Notes

1. An issue of *St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly* (47(1), 2003) was entirely devoted to
these debates.

2. See, for example, the brief and cautious overview of this field in Timothy S. Miller, "Intro-

3. On the attitudes of the early Christian Fathers to participation in warfare and military
service, see the sources translated in Louis J. Swift, *Early Fathers on War and Military Service (Message of the Fathers of the Church)*. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1883.
For studies of the problems raised by these attitudes, see A. Harnack, *Militia Christi: Die christliche Religion und der Soldatenstand in der ersten drei Jahrhunderten*. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1905; Cecil John Cadoux, *The Early Christian Atti-


5. Greek text in Ralles and Potles, *Syntagma Ton Theion kai Ieron Kanonon*, vol. 4, p. 69.

6. See, for example, Stanley S. Harakas, “The Teaching of Peace in the Fathers”, in Stan-
7. This interpretation is still supported by the majority of scholars investigating Eastern Orthodox approaches to warfare; see, for example, Alexander F. C. Webster, “Justifiable War as a ‘Lesser Good’ in Eastern Orthodox Moral Tradition”, St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 47(1), 2003: 3–59, pp. 25–27; Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, p. 26.
8. See the texts of some of the relevant canons in Swift, Early Fathers on War and Military Service, pp. 88, 92–93.
10. Greek text of the Zonaras and Balsamon commentaries in Ralles and Potles, Syntagma Ton Theion kai Ieron Kanonon, vol. 4, pp. 132–133.
11. See the account of the emperor’s request and the clerical hierarchy’s reaction in John Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, ed. Hans Thurn. New York and Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1973, pp. 273–275. This opposition between the emperor and the patriarch concerning the sanctification of soldiers fallen in battle was one of the high points of their power struggles during Nikephoros Phokas’ reign.
14. See the accounts of the synod’s decisions by Balsamon and Matthew Blastares in Ralles and Potles, Syntagma Ton Theion kai Ieron Kanonon, respectively, vol. 4, p. 133, and vol. 6, p. 492.


29. See, for example, Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, chs 1–3.


37. See Vári (ed.), *Leonis Imperatoris tactica*.
39. On the coexistence in military treatises (and Byzantine political military ideology in general) of Byzantine philanthropic notions with the strategic and practical concerns of an empire that was intermittently on the defensive on one or more fronts, see Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World*, pp. 26 ff.
40. See the arguments for the existence of such a tradition in Webster, “Justifiable War as a ‘Lesser Good’”, and the negative responses to his case published in *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, 47(1), 2003: 59–65, 77–111.
41. On these episodes during the siege of Constantinople and the quoted homily of Theodore Synkellos, see Averil Cameron, “Images of Authority: Elites and Icons in Late Sixth-Century Byzantium”, *Past and Present*, 84, 1979: 3–35, pp. 20–21.
42. On the religio-political circumstances of St Constantine’s mission to the Abbasid court and their possible impact on his “just war” statement, see Goodin, “Just War Theory and Eastern Orthodox Christianity”.
45. See the brief analysis of the implications of these continuities and discontinuities in Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World*, pp. 32–33.
48. On the need to integrate the study of the nation-building and ethnic self-determination processes in the Byzantine Commonwealth into modern mainstream attitudes to and narrative of European identities as well as the reasons for the general absence of Byzantium and the Byzantine Commonwealth from the predominantly “Eurocentric” reconstructions of the formation of Europe in European historiography, see Averil Cameron, *The Byzantines*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 163–179. This neglect of the nation-formation processes in Orthodox Eastern Europe is all the more puzzling since, as stated by Timothy Ware in his standard book on Orthodoxy, “Nationalism has been the bane of the Orthodox Church in the last ten centuries” (*The Orthodox Church*, London and New York, 1963, reprinted 1997, p. 77). It is worth noting in this context that, in the fourteenth century, the capital of the second Bulgarian empire, Túrnovo, came to claim for a time the imperial status and title of “New Constantinople”; for arguments that this notion of *translatio imperii* reached Russia through Bulgaria and not directly from Byzantium, see, for example, Baron Meyendorff and Norman H. Baynes, “The Byzantine Inheritance in Russia”, in Norman H. Baynes and H. St. L. B. Moss (eds) *Byzantium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. 369–392.
50. Catherine the Great’s regard for Islam is well attested and her policies towards the Muslim subjects of the Russian empire were far more benevolent than those of her predecessors; her reign witnessed the beginning of the little-explored process of integration of the Islamic communities in the Orthodox Russian empire. On this process and its long-term implications, see the ground-breaking work of Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar. Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.


66. In his declaration, Patriarch Gavriló offered his passionate support to the bold military coup d'état against Prince Paul, the regent of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, on account of his agreement to join the Axis powers’ Tripartite Pact. Patriarch Gavriló categorically proclaimed that all Serbian historical achievements had been won only and entirely “by the sword” – “in a sea of spilled blood” – and, without such war endeavours and their countless victims, no victory is possible – as no resurrection is possible without death. See the text of his declaration in “U čemu je znacˇaj 27. marta”, in Patriarch Gavriló, *Memoari patrijarha srpskog Gavrila*. Beograd: Sfario, 1970, p. 270; English translation of the relevant paragraph in Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia*, p. 17.


68. English translations of relevant paragraphs from Patriarch Tikhon’s pastoral letters, etc., are available in Bos and Forest (eds), *For the Peace from Above*, Ch. 5, online at [http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-5](http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-5) (accessed 14 October 2008).


73. Regionally, such initiatives included two meetings with senior Croat Catholic clerics during the war in Croatia in 1991 (which resulted in general appeals for peace); an official appeal for peace and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 (made jointly with the Catholic episcopate and the Islamic religious community); the peace “message” made during the Serbian Orthodox bishops’ extraordinary meeting in Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in November 1994 (in Bos and Forest, eds, *For the Peace from Above*, Ch. 9, available online at <http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-9>); participation in various peace-making inter-faith programmes in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina; involvement in the postwar Serbian governmental Commission for Truth and Reconciliation; and Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle’s overtures to Croat and Muslim communities and clerics from 1999 onwards. Internationally, such initiatives and pronouncements have included the statement of Patriarch Pavle to the World Council of Churches Central Committee meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, 20 January 1994 (in Bos and Forest, eds, *For the Peace from Above*, Ch. 9, available online at <http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-9>); and the involvement of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Vienna Declaration of 1999 on peace and tolerance in Kosovo (in Bos and Forest, eds, *For the Peace from Above*, Ch. 9, available online at <http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-9>). The Serbian Orthodox Church also integrated into the litanies at Vespers, Matins and the Divine Liturgy prayers for peace and protection against hostile persecution of and violent attacks on its Orthodox flock (English translation of the prayers in Bos and Forest, eds, *For the Peace from Above*, Ch. 7, available online at <http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-7>).

74. For quotes from and references to some relevant statements and writings of senior clerics such as Metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic, Archimandrite Bishop Atanasije Jevtic and Bishop Filaret of Mileseva, see, for example, Radić, “Crkva i srpsko pitanje”; passim; Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia*, pp. 5, 22–23, 121–122; Duijzings, *Religion and Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, pp. 180, 196–198; Tomanić, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, pp. 126–128, 135–140, 146–149, 186–191 and passim; Perica, *Balkan Idols*, pp. 143--

75. See, for example, Perica, Balkan Idols, pp. 158–162; Vukomanović, O čemu crkva (ne) može da se pita, passim; Tomanić, Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj, pp. 226–228.


79. In the 1980s, the Ecumenical patriarchate had organized a series of meetings and events at its Orthodox Centre in Chambeșy, Geneva, with topics including the need for Christian–Muslim dialogue and the modern relevance of Orthodox teachings of peace. In the 1990s, the Ecumenical patriarchate repeatedly referred to its earlier condemnation of ecclesiastical nationalism/racism (or “ethnophyletism”) during the Local Synod convened in 1872 in Constantinople to deal with the question of the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate, approved by the Ottoman authorities in 1870. See, for example, the address of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to the Conference on Peace and Tolerance convened at Istanbul, Turkey, in February 1994 (with a number of references to the implications of nationalism and its religious variants in Eastern Europe), available at <http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/peace-and-tolerance> (accessed 14 October 2008). The Bosphorus Declaration issued by this conference (available at <http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-9>, accessed 14 October 2008) condemned the exploitation of religious symbols by aggressive nationalism in former Yugoslavia; it also reaffirmed the Berne Declaration of 26 November 1992, stating that “a crime committed in the name of religion is a crime against religion”. More recent statements on peace-making and religious bridge-building issued by the Ecumenical patriarch since the conference in 1994 are available at <http://www.ocupatriarchate.org/making_peace/?index=9> (accessed 14 October 2008).


83. The “Declaration of the Syndesmos War and Peace in Europe Seminar”, which was hosted by the Metropolis of Kydonia and Apokoronos, Chania, Crete, in October 1994, is available at <http://incommunion.org/articles/resources/for-the-peace-from-above/chapter-9> (accessed 14 October 2008).